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ABSTRACT 
 
Software of the Oppressed: Reprogramming the Invisible Discipline 
 
 
Advisor: Matthew K. Gold 
 
Software of the Oppressed is a critical analysis of software practices within the university 
and the ways they contribute to a broader status quo of software use, development, and 
imagination. Through analyzing the history of software practices used in the production and 
circulation of student and scholarly writing, I argue that this overarching software status quo has 
oppressive qualities in that it supports the production of passive users, or users who are unable to 
collectively understand and transform software code for their own interests. I also argue that the 
university inadvertently normalizes and strengthens the software status quo through what I call 
its “invisible discipline,” or the conditioning of its community—particularly students, but also 
faculty, librarians, staff, and other university members—to have little expectation of being able 
to participate in the governance or development of the software used in their academic settings. 
This invisible discipline not only fails to prepare students for the political struggles and practical 
needs of our digital age (while increasing the social divide between those who program digital 
technology and those who must passively accept it), but reinforces a lack of awareness of how 
digital technology powerfully mediates the production, circulation, and reception of knowledge 
at individual and collective levels. Through this analysis, I hope to show what a liberatory 
approach to academic technology practices might look like, as well as demonstrate—through a 
variety of alternative software practices in and beyond the university—the intellectual, political, 
and social contributions these practices might contribute to higher education and scholarly 
knowledge production at large. I conclude the dissertation with suggestions for “reprogramming” 
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our academic technology practices, an approach that I also explored in practice in the production 
of this dissertation. As I describe in the Afterword, the genesis of this dissertation, as well as the 
production, revision, and dissemination of its drafts, were generated as part of two digital 
projects, Social Paper and #SocialDiss, each of which attempted in their own small way to resist 
the invisible discipline and the ways that conventional academic technology practices structure 
intellectual work. The goal of this dissertation and its related digital projects is thus to help shine 
light on the exciting intellectual and political potential of democratizing software development 
and governance in and through educational institutions.  
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Introduction  
 
 
Sleepwalking into surveillance capitalism, which is evolving into data and computation 
driven authoritarianism, one cool service at a time. 
— Zeynep Tufekci (@zeynep) April 26, 2017 
0.1. The rise of digital oppression 
This dissertation is a critical analysis of software practices within the university and the 
ways they contribute to a broader status quo of software use, development, and imagination. I 
argue that this overarching software status quo has oppressive qualities in that it supports the 
production of passive users, or users who are unable to collectively understand and transform 
software code for their own interests. I also argue that the university inadvertently normalizes 
and strengthens the software status quo through what I call its “invisible discipline,” or the 
conditioning of its community—particularly students, but also faculty, librarians, staff, and other 
university members—to have little expectation of being able to participate in the governance or 
development of the software used in their academic settings. This invisible discipline not only 
fails to prepare students for the political struggles and practical needs of our digital age (while 
increasing the social divide between those who program digital technology and those who must 
passively accept it), but reinforces a lack of awareness of how digital technology powerfully 
mediates the production, circulation, and reception of knowledge at individual and collective 
levels. Through this analysis, I hope to show what a liberatory approach to academic technology 
practices might look like, as well as demonstrate—through a variety of alternative software 
practices in and beyond the university—the intellectual, political, and social contributions these 
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practices might contribute to higher education and scholarly knowledge production at large. I 
conclude the dissertation with suggestions for “reprogramming” our academic technology 
practices, an approach that I also explored in practice in the production of this dissertation. As I 
describe in the Afterword, the genesis of this dissertation, as well as the production, revision, and 
dissemination of its drafts, were generated as part of two digital projects, Social Paper and 
#SocialDiss, each of which attempted in their own small way to resist the invisible discipline and 
the ways that conventional academic technology practices structure intellectual work. The goal 
of this dissertation and its related digital projects is thus to help shine light on the exciting 
intellectual and political potential of democratizing software development and governance in and 
through educational institutions.  
When I began this dissertation several years ago, my description of software as 
“oppressive” may have seemed excessively grim if not intellectually irresponsible. As a concept, 
oppression is often associated with forms of control that are far more visibly violent, degrading, 
and coercive than any type of control or manipulation carried out on users by software. Using 
software, after all, whether in the form of email, a social media platform, a search engine, or a 
word processor, is not physically enforced upon individuals in the same way that racism, sexism, 
and classism are imposed on individuals without any choice on their part. However, in the past 
several years, public discourse has become increasingly critical of “Big Tech,” recognizing that 
digital technologies do in fact impose profound threats to democratic freedom and individual 
rights in ways that might be described as digital forms of oppression. This growing public 
disapproval has in part been galvanized by a string of highly-publicized digital scandals, such as 
Edward Snowden’s revelations of the global surveillance program in 2013 (Lyon 2014), the fake 
news controversy of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election (Shane 2017), and the Facebook–
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Cambridge Analytica data scandal reported on in 2018. Scholars have also called attention to 
numerous other ways that digital tools enact forms of racial, political, sexist, and economic 
oppression that, in many cases, are unavoidable by the individuals subjected to them. For 
example, Rebecca Mackinnon (2012), Jose van Dijck (2014, 2013), Marjorie Heins (2013), 
Christian Fuchs (2013), Zeynep Tufekci (2017) and David Lyon (2014) have demonstrated how 
digital technologies and platforms enable corporate and state actors to surveil or censor users and 
shutdown services to control political unrest. Terra Tiziana (2000), Trebor Scholz (2016), and 
Fuchs (2014) argue that many popular digital technologies, such as Facebook or Twitter, exploit 
the labor of their users. John Cheney-Lippold (2011), Lawrence Lessig (1999), and Alexander 
Galloway (2006), have shown that these tools also manipulate or control user behavior. In 
addition, Tarleton Gillespie (2014) has shown they algorithmically control the circulation of 
information, Jean Burgess (2015) has argued that they inadequately suppress abusive activity, 
Safiya Noble (2018) has shown that they are are often racially biased, and Virginia Eubanks has 
argued that they reinforce economic inequality (2018). These criticisms are underscored by 
broader digital technology activist movements, in which organizations such as The Free 
Software Foundation, The Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Internet Defense League, Fight 
for the Future, Platform Coop, and Unlike Us, as well as independent activists, have advocated 
for more just forms of software, and developed free and open source alternatives such as the 
GNU/Linux operating system (in development since 1984), and more recent projects such as the 
anonymous browser Tor and the social networks GNU Social and Mastodon. Tech workers 
themselves have joined the choir of criticism, starting grassroots organizations like Tech 
Workers Coalition, CoWorker.org, Tech Solidarity, Silicon Valley and Rising, to campaign 
against tech companies’ policies, labor practices, and government contracts that they see as 
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unjust (Banks 2018). The European Union, which was once largely friendly to big tech, is now 
carrying out extensive measures to limit its powers (Singer 2018). In the U.S., major leaders of 
the tech industry, including Facebook C.E.O. Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook C.O.O. Sherly 
Sandberg, and Twitter C.E.O. Jack Dorsey have been brought to testify before Congress about 
whether their companies can be trusted to use their power responsibly. Even present and former 
executives of tech companies, such as Apple’s CEO Tim Cook and Facebook’s former vice-
president of user growth Chamath Palihapitiya, have publicly decried the negative social effects 
of some of these digital technologies (Wong 2017; Morris 2018). Whereas only a few years ago 
the concept of “oppression” may have been seen as too extreme to describe the influence of 
digital technology on everyday life, today it is almost cliche. 
 My understanding of digital oppression, however—which I reframe below as “cyborg 
oppression”—draws on a specific definition offered by Paulo Freire, the Brazilian educator 
known for his pioneering work in critical pedagogy, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. For Freire, 
oppression is the systematic suppression of the right for individuals to collectively understand 
and transform the world (44-45). Ironically, this systematic suppression of understanding often 
occurs in institutionalized forms of education, where students learn to passively accept the 
intellectual and ideological views of their oppressors rather than to think for themselves. 
Overcoming oppression, however, is also a process of education in which individuals reclaim 
their ability to understand and transform the world according their own needs and interests. For 
me, understanding oppression and liberation as types of educational processes has been key to 
thinking through political issues related to digital technology and the possibility of emancipatory 
action. How might we begin to understand, I wondered at the beginning of this project, the 
software of the oppressed—both the software that represents oppression today, and the type of 
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software and software practices that the oppressed might adopt to overcome this oppression? 
How might we think of software as pedagogical in and of itself, with oppressive forms of 
software “teaching” users to accept a certain power dynamic as natural and inevitable? Would it 
be possible to imagine a liberatory form of software and software practice that instead “teaches” 
users to critically understand the way software mediates their world and invite them to help 
direct that mediation? And finally, in what ways do institutions of education, through their 
culture of software use, unwittingly reinforce software oppression, and how might they instead 
support software liberation?  
 Certainly, new laws and regulations (such as called for by Zeynep Tufekci [2018], 
Michael Boskin [2018], and many others) will be necessary to protect and advance democratic 
freedom against the exploitative direction many digital technologies have taken, but laws and 
regulations are not enough on their own. What we need most of all are citizens (not simply 
technology experts) who are able to critically understand these issues, and based on that 
understanding, able to modify technical, legal, economic, and social practices in ways that ensure 
that technology serves rather than opposes democratic interests. A long term solution to digital 
oppression, thus, must emphasize the role of education in cultivating the understanding and skills 
necessary for the diverse tactics required for working towards digital liberation. And this 
education should not simply “teach” students critical viewpoints on digital technology, but also, 
as Chris Gilliard (2017) argues, “enact” liberatory forms of software practice within the 
classroom. As Kenneth Bruffee observes, “We tend to forget much of the subject matter of the 
courses we have taken … but we do not easily forget the conventions that govern those courses 
and the values implicit in them” (63). The software conventions that we adopt in education may 
be more powerful than the ideas about software that we teach. 
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 Surprisingly, however, despite its importance to the struggle against digital oppression, 
education has received relatively little attention. We denounce the exploitative and unethical 
tactics of software companies while continuing to use software that violates user privacy and 
user freedom, such as Google Docs, Blackboard, and Facebook, in academic practices like 
teaching, professional networking, and collaboration. Though the challenges of transforming 
academic software practices are complex, they are also, in my opinion, at the heart of the 
struggle for digital liberation. The university is, in many different and sometimes surprising 
ways, a key site of reproducing the power that digital companies wield over lives, and any 
earnest attempt to transform the digital status quo must consider how this transformation will be 
supported through education. Just as Freire asserted that education is never neutral and always 
imposes an ideological view of the world on students, so must we recognize that software used 
within educational practices also teaches our students ideological views of what interests 
software serves and who has the rights to make those decisions. The goal of dissertation, thus, is 
to underscore the exciting and often overlooked potential of the university for bringing about a 
more just and equitable digital future.  
0.2. The Cyborg University 
While setting out to analyze the use and adoption of digital technology within the 
university, I struggled to find a concept that adequately conveyed the pervasive and profound 
influence that digital technology has across all areas of academic practice and its relationship to 
the political issues described above. Often our language for discussing technical innovation in 
the university pertains to discrete areas of academic practice, which while useful for discussing 
some aspects of technological change, does not help us attend to the fact that digital technologies 
permeate nearly every activity of the university, and in many cases, have done so for decades. 
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For example, terms that have emerged or gained increased popularity in the past fifteen years, 
such as “the digital humanities,” “digital scholarship,” “digital pedagogy,” “digital learning,” “e-
learning,” “e-scholarship,” “digital rhetoric,” and “networked participatory scholarship,” are 
used to convey the way these practices have changed through novel uses of digital technology, 
even though traditional forms of these practices often—if not always—rely on some form of 
digital technology, such as the word processor or digitally managed library catalogues. And, 
while these terms can be helpful in generating critical discourse around technological 
transformation in these sites of academic practice, they do not direct our attention to the software 
politics of these transformations, or rather, who gets to make decisions about the design and use 
of software in these areas of practice, and what complex (and often concealed) interests are often 
at play in those decisions. In this way, even terms that help us consider the broad influence of 
technology on the university as a whole, such as the “virtual university” (Robins & Webster 
2002), the “digital university” (Hazemi et al. 2012), or the “tower and the cloud,” as Richard N. 
Katz (2010) describes the university in the age of cloud computing, do not, on their own, 
emphasize the political processes inherent in this technological influence.  
While some might consider a specific word for the politics of technological change in the 
university as unnecessary, my experience working in various academic sites of technological 
practice has convinced me that the current language for discussing academic technology makes it 
all too easy to ignore or dismiss the political dimension of digital technology when implementing 
it in courses, degree programs, campus infrastructure, and other academic projects. As a digital 
fellow as The CUNY Graduate Center and later as the Digital Humanities Coordinator at UC San 
Diego, I participated in numerous projects and discussions revolving around academic 
technological practice where I longed for a word that might more effectively enforce attention to 
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these issues in the same way that the concept of “diversity” has helped demand that the 
university provide more support for inclusion in its varying activities. And at the same time, I 
also wanted a word that showed that digital politics weren’t only relevant to those who took 
professional or academic interest in digital technology but in fact affected every member of the 
university.  
It wasn’t until after I finished the first draft of my dissertation that I began to think about 
the way Donna Haraway’s figure of the cyborg might in fact be helpful for politicizing 
technological practice in the academy. I came to this idea while rereading Samir Chopra and 
Scott Dexter’s Decoding Liberation: The Promise of Free and Open Source Software, a book 
that strongly influenced my thinking in the dissertation. In their text,  they use Haraway’s figure 
of the cyborg to call attention to the way software, and thus its politics, is deeply embedded in 
nearly all facets of our lives (149). I found this use of the cyborg figure immediately applicable 
for my work in that it could help reconnect the way “digital” and “traditional” forms of academic 
practice are often discussed as if in opposition. Like Haraway’s cyborg, which she defines as “a 
hybrid of machine and organism” (149), the university, too, could be considered as a type of 
cyborg in that nearly all of its essential activities—such as the production of student writing and 
faculty research, the administration of payroll, and library circulation—are in some way 
mediated by software. And just as Haraway insists that no life is exempt from this cyborg status 
given the deep influence of science and technology (150), so might the idea of a “cyborg 
university” help convey that no member of the university, not even the self-described “Luddites” 
nor “technophobes,” are outside of the mediating influence of university technology. However, 
when I returned to Hawaray’s “Cyborg Manifesto” with my project in mind, I was struck by how 
many more ways her figure of the cyborg could help provide a framework for the political, 
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historical, and social dimensions of academic technological practice that I had been trying to 
articulate in the first draft of the dissertation. For example, her figure of the cyborg (in contrast to 
the original use of the term put forth by scientists Manfred Clynes and Nathan S. Kline in 1960 
[27]), immediately calls attention to the political situatedness of technology, one that she 
explicitly describes as an oppressive global political situation of “militarism and patriarchal 
capitalism” (151). The cyborg’s role in this political situation is complex. Given its militaristic 
origins, the cyborg is “without innocence” (151). Yet at the same time the cyborg is a necessary 
tool for emancipation in that it promises new powerful political forms of social interaction 
through unlikely affinities and coalitions (155).  
I found Haraway’s political understanding of technology extraordinarily useful for 
theorizing the politics of academic technology, and set about revising the dissertation with the 
“cyborg university” as one of its key organizing ideas. At the very least, the concept of the 
“cyborg university” is provocative: it declares straightaway the university’s technological 
situatedness in a global struggle for economic and political domination, in which technology has 
shown itself to be a tool for both oppression and liberation. It rejects any nostalgic notion that 
either the university or any of its techniques (whether digital or analogue) were ever innocent, 
but also at once also rejects the need for innocent origins in its quest for emancipation and 
survival (175). It problematizes simplistic forms of suspicion or rejection of novel forms of 
digital technology and practice expressed by individuals who do not acknowledge or seem to 
realize that their use of word processors, email, databases, search engines, and administrative 
systems also constitutes a form of digital technology. And finally, in its attention to the societal 
forces of technical production and reproduction, the cyborg university helps draw attention to the 
9
  
ways academic institutions themselves reinforce the software status quo by training students to 
passively accept the software they’ve been given.  
Not everyone will agree that the “cyborg university” is a helpful concept, or that the 
figure of the cyborg more generally is useful for conveying the political dimensions of software 
in the 21st century as I have done in this dissertation. While circulating these drafts for review as 
part of the #SocialPaper project, I received gentle pushback from several individuals regarding 
my adoption of the cyborg, along with suggestions that my arguments could be made just as 
forcefully, and perhaps with less baggage, without it. One of these critics was Scott Dexter, the 
co-author of the book that had drawn my attention to the usefulness of the figure of the cyborg 
for my project in the first place. In many respects, I sympathize with the critical feedback I 
received from Dexter and others about the usefulness of the figure of the cyborg. Haraway’s 
Manifesto is, after all, more than thirty years old, and has received ample criticism for a variety 
of issues, such as its lack of attention to race and ability as I discuss in Chapter 2. Additionally, 
given its late inclusion in the dissertation project, I was not able to incorporate the concept of the 
“cyborg university” throughout my arguments as smoothly as I might have had I begun the 
project with the concept already in hand. Nor, am I afraid, has the “cyborg university” become 
my longed for “go to” word for inspiring software activism in the minds of faculty, 
administrators, librarians, and IT personnel — I can only imagine the looks I would get if I used 
the term in one of our meetings! Nonetheless, despite some of these shortcomings, I stand by the 
value of the “cyborg university” for sharpening the critical claims of the dissertation and for 
thinking about university technology more generally, which I argue in great detail, perhaps to the 
point of tedium, in Chapter 2. I have also been encouraged to see the renewed (though modified) 
relevance of the figure of the cyborg in la paperson’s concept of the “scyborg,” a complicated 
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and paradoxical figure of the university, described as “ a reorganizer of institutional machinery” 
that “subverts machinery against the master code of its makers” and “rewires machinery to its 
own intentions.” Whether or not I decide to explicitly use the concept of the “cyborg university” 
in future work, it has been invaluable for the development of my thinking about academic 
technology and will likely continue to inform, even if quietly, my research and practice in this 
area. 
0.3. Summary of what follows 
The dissertation is organized into two parts, comprising five chapters. It also includes an 
Afterword, which describes the digital projects Social Paper and #SocialDiss that helped shape 
the dissertation, and an Appendix that offers a few representative artifacts from the #SocialDiss 
projects.  
Part I of the dissertation presents the overarching analytical framework of what I call the 
“cyborg world,” which is governed by what I call the “software status quo.” In chapter 1, 
“Alienated Intelligence: The Private Interests of the ‘Global Brain,’” I argue that ideological 
views regarding computer intelligence have left us unprepared to account for the ways computer 
intelligence has helped enable what Shoshana Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism,” a form of 
capital accumulation where personal data is collected to “predict and modify human behavior as 
a means to produce revenue and market control” (2015, 75). Here I show how various concepts 
of collective intelligence, or what Francis Heylighen has described as metaphors pertaining to the 
“global brain,” have been used to assert computing technology as politically neutral and 
objectively good. I then draw on media theorists Shoshana Zuboff, Jose van Dijck, Tiziana 
Terranova, and others to describe how our current model of the “global brain” is economically 
sustained through “dataveillance” or surveillance of users for corporate profit. I explore how this 
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model of dataveillance deeply “alienates” the “global brain,”—or the intelligence generated by 
user activity—from the vast majority of the users themselves, insofar as this collective 
intelligence is instrumentalized for the private interest of corporations and their shareholders, 
rather than the user or the public. I argue that optimistic claims about computer intelligence need 
to be reevaluated to account for the the concerning implications of dataveillance. Though I do 
not discuss software in particular in these arguments, the purpose of this chapter is to develop an 
understanding of the political and intellectual stakes of computational intelligence before 
analyzing in the following chapter the role that software plays in its alienation.  
In Chapter 2, “Software of the Oppressed: The Crisis of the Cyborg World,” I begin to 
spell out more concretely the concept of “cyborg oppression” as a useful way to think through 
how issues pertaining to freedom and oppression are at play in our use, development, and 
exposure to software, given the deeply alienating social-economic practices of the software 
status quo that I brought to light in Chapter 1. Drawing on the work of the science and 
technology scholar Donna Haraway and the educational philosopher Paulo Freire, I define 
cyborg oppression as a condition in which the technological, social, political, and economic 
forces that constitute the everyday existence of individuals actually work to deny the everyday 
user from collectively understanding, and thus being able to transform, their digitally-mediated 
world. While there are many forces at play in the production of “cyborg oppression,” I focus 
primarily on the role of software as a key mechanism in its facilitation, as well as an artifact 
whose design expresses the values and interests of cyborg oppressors. I then show how my 
notion of cyborg oppression not only enables us to lucidly detect oppressive features within 
everyday digital technologies, but also offers a novel and promising framework for working 
towards cyborg liberation.  
12
  
Part II of the dissertation explores how the university is itself woven into the cyborg 
world and explores its potential for “reprogramming” the software status quo for a more just and 
equitable digital future. In Chapter 3, “The Cyborg University and Its Invisible Discipline,” I 
turn from the general oppression instituted by the software status quo to the way this oppression 
is manifest in the university in particular. Here I argue that the university is a site that plays a 
critical but often overlooked role in the initial production, development, and dissemination of 
those technologies which ultimately become dominant in everyday digital practice beyond the 
university itself. I begin this chapter by describing how blending cyborg studies with critical 
pedagogy and critical university studies—to forge the core analytical concept of the ‘cyborg 
university’—offers a promising way to begin connecting the use and implementation of 
information technologies within the university to broader technopolitical issues. I then provide a 
brief historical overview of the underappreciated fact that the university originally played an 
important collaborative role in the development of its own digital technologies: since the 1960s, 
different organizational areas were creatively adopting or outright developing digital technology 
for their own purposes, such as teaching, word processing, library collections, and so forth. Yet 
while many of these endeavors represented highly-imaginative and impressive adoptions of 
digital technology for educational and research purposes, I go on to show that very few of these 
institution-internal efforts were undertaken with an eye to specifically enabling their users to 
individually or collectively participate in this development. I argue, therefore, that the omission 
of social and technical mechanisms that would enable this sort of more widespread user 
participation constitutes an “invisible discipline” of the university upon its software users, 
insofar as it teaches the majority of users to passively accept the software that mediates their 
university and everyday activities as unchangeable and possibly even neutral. I then turn to the 
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more direct forms of discipline that the university helps enable. As Chris Gilliard notes, many of 
the most pernicious practices of capitalist digital media—such as surveillance, information 
asymmetry, and digital redlining—are replicated in educational institutions “in the name of 
‘efficiency,’ ‘engagement,’ or ‘improved outcomes’” (2017). On the other hand, I also begin to 
bring to light the university’s role in giving capitalist digital technology a wider-spread traction 
in the first place. Here I develop Ira Shor’s insight that “schooling is a device through which a 
corporate society reproduces its class-based order” (2) as I argue that the university’s invisible 
discipline itself ultimately comes to play an important role in reproducing a class-based user 
order, in which only corporations and administrative entities are granted the right to understand 
and modify the profound and multidimensional influence digital technology wields upon 
everyday users.  
In Chapter 4, “Writing in the age of alienated intelligence: The techno-rhetorical situation 
of the cyborg university,” I turn to the use of technology in academic writing and the teaching of 
writing within the university. Here I describe how emerging digital practices have changed what 
Lloyd Bitzer calls the “rhetorical situation” of the university, specifically the context, effects, and 
audience of academic writing. I call this digitally-mediated rhetorical situation a “techno-
rhetorical situation,” and argue that, just as with the intelligence produced within the general 
software status quo, so, too, the “intelligence” produced by academics and students in particular 
(in forms such as digitally written homework assignments, scholarly papers, and other academic 
communications) is deeply alienated from the individual academics themselves, in that this 
intelligence (data) is likewise exploited by corporate entities for the purpose of creating and 
hoarding ‘information capital,’ or valuable data and metadata related to their digital 
communications that can be instrumentalized for corporate intelligence and profit. I begin by 
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looking at the historical development of U.S. writing instruction in higher education in the 20th 
century, in order to trace out the transition from classical models of rhetoric to their current 
manifestation in the cyborg university. Beginning with pedagogies and administrative 
frameworks that were implemented before the adoption of software, I then show how these 
models for rhetoric actually had a strong influence upon the ways in which computer and 
network technologies were initially adopted for writing instruction in the 1980s and onward. I 
then argue, however, that these classical pedagogies and frameworks did not and could not 
anticipate the political complexity and multidimensionality of writing in the current age of 
“alienated intelligence.” Only a more progressive model—one closer to what Berlin calls the 
‘social epistemic’ model of rhetoric, which evaluates knowledge production according to its 
contribution to social and political realities, rather than merely correct, expressive, or useful 
forms of writing—might continue to provide would seem to have an initial theoretical 
perspective that is suitable fit for beginning to comprehend and critique the implications of 
alienating processes on our techno-rhetorical situation. Here I exploit the aspect of the the social 
epistemic model that emphasizes the liberation of student consciousness as its chief aim. 
In Chapter 5,“Dialogic Machines: Reprogramming the Invisible Discipline,” I take up the 
task of developing a more concrete alternative relation to the cyborg university, and ultimately to 
the software status quo more generally. Here I argue that the incorporation of participatory 
design practices into educational and scholarly communication technologies represents an 
important counter model of technological practice. More specifically, I argue that Paulo Freire’s 
concept of “dialogue” can help steer students towards critically engaging and transforming the 
cyborg university, by insisting that the software code, and the powers that motivate it, actually 
disclose or communicate themselves in genuine conversation. I introduce and develop the notion 
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of “dialogic machines,” or communicative acts made of code, speech, or some combination 
thereof, which incorporate within themselves this commitment to openness, self-revelation, and 
transparency. I suggest that the development of software within the university on the model of 
dialogic machines promises to provide us tool for “reprogramming the invisible discipline,” 
insofar as it would essentially incorporate the goal of allowing more users to understand and 
develop the software of the cyborg university. Where large scale, well-funded, socially-
supported dialogic machines are not possible (as is usually the case), dialogic machines may 
simply be individual, modest efforts to help bring that possibility into being.  
More generally, I suggest in my conclusion that this dialogic approach to information 
communication technologies used in educational settings has the rich potential for fostering 
critical technological consciousness in the general student body that will better equip them to 
democratically participate in the pressing technopolitical issues of our time. I further argue that 
this approach is highly-relevant to undergraduate and graduate writing intensive courses as it 
offers opportunities for students to study and modify how software subtly influence their 
intellectual and writing activities. I draw on existing examples of participatory technological 
practices outside of the university to outline several ways they might be applied dialogically 
within educational settings. I also recount my own experience with creating and developing 
Social Paper at The CUNY Graduate Center, a project that was meant to explore these ideas in 
practice. I reflect on some of the challenges and advantages of these projects, and end by 
sketching a series of suggestions for the institutionalization of democratic software development 
within humanistic spheres of the cyborg university.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Alienated intelligence: The private interests of the “Global Brain”  
 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the development of the modern digital computer, intelligence has remained 
one of the central metaphors used to express the foundation and ongoing promise of its 
capabilities. As an idea associated with social progress, democratic participation, scientific 
advancement, creativity, professional success, self-determination, happiness, and personal worth 
(Castles 2012, Privateer 2008, Goodey 2013), intelligence has done much to drive optimistic 
claims abouts the role and possibility of computing technology in our lives. However, as useful 
as the metaphor of intelligence may be for understanding the computer’s capacity, it also 
obscures other equally important processes brought about by its broad diffusion in nearly all of 
our activities. As the rise of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff 2013, 2018) transforms computer 
intelligence into a means of capital accumulation, we need a new framework for understanding 
and evaluating the types of intelligence facilitated, produced, and embodied by computer 
technology. In this chapter, I show how historical ideas of global intelligence, or what Francis 
Heylighen refers to as metaphors of the “global brain,” inform recent optimistic accounts of 
computing technology, particularly those of Yochai Benkler, Henry Jenkins, and Kevin Kelly.  I 
then argue that this global intelligence, produced through the computing technologies of 
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surveillance capitalism, is alienated, given that it is instrumentalized by capitalist media 
companies to “predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market 
control” (Zuboff 2013, 75). I then argue that a new concept of computational intelligence is 
needed to help attend to the significance and processes of alienation. Though I do not discuss 
software in particular in these arguments, the purpose of this chapter is to develop an 
understanding of the political and intellectual stakes of computational intelligence before 
analyzing in the following chapter the role that software plays in its alienation.  
 
1.1 The ideology of intelligence 
The advancement and proliferation of computing technology has been celebrated for 
many different reasons. Central to many of these positive assessments, however, is the 
computer’s ability to augment or embody human intelligence, which, as defined by the Oxford 
English Dictionary as the “capacity to understand,” is foundational not only for intellectual 
pursuits but for nearly all of human activity, whether social, political, creative, or economic. 
Before giving an overview of the different ways intelligence has been used to describe the 
computer’s capacity and mobilize its development and adoption, it would be beneficial to first 
understand what we mean by “intelligence” itself.  
The concept of “intelligence” is often treated as self-evident and universally understood. 
For example, in their 1994 book The Bell Curve, scholars Richard Herrnstein and Charles 
Murray, state that “The [idea of] intelligence is … as universal and ancient as any understanding 
about the state of being human … Gossip about who in the tribe is cleverest has probably been a 
topic of conversation around the fire since fires, and conversation, were invented” (1). In her 
book Inventing Intelligence: How America Came to Worship the IQ, Elaine Castles affirms that 
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intelligence is thought of as an age-old and matter of fact concept. “Most of us assume that we 
know what intelligence is,” she writes, “ … and, we assume, people have always thought this 
way” (36). However, as Castles, and scholars such as Paul Michael Privateer (2008), and C.F. 
Goodey (2013) argue, the concept of intelligence is remarkably malleable, with its present day 
formation and modes of measurement only developed in the second half of the 19th century. 
Privateer calls intelligence a “a historically slippery and ideologically prone metaphor,” 
observing that “the content of the definition itself changes from one era to the next, making it not 
only circular but contingent at each point on historical circumstance” (5). Similarly, Goodey 
argues that “intelligent people … are not natural kinds but historically contingent forms of 
human self-representation and social reciprocity, of relatively recent historical origin” (2). 
Castles agrees that “there is nothing at all “universal and ancient” about the idea of intelligence” 
(2).  
However, while the definition of intelligence has fluctuated from one historical moment 
to the next, it has consistently been held in high regard. As Goodey observes, Western culture 
has for centuries regarded human intelligence as “self-evidently positive, the crowning feature of 
our species” (5). This high regard for intellegience is perhaps so ingrained and widespread that it 
may be difficult today to consider it in a more critical light. As Castles writes of one 
measurement of intelligence, “Many Americans regard IQ as the primary indicator of basic 
personal worth. Individuals with high IQs are perceived as somehow better than other people” 
(3). Her observation echoes others, such as Jerome Kagan’s description of the IQ as “our modern 
substitute for saintliness, religiosity, [and] courage” and Nicholas Lehman’s that the SAT score 
is often taken as “a scientific, numeric assignment of worth which . . . lodge[s] itself firmly in the 
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mind, never to be forgotten” (qtd. in Castles 3). Likewise, Privateer observes that “intelligence 
became and continues to be the most valued human faculty” in Western culture (79).  
There are of course many good reasons, if they need saying at all, for society’s high 
regard for intelligence. The capacity to understand, as we’ve already noted, is foundational to 
many human activities, and multiple forms of innovation and progress are thought to be brought 
about by advanced forms of understanding. It has also been instrumental in many social 
movements that we should look favorably upon. Enlightenment writers in the the 18th century 
began paving the way for women’s rights based on the argument that women—if not equally 
capable of intelligence as men—were at least, under the right conditions, capable of cultivating a 
minimum amount intelligence (106-7). Similarly, as Goodey observes, the “liberation 
movements of black people, gays or women” in the 20th century were advanced through the idea 
that “that human beings are equal and autonomous by virtue of being rational” (4). Intelligence, 
thus, has acted as a quality marking beings as worthy of equal rights and dignified treatment. 
One recent example of this trend is the argument that has circulated in numerous national 
publications in the past several years that octopus “are too smart to be eaten” (Killingsworth 
2014).  
But by the very same token, then, the concept of intelligence can be leveraged to exclude 
or dehumanize individuals who are perceived as not possessing enough of it. As Privateer’s 
social history of intelligence surveys, the concept of intelligence has been used throughout 
history as justification for horrific forms of social, racial, and economic inequality, exclusion, 
and oppression. He observes, “ideas of intelligence have historically helped to produce 
privileged social values and to insure conformance to them. For instance, they have legitimized 
superior intellects and superior kinds of knowledge different from ordinary minds and inferior 
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knowledge” (2). Such superiority, he recounts, has been used to legitimize any number of beliefs, 
policies, and jurisdictions that serve status quo power relations, such as prohibitive immigration 
agendas, the sterilization of “low functioning” individuals, the provision of unequal forms of 
education, and the justification of economic inequality (103). Though there are too many 
examples to provide here, a few should help clarify just how directly the idea of “intelligence’ 
has been used as a tool to justify oppression. In 1919, the psychologist Henry Goddard used 
intelligence as a justification of privilege in assuring his students at Princeton that “that workmen 
have a 10 year intelligence while you have a 20. To demand for him such a home as you enjoy is 
as absurd as it would be to insist that every laborer should receive a graduate fellowship. How 
can there be such a thing as social equality with this wide range of mental capacity?” (qtd. in 
Privateer 11). The same year, Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman argued that individuals with 
insufficient intelligence should be directly monitored by the state, advocating for intelligence 
tests would help “bring tens of thousands of these high-grade defectives under the surveillance 
and protection of society . . . curtailing the reproduction of feeble-mindedness and in elimination 
of an enormous amount of crime, pauperism, and industrial inefficiency” (qtd. in Privateer 12). 
In 1926, the sociologist Clifford Kirkpatrick used intelligence to argue for stricter immigration 
policies, warning his nation that “definite limits are set by heredity, and immigrants of low innate 
ability cannot by any account of Americanization be made into intelligent American citizens 
capable of appropriating and advancing a complex culture” (qtd. in Privateer 206). Even today, 
Privateer argues, intelligence is leveraged as a means of “controlling and privileging certain 
behaviors and values” (16) such as exhibited in the US Office of Education policies that allocate 
more resources for highly intelligent children (193) and the use of IQ in determining whether a 
criminal can be held morally culpable (5). 
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The use of the concept of “intelligence” to uphold or overturn certain social relations is 
testament to its ideological status. As Privateer notes, ideological beliefs “determine the relations 
humans have with certain constructions of reality, their way of perceiving of and complying with 
“reality” (15). Often taken to be a “proven scientific phenomenon,” Privateer argues it functions 
as an “indeterminate metaphor” (1) that is molded to support the interests of power. In our own 
day, for example, Privateer argues that the modern idea of intelligence, “with its emphasis on 
speed and production, and the privileging of reason, mental agility, and methodical accuracy,” is 
directly shaped by the material needs of technocapitalism (8). This conception of intelligence, 
which is reinforced by many common testing practices, may seem relatively natural and “age 
old” to us now. However, its modern character can be readily detected when compared to older 
conceptions of intelligence, such as the belief that intelligence is a spiritual essence as put forth 
by philosophers Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and George Berkeley in the 17th and early 18th 
centuries.  
 Privateer’s analysis echos the arguments of numerous scholars such as Paulo Freire 
(1970), Pierre Bourdieu (1990), and Michel Foucault (1988) that knowledge, education, and 
other intellectual investments that are often considered as politically neutral goods in fact play a 
direct role in the sustaining and reproducing status qup power relations. My goal is not to 
rehearse these arguments here but rather suggest that something similar may be at play in the the 
use of intelligence as a guiding metaphor for understanding the processes and effects of 
computers in our lives. That is to say, America’s naive “worship” of intelligence, to use Elaine 
Castles’ term, has contributed to dominant ideological viewpoints that drive the development, 
adoption, and perception of the computer’s value. When applied to the intelligence of people, 
this worship blinds the “worshiper” to the way intelligence is often used as a justification of 
22
  
oppressive, unjust, racist, sexist, ableist, and classist social structures. When applied to 
computers, this worship creates discursive spaces where computers are valorized for the forms of 
intelligence they help support (such as collective intelligence) or embody (such as an intelligent 
agent) without attention to the social realities that these computers reflect and help reproduce. 
We will shortly discuss those social realities in greater detail, but first we will take a more 
indepth look at the historical development of the idea computational intelligence and its positive 
associations.  
1.2 The computer as intelligent machine 
Today, the metaphor of intelligence is widely apparent in the names of industry and 
disciplinary trends related to computers as well as in discourse about them. For example, the 
World Wide Web, which continues to serve as a backbone technology for networked computers, 
was developed, in the words of its inventors Tim Berners Lee and others, “to be a pool of human 
knowledge.” We use the word “smart” to describe phones with computer technology, which 
today are owned by 77% of the adult U.S. population (“US Smartphone”). The field of artificial 
intelligence, a subfield of computer science delineated in 1955, is now one of the most highly-
invested areas of computational development with revenue expected to grow to $47 billion by 
2025 (Research and Markets). The metaphor of intelligence is apparent in machine learning and 
deep learning, two subfields of artificial intelligence, which boosters and critics alike argue are 
transforming all areas of human activity, such as science, technology, business, politics, and war 
(Domingos 2015, Kumar 2017, Goodfellow 2016). The metaphor is arguably also at play in the 
field of neural network programming, which uses the human brain and nervous system as a 
model for programming computers to carry out complex tasks such as recognizing handwriting, 
searching, and receiving and compressing massive files (Dreyfus 2005). In a nod to the centrality 
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of intelligence in these endeavors, industry specialists have increasingly referred to this stage of 
technological development as an era of “cognitive computing” (Kumar 2017, Kelly III 2013, 
Hurwitz 2015).  
 Like discussions of intelligence at large, many discussions about computer technology 
treat the idea of computational intelligence as self-evidently positive or as a worthy ideal guiding 
continued computational innovation. For example, the mission statement of the MIT Center for 
Collective Intelligence states its purpose is to investigate how “people and computers [might] be 
connected so that collectively they act more intelligently than any person, group, or computer has 
ever done before.” This mission statement, which is representative of many discursive uses of 
computational intelligence as we will see below, uses computational intelligence not only to 
describe an alleged objective quality of computer technology, but as a goal that represents an 
unqualified good, an end in itself. This value construction holds that the more computers connect 
individuals to information, facilitate knowledge production, and intelligently assist in human 
activities, the better. Questions pertaining to what that intelligence achieves, who benefits from 
its processes, and the broader social and environmental effects of its material facilitation are an 
afterthought if discussed at all. This is not to say that boosters of computational intelligence 
ignore social, environmental, and other problems. On the contrary, many argue that new and 
improved forms of computational intelligence will solve such problems, such as John Kelly III’s 
assertion that machine learning will be “necessary” for “[dealing] adequately with the exploding 
complexity of today's world and successfully address interlocking problems like disease and 
poverty and stress on natural systems” (4). However, these claims seem to arise more out of 
booster’s belief in the power, goodness, and general applicability of forms of computer 
intelligence rather than through a genuine understanding of the needs of such problems. 
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Moreover, they represent a self serving technocratic approach to problems that may require 
social rather than technical solutions.  
Another hint at the ideological status of computational intelligence is apparent in the 
continuously shifting nature of its definition. In many of its discursive uses, computational 
intelligence is treated as a universally-recognized, measurable quality that varies only in degree 
not in kind. On closer inspection, however, ideas of computational intelligence can be seen to 
vary according to the precise way the computer is seen as enacting intelligence and the purpose 
that such intelligence serves. One anecdote in particular sheds light on the connection between 
the ambiguity surrounding both intelligence and computational intelligence. Larry Tesler, a 
computer scientist involved in many important advancements in computing technology in the 
second half of the 20th century, is quoted in Douglas Hofstadter's 1979 book Gödel, Escher, 
Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid as saying, “Artificial intelligence is whatever hasn’t been done 
yet” as a means of conveying the lack of objective parameters defining artificial intelligence. 
Pamela McCorduck confirms the subjective nature of artificial intelligence in the history of its 
development, writing “It’s part of the history of the field of artificial intelligence that every time 
somebody figured out how to make a computer do something—play good checkers, solve simple 
but relatively informal problems—there was chorus of critics to say, ‘that’s not thinking’” 
(McCorduck 204). However, in an interesting twist, Tesler argues that he has been misquoted by 
Hofstadter. “What I actually said was: ‘Intelligence is whatever machines haven't done yet.’ 
Many people define humanity partly by our allegedly unique intelligence. Whatever a machine—
or an animal—can do must (those people say) be something other than intelligence” (qtd. In 
Hendler 74-75). As Tesler’s comment suggests, both human intelligence and computational 
25
  
intelligence are concepts whose definitions shift according to the way the speaker needs the 
concept to work with their worldview.  
The perception that computers might embody or assist with rational capacities stretches 
back to the pre-history of the modern digital computer. Though there is not enough space in this 
chapter to provide a thorough account of the many ways intelligence has been discussed in 
relation to computers, we can still construct a general understanding of how the concept of 
computational intelligence has been ideologically mobilized from key moments in the 
computer’s development. In 1833, Ada Lovelace referred to a futuristic calculating device she 
was shown as a “thinking machine” in her diary (Plant 5). Officially named the “Difference 
Engine,” it was invented by Charles Babbage, a mathematician and mechanical engineer, for the 
purpose of calculating arithmetical tables for the British government (Plant 19). Lovelace would 
later collaborate with Babbage to develop a proposal for the the Analytic Machine, which while 
also driven by the same purpose as the Difference Engine, was significantly expanded in scope in 
that it aimed to provide universal computing power for any calculation problem (rather than only 
ones “uniquely specified in advance by the machine’s instructions)” (Babbage qtd. in Plant 20). 
Lovelace recognized that the general purpose affordances of the Analytic Engine could 
potentially transform activities that it had not been specifically designed to support, such as 
scientific inquiry: “In so distributing and combining the truths and the formulae of analysis, that 
they may become more easily and rapidly amenable to the mechanical combinations of the 
engine,” she wrote, “the relations and the nature of many subjects in that science are necessarily 
thrown in new lights, and more profoundly investigated” (qtd in Plant 21). Though the Analytic 
Machine was never realized, it is notable for our study as it is credited as the first general 
computer and served as a reference point in later discussions about computer intelligence, 
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particularly Lovelace’s conception of the limits of the Analytic Engine. In particular, Lovelace, 
who is recognized as the the world’s first programmer (Plant 27), believed that the Analytic 
Engine was simply an extension and support of the programmer’s thinking. Observing this limit, 
she wrote “the Analytical Engine has no pretensions to originate anything. It can [only] do 
whatever we know how to order it to perform” (qtd in Wardrip-Fruin 59 itals mine). For 
Lovelace, machines could assist human intelligence, but they did not represent intelligence in 
and of themselves.  
 In the mid 20th century, however, with the emergence of the modern digital computer, 
computer scientists began to consider the possibility of whether computers might indeed be 
programmed to carry out thinking in their own right rather than simply assisting the thinking of 
the computer users. In a paper delivered in 1950 entitled, “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence,” Alan Turing famously argued that computers could be programmed to be 
intelligent, or at least be programmed to “imitate” intelligence, which he further argued 
amounted to the same thing. Turing was so confident that this truth would soon be widely 
evident that he wrote, “by the end of the century … one will be able to speak of machines 
thinking without expecting to be contradicted” (Wardrip-Fruin 54). A few years later, in 1955, a 
group of scientists, including John McCarty, Marvin Minsky, and Claude Shannon, took up the 
possibility of computer intelligence during a two month research project at Dartmouth 
University. In their proposal, they coined the term “artificial intelligence” to describe the new 
type of computational intelligence they were interested in developing. Despite the new term their 
approach was similar to Turing’s in that it was based “on the conjecture that every aspect of 
learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a 
machine can be made to simulate it” (McCarthy 2006 1).  
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Turing’s paper and the Dartmouth workshop focused strictly on autonomous forms of 
computer intelligence, or computers that could think on their own. But by 1960, computer 
scientists were also beginning to consider the revolutionary possibilities of computers for 
assisting human thought, whether “artificially intelligent” and capable of thinking for themselves 
or simply supporting human thinking through the computer’s ability to rapidly process and 
communicate information. In some respects, this idea was a continuation of Lovelace’s belief 
that a machine might assist in human thinking in transformative ways, but the character and 
scope of this assistance was greatly expanded as computer “storage capacity and speed,” as noted 
by Turing in his 1950 paper, had quite dramatically expanded the machine’s possibilities (qtd. in 
Wardrip-Fruin 59). In his 1960 paper, “Man-Computer Symbiosis,” Pentagon computer scientist 
J.C.R. Licklider predicted that “in not too many years, human brains and computing machines 
will be coupled together very tightly and the resulting partnership will think as no human brain 
has ever thought and process data in a way not approached by the information-handling 
machines we know today” (Licklider 4). Though Licklider mainly considers this new form of 
computer-augmented intelligence as one consisting of “cooperation” between the computer and 
the individual, he also takes note of capacities that we might commonly associate today with 
networked technologies. For example, he notes that time shared computers usefully assist in 
facilitating cooperation between researchers, and additionally imagines the creation in “ten to 
fifteen years” of a network of “thinking centers” that might “incorporate the functions of present-
day libraries together with anticipated advances in information storage and retrieval” that 
individuals might connect to through “leased wire services” (Licklider 7).  
Licklider was not alone in his interests. In 1962, Douglas Engelbart, another computer 
scientist at ARPA, published his paper, “Augmenting Human Intellect: A Conceptual 
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Framework,” which outlined a computational support system to help “man” face the increasingly 
urgent and “complex situations” of the modern world (Packer 66). In this paper, which 
introduced ideas for many key aspects of the personal computer (such as email, the mouse, 
online forums, word processing, and so forth), Engelbart conceived of intellectual augmentation 
as “more-rapid comprehension, better comprehension, the possibility of gaining a useful degree 
of comprehension in a situation that previously was too complex, speedier solutions, better 
solutions, and the possibility of finding solutions to problems that before seemed insoluble” (qtd. 
in Packer 66). For Engelbart, the enhancement of intelligence relies primarily on speeding up 
intellectual processes. He imagined this intelligence augmentation to assist a very particular type 
of “complex situation” that he defined as “the professional problems of diplomats, executives, 
social scientists, life scientists, physical scientists, attorneys, designers—whether the problem 
situation exists for twenty minutes or twenty years” (qtd. in Packer 66). In the paper, he also 
emphasizes the role computational augmentation can play in in dramatically elevating the 
efficiency of human collaboration, observing, “Three people working together in this augmented 
mode seem to be more than three times as effective in solving a complex problem as is one 
augmented person working alone—and perhaps ten times as effective as three similar men 
working together without this computer-based augmentation.”  
While Licklider and Engelbart were imagining the possibilities of computer intelligence 
for professionals and professional problems, Ted Nelson, a philosophy graduate student at 
Harvard University in 1960, was thinking about its applicability for a much broader set of 
individuals and applications. In 1960 he began thinking about a “digital repository scheme for 
world-wide electronic publishing,” dubbed “Project Xanadu” in 1966, that media historian 
Brenda Barnet argues was the first vision of networked computer intelligence as “a domestic 
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thing—something your mom and pop would consume over latte and a cheeseburger” (Deschow 
59). During the early 1960s, Nelson developed ideas for hypertext, hypermedia, and versioning 
systems as well as the belief that computers should be understood and developed by ordinary 
individuals rather than merely the “computer priesthood.” For Nelson, computational intelligence 
was something that should not only serve everyone (beyond the typical computer scientists and 
professionals that had access to them), but should be under the command of the ordinary user. He 
would later document these ideas in his 1974 manifesto book Computer Lib / Dream Machine, 
which insisted “everybody should understand computers” (qtd. in Wardrip-Fruin 303). He wrote, 
“Unfortunately, due to ridiculous historical circumstances, computers have been made a mystery 
to most of the world. And this situation does not seem to be improving” (303), additionally 
arguing that ideally, future computer systems would not be “programmed,” “but rather designed, 
written, drawn and edited, by authors, artists, designers and editors” (313).  
Interest in remotely networked computers continued to grow throughout the 1960s. In 
1963, Licklider wrote a memorandum describing his idea for an “Intergalactic Computer 
Network” that would provide “the main and essential medium of informational interaction for 
governments, institutions, corporations, and individuals” (Garreau 22). His ideas helped inspire 
the conception and sponsorship of ARPANET, the world’s first computer-to-computer network, 
which first received funding by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the United 
States Department of Defense in 1966 (Markoff 2017). Though computer networks were 
imagined to serve many purposes, many saw them as opening up new intellectual possibilities 
for the average individual. There was hope, for instance, that computer networks might one day 
grant universal access to the human store of knowledge, such as evident in John McCarthy’s 
observation in 1966 that the computer could potentially provide everyone “better access to the 
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Library of Congress than the librarian himself” (71). But there was also the belief that 
computers, whether connecting individuals across great geographic distances or just in the same 
room, could make intellectual collaborations more productive and effective. Informal 
communication practices carried out for decades on shared computers—often facilitated through 
leaving text files in a designated folder—had demonstrated to many computer scientists the 
unexpected value—or efficiency—of computer mediated communication. In 1968, Licklider and 
Robert Taylor, who were then at work on developing the still-unreleased ARPANET, observed 
that computers helped distribute and organize a group’s intellectual resources. In a paper entitled 
“Computer as a Communication Device,” they wrote that such distributed communication, 
“through a single multi access computer with the aid of telephone lines—is beginning to foster 
cooperation and promote coherence more effectively than do present arrangements for sharing 
computer programs by exchanging magnetic tapes by messenger or mail” (28). In this paper, 
Licklder and Taylor also express confidence that technological advancements would continue in 
such a manner that the computers affordances for networked communication would soon be 
available for many individuals, predicting that “in a few years, men (sic) will be able to 
communicate more effectively through a machine than face to face” (21). They were largely 
optimistic about this transformation, writing that:  
 
life will be happier for the on-line individual because the people with whom one interacts 
most strongly will be selected more by commonality of interests and goals than by 
accidents of proximity. Second, communication will be more effective and productive, 
and therefore more enjoyable. Third, much communication and interaction will be with 
programs and programmed models, which will be (a) highly responsive, (b) 
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supplementary to one’s own capabilities, rather than competitive … And, fourth, there 
will be plenty of opportunity for everyone (who can afford a console) to find his calling, 
for the whole world of information, with all its fields and disciplines, will be open to 
him—with programs ready to guide him or to help him explore. (40)  
 
Licklider and Taylor were clearly excited about the intellectual potential of computers 
that could connect individuals across great distances and assist with information based tasks. Of 
note however, is the limitations of the power of such intelligence. In speculating upon the 
potential impact of the emerging “intelligence amplification” technology, they argue that the 
ethical character of its impact will be determined by whether network connectivity is a “privilege 
or a right” (40). They write,“if only a favored segment of the population gets a chance to enjoy 
the advantage of “intelligence amplification,” the network may exaggerate the discontinuity in 
the spectrum of intellectual opportunity” (40). While Licklider and Taylor are the first in the 
thinkers covered here thus far to attend to the unequal social realities surrounding technological 
access, it is noteworthy that the type of “intelligence amplification” they celebrate is one that is 
not “smart” enough to help transform these social realities. For Licklider and Taylor, as for many 
of theorists discussed here, computational intelligence is conceived of as a neutral entity, rather 
than something that reproduces (or could alternately intervene) upon status quo power relations.  
When the launch of ARPANET in 1969 provided the first connection between computers 
spread out across a great distance, the computer scientist community had already had a least a 
decade’s worth of experience practicing and observing the value of computer mediated 
communication in less geographically-expansive ranges, enabling them to quickly take 
advantage of ARPANET for this purpose. While such use might seem obvious to us today, Janet 
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Abbate reminds us that the primary purpose of ARPANET was to “help users access large, 
centralized computing resources” (106) not necessarily to facilitate human readable 
communication. She further argues that, had users not discovered this “unexpected” use case for 
ARPANET, “the network might be remembered today as a minor failure rather than a 
spectacular success” (106). 
 But ARPANET and the networks that became available in the next decade were also at 
once significantly different than communications occurring via a shared mainframe computer 
whose users would all be geographically proximate. As foundational as computer mediated 
communication prior to ARPANET was for the development of networked computing 
technology, these were tools that offered computer mediated communication only to one’s co-
workers and co-researchers—hardly the global, comparatively diverse, and sometimes 
anonymous masses that would come online in the next decade. As we can see in the speculations 
anticipating its arrival, the notion of computational intelligence thus became progressively 
global. One therefore might be tempted to think of the global nature of intelligence as something 
specific, and perhaps even caused by, the development of various forms of computer mediated 
communications. However, ideas for forms of globally-connected intelligence had existed for 
much longer. In order to assess the way advancements in networked computer technology would 
continue to be described as enabling new and beneficial forms of intelligence, we should briefly 
review how these ideas are in fact situated within a broader and far older set of ideas regarding 
the value and nature of intelligence facilitated through some form of global connectivity.  
1.3. The ‘Global Brain’ 
Francis Heylighen suggests that many visions of global forms of computational 
intelligence can be understood as informed by the metaphor of the global brain. Today, that 
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metaphor is most often evoked in the description of “emerging, collectively intelligent network 
that is formed by the people of this planet together with the computers, knowledge bases, and 
communication links that connect them” (274). However, as Heylighen points out, the global 
brain metaphor is based on three much older metaphors for understanding knowledge and planet-
wide knowledge systems: “organicism,” or the the view of “society or the planet as a living 
system” that stretches back to the fourth century (275), “encyclopediasm,” consisting of the “aim 
to develop a universal knowledge network” that was developed by Enlightenment thinkers in the 
18th century (275), and “emergentism,” a view that “anticipates the evolution of a suprahuman 
level of consciousness in which the individual loses its separate, subjective being and merges 
with humanity and perhaps even the world as a whole” (280).  
While not all discourse about global varieties of computational intelligence today refer 
directly to the metaphor of the global brain or the three foundational metaphors Heylighen argues 
it draws from, I agree with Heylighen that they are powerfully at play just under the surface in 
the optimistic beliefs that networked technology is advancing collaborative, democratic, 
organized, universally accessible, interactive, emergent, and ‘responsive’ forms of global 
intelligence, such as evident in social media, online forums, wikis, blogs, list-servs, and other 
digital resources. Having these three metaphors in mind is also useful for differentiating between 
visions of a connected world that emerge in the 20th century, not least because it helps us 
appreciate how not all visions of a collective intelligence take themselves to have the same single 
goal at stake. The global brain, as I will return to later, is also helpful for thinking more 
holistically and globally about the use of “smart” or “intelligent” devices at an individual level.  
Take for example the idea of the conversion of the “Earth” into a huge “brain” offered by 
Nikola Tesla, the physicist who made major contributions to our modern electricity system. In a 
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1926 interview with Colliers Magazine, Tesla described a world that would soon be connected 
by the very medium he helped create:  
 
When wireless is perfectly applied the whole Earth will be converted into a huge brain, 
which in fact it is, all things being particles of a real and rhythmic whole. We shall be 
able to communicate with one another instantly, irrespective of distance. … and the 
instruments through which we shall be able to do this will be amazingly simple compared 
to our present telephone. A man will be able to carry one in his vest pocket” (Colliers 
1926 n.p.).  
 
Tesla’s vision of a world connected by wireless is often cited as a surprisingly early 
prediction of the World Wide Web (Kleinrock 2008, Carlson 2013). But what I want to point out 
is how Tesla’s speculation about the benefit of this technology for rapidly sending information 
across the globe is grounded in a particular ideological view of the world. According to Tesla, 
the “majority of the ills from which humanity suffers” are not due to social inequalities, but 
rather “to the immense extent of the terrestrial globe and the inability of individuals and nations 
to come into close contact” (n.p.). There is no sense of awareness in his interview that the ability 
for individuals to communicate across the globe instantaneously might bring power into the 
hands of either more or less individuals. For Tesla, the erasure of physical distance (not social 
inequality) would be enough to relinquish human suffering as he treats distance as the main 
impediment to the unification of all of humankind into a “real and rhythmic whole.” Thus, in 
Tesla’s view, the benefits of these technologies are circumscribed to simple improvements in 
human experience such as the reduction of domestic labor, the speeding up of transport, and the 
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instantaneous transmission of news and information. Given its disregard for power relations, 
Tesla’s vision of wireless technology and the collective intelligence it might facilitate, should be 
seen as largely in service of the status quo.1  
In contrast, the vision of a “global brain” offered in 1938 by Herbert George Wells, the 
British writer who helped forge the genre of science fiction, embodies a view that is more 
critically attuned, at least in one respect, to the ways collective intelligence can work to either 
uphold or disrupt the status quo. In a series of essays written at the brink of World War II, Wells 
developed a particular conception of a “world brain” that he argued would serve as a necessary 
instrument for working towards world peace. He developed this concept as an alternative to 
universities, society’s more traditional means of supporting collective intelligence, that he argued 
were too out of touch to be of any use in the world’s pressing problems. In one of his essays, 
Wells complained, “Why are our universities Boating above the general disorder of mankind like 
a beautiful sunset over a battlefield?” (Wells 64). For Wells, education and knowledge 
production could and should do more. W. Boyd Rayward describes Wells’ vision of a global 
brain as developed as a means to counter the “nationalism, religious narrow-mindedness, 
individualism, intolerance, weapons technology and the deepening threat of a new war” that 
were threatening to destroy “new and valuable forms of social organization” (235). As a Utopian 
liberal socialist (189), Wells believed that evolutionary forces could bring about the realization 
of a new world polity, but, as Rayward observes of Wells’s thoughts at the time, it would 
“depend on the mobilization of man's knowledge—and this involved the management of 
information” ( 235). Any hope of world peace thus demanded a global education process that 
would unify the minds of humankind by being “in direct touch with all the original thought and 
research in the world (71)” as well as extending “its informing tentacles to every intelligent 
                                                
1 For further discussion of Tesla’s vision, see “Atmospheres of Communication” by Jennifer Gabrys 
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individual in the community—the new world community” (71). Wells thus developed a 
sophisticated plan to create a type of “alive and growing” World Encyclopedia that would 
“would be the mental background of every intelligent man in the world” (20).  
While Wells’ vision is obviously informed by an encylopediac view of collective 
intelligence, we should also note that the organic metaphor is strongly present in his hope that it 
might assist in the “the possible unification of the world into one community of knowledge and 
will" (qtd. in Rayward 235). And though Wells imagined this World Encyclopedia as comprising 
social organizations and processes rather than computer networks, his depiction of it as a “depot 
where knowledge and ideas are received, sorted, summarised, digested, clarified and compared” 
(69) is in many ways emblematic of the web we have today (Rayward 236). We should note, 
however, that Wells ultimately views the producers of this World Brain as in line with status quo 
authoritative and patriarchal views of knowledge (and as dependent on university research). Of 
its production, he writes: “It would be in continual correspondence with every university, every 
research institution, every competent discussion, every survey, every statistical bureau in the 
world. It would develop a directorate and a staff of men of its own type, specialised editors and 
summarists. They would be very important and distinguished men in the new world” (70 italics 
mine). On one hand, the organizational structure Wells proposes is in line with the democratic 
belief that expert forms of knowledge should be universally accessible. On the other hand, 
Wells’ world brain is not organized to enable universal and democratic access towards 
knowledge and cultural production that would be later championed by thinkers such as 
Rheingold (1985), Jenkins (1992, 2006), and Benkler (2006) in their assessment of the Web’s 
potential. This is not an oversight on the part of Wells. Though Wells was highly critical of the 
influence of commercialism on society, he was equally disenchanted with democratic rule by the 
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masses. Describing him as the “godfather of American Liberalism,” Fred Siegel writes that 
Wells “taught upper-middle-class liberals that they were entitled to govern in the name of social 
evolution (2015). As Wells wrote in his 1906 book The Future of America, “The greatest work 
which the coming century has to do is to build up an aristocracy of thought and feeling which 
shall hold its own against the aristocracy of mercantilism” (307). Thus, Wells’ World Brain 
serves as another example of how global information systems are always informed by 
ideological views.  
Just after World War II, we find what also can be considered as a species of the global 
brain imaginary in Vannevar Bush’s 1945 article for the Atlantic Monthly, “As We May Think.” 
Bush, the engineer who oversaw the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development during 
World War II, wrote the article to suggest a new occupation for the engineers who had recently 
been relieved of their wartime duties. Though like Wells, Bush is invested in the easy 
accessibility of the increasingly-abundant store of human knowledge, or what Heylighen would 
categorize as encyclopediasm, his imagination of it could not be more different. Whereas Wells 
imagined institutions and professional organizations distributing knowledge, Bush imagined a 
technical device called the “memex” in which “an individual stores all his books, records, and 
communications, and which is mechanized so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and 
flexibility” (n.p.). Bush thought the memex would help update professional methods of 
transmitting and reviewing knowledge, which Bush observed were “generations old and by now 
... totally inadequate for their purpose” (n.p.). While the memex was neither a computer nor a 
network, the design of the memex was intended to provide many of the same affordances later 
offered by networked computers. For example, the memex was intended to serve as an extension 
of human memory, enable individuals to browse the entirety of human knowledge through 
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associative trails, and allow individuals to easily share their browsing trails with others. But 
perhaps most interesting of all is the way a consideration of war enters his discussion of the 
memex. For Wells, the world brain was a means to prevent war and foster peace. For Bush, the 
memex was a tool to produce knowledge, which he considered a “true good” in and of itself. The 
only explicit relationship that the memex would have to war in Bush’s mind was the fact that war 
would potentially “terminate” human development before such a tool could be realized. 
Knowledge produced by the memex apparently was not explicitly envisioned to be the type that 
could save the world on its own.  
1.4. Computers for a “Global Brain”  
With an understanding of how some thinkers conceived of global-forms of connected 
intelligence independent of computers, we can now better appreciate some of the core underlying 
metaphors of computational intelligence as they take on an increasingly global character. For 
example, in consideration of the views of computational intelligence already discussed, we see 
encyclopediac metaphors at play in ideas of Ted Nelson and John McCarthy, each imagining in 
different ways how computer technology might grant ordinary users access to the world’s 
knowledge. We can identify organicist metaphors in descriptions of computers enabling robust 
forms of collaboration and cooperation, enabling participants to work together as if “a living 
system.” And we can also see emergentist metaphors in descriptions of how these new forms of 
computer intelligence, whether as computer facilitated collaboration or artificial intelligence, are 
in fact representing new forms of intelligence capable of producing new insights or assisting in 
new activities. These methaphors would continue to be used to describe networked forms of 
computational intelligence over the next several decades. However, ideas about the purpose and 
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capabilities of computational intelligence would continue to shift, especially during different key 
technological developments.  
One major development was the broadening of network access throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. When the first message was sent through ARPANET in 1969, only four institutions 
(UCLA, Stanford, the University of Utah School of Computing, and the University of California, 
Santa Barbara) had access to the network. Though ARPANET would expand to include dozens 
of new sites over the course of the next decade, access to it was still extremely limited. As one 
computer science student observed, “It was commonly accepted at the time that to join the 
ARPANET took political connections and $100,000” (Lueg 24). Starting a decade after 
ARPANET’s launch, however, new services and utilities were launched that opened up computer 
networks to a significantly broader group of users. In 1979, for example, graduate students at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and Duke University launched Usenet, a global 
networked discussion system they referred to as the “poor man’s ARPANET” as it was intended 
to provide computing resources to those who weren’t able to afford them (Lueg 24). Usenet, 
which facilitated computer to computer connection through phone lines, grew to 1000 sites in 
just five years and rapidly attracted new members who were looking, as early Usenet user and 
historian Michael Hauben observes, to find “compatriots in thought” across the country and 
world (1997). However, unlike the visions of networked computer intelligence offered by 
Licklider and Englebart Hauben characterizes the exchange of ideas happening on Usenet as 
motivated by the “thrill” of connecting with others.  
A number of other networks opened up during this time that gave more users users access 
to networked communication. In 1980, CompuServe and The Source launched the first 
commercial online service, allowing anyone with a computer and a modem to access the Internet. 
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The university network Bitnet followed in 1981 and the Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link in 1985. 
Along with the expansion of users came the expansion of activities users could participate in 
while online, enhancing the ways networks could help users exchange information and develop a 
sense of community. Computer bulletin systems, which allowed for community postings and 
discussion, were developed in 1978 (Lake 2009 n.p.). The first networked, text-based, 
multiplayer game, known as a “Multi User Dungeon (MUD)” was released in 1980 (Kelly & 
Rheingold 1993). Listserv software, which allowed for one-to-many email, was released in 1986 
(Lake 2009 n.p.).  
1.5 Growing emphasis of community, inevitability, and uncertainty of outcome of computational 
intelligence  
In this broadened networked context, new visions of a connected world emerged that 
reflected the expansion of the type of people who had access to the Internet and the type of 
interactions they could have through it. Howard Rheingold, clearly enthused by his own 
experiences with these technologies, provided an early catalogue of these different ideas in his 
1985 book Tools for Thought. Of key importance to the book is the way in which computers 
amplify thought not only through their ability to store and compute great quantities of 
information, but also through the social communities enabled by their networks. Rheingold’s 
vision embodies many of the organicist, encyclopediast, and emergentist aspects of the other 
visions considered in this chapter, but it is also distinct in several important respects. First, in his 
description of both networked and print forms of communication, he switches the value from the 
information itself to the communities that emerge through the exchange of information: “The 
true value of books emerged from the community they made possible, an intellectual community 
that is still alive all over the world” (14). He would expand on the value of community later in 
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his 1993 book The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier, observing, in a 
slight shift from other conceptions of computational intelligence, that he valued the computer 
network not only for its ability to provide rapid access to information, but for the sense of 
community it imparted. He writes, “What amazed me wasn't just the speed with which we 
obtained precisely the information we needed to know, right when we needed to know it. It was 
also the immense sense of security that comes with discovering real people ... are available, 
around the clock, if you need them. There is a magic protective circle around the atmosphere of 
this particular conference. We're talking about our sons and daughters in this forum, not about 
our computers or our opinions about philosophy” (1).  
Another notable aspect of Rheingold’s 1985 vision of computational intelligence is it 
marks a growing sense of its inevitable broad presence in all of human affairs that was only 
latent in Licklider’s 1960 prediction that “in a few years, men will be able to communicate more 
effectively through a machine than face to face.” “There is little doubt,” Rheingold writes of 
these emerging technologies, “that the worldwide availability of fantasy amplifiers, intellectual 
toolkits, and interactive electronic communities will change the way people think, learn, and 
communicate” (1984 14). Unlike Licklider, however, who writes that “life will be happier for the 
on-line individual,” Rheingold expresses ambivalence about the ethical and social outcome of 
the computer’s inevitable development, writing, “Nobody knows whether this will turn out to be 
the best or the worst thing the human race has done for itself, because the outcome of this 
empowerment will depend in large part on how we react to it and what we choose to do with it” 
(1984 13). What is also notable in this statement is who Rheingold thinks can help shape this 
coming intelligence. As a popular press book, readers can assume that his use of “we” include 
the ordinary citizen rather than simply the engineers that design computing technology. This 
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articulation of the possibility (and need for) human participation in shaping computational 
technology would continue to be echoed in the work of theorists to come. Unfortunately, 
however, as will see, many of these echos are just as vague in their suggestions for what concrete 
steps need to be taken to allow for this “we” to more participate as effectively and speedily as 
computers had made other forms of computer-assisted intelligence.  
 1.5. Computational intelligence for networked production  
The 1990s was yet another transformative decade for networked technology and culture 
given the public release of the World Wide Web in 1991 and the explosive growth in connected 
users that followed (Abbate). Inspired by the new opportunities to easily distribute information to 
mass audiences, organizations such as libraries and governmental agencies experimented with 
the web for distributing information while hundreds of books, articles, and conference 
proceedings were published on topics pertaining to networked digital society. The 1990s was 
also a decade in which the forms of networked collaboration championed by so many of the 
thinkers discussed here began to demonstrate a surprising economic power for the production of 
sophisticated computing technology through massive voluntary networked collaborations. Free 
and open source software communities developed software that was widely adopted and highly 
valued such as the “Linux operating system for servers, the Apache Web server for Web pages, 
the perl and python scripting languages for building quick Internet applications, a number of 
other lower-level tools like Bind (an implementation of the DNS protocol) or sendmail for e-
mail” (Kelty 107-8). The growing success of these new methods helped generate increased 
recognition of voluntary networked collaboration as a viable model of software production. Of 
key importance was Eric Raymond’s 1997 influential essay “The Cathedral and the Bazaar,” 
which theorized in detail why these methods were more effective and more efficient than 
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traditional forms of hierarchical software development and influenced Netscape 
Communications Corporation’s landmark decision in 1998 to turn its browser into an open 
source product now known as Mozilla (Kelty 107).  
Software, however, was not the only good that was being transformed by new forms of 
networked collaboration. Voluntary networked production would also come to be recognized as 
a new and important mode of producing knowledge and cultural goods, especially after the turn 
of the century when a flood of new platforms and services emerged that enabled users to 
produce, distribute, and access information in novel social and intellectual ways, and often for 
free.2 Though the Internet industry would go into crisis in the “dot com crash” of 2001 in which 
stocks of Internet companies collectively lost $1.7 trillion in the course of a few months 
(Kleinbard 2000), the number of Internet users nonetheless grew exponentially from 45 million 
in 1995 to 1 billion in 2005 (“Statista”). In this ten year time period, advancements in the the 
processing and storage power of computers (Mayer-Schönberger 2013), the miniaturization of 
sensors, chips, and batteries, and other parts necessary for the construction of computer devices 
(Bouhai 2017), the widespread adoption of smartphones that allow for continuous, real time 
network connection (Rheingold 2002), and the popularization of freely available “Web 2.0” tools 
that enable users to rapidly share, access, and co-produce information (Fuchs 2013), helped bring 
about a new capacity for networked users to flexibly and voluntarily share and produce 
information in collaboration with both other users and computers.  
                                                
2 These technologies included the content management system Drupal (2000), the crowd-sourced encyclopedia 
Wikipedia (2001), blogging platforms like Wordpress (2003) and Blogger (2003), the virtual gaming platform 
Second Life (2003), the social network Facebook (2004), the restaurant review platform Yelp (2004), the video 
sharing platform YouTube (2005), the micro-blogging site Twitter (2006), and a suite of tools offered by Google, 
such as the collaborative writing platform Google Docs (2004), Google Books (2004), and Google Maps (2005).  
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1.6. Benkler and the democratic promise of the network 
This new massively-connected world, in which valuable information goods were 
produced outside of traditionally understood economic motives, inspired many scholars and 
commentators to remark that the web was rapidly democratizing knowledge, culture, and 
political production. As Jose van Dijck observes, “Between 2000 and 2006, quite a few media 
theorists claimed that Web 2.0 applications exponentially enhanced the natural human need to 
connect and create, and they declared early victory for the user” (2013, 10). In 2006, legal 
scholar Yochai Benkler published The Wealth of Networks, perhaps one of the most theoretically 
expansive statements on this transformation, given its engagement in political, economic, and 
social theory, and also widely influential given the subsequent attention it received from fields as 
diverse as scholarly communication (Duranceau 2008) to digital learning (Kahne 2012). In this 
book, Benkler observed that new forms of collaborative production carried out via the World 
Wide Web represented the emergence of new type of economy he described as the “networked 
information economy.” In contrast to the older industrial information economy in which the 
means of production were scarce and thus accessible only to a few, the networked information 
economy opened enabled all networked users to collaborative produce and access information-
based goods. In Benkler’s view, the fact that “the basic material capital requirements of 
information production are now in the hands of a billion people around the globe who are 
connected to each other more or less seamlessly” granted networked individuals “a new practical 
freedom of action” (462) that was not possible before.  
Though Benkler’s ideas significantly develop the economic, legal, and social theories 
related to collective intelligence carried out through the networked communication, it is still 
strongly grounded in organicist, encyclopediac, and emergentist notions of the global brain. His 
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idea of the commons, a collection of collectively governed and shared resources (61), embodies 
much of the general spirit of organicism in which individuals act in concert as a unified living 
system. This commons, he argues, allows for a new form of production that is “radically 
decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary; based on sharing resources and outputs among 
widely distributed, loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying 
on either market signals or managerial commands” (60). These commons also embody 
emergentist notions of collective intelligence given that they enable the “emergence of more 
effective collective action practices that are decentralized but do not rely on either the price 
system or a managerial structure for coordination” (63) or self-organizing systems of individuals 
working collectively to produce valuable information goods. Finally, this commons, as a set of 
ever-expanding and improving information-based goods, including knowledge and information-
based tools for developing knowledge, also represents an encyclopediac view of collective 
intelligence. For Benkler, this broadened access to information goods (represented by the 
commons) “improves [individuals’] capacity to do more for and by themselves,” “enhances their 
capacity to do more in loose commonality with others, without being constrained to organize 
their relationship through a price system or in traditional hierarchical models of social and 
economic organizations,” and “improves the capacity of individuals to do more in formal 
organizations that operate outside the market sphere” (8).  
More than any other thinker considered thus far, Benkler develops his ideas about 
computational intelligence in distinctly political terms. “Information, knowledge, and culture are 
central to human freedom and human development,” he observes. “How they are produced and 
exchanged in our society critically affects the way we see the state of the world as it is and might 
be; who decides these questions; and how we, as societies and polities, come to understand what 
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can and ought to be done” (1). Thus, for Benkler, the networked information economy, and the 
collective intelligence it supports, represents a real expansion of political freedom and 
democratic participation given the way it greatly expands individual access to knowledge and 
knowledge production. Rather than having a “mass mediated public sphere” where only a few 
sanctioned experts have public voice, it supports a “networked public sphere” where all 
networked users are able to share their views, thus increasing the diversity of political and 
cultural expression. This networked public sphere is also distinct from the mass mediated public 
sphere given that the “basic tools enabled by the Internet—cutting, pasting, rendering, 
annotating, and commenting—make active utilization and conscious discussion of cultural 
symbols and artifacts easier to create, sustain, and read more generally” (294). Pointing to the 
Wikipedia page on Barbie as an example, he shows how Wikipedia not only allows networked 
users to learn about Barbie and participate in developing knowledge about Barbie, but also 
allows users to see the history and discussion related to the production of the page. He argues 
that these general affordances make culture at large more “transparent” and more “self-
reflective.” 
1.7. Web 2.0: surveillance capitalism as a new form of digital capital acquisition 
While Benkler’s view as of 2006, and its more advanced engagement with economic and 
political theory, represents an exciting advancement in the political theorization of collective 
intelligence, it unfortunately did not pay sufficient attention to the economic logic that was 
driving the rapid development of networked information technologies right around the time of 
the book’s publication. Shoshana Zuboff describes this logic as “surveillance capitalism,” or a 
method of capital accumulation in which information is robbed from users in order to “predict 
and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market control” (75). This new 
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logic, while providing economic conditions that contributed to a massive participation in 
networked forms of collective intelligence, simultaneously transformed those forms of collective 
intelligence into forms of capital accumulation. As I will more fully detail below, this 
instrumentalization of collective intelligence for private interest undermined the optimistic 
claims of half a century’s worth of speculation on the intellectual and democratic potential of 
computers. However, given the powerful legacy of the metaphor of computational intelligence to 
describe the role of computers in our lives, it has been difficult to fully appreciate the 
significance of this new logic on the ways we use computers to support or embody intellectual 
processes. Before we discuss that impact, it is worth developing an understanding of the logic 
and processes of surveillance capitalism.  
In the wake of the dot com crash, some Internet companies began shifting their business 
model away from selling digital software and services to generating value through various forms 
of user engagement. Tim O’Reilly famously described this new Internet business paradigm as 
“Web 2.0” in a rebranding effort aimed “to restore confidence in an industry that had lost its way 
after the dotcom bust” (O’Reilly and Battelle 2009 n.p.). Though there were diverse Web 2.0 
strategies for generating value from user engagement, collection and use of user data was one of 
its key methods. In some cases, that involved enabling users to have more input or flexibility 
with the code of the software, but of most importance was the passive, continuous, real time 
collection of user data. In an article detailing Web 2.0’s features, O’Reilly writes: 
 
One of the key lessons of the Web 2.0 era is this: Users add value. But only a small 
percentage of users will go to the trouble of adding value to your application via explicit 
means. Therefore, Web 2.0 companies set inclusive defaults for aggregating user data and 
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building value as a side-effect of ordinary use of the application. As noted above, they 
build systems that get better the more people use them. (n.p.) 
 
O’Reilly describes this accumulation of user data as “collective intelligence” that depends on “on 
managing, understanding, and responding to massive amounts of user-generated data in real 
time.” This data isn’t just collected for the purpose of improving superficial features of the 
platform but rather constitutes the core value of an Internet platform as it can be used to sell 
targeted ads and further develop business intelligence. O’Reilly observes, “The race is on to own 
certain classes of core data: location, identity, calendaring of public events, product identifiers 
and namespaces” as companies that first reach “critical mass [of certain classes of core data] via 
user aggregation” are then able to turn that aggregated data into a system service. The economic 
incentive to capture user data is thus so great that Internet companies (Facebook and Google for 
example) provide their services for free and consistently seek new venues to aggregate new 
classes of core data, such as higher education, workplace communications, event management, 
and so forth. As Jose van Dijck observes, this surrendered user data thus become a type of 
“currency used to pay for online services” that social media companies “monetize” by 
“repackaging and selling them to advertisers or data companies” (2014 200-201). 
Corporate tracking of consumer behavior was not new in the 21st century nor was it new 
when Roger Clarke coined the term “dataveillance” in 1988 to describe the “the systematic use 
of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or communications of 
one or more persons” (n.p.). In 1865, for example, Richard Millar Devans used the term 
“business intelligence” to describe a banker’s practice of methodically collecting and analyzing 
information related to his business as a means to gain a competitive advantage (Davis 24). Bruce 
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Schneier, a cryptographer and specialist in digital privacy, also reminds us that companies have 
been methodically tracking customers long before the arrival of Web 2.0 technologies, using 
tools such as loyalty cards and direct marketing, and consolidating customer data gleaned from 
credit bureaus and public records (2015).  
In this respect, dataveillance is simply part of (and contributor to) the ongoing emergence 
of what Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier call “datafication,” or the technological 
trend of turning all aspects of our life and world into computerized data. The use of data for 
comprehending certain aspects of the world is not new as practices of collecting information 
such as manifest by libraries, censuses, surveys, and so forth date back thousands of years in 
some cases. Nor, obviously, is data a new feature of computers or networks—the word was first 
used in a computational sense in 1946 (OED) and is an inherent feature of the modern computer.  
Still, while scientists have long speculated on the research potential of analyzing massive 
data sets, it has only been recently that advancements in data storage and computing power, and 
the near-ubiquity of receptor devices have made big data a viable approach for scientific inquiry. 
Scientific processes that would take a decade in the nineties or even early 2000s—such as 
sequencing a genome or collecting astronomy data —now take only several days. Mayer-
Schonberger and Cukier cite one example in astronomy that gives a sense of the scale of these 
advancements: 
 
When the Sloan Digital Sky Survey began in 2000, its telescope in New Mexico collected 
more data in its first few weeks than had been amassed in the entire history of astronomy. 
By 2010 the survey's archive teemed with a whopping 140 terabytes of information. But a 
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successor, the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope in Chile, due to come on stream in 2016, 
will acquire that quantity of data every five days. (7)  
 
Seen as a tool for dataveillance, this vast improvement in existing computing power 
pushes the possibilities for data capital to a new level in terms of size and scale. As Clarke points 
out, contemporary dataveillance is different in it enables organizations to cheaply and granularly 
track, analyze, cross check, and indefinitely store the entirety of user behavior, or all the 
activities they conduct in a computer environment that the organization controls. Jose Van Dijck 
further points out that data generated by dataveillance can be easily stored for future analysis of 
undetermined purposes and merged with other data sets.  
 
Dataveillance — the monitoring of citizens on the basis of their online data — differs 
from surveillance on at least one important account: whereas surveillance presumes 
monitoring for specific purposes, dataveillance entails the continuous tracking of 
(meta)data for unstated preset purposes. Therefore, dataveillance goes well beyond the 
proposition of scrutinizing individuals as it penetrates every fiber of the social fabric. 
(van Dijck “Datification” 205) 
1.8. The alienation of the user from their (‘algorithmic’) self and their (digital) labor 
With the increase in both the general Internet user population and the value of their data 
in the early 2000s, dataveillance became a much more profitable enterprise than it was 
previously. Companies could use its techniques to monitor, study, and instrumentalize user 
activity with great ease and virtually no effort or conscious consent on the part of the user. John 
Cheney-Lippold describes how this dataveillance is used to produce “algorithmic identities” of 
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users that use “statistical commonality models to determine one’s gender, class, or race in an 
automatic manner” for the purpose of selling targeted ads or data pertaining to the algorithmic 
identity itself (165).  
Algorithmic identities, to speak in Cheney-Lippold’s language, are composed of both 
explicit data consciously produced by the user, as well as implicit data, that describes particular 
aspects of the user’s behavior when producing or interacting with explicit data and whose 
parameters are set by owner of the information environment she’s using, be it a platform, app, or 
webpage. Explicitly, a user produces data in the form of content she intends to communicate 
with others, such as posting on social media, uploading a video, sending an email, or creating a 
connection with another user through likes, follows, friending, favoriting and so forth. Implicitly, 
she also generates data related to the meta circumstances of producing or interacting with 
content—such as related to the device she is using, her geographical coordinates, the time of day, 
her browsing habits, and other circumstantial aspects of her activity and environment.  
It is important to note that the user need not actually produce content for implicit data to 
be collected. Engaging with these platforms in any way, sometimes even merely by having an 
app installed on one’s phone, enables these companies to collect data. Indeed, data pertaining to 
the content she reads, the time she takes to read it, the links she clicks, the character and activity 
of her network, or even her geographical activity while carrying a phone with an app installed, 
can all be collected by digital platforms and apps. Schneier gives examples of how some web 
platforms and smartphone apps collect these implicit forms of user data, sometimes even 
collecting data that extends far beyond the user’s interaction with the platform or app itself. In 
2013, Jay Z and Samsung released an app package of his album Magna Carta Holy Grail that 
was essentially spyware in that it could view “all accounts on the phone, track the phone's 
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location, and track who the user was talking to on the phone” (48). Likewise, the popular Angry 
Birds mobile game app, first released in 2009, tracks the user’s location if when she is not 
playing the game. While the user may view the content of her explicit data as more 
representative of her character, both explicit and implicit forms of data are grouped together to 
form a profile of the user which can be analyzed in multiple ways to better predict user behavior. 
As evidenced by the early endeavors mentioned above from computational astronomy, 
the development of big data resources and practices was initially driven by the scientific 
community. However, as Web 2.0 platforms began to set their sites on generating profit via user 
data, datafication became such an important profit strategy for digital companies that Michael 
Palmer’s observation in 2006 that “data is the new oil” continues to be widely repeated (Haupt 
2016).The ease in which networked digital activity could be tracked and analyzed also 
contributed to the increasing sophistication of big data methods developed by industry. Mayer-
Schonberger and Cukier observe that “because Internet companies could collect vast troves of 
data and had a burning financial incentive to make sense of them, they became the leading users 
of the latest processing technologies, superseding offline companies that had, in some cases, 
decades more experience" (6). Web 2.0 Internet companies were also quick to recognize that 
data as a “raw material of business, a vital economic input, used to create a new form of 
economic value,” which could be “cleverly reused to become a fountain of innovation and new 
services” (5). Jose van Dijck observes that the metadata that “not not too long ago [was] 
considered worthless byproducts” are now “treasured resources that can ostensibly be mined, 
enriched, and repurposed into precious products” (“Datafication” 199). Her observation is 
confirmed in numerous industry publications, such as in Joris Toonders’ business advice column 
for Wired:  
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For many companies, their data infrastructure is still a cost center nowadays and should 
become a profit center by using the data to improve everything, day by day. Companies 
must begin treating data as an enterprise wide corporate asset while also managing the 
data locally within business units. 
 
This enables sharing of data about products and customers – which provides 
opportunities to upsell, cross sell, improve customer service and retention rates. By using 
internal data in combination with external data, there is a huge opportunity for every 
company in the world to create new products and services across lines of business. 
 
As Toonder’s advice suggests, even companies that do not start off as “big data” companies have 
the opportunity to generate new products, services, and profits with data collected through their 
infrastructure.  
1.9. Dataveillance and the emergence of the network as ‘alienated intelligence’ 
What I want to argue now is that the ongoing background harvesting of data capital from 
network use not only alienates users from their real products in the straightforward sense of 
generating a set of data whose contents users have no way of being aware of or accessing, but 
also in the specific sense of alienating users from the intelligence that is created on the basis of 
these products. Data harvested through dataveillance clearly contribute to a form of business 
intelligence, insofar as they lead to increasingly effective means for creating further demand for 
goods and services, whether these are traditional consumable goods, online services, or 
something else altogether. What is more, the intelligence itself is at least as valuable as the data 
54
  
harvested, if not much more so, with the subsequent algorithmic assessment and reproduction of 
the data being absolutely essential to confer a real use-value on the data itself. This business 
intelligence, however, is produced by user’s own networked intellectual activity, for the sake of 
corporate—and possibly state—entities whose interests are largely alien and unknown to the 
producers themselves. For this reason, the resulting intelligence can be usefully understood as 
“alienated intelligence” in the Marxist sense that their intellectual labor is exploited for capitalist 
interest. Marx describes the process of alienation as one in which: 
 
The worker places his life in the object; but now it no longer belongs to him, but to the 
object [...] What the product of his labour is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, 
the less is he himself. The externalisation of the worker in his product means not only 
that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, 
independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an autonomous 
power; that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and 
alien. (Quoted in Berardi 37-38).  
 
It may seem incorrect to apply a concept developed to describe the exploitation of 19th 
century factory workers to voluntary use of freely available tools that often provide the user with 
a valuable service. Nonetheless, the concept of alienation is useful for pointing out a particular 
dynamic at play in digitally-mediated intellectual production processes regardless of whether the 
subject receives wages. Just as the factory worker’s labor is alienated from them in order to feed 
capitalist accumulation (that “hostile and alien” object “external” to the worker), digitally-
mediated intellectual activity is also alienated from students and academics as it is transformed 
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into what business theorists Robert Kaplan and David Norton call “information capital” (249) or 
data and metadata pertaining to user activity that is collected by corporate entities for the purpose 
of capital accumulation. But note that it is not just the ‘pure data’ itself that is of value; it is (in 
Marx’s terms above) the ‘autonomous power’ connected to such data, the uses that it can be put 
to, the know-how that arises from observing and experimenting with users’ behavior — in a 
word, intelligence. As scholars such as Tiziana Terranova (2000), George Ritzer and Nathan 
Jurgenson (2010), Christian Fuchs (2010), and Trebor Scholz (2012) have argued, digitally-
mediated activities carried out for personal interest rather than wages—such as community 
building or producing and sharing knowledge—can nonetheless be conceived of as labor given 
the way that capitalist digital companies exploit this activity for their own purposes.  
What I’d like to suggest here is that this form of data extraction by capitalist digital media 
companies can be usefully understood not just as alienation, but as alienated intelligence, given 
the way that it directly captures the intellectual labor of users to develop its own corporate 
intelligence for the accumulation of capital. I like this term because it helps unsettle our 
conception of the type of intelligence or knowledge that is produced through mass engagement 
with networked technology and also—as I will show in chapter 4—helps us connect political 
issues related to digital technology with scholarly and educational writing practices.  
1.10. Rethinking the ‘wealth of networks’ in light of user alienation 
With the concept of “alienated intelligence” in mind, we can better see the need for qualifying 
Benkler’s argument that our networked world has given humankind a “new freedom” that “holds 
great practical promise” for “individual freedom,” for “better democratic participation,” for 
“more critical and self-reflective culture,” and for “ improvements in human development 
everywhere” (2016 2). Benkler treats information solely as a medium that enables the practical 
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exchange and collaboration of information-based goods through networks rather than the 
medium that likewise allows for monetizing user activity. Likewise, his perspective of commons-
based peer production is overly skewed towards users’ perception of these activities, rather than 
the businesses whose digital services enable them. His description of commons-based peer 
production as not relying on “the price system or a managerial structure for coordination” (60) 
fails to recognize many of the platforms that have come to support what appears like commons-
based peer production exist purely on account economic incentive and are designed to structure 
user coordination and activity in ways that maximize profits. Users are thoroughly alienated from 
the economic product of their labor in that they do not receive a portion of the profit, nor are 
steps taken to make them explicitly aware of the product they’re creating and its value and use. 
While commons-based peer production can be seen to support the democratization of certain 
aspects of knowledge and cultural production, this democratization is sharply constrained to the 
level of producing and distributing information-based content rather than democratically 
understanding and governing the rules and structures which enable that exchange.  
In some respects, Benkler’s lack of attention to the alienating conditions of dataveillance 
might be chalked up to the time period in which he was writing. In 2006, the year in which The 
Wealth of Networks was published, business models that relied on user data extraction were still 
in their infancy and not as broadly discussed in the media or scholarly literature as they are 
today. Tim O'Reilly’s Web 2.0 manifesto and Facebook was only two years old. Many, though 
not all, of the activities Benkler points to as examples of commons based peer production were in 
fact conducted in nonproprietary virtual spaces, such as Wikipedia, Project Gutenberg, 
SETI@Home, and the Free Software initiative. However, Benkler doesn’t give sufficient 
attention to the economic models supporting the technologies they describe nor does he 
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anticipate how these emerging economic models might complicate his claims. Instead, Benkler 
pays more critical attention to the incumbents of the old industrial and cultural order who are 
threatening to stifle new forms of networked activity through copyright protection (2). 
1.11. Theorizing the politics of emerging collective network intelligence: Jenkins 
In 2006, the same year that Wealth of Networks was published, media scholar Henry 
Jenkins published Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, a text that similarly 
argues that new networked practices are enabling for more democratic forms of production. As a 
media theorist, Jenkins is focused specifically on cultural production, arguing that new 
networked practices are enabling more individuals than ever before to collaborate and take a 
more active role in producing the culture they consume. Jenkins calls this new cultural form 
“convergence culture.” First theorized as a new paradigm for media industries by the MIT 
political scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool, “convergence” was a term that became increasingly popular 
in the media industries to describe and champion transformations occuring in the business (4-7). 
In 1983, de Sola Pool described “convergence” as blurring the lines between media, even 
between point-to-point communications, such as the post, telephone and telegraph, and mass 
communications, such as the press, radio, and television” (qtd. in Jenkins 10). This convergence 
meant that services that were formally provided separately (such as radio and news) might now 
be provided through the same physical means (such as the Internet). For Benkler, convergence 
culture represents an important and novel opportunity for users to collaboratively produce 
cultural goods across media platforms, industries, and devices, in effect making cultural 
production less hierarchical and more participatory (2-3). 
Jenkins discussion may at first seem unrelated to our study of computational intelligence, 
however the concept of intelligence, specifically collective intelligence, plays a key role in his 
58
  
conception of convergence culture and participatory culture. First, he defines convergence as a 
process that is facilitated through the “brains” of technology users. He argues, “Convergence 
does not occur through media appliances, however sophisticated they may become. Convergence 
occurs within the brains of individual consumers and through their social interactions with 
others” (3 italics mine). The process is carried out as the construction of “personal mythology” 
from “the bits and fragments of information extracted from the media flow and transformed into 
resources through which we make sense of our everyday lives” (3). The limits of the individual 
brain then plays a generative role in stimulating communication (or convergence) of information 
across individuals and through various forms of media. Jenkins observes, “Because there is more 
information on any given topic than anyone can store in their head, there is an added incentive 
for us to talk among ourselves about the media we consume (3-4). 
Jenkins argues that this convergence encourages “collective intelligence,” which he 
defines as the “ability of virtual communities to leverage the combined expertise of their 
members. What we cannot know or do on our own, we may now be able to do collectively” (27). 
Drawing from the theorist Pierre Levy, he argues that collective intelligence is giving rise to a 
“new knowledge culture . . . as our ties to older forms of social community are breaking down, 
our rooting physical geography is diminished, our bonds to the extended and even the nuclear 
family are disintegrating, and our allegiances to nation-states are being redefined” (27). 
Collective intelligence is also part of the emergence of new forms of community that “are 
defined through voluntary, temporary, and tactical affiliations” and “held together through the 
mutual production and reciprocal exchange of knowledge.” Pointing to examples of the way 
collective intelligence has enabled fans to take a more active role in producing or engaging with 
culture, he argues that it ultimately has strong strong political implications and possibilities. 
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“Right now,” he writes, “we are mostly using this collective power through our recreational life, 
but soon we will be deploying those skills for more “serious” purposes” (11). Describing the 
“democratic potential” of these contemporary cultural trends, he argues that we must work 
towards cultivating and supporting collective intelligences as a means for working towards a 
“better, more just society” (247).  
1.12. Cultivating a culture of collective participatory self-governing 
Like Rheingold and Benkler, Jenkins acknowledges that, “there is nothing inevitable 
about the outcome” of these technologies (247) and so it is important to take advantage of this 
window of opportunity and fight to sustain and further develop these modes of participation. He 
describes this approach as “critical utopianism” and distinguishes it from “critical pessimism,” 
which emphasizes a self defeating “politics of victimization” in the face of media concentration 
(247). Jenkins acknowledges that media concentration can be bad in that it “stifles competition 
and places media industries above the demands of their consumers,” “lowers diversity” of 
content, “lowers incentives for companies to negotiate with their consumers,” and “raises the 
barriers to (consumer) participation” (248). However, he still views commercial, “top-down,” 
media as playing an important role in convergence culture: 
 
Convergence culture is highly generative: some ideas spread top down, starting with 
commercial media and being adopted and appropriated by a range of different publics as 
they spread outward across the culture. Others emerge bottom up from various sites of 
participatory culture and getting pulled into the mainstream if the media industries see 
some way of profiting from it. The power of the grassroots media is that it diversifies; the 
power of broadcast media is that it amplifies. That’s why we should be concerned with 
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the flow between the two: expanding the potentials for participation represents the 
greatest opportunity for cultural diversity. Throw away the powers of broadcasting and 
one has only cultural fragmentation. The power of participation comes not from 
destroying commercial culture but from writing over it, modding it, amending it, 
expanding it, adding greater diversity of perspective, and then recirculating it, feeding it 
back into the mainstream media. (257) 
 
For Jenkins, convergence culture requires a collaboration between commercial and grassroots 
media. Thus, while some media activists argue the need to break up media concentration to allow 
for more diverse forms of media expression, Jenkins argues there are more pressing issues to 
attend to: 
 
Put all of our efforts into battling the conglomerates and this window of opportunity will 
have passed. That is why it is so important to fight against the corporate copyright 
regime, to argue against censorship and moral panic that would pathologize these 
emerging forms of participation, to publicize the best practices of these online 
communities, to expand access and participation to groups that are otherwise being left 
behind, and to promote forms of media literacy education that help all children to develop 
the skills needed to become full participants in their culture. (248) 
 
Jenkins argues that these efforts are critical for supporting forms of collective intelligence and 
participation that are ultimately necessary for sustaining and further cultivating democracy. 
Though his vision of collective intelligence is in very many ways similar to ideas of 
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computational intelligence expressed in the 1960s, his comments here show that he is much more 
attuned to the social, educational, legal, and cultural frameworks that enable this collective 
intelligence to develop. As already indicated by his description of “brains” as the host of 
convergence, Jenkins views humans almost as a form of technology that needs to be aptly 
programmed to facilitate collective intelligence. He describes the ideal participant of this 
collective intelligence as a “monitorial citizen” who possess a special set of skills that enable 
them to navigate an information-abundant world:  
 
Not simply being able to read and write, but being able to participate in the deliberations 
over what issues matter, what knowledge counts, and what ways of knowing command 
authority and respect. The ideal of the informed citizen is breaking down because there is 
simply too much for any individual to know. The ideal of monitorial citizenship depends 
on developing new skills in collaboration and a new ethic of knowledge sharing that will 
allow us to deliberate together. (258) 
 
In his description of a monitorial citizen, the technology for collective intelligence is a given; 
what is at stake is the individual’s ability to use it in a productive and meaningful ways. Jenkins 
expands upon these ideas specifically with eye towards their significance for education in a white 
paper published in 2009, “Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media Education 
for the 21st Century.” Though he shifts his emphasis from convergence culture to participatory 
culture, this document continues to develops his argument that new practices of networked 
collaboration and and participation are essential for contemporary life. He describes participatory 
culture as: 
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a culture with relatively low barriers to artistic expression and civic engagement, strong 
support for creating and sharing one’s creations, and some type of informal mentorship 
whereby what is known by the most experienced is passed along to novices. A 
participatory culture is also one in which members believe their contributions matter, and 
feel some degree of social connection with one another (at the least they care what other 
people think about what they have created). (3) 
 
Written for educators and policymakers, the white paper makes a number of arguments as to why 
education should pay more attention to popular forms of networked participatory engagement 
and incorporate some of these practices into its curriculum. Given that youth are already 
engaging in these practices, schools have the responsibility to help students develop more 
critical, ethical, and effective forms of engagement, which Jenkins calls “new media literacies.” 
These literacies, he further argues, will be vital for training students to critically understand how 
“commericial interests” structure many of the features of digital environments in ways that are 
not always immediately apparent (16-20). He also argues that new media literacies are important 
for education in that they can open up “opportunities for learning, creative expression, civic 
engagement, political empowerment, and economic advancement” (8),  stimulate political 
interest in youth, and provide  training in important new collaborative and technological skill sets 
necessary for 21st century jobs and citizenship (10).  While Jenkins is critical of some of the 
features of emerging digital technologies, he is largely optimistic about the potential of these 
technologies for education, and in turn, the ability for education to prepare students to critically 
understand these technologies.   
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1.13. The question of the subject (agent) of the reform toward networked culture 
Jenkins also urges for policy changes that would enable society to take better advantage 
of the web and digital technology, and like Benkler, is particularly interested in curtailing 
restrictive copyright laws that stifle new forms of peer production. Jenkins, though, goes further 
than Benkler in his advocacy, given his attention to thinking about the role education might have 
in preparing students to take advantage of the opportunities of digital forms of knowledge 
production and safeguard themselves from some of its challenges. However, it is striking that 
neither Benkler nor Jenkins ultimately question the particular economic foundation that drives 
the development and availability of digital technologies. More specifically, they do not set out to 
fully uncover the identity of the subjects or agents who are responsible for orchestrating this shift 
in culture itself. Instead, technological changes are often described as if they are happening 
without a subject whatsoever, or as if the changes themselves are the subject or agent of 
themselves. Take for instance Benkler:  
 
A series of changes in the technologies, economic organization, and social practices of 
production in this environment has created new opportunities for how we make and 
exchange information, knowledge, and culture. These changes have increased the role of 
nonmarket and nonproprietary production, both by individuals alone and by cooperative 
efforts in a wide range of loosely or tightly woven collaborations. These newly emerging 
practices have seen remarkable success in areas as diverse as software development and 
investigative reporting, avant-garde video and multiplayer online games. (2 emphasis 
mine) 
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Here Benkler constructs “a series of changes” as the subject that “has created new 
opportunities” as if those changes occurred without political, social, or economic actors. While 
he attends in depth to the exciting possibilities arising from these opportunities, he does 
sufficiently attend to the economic foundations driving and sustaining these changes. This same 
perception of “change” being the agent driving change is present in Jenkins’ work as well. In 
making a case for media literacy, he argues that “Changes in the media environment are altering 
our understanding of literacy and requiring new habits of mind, new ways of processing culture 
and interacting with the world around us” (21 emphasis mine). Though their use of “change” as a 
subject in these sentences may seem incidental, it in fact reflects the way in which technological 
change is treated in each of their works. Nowhere in either of these two writers is there a 
suggestion that the technology itself—even prior to the development of laws and policies that 
govern it—is an expression of human action and human power; their discussion instead 
effectively erases the human origins and social dimensions of these technologies. Technology is 
instead presented as an alien force that human beings can only domesticate and prepare for. 
 To be clear, the works of Benkler and Jenkins under discussion here are motivated by 
what I take to be a genuine interest and in stewarding technological change in such a way to take 
advantage of its real political, economic, and cultural opportunities and temper some of its less 
agreeable aspects. I am in full sympathy with their motivations and applaud their ability to richly 
expand our understanding of the significance of these technological changes within a broader 
cultural and economic context. However, the perspective that they offer is ultimately insufficient 
for preparing society to actively steer the course of technological development as they too readily 
acquiesce to the logic of surveillance capitalism that is steering these changes as if it were neutral 
and inevitable force. Though Jenkins and Benkler are clear that they don’t think the outcome of 
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technological change is inevitable, this acquiescence nonetheless represents a form of 
inevitability in their thought, connecting them, however unexpectedly, with some of the more 
wilder and and less theoretically-engaged articulations of cyberutopianism and 
technodeterminism. In my next section, I will discuss a writer who has offered one of the most 
recent and forceful articulations of technodeterminism. In his writings, I will hope to show how 
the metaphors of the global brain (and the democratic hopes they contained) have been entirely 
co-opted in the service of elevating a form of alienated collective intelligence designed to serve 
capital accumulation. However, despite the bombastic nature of some of his claims, out of all the 
thinkers considered, he is perhaps the most articulate about the ways corporate interests are 
benefitting from the development of our global brain.  
1.14. The inevitability of the global brain: Kelly 
Kevin Kelly, a longtime commentator on cyberculture, offers a deterministic view of the 
future of networked technologies in his recent New York Times best selling book The Inevitable: 
Understanding the 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape our Future (2016). As a popular 
press book, The Inevitable is more concerned with propounding the author’s personal views than 
grounding its many bold assertions about coming technological change in extensive scholarly 
research. However, this view is of interest due to Kelly’s early and influential role in helping 
develop the culture of Silicon Valley, and his continued embeddedness within this culture. In the 
early 1980s, Kelly began working as an editor for Whole Earth Catalog, a publication started by 
Stewart Brand in the late 1960s that provided information and consumer access to technologies 
conducive to the counterculture, “back-to-the-land” lifestyle. As Fred Turner tells us, Brand and 
the counterculture movement his publications played a highly-influential role in shaping the 
philosophy and social networks of Silicon Valley. Kelly, thus, experienced these developments 
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from the center, often playing a leading role in pivotal events such as the first hackers conference 
in 1984 and the launch of the WELL, one of the earliest virtual communities. In 1992, Kelly 
helped co-found Wired magazine, one of the most influential publications on technology and 
culture, and served as executive editor until 1999. He has authored several books on technology, 
served as a futurist advisor on Steven Spielberg’s film Minority Report, and co-pioneered the 
“quantified self” movement.  
As reviewers of his previous books have observed, The Inevitable pays virtually no 
attention to social and economic factors driving technological change, manifesting in what Jerry 
A. Coyne has described as Kelly’s “bizarre neo-mystical progressivism.” As Coyne notes, Kelly 
is a self-described devout Christian, and his technological and religious views are complexly 
intertwined. In an interview he declared that technology is “not some lesser evil that we just have 
to put up with, nor is it a neutral tool that can be used for good or bad,” but rather “a divine 
phenomenon that is a reflection of God.” In a 2002 article for Wired, he outlines the “mystical 
doctrine of universal computation” and explored arguments about whether God should be viewed 
as the source code or the programmer of the universe.  
Clearly, then, Kelly is not writing from the same scholarly perspective as Benkler and 
Jenkins. However, his book nonetheless provides and important perspective on technological 
change. Written ten years after The Wealth of Networks and Convergence Culture, and from an 
author who is intimately situated within the communities that are driving technological change, 
For one thing, The Inevitable includes in its analysis a range of important technological trends 
that were not considered by Benkler or Jenkins. In particular, it accords a more adequate focus 
on the centrality of artificial intelligence and tracking in our current information landscape. 
Given the professional and social status of the author, it also offers a snapshot of one strain of 
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Silicon Valley’s technological imagination, which is important for comprehending the ideology 
underlying its technological innovation. And finally, though in many respects it is a book that 
greatly differs from the other two texts considered, there are some subtle — and perhaps 
surprising — parallels that are worth examining more closely.  
As the title declares, The Inevitable is about twelve technological forces that are driving 
technological change and are thoroughly immune to human resistance, or even large scale 
disasters such as “crime, war, or our own excesses” (2). The forces are inevitable, “because they 
are rooted in the nature of technology rather than the nature of society” (7). Kelly describes their 
inevitability as a “bias in the nature of technology that tilts it in certain directions and not others” 
or as stemming from “their basic physics” (4). He clarifies, however, that this does not mean the 
full scope of our response to these technologies are fully determined: “All things being equal, the 
physics and mathematics that rule the dynamics of technology tend to favor certain behaviors. 
These tendencies exist primarily in the aggregate forces that shape the general contours of 
technological forms and do not govern specifics or instances” (3). As an example, he asserts that 
the Internet as a form of global networks was inevitable, but that humans choose whether the 
Internet is public or secret, commercial or nonprofit, national or international. The degree of 
influence Kelly believes human choice has however remains unclear, given that he argues that 
digital technologies will “hatch similar results again and again,” regardless of the geographical, 
political, or business contexts in which they’re deployed (4). 
Thus, the goal of Kelly’s book is to “uncover” the underlying forces of technology “so 
that we can embrace them”: 
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Once seen, we can work with their nature, rather than struggle against it. Massive 
copying is here to stay. Massive tracking and total surveillance is here to stay. Ownership 
is shifting away. Virtual reality is becoming real. We can’t stop artificial intelligences 
and robots from improving, creating new businesses, and taking our current jobs. It may 
be against our initial impulse, but we should embrace the perpetual remixing of these 
technologies. Only by working with these technologies, rather than trying to thwart them, 
can we gain the best of what they have to offer. I don’t mean to keep our hands off. We 
need to manage these emerging inventions to prevent actual (versus hypothetical) harms, 
both by legal and technological means. (5)  
 
As I will show shortly, Kelly’s view that certain forms of technological change are inevitable, is 
animated by ideological views about technology and human society.   
 
1.15. Life-logging: the inevitability of ‘tracking’ and the inescapability of the ‘quantified self’ 
The twelve inevitable forces Kelly focuses on are “becoming,” “cognifying,” “flowing,” 
“screening,” “accessing,” “sharing,” “filtering,” “remixing,” “interacting,” “tracking,” 
“questioning,” and “beginning,” each of which he spends a chapter theorizing. These forces, he 
argues, are shaping the ways in which digital technology is used and developed. Many of them 
affirm the key observations of Benkler and Jenkins. The ability to access, share, filter, remix, and 
interact through networked digital technology is a core condition of Benkler’s networked 
information economy and Jenkins’ convergence culture. Some of Kelly’s forces however 
highlight trends in the use and development of networked digital technology that are not 
considered by Benkler in Jenkins. In particular, his observations regarding “cognifying,” and 
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“tracking” begins to shine light on a critical dimension of networked digital technology that goes 
entirely unconsidered in the analyses of Benkler and Jenkins. 
Kelly describes how the ability to track aspects of human behavior and physiology has 
radically advanced. He writes, “in the last few years extremely tiny digital sensors that cost just a 
few pennies have made recording parameters so easy (just click a button), and the varieties of 
parameters so vast, that almost anyone can now measure a thousand different aspects of 
themselves” (237). Kelly, who helped found the Quantified Self movement, points to ways 
individuals are using this technology to track physiological aspects of themselves such as “diet, 
fitness, sleep patterns, mood, blood factors, genes.” He also points to the ways individuals use a 
variety of digital technologies to track their different professional and social behaviors, or their 
“lifestream.” Stephen Wolfram, for example, created 1.7 million files about his life: 
 
He processed all his outgoing and incoming mail for 25 years. He captured every 
keystroke for 13 years, logged all his phone calls, his steps, his room-to-room motion in 
his home/office, and his GPS locations outside his house. He tracked how many edits he 
made while writing his books and papers. Using his own Mathematica program, he 
turned his self-tracking into a “personal analytics” engine, which illuminated patterns in 
his routines over several decades. (239) 
 
Kelly calls the process of automatic, mechanical tracking of one’s life “lifelogging.” Though 
forms of lifelogging has been experimented with since at least the mid-1980s, the increasing 
cheapness and availability of tiny sensors and computing power has significantly expanded the 
potential and practicality of lifelogging. Kelly argues that we will soon be able to continuously 
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track a vast range of every individual’s physiological state, communicative activities, and 
geographical location. This lifelog would provide: 
 
● “a constant 24/7/365 monitoring of vital body measurements” 
● “an interactive, extended memory of people you met, conversations you had, places you 
visited, and events you participated in” 
● “A complete passive archive of everything you have ever produced, wrote, or said” 
● “A way of organizing, shaping, and “reading” your own life” (249) 
 
In addition, continuous tracking will extend (and indeed already does) to traffic, public spaces, 
smart homes, grocery shopping, purchase patterns, media usage, web browsing, and so forth. 
“Ubiquitous surveillance is inevitable,” he declares (260). “The internet is the world’s largest, 
fastest, tracking machine, and anything that touches it that can be tracked will be tracked….We 
will constantly self-track, track our friends, be tracked by friends, companies, and governments” 
(256). “This bias to track is technological rather than merely social or cultural. It would be true 
in a different nation, even in a command economy, even with a different origin story, even on 
another planet” (257).  
1.16. Capital interests and the agents of artificial (collective) intelligence 
For Kelly, the coming of ubiquitous surveillance has several implications. Individuals 
will benefit by having powerful new modes of understanding and modifying their physiological, 
intellectual, social, and psychological tendencies. He also acknowledges that ubiquitous 
surveillance grants companies and governments too much access to a population’s data, and that 
measures need to be taken where populations, governments, and companies all have equal access 
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to data. “Since we cannot stop the system from tacking, we can only make the relationship more 
symmetrical” (260). It is a brief aside, however, and seems not to concern him too much. What is 
most noteworthy about Kelly’s observations is the way in which he connects ubiquitous tracking 
to what may seem like an entirely different technological trend: artificial intelligence. 
As Kelly notes, artificial intelligence (AI) has become an increasingly important focus for 
digital technology companies. This has become only more the case after his book’s publication 
in 2016. Statista reports that in 2017, the global AI market is expected to be worth approximately 
1.25 billion U.S. dollars, and expected to rise to 36.8 billion by 2025. While AI might have once 
seen the stuff of science fiction, it is now used in a variety of everyday tasks such as image 
recognition, object identification, detection, and classification, as well as automated geophysical 
feature detection (Statista). Tech giants such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, AirBnb, and Uber 
are all investing heavily in developing AI methods and applications. As Kelly notes, no human 
activity is too complex or too trite for AI application. He names music, laundry, marketing, real 
estate, nursing, construction, toys, sports, and even knitting as examples of quotidian activities 
that might soon be transformed by AI implementation. He describes this increasing distribution 
of AI into all aspects of our world as “cognifying,” and like “tracking,” sees it as another 
inevitable force. 
Kelly makes a number of speculative assertions about the the future of AI and its social 
and economic effects. For instance, he describes how these new types of intelligence will be 
necessary for solving problems that the human mind cannot, such as “the current grand mysteries 
of quantum gravity, dark energy, and dark matter” (47). He also assures us that the jobs that they 
will take will allow for humans to have better, more interesting jobs. However, I am most 
interested in highlighting the way Kelly connects the development of artificial intelligence to the 
72
  
phenomenon of tracking. Current approaches in AI are based on “teaching” machines certain 
forms of intelligence by feeding them massive amounts of data. Much of this data is generated 
through the multiple modes of tracking employed by digital technologies. As Kelly notes, “Part 
of the AI breakthrough lies in the incredible avalanche of collected data about our world, through 
which provides the schooling that AIs need. Massive databases, self-tracking, web cookies, 
online footprints, terabytes of storage, decades of search results, Wikipedia, and the entire digital 
universe became the teachers making AI smart” (39). Seen in this light, data gleaned from 
ubiquitous tracking isn’t only valuable for companies in their pursuit of selling user focused 
advertising. Instead, data becomes a raw asset for creating tomorrow’s most valuable product.  
Kelly relates a personal anecdote that suggests technology companies have been 
preparing for this longer game for quite some time. In 2002, Kelly asked Google’s co-founder 
Larry Page why Google was invested in building free search engines. Page replied: “Oh, we’re 
really making an AI” (37). Kelly expounds upon Page’s reply: 
 
Rather than use AI to make its search better, Google is using search to make its AI better. 
Every time you type a query, click on a search-generated link, or create a link on the page 
you are training the Google AI. When you type “Easter Bunny” into the image search bar 
and then click on the most Easter Bunny-looking image, you are teaching the AI what an 
Easter Bunny looks like. Each of the 3 billion queries that Google conducts each day 
tutors the deep-learning AI over and over again. With another 10 years of steady 
improvements to its AI algorithms, pus a thousandfold more data and a hundred times 
more computing resources, Google will have an unrivaled AI. (37) 
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In several respects, then, Kelly’s book is remarkably more attuned to the role of data in 
the development and use of networked digital technologies. Of course, being published in 2016, 
ten years after The Wealth of Networks and Convergence Culture, Kelly had the benefit of 
observing the way in which dataveillance would come to play an increasingly important role in 
the networked information economy. Still, Kelly’s industry-insider status keys him into the basic 
fact, overlooked by both Benkler and Jenkins and many others, that dataveillance isn’t simply 
about selling targeted ads, but rather created inputs for machine learning in an industry-wide 
dash towards developing artificial intelligence. Pointing to the ways in which forms of artificial 
intelligence are already deployed in everyday applications, Kelly argues that artificial 
intelligence will increasingly take over all forms of labor—from professional occupations to 
other types of activities such as recommendation systems, search results, marketing, 
construction, nursing, personal assistance and so forth. Whether Kelly is right about the degree to 
which artificial intelligence “takes over,” his observations imply that networked user activity 
plays a direct role in “training” these artificial intelligences as well as producing an industry 
product completely alienated from a majority of the users whose labor has unwittingly gone into 
producing it. 
What room, then, if any, does Kelly see for potential openings for decreasing this general 
alienation from this artificial intelligence? Judging from the title of his book alone, The 
Inevitable: Understanding the Twelve Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future, Kevin 
Kelly seems to ascribe a far more deterministic view about the nature of technological change. 
However, a close reading reveals that Kelly, Jenkins, and Benkler share more similar views on 
this topic than one might immediately suspect. Though Kelly believes that there are certain 
“natural,” “physical” forces that drive technological development, he also believes that humans 
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still have an important role in managing them through “legal and technological means.” For 
example, he writes: “...while we can’t stop (tracking), it does matter greatly what legal and social 
regimes surround ubiquitous (tracking). How we handle rewards for innovation, intellectual 
property rights and responsibilities, ownership of and access to (tracking) makes a huge 
difference to society’s prosperity and happiness. Ubiquitous (tracking) is inevitable, but we have 
significant choices about its character” (256).3 Throughout the book he makes a few specific 
suggestions about what those choices should include. For example, he argues that given the 
inevitability of tracking all human activity, measures should be put in place so that the benefits 
of tracking can be equitably shared by all: “If symmetry can be restored so we can track who is 
tracking, if we can hold the trackers accountable by law (there should be regulation) and 
responsible for accuracy, and if we can make the nefits obvious and relevant, then I suspect the 
expansions of tracking will be accepted” (261).  
However, these comments are sparse and fairly undeveloped, giving one these sense that 
Kelly doesn’t see these issues of primary concern. What comes across more strongly in the book 
is the sense of glory manifesting itself in these inevitable changes. In his last chapter, he invokes 
the sublime by describing how technology is evolving towards the development of an 
unfathomably vast intelligence which will make our current moment appear “ancient”: 
 
Thousands of years from now, when historians review the past, our ancient time here at 
the beginning of the third millennium will be seen as an amazing moment. This is the 
time when inhabitants of this planet first linked themselves together into one very large 
thing. Later, the very large thing would become even larger, but you and I are alive at that 
                                                
3 The subject of the this paragraph is in fact “copying,” not “tracking.” However, Kelly instructs the reader to 
substitute the word “tracking” for the word “copying” in this paragraph, as his observations apply to both forces.  
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moment when it first awoke. Future people will envy us, wishing they could have 
witnessed the birth we saw. It was in these years that humans began animating inert 
objects with tiny bits of intelligence, weaving them into a cloud of machine intelligences 
and then linking billions of their own minds into this single supermind. This convergence 
will be recognized as the largest, most complex, and most surprising event on the planet 
up until this time. (291) 
 
Kelly’s tone in this passage recalls the 19th century belief in manifest destiny, belief that 
American settlers were historically (and virtuously) destined to settle the continent as part of 
God’s work (Mountjoy 13). Compare Kelly’s words with Thomas Paine’s “Common Sense” 
pamphlet, which embodied and encouraged the movement’s belief (Mountjoy 15): “We have it 
in our power to begin the world over again. A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened 
since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand” (Paine 118-119).4 Like 
Paine, Kelly finds our moment one in which the world is being reborn. There is a sense of 
virtuousness in the inevitability in Kelly’s claims as well: “We are marching inexorably towards 
firmly connecting all humans and all machines into a global matrix” (296). In this future we will 
find a “new regime wherein our creations makes (sic) us better humans…” (296).  
In this final chapter, however, there is no mention of the stakes of this “inexorable 
march,” nor any reiteration of the importance or potential effects of specifically human choice. It 
is also difficult to discern what he means by “better humans,” as he gives no concrete description 
of what “better” might entail. Indeed, only a few chapters earlier, he makes a statement that 
                                                
4 Compare also the aforementioned remarks about Kelly’s Christian background. 
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should make us further question what he means by “better,” and who in fact will benefit from 
these technological developments:  
 
The big global system will not be utopia. Even three decades from now, regional fences 
will remain in this cloud. Parts will be firewalled, censored, privatized. Corporate 
monopolies will control aspects of the infrastructure, though these internet monopolies 
are fragile and ephemeral, subject to sudden displacement by competitors. Although 
minimal access will be universal, higher bandwidth will be uneven and clumped around 
urban areas. The rich will get the premium access. In short, the distribution of resources 
will resemble the rest of life. (294)  
 
This implies that Kelly’s view of technological change will ultimately offer a very narrow scope 
of ill-defined action that humans in general might contribute to its stewarding. What seems 
perhaps even more inevitable than technological development, for Kelly, is the persistence of an 
economic order that preserves corporate domination and unequal distribution of resources among 
social classes. Here we find a further acceptance and perceived neutrality of the current 
economic order driving technological change. Nothing in his book suggests that Kelly thinks this 
order could be changed by either human action (such as the laws and policy changes he suggests 
earlier for cultivating these technologies) or technological action itself. Even the supermind 
composed of “billions of minds” is apparently powerless to think through new possibilities for 
social order.  
Despite its current alienated manifestation, there is still much promise in the idea of a 
global brain, or a networked world in which humans can rapidly share information for the 
77
  
purpose of advancing democracy, education, and human well being. What I hope to have shown 
here in my critical readings of some of its champions is that objective conceptions of collective 
intelligence are unequipped to recognize the ways the “intelligence” produced by the network 
can contribute to reproducing unequal and oppressive realities such as we see today with the 
emergence of surveillance capitalism. In the next chapter, I’ll develop a framework that in 
contrast to the thinkers surveyed here will attend to the social realities of the production, design, 
use, and instrumentalization of networked technology, which I will reframe as “software,” that 
facilitates collective intelligence. This framework will begin to allow us to pay better attention to 
how private interest shapes the activities, mentalities, and capabilities of the networked user and 
prepare us later on to imagine more equitable forms of participation in the development and use 
of software in order to allow for more liberating forms of collective intelligence.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Software of the Oppressed: The Crisis of the Cyborg World 
 
As we shall see, the future limits of this technology are not in the hardware but in our 
minds … For the immediate future, the issue of whether machines can become intelligent 
is less important than learning to deal with a device that can become whatever we clearly 
imagine it to be. 
—Ted Nelson  
We don’t know how to talk about these companies, nor digest their sheer power. 
—Ellen P. Goodman and Julia Powles  
 
2.1. Introduction: oppression in the software status quo  
As we saw in the last chapter, the metaphor of intelligence has been used by many 
computer scientists, theorists, and critics to describe the benefits and continued promise of the 
role of computers in our lives. Though this metaphor is useful in many ways for understanding 
and developing the computer’s capacities, it is unfortunately not as equipped for understanding 
the variety of economic and social processes facilitated by the broad diffusion of computer 
technology in society. In particular, it has kept contemporary theorists and boosters of computing 
technology—such as Yochai Benkler, Henry Jenkins, and Kevin Kelly— from sufficiently 
considering the economic logic of “surveillance capitalism” that propels the development and 
availability of computing technology and the significance of this logic for the type of 
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“intelligence” the computer facilitates. These writers have instead largely treated the economic 
foundations of the computational innovation as neutral and inevitable, leaving us with very few 
tools for analyzing computer technology in the specific context of surveillance capitalism. To fill 
this need, I offered the concept of “alienated intelligence” as a way to shift the metaphor of 
computational intelligence in such a way that we can better attend to the economic and political 
dimensions of the use, development, and championing of computer technology.  
In this chapter, I will focus on the role of software in facilitating this alienation and argue 
that multiple aspects of software production and use (ranging from its technical design to 
common beliefs about who is capable of producing software) are put into the service of carrying 
out this alienation. I will then attempt to show that the use of software to facilitate alienation 
ultimately constitutes a form of political oppression. Drawing on the work of science and 
technology scholar Donna Haraway and educational philosopher Paulo Freire, I will develop the 
specific concept of “cyborg oppression” to describes the continuous, algorithmically automated 
denial of letting individuals understand and transform their digitally-mediated world. I will then 
suggest how my notion of cyborg oppression might be used to better identify less recognized 
oppressive features of popular and normalized computer technology as well as offer a framework 
for thinking through what “liberating” computer technology might look like.  
 
2.2. The need for new analytical concepts  
A number of scholars and media commentators have called attention to the difficulty in 
adequately comprehending and discussing our rapidly evolving digital world. Words such as 
“web,” “online,” or “Internet” do not sufficiently convey the complex and widespread way in 
which digital technologies are intertwining with nearly all aspects of life. While more recent 
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terms such as “Internet of Things,”5 “ubiquitous computing,” and “everyware,”6 highlight the 
widespread prevalence of these technologies, they still fail to capture the social and political 
dimension of their use. Furthermore, these words exclude forms of offline digital technology that 
are also important aspects of our digital life. Yochai Benkler’s influential concept of the 
“networked information economy” (2006) improves in some ways upon these terms, as it 
expands our attention beyond the tools themselves and onto the broader social world in which 
they influence action. However, despite this advantage, Benkler’s notion of economy is limited 
to the world of user production rather than the production and availability of the tools 
themselves, as was discussed in the previous chapter. In some respects, Tim O’Reilly’s term 
“Web 2.0,” conceptualized as set of business strategies for digital companies, does shine light on 
this economic aspect of digital tools, but only at the cost of carefully considering their broader 
political dimension. One might turn to the exciting work by Anne Helmond on the 
“platformization of the web”7 as a concept that highlights the social effects of dominant business 
trends on the web, but this concept, too, limits our attention to digital platforms and does not help 
us think about digital tools outside of the platform paradigm. Individually, each of these concepts 
can be useful in focusing our attention on specific characteristics and potentialities of our digital 
                                                
5 For an overview of the “Internet of Things,” see Greengard 2015.  
6 For literature on “ubiquitous computing,” see Greenfield 2010, Obaidat et al 2011, and Poslad 2011.  
7 Helmond uses the term “platformization” to refer to the “rise of the platform as the dominant 
infrastructural and economic model of the social web and the consequences of the expansion of social 
media platforms into other spaces online” (2015, 5). She writes:“The term “platform” has become the 
dominant concept for social media companies for positioning themselves in the market and addressing 
users, and it has been widely taken up by consumers and the press (Gillespie 2010). Within new media 
studies, the platform concept has gained prominence to draw attention to the “discursive work” they 
undertake (Gillespie, 2010, p. 348) and to the role of software—which powers social media—in shaping 
participation and sociality (Bucher, 2012a; Hands, 2013; Langlois, McKelvey, Elmer, & Werbin, 2009; van 
Dijck, 2013)” (Helmond 2015, 2). In addition, MIT’s book series Platform Studies publishes monographs 
that investigate the “underlying computer systems and how they enable, constrain, shape, and support 
the creative work that is done on them.”  
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environment and its shifting, heterogenous character, but they do not yet offer a broad critical 
framework for considering the political and social aspects of digital technology at large.  
Part of the challenge of describing our digital environment stems from the simple fact 
that it has evolved faster than our ability to conceptualize its changes and their broad effects. 
Referring to the enormous scope of these changes, scholar Cathy Davidson rightly observes, 
“This isn’t just a new technology. It is a new conceptual, epistemological, economic, intellectual, 
and social model for human interaction” (2017). Similarly, in a September 2016 article in The 
Guardian, Ellen P. Goodman and Julia Powles describe a sort of speechlessness in the wake of 
these changes: 
 
We don’t know how to talk about these companies, nor digest their sheer power.  
 
We call them platforms, networks or gatekeepers. But these labels hardly fit. The 
appropriate metaphor eludes us; even if we describe them as vast empires, they are unlike 
any we’ve ever known. Far from being discrete points of departure, merely supporting 
the action or minding the gates, they have become something much more significant. 
They have become the medium through which we experience and understand the world. 
 
Other commentators have pointed to ways that this conceptual and linguistic gap has enabled 
corporations to set the terms of the ways in which they are discussed and understood. Digital 
platforms often use rhetoric that signals the company’s commitment to democratic or community 
values. Facebook’s mission, for example, is “to give people the power to share and make the 
world more open and connected.” Google’s mission is “to organize the world's information and 
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make it universally accessible and useful.”8 While there may be aspects of truth to these mission 
statements, they both leave out the critical fact that their missions also rely on the profitability of 
these activities, which in turn deeply shapes—and ultimately sets limits to—the way in which 
they interpret and carry out activities of openness, connection, organization, and so forth. At 
best, this egalitarian rhetoric obscures the ways that private interests mediate user activities. At 
worst, it hides or at least misrepresents those activities all together. Van Dijck, for example, 
describes this process as one in which developers attempt to “impute” utopian meanings into 
their corporate mission (2013,11). She writes, “Key terms used to describe social media’s 
functionality, such as the “social,” “collaboration,” and “friends,” resonate with the communalist 
jargon of early utopian visions of the web as a space that inherently enhances social activity. In 
reality, the meanings of these words have increasingly been informed by automated technologies 
that direct human sociality” (2013, 13). Similarly, education technology critic Audrey Watters 
has usefully described one example of this as “openwashing,” or the use of the rhetoric of 
“openness” to promote technologies as “politically good” or “progressive,” when in fact that 
“openness” has no clear, concrete meaning or political commitment. Watters writes:  
  
We act—at our peril—as if “open” is politically neutral, let alone politically good or 
progressive. Indeed, we sometimes use the word to stand in place of a politics of 
participatory democracy. We presume that, because something is “open” that it 
necessarily contains all the conditions for equality or freedom or justice. We use “open” 
as though it is free of ideology, ignoring how much “openness,” particularly as it’s used 
by technologists, is closely intertwined with “meritocracy”—this notion, a false one, that 
                                                
8 This is the successor to their even more explicitly moral-idealistic slogan of ‘don’t be evil,’ which was 
(ominously) phased out in 2015. 
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“open” wipes away inequalities, institutions, biases, history, that “open” “levels the 
playing field.” (Watters 2014 n.p.) 
  
In his critical analysis of Wikipedia, Nicholas Tkacz has also underscored how the seemingly 
neutral rhetoric of “openness” helps advance a neoliberal ideology (178). The continuous use of 
words commonly associated with progressive values to carry out technological and corporate 
agendas has its roots in what Richard Barbrook and Andy Cameron have famously called the 
“Californian Ideology,” a “contradictory blend of conservative economics and hippie radicalism” 
(15) made possible through “a nearly universal belief in technological determinism” (5), of the 
sort we found in our review in the previous chapter of Kevin Kelly’s recent work.  
As a linguistic trend, it has arguably made it more difficult for the public to critically 
comprehend and discuss the complex effects of digital technologies. As media commentator 
Astra Taylor has noted, it is extraordinarily difficult to begin a critical public discourse about 
these issues when “we have wholly adopted the language and vision offered up by Silicon Valley 
executives and the new-media boosters who promote their interests” (9-10). Scholars themselves 
have also been criticized for too readily adopting the rhetoric and vision of these technology 
companies. Henry Jenkins’ notion of “convergence culture,” which claims that new technologies 
are allowing for more expansive and inclusive forms of collaboration and participation (cf. 
previous chapter), was extensively critiqued in a special issue of the scholarly journal Cultural 
Studies in 2011. In their introduction to the issue, editors James Hay and Nick Couldry argue that 
Jenkin’s idea of convergence culture does not do nearly enough to sufficiently account for the 
corporate logic that enables networked participatory culture.  
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2.3. The return of the cyborg, the birth of the cyborg world 
Altogether, these observations suggest there is need for new modes of considering digital 
technology more broadly, and the unexpected relationships between its social, technological, 
economic, cultural, and political dimensions. What I will argue here is that Donna Haraway’s 
figure of the cyborg, updated for the 21st century, offers a surprisingly productive framework for 
analyzing these dimensions despite—as I will consider shortly—the variety of critiques it has 
received since the 1984 publication of Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto.” It can help us, first of all, 
recognize the sometimes invisibled embeddedness of digital technology in our everyday lives. 
For example, in their 2007 book Decoding Liberation: The Promise of Free and Open Source 
Software, Samir Chopra and Scott Dexter describe use the cyborg figure to show how digital 
techology influences nearly all aspects of human life and society. They write:  
 
In a world in which computer technology infiltrates all interactions with the physical 
world, when its prosthetic enhancements becomes ubiquitous, our world is no longer a 
physical one populated by cyborgs, but is itself a cyborg world. In the cyborg world, 
humans and machines commingle, a merger enabled and governed by software. This 
interaction, ranging from mundane uses of computers for personal productivity to 
networking, from e-government to computer prosthetics, to our saturation by the 
informational content of media, is in part determined and limited by the abilities of the 
machine, which are in turn determined by its software. Software, the machines on which 
it runs, and the humans that use it, create the cyborg world. (149 emphasis mine) 
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As the excerpt articulates, Chopra and Dexter are interested specifically in the role of 
software in the cyborg world. Software, which they define as “a sequence of instructions for the 
computer to execute” (xiii), constitutes a governing force as it sets the scope of possible action of 
the digital technologies it constitutes. Thus, they argue that political freedom in the cyborg world 
depends on the protection of technologically specific political freedoms regarding the use and 
production of software. In their account, these freedoms have been infringed upon by dominant 
modes of commercial software production and distribution that conceal the source code of 
software programs from the software user. This concealment is often justified as the natural 
protection of a “trade secret,” whose revelation would supposedly cause “disastrous economic 
effects for its corporate creator” (xiv). However, the concealment of source code already has the 
negative consequence of putting personal and political freedoms at stake, both with respect to 
freedom of creativity and with respect to freedom from harm. Concerning the latter, the closed 
nature of software denies users the right to individually or collectively comprehend the activities 
enabled by software. This allows software companies to secretly inflict unwanted forms of user 
manipulation and control, as I will discuss shortly. Concerning the former, closedness also denies 
users the ability to individually or collectively modify software for their diverse and emerging 
needs. This has the further cultural consequence, among the vast majority of users, of 
contributing to what Jonathan Zittrain has described as the move away from the earlier 
computing community’s ethos of a “generative network,” which “fosters innovation and 
disruption,” and move toward an ethos of viewing computing as a “appliancized network” (8), a 
shift that itself greatly limits its innovative capacity, as I will also argue below.  
 Chopra and Dexter use the figure of the cyborg world to work against the common 
assumptions that software is something whose conditions are merely or largely technical, whose 
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inner workings are only of interest to those who are technically inclined, and whose effects are 
largely limited to certain very specific ‘human-computer interactions.’ These assumptions are 
reinforced by the fact that—as scholars such as Wendy Chun (2011) and Jose Van Djick have 
observed (“Datification”)—computers and software have long been conceived of neutral and 
objective technologies by their makers, users, boosters, and even in the U.S. legal system. They 
may also be reinforced by the fact that, as Chopra and Dexter point out, users often don’t have 
access to the code of the software that runs their computers, or is present in cars, buildings, 
appliances, financial and transportation systems. Despite its relative invisibility, however, it is 
becoming increasingly obvious that software has extensive political and social effects—and not 
just in the obvious sense that manipulation of, e.g., Facebook algorithms for advertisements by 
‘fake news’ syndicates might have been decisive in the 2016 U.S. election (Alcott 2017). This 
gives support Chopra and Dexter’s claim that “to understand (software) as mere machine 
instructions is to ignore its creative potential and its power to enforce political and social control, 
is to indulge in a problematic blindness” (xvi).  
 
2.4. A critical history of the use of the concept 
If the foregoing helps to motivate the idea that the figure of the cyborg—and its extension 
to the cyborg world—will be especially well-suited to let us appreciate the many ways in which 
software is intimately bound up in the activities of daily life, we can now turn more directly to 
the exposition of the core concept itself, beginning with the history of its formation 
“Cyborg” was originally coined in 1960 by scientists Manfred Clynes and Nathan S. 
Kline in an article regarding technological solutions for adapting the human body to space travel 
so as to “(free) man [sic] to explore” (27). The cyborg, they write “deliberately incorporates 
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exogenous components extending the self-regulatory control function of the organism in order to 
adapt it to new environments” (27). Or to put it more simply, the cyborg is a “man” that uses 
technological devices to “automatically and unconsciously” assist its biological needs, “leaving 
man free to explore, to create, to think, and to feel” (27) in an otherwise hostile environment 
such as outer space.  
As with most recent theorists, however, Chopra and Dexter’s use of the term ‘cyborg’ 
draws directly on Donna Haraway’s later use of it in her famous 1985 “Cyborg Manifesto.” Her 
own notion of the cyborg differs considerably, in important ways, from the one first put forth by 
Clynes and Kline. In Clynes and Kline’s conception, the cyborg is an exceptional being made for 
exceptional situations. For Haraway, however, writing only a little more than two decades later, 
the cyborg is unspectacular in that it is an existential quality of all life. “By the late twentieth 
century…” she writes, “we are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and 
organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology…” (150). For Haraway, it’s 
impossible to talk about technology as something separate from ourselves, as it is deeply infused 
in the processes that mediate our social, political, and biological lives. It is this last feature—the 
indefinitely permeating quality of what is cyborg—that Chopra and Dexter, in turn, take as their 
jumping-off point for the concept of a cyborg world. For Chopra and Dexter, software is the 
ever-present medium which enables and governs the constant and pervasive merger between 
technology and these different aspects of life.  
Though I want to further develop this use of the term for what follows, it is worth 
acknowledging upfront that there have been various concerns raised about the concept itself. 
Given that its roots are by now more than thirty years old, the concept of a“cyborg world” may 
seem more distracting than useful for a discussion of contemporary digital technology. In some 
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ways, it may seem as dated as other technological terms that have fallen out of fashion such as 
“cyberspace,” which David Bell describes as having the “quaint tinge of nostalgia to it... oddly 
old-fashioned, antique even, yet ...belying its roots in science fiction, something even maybe a 
little bit utopian” (2). More importantly, Haraway’s cyborg has has been used to signify so many 
different aspects of contemporary life that the term might seem nothing more than an empty 
cliche today. Haraway’s former student, Zoe Soufoulis, has described the Manifesto’s mass 
influence as a “cyberquake,” observing that it has influenced a wide variety of discursive spaces, 
such as “feminist political theories of anthropology, ethnic identities, and lesbian and queer 
sexualities . . . [to] studies of cosmetic surgery, reproductive technologies, and female body 
building,” as: 
 
The vocabulary of cyborgism was found relevant for discussing a range of cultural and 
technological phenomena, from mundane computer and video game interactions, or 
human interactions mediated by computers and the Internet, to more extreme examples of 
anything involving physical and virtual intimacies between humans and machines, 
especially where the latter were seen to exert some type of agency. (56) 
 
In other words, the cyborg manifesto has perhaps been overused in scholarly discussion. It has 
also received considerable criticism on multiple accounts as actually helping a number of other 
theoretical blindspots persist below the critical radar, which in turn may lead us to believe the 
concept is better left by the wayside. Abby Wilkerson, for example, has argued that the “myth 
evades the very issues of race and sexuality which it seems to be addressing” and calls for a 
“more concrete, situated approach to theorizing sexuality” (164). In a powerful demonstration of 
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the manifesto’s evasions of race, Jade Davis posted a modified version of the manifesto online, 
where every use of the word “cyborg” was replaced with “black slave.” She describes the 
motivations for the modification in a blog post: 
 
In 2011 I was enrolled in a core course in the second year of my program. We read “A 
Cyborg Manifesto.” As is often the case, I was the only black person in the room. I read 
something different than everyone else based on the discussion. All I could think was, 
“we use words like cyborg because we don’t have the language to talk about the black 
experience, more specifically the organizing role chattel slavery, signified by the black 
body, played and continues to play, in culture and society. Instead of joining the 
discussion I copied the text into a google doc and did a find and replace… “cyborg” 
should be “black slave.” 
 
The point of Davis’ experiment was to show that the issues Haraway conceived of as related to 
technology might in fact be better recognized as issues related to racial oppression, suggesting 
that the manifesto too readily ignores racial oppression. Similarly, Alison Kafer notes that the 
manifesto disregards “any kind of critical engagement with disability . . . disabled bodies are 
simply presented as exemplary . . .requiring neither analysis nor critique” (105). Judy Wajcman 
argues in a parallel fashion that “the cyborg solution and the goddess solution” imposes a 
dichotomy that "caricatures feminism” and impedes useful modes of thought for thinking 
through technological issues. Others have even called attention to the lack of accessibility of 
Haraway’s prose, such as Jackie Orr who notes that "undergraduate students in a science and 
technology class find the cyborg manifesto curiously relevant but somewhat impenetrable to 
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read." Even Haraway herself seems to signal the obsolescence of cyborg thinking in a 2006 
interview when she states that, “The despised place then was the cyborg, which is not true now” 
(Gane & Haraway, 156).  
To be sure, the manifesto is imperfect, and cannot be considered outside the light of these 
important criticisms. Nonetheless, in face of the difficulties conceptualizing our evolving digital 
paradigm, I remain convinced that the notion of the “cyborg world” in particular still has much 
to offer. First, it simply provides a flexible name for more comprehensively describing the 
diverse types of digital technology and their use that cannot be narrowed down to words like the 
“Internet,” “World Wide Web,” or “platforms,” and that may change over time. In this 
framework, we can now see these types of terms as overlapping modalities of the cyborg world, 
each emerging in a particular set of economic, social, and technological conditions, and often 
named not merely to describe some objective fact of the cyborg world, but to rally interest and 
investment in a particular type of business or research activity that pertains to it. Secondly, the 
very subject of the term—”world”—foregrounds the social and political dimension of digital 
technologies in ways that the other terms do not. In this way, the term encourages us to consider 
digital technologies not simply as consumer services or communication devices that we employ 
as masters, but rather as mediums that influence our freedoms, subjectivities, and very modes of 
being. Chopra and Dexter underscore this point in their description of technology as “cognitive 
extensions,”: 
 
The worry that we surrender decision making to our cognitive extensions is not idle 
Luddite speculation. It is the real fear of becoming passive recipients of opaque 
technology. Questions of technology are no longer external to us: to inquire into the 
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nature, shape, form and control of technology is to inquire into ourselves. Those to 
whom we grant this control are those whom we vouchsafe control of ourselves. (146 
emphasis mine) 
 
The concept of the cyborg world thus elevates questions concerning user freedom to the status of 
questions of freedom in and of itself.  
 
2.5. Recovering neglected themes from Haraway’s original text 
I have suggested that Chopra and Dexter’s own adoption of the concept ‘cyborg world’ 
already begins to chart a fruitful path for uncovering some of the broad political questions 
regarding digital technologies, and their relevance to human freedom at large. However, their use 
of the figure does not exhaust the full range of meanings that Haraway grants to the cyborg in her 
original manifesto. There are in fact many more promising avenues of thought offered in her 
manifesto that can continue to generate fresh conceptual frameworks for understanding and 
transforming our increasingly complex cyborg world. In this section, I’ll give an an overview of 
some these unconsidered aspects of Haraway’s manifesto so as to revive some of her ideas that 
modified slightly, may still be of powerful use.  
To be in a position to more fully understand Haraway’s manifesto, we must first 
acknowledge that it is intended as what she calls a “political myth” that is offered to help redirect 
thought and action in more fruitful ways of countering capitalism’s global dominance. 
Understanding this text as myth, or as a text that is meant to inspire new perspectives rather than 
enforce clearly defined concepts, will help us reckon later with some of its more ambiguous and 
contradictory moments. Indeed, Haraway is more interested in breaking down entrenched forms 
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of conceptual clarity to open possibility for new thought, than offering yet another totalizing grid 
for understanding. She uses the cyborg myth to challenge a broad array of notions related to 
technology, identity, and dualistic forms of Western thought, especially as they show up in 
influential feminist and socialist discourses contemporary to the time of the manifesto’s 
publication.She writes:  
 
One of my premises is that most American socialists and feminists see deepened 
dualisms of mind and body, animal and machine, idealism and materialism in the social 
practices, symbolic formulations, and physical artefacts associated with 'high technology' 
and scientific culture. From One Dimensional Man (Marcuse, 1964) to the Death of 
Nature (Merchant, 1980), the analytic resources developed by progressives have insisted 
on the necessary domination of technics and recalled us to an imagined organic body to 
integrate our resistance. (154) 
 
Haraway argues that these modes of thought are underwritten by a logic of domination and a 
misguided hope for organic or natural forms of social unity that impede the advancement of 
progressive political action. She notes that the failure of these forms of thought can be readily 
observed in the hard realities of the present political situation: “War prepares us to notice some 
important inadequacies in feminist analysis which has proceeded as if the organic, hierarchical 
dualisms ordering discourse in 'the West' since Aristotle still ruled,” she writes. “The 
dichotomies between mind and body, animal and human, organism and machine, public and 
private, nature and culture, men and women, primitive and civilized are all in question 
ideologically” (163, italics mine). Haraway asserts an urgent need to form political unity through 
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affinities between diverse identities, and the breaking down of hierarchical dualisms to allow 
more imaginative possibilities for resistance. Underscoring this point, she writes, “The need for 
unity of people trying to resist world-wide intensification of domination has never been more 
acute” (154). Writing in the shadow of the Cold War, Haraway sees the struggle as one between 
life and death for life on earth. She writes, “I want to see if cyborgs can subvert the apocalypse 
of returning to nuclear dust in the manic compulsion to name the Enemy” (151).  
Haraway’s proposed cyborg hero, however, is not just a technological configuration, but 
an imaginative configuration made possible by myth. For Haraway, myths are extremely 
powerful forms of control and influence as they sustain and enable different forms of political, 
intellectual, technological, and social imagination and being. For example, she describes the 
dualistic, hierarchical forms of thinking that she opposes as part of the Western “high-tech myth 
systems” that structure “our imaginations of personal and social possibility” (169). These myth 
systems are colonizing forces that are driving the human species towards self destruction (175). 
Her manifesto, thus, is offered as a counter myth to open up new imaginative possibles for 
thought and action. She uses the figure of the cyborg not only to describe the new technological 
status of the world, but as an “imaginative resource” for breaking out of “the maze of dualisms in 
which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves” (181). By breaking free of these 
dualisms, Haraway hopes we might imagine new powerful political forms of unlikely affinities 
and coalitions between machines, animals, and social identities (155). Underscoring the 
importance of imagination to our political, social, and even technological realities, she writes:  
 
Liberation rests on the construction of the consciousness, the imaginative apprehension of 
oppression, and so of possibility . . . This is a struggle over life and death, but the 
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boundary between science fiction and social reality is an optical illusion. (149, italics 
mine). 
 
For Haraway, our social realities are in large part formed by the ways in which our imagination 
enables us to perceive and act in the world. Her figure of the cyborg thus acts as a provocative 
question throughout the manifesto, intended to stimulate and expand the imagination for new 
political possibilities. “Who cyborgs will be is a radical question,” she writes. “The answers are a 
matter of survival” (153). Imagining the cyborg becomes a framework for imagining the 
possibility of historical transformation. The precise nature of the cyborg thus remains an open 
question throughout the manifesto.  
Haraway initially defines the cyborg early on in her manifesto as a “cybernetic organism, 
a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” 
(149). At first glance, this definition appears to be mostly in line with Clynes and Kline’s general 
notion of a biological creature whose life functionalities rely on technological assistance. Her 
first concrete examples generalize Clyne and Kline’s cyborg to other forms of life besides man, 
such as animals, and also includes modern medicine as a form of technology: “Contemporary 
science fiction is full of cyborgs—creatures simultaneously animal and machine, who populate 
worlds ambiguously natural and crafted. Modem medicine is also full of cyborgs, of couplings 
between organism and machine, each conceived as coded devices, in an intimacy and with a 
power that was not generated in the history of sexuality” (149-150). The examples she gives here 
are still largely wedded to Clynes and Kline’s underlying idea of cyborgs as organisms who are 
biologically fused to technological prostheses. However, without warning, Haraway’s cyborg 
takes on a much more ambiguous and sometimes contradictory significance than these initial 
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simple animal-machine pairings suggest, revealing the cyborg to be as much of a mythic or 
metaphorical figure as a descriptive concept. For example, Haraway points to “Southeast Asian 
village women workers in Japanese and US electronics firms” as “real-life cyborgs” (177). This 
example might strike us as surprising, given that these women do not have technological 
prostheses that are described in Kline and Clyne’s original description of the cyborg and that 
often accompany popular imagery of the cyborg. Yet, Haraway describes these women as “real-
life cyborgs” based on their ability to collectively resist capitalist industrial order in an act that 
she describes as “rewriting the texts of their bodies and societies” (177). Similarly, she also 
points to “women making chips in Asia and spiral dancing in Santa Rita jail” as examples of 
cyborgs based on the fact that their “constructed unities will guide effective oppositional 
strategies” (154). From these examples we can deduce that Haraway’s conception of the cyborg 
does not necessarily rely on overt couplings of organism and machine, but may instead consist of 
beings that are able to resist or transform (or “rewrite” in Haraway’s language) their social 
position and environment through constructing “unities” or unlikely “couplings” across social 
groups that rely on political (through choice) rather than organic bonds (of blood relation).  
At other points, however, Haraway gives indication that she doesn’t mean to limit the 
cyborg only to people invested with this quality of political resistance. This is seen most 
strikingly in her declaration we noted earlier that “we are (all) cyborgs” (150). Here, Haraway 
seems to imply that all subjects are cyborgs, regardless of any one’s personal political affiliation, 
thus troubling yet again any certainty that the concept of the cyborg relies on a particular type of 
politics or technological configuration. 9 There are several ways we might account for this 
                                                
9 I interpret her use of the word “we” here—however much she contests totalizing, unifying concepts throughout the 
piece—to refer to all of humankind, regardless of any one individual’s politics or particular usage of machines. For 
example, she writes “Which identities are available to ground such a potent political myth called 'us,' and what could 
motivate enlistment in this collectivity?” (155). 
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surprising generalization of all human beings as cyborgs. One way is to acknowledge that human 
society as a whole is reliant on biotechnologies (such as medicine) and communication 
technologies in ways that, though do not appear as highly-visible technological prostheses of the 
body, still qualify as incorporating technology into our bodily processes. However, an even 
broader way that we might understand her claim is through her broader assertion elsewhere in 
the manifesto that “there is no fundamental, ontological separation in our formal knowledge of 
machine and organism, of technical and organic” (178). If there is no conceptual difference 
between machine and organism, then every human being, even one seemingly untouched by 
modern technology, is just as much a cyborg as a human being with technological prostheses.  
 
2.6. Responding to the worry of emptiness: effecting oppositional consciousness 
By the same stroke, however, it would also seem to follow, conversely, that objects we 
typically take to be purely machines also might be said to be cyborgs, and therefore 
incorporating something of the organic into themselves. Through such an expansive lens, it can 
be difficult to identify the logic underwriting Haraway’s descriptions of cyborgs, and tempting to 
conclude that there is no way to rule anything at all out from the category of the cyborg. 
Haraway’s own text can seem to confirm this worry: “Cyborgs are ether, quintessence,” she 
writes in one of the more elusive sections of the manifesto. She continues: 
 
The ubiquity and invisibility of cyborgs is precisely why these sunshinebelt machines are 
so deadly. They are as hard to see politically as materially. They are about consciousness 
- or its simulation. They are floating signifiers moving in pickup trucks across Europe, 
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blocked more effectively by the witch-weavings of the displaced and so unnatural 
Greenham women, who read the cyborg webs of power so very well, than by the militant 
labour of older masculinist politics, whose natural constituency needs defence jobs. 
(153). 
 
Here we see the cyborg described with a range of evocative observations that defies traditional 
notion of either organism or machine; what is more, it can hardly be said to be based on any 
explicit notion of political resistance that defined one of the earlier examples of the cyborg. 
Instead, cyborgs are invisible and ubiquitous as ether.  
In part, this imagery may simply refer to the miniaturization and invisibility of modern 
technology that she mentions just previously:  
 
Miniaturization has turned out to be about power; small is not so much beautiful as pre-
eminently dangerous, as in cruise missiles. Contrast the TV sets of the 1950s or the news 
cameras of the 1970S with the TV wristbands or hand-sized video cameras now 
advertised. Our best machines are made of sunshine; they are all light and clean because 
they are nothing but signals, electromagnetic waves, a section of a spectrum, and these 
machines are eminently portable, mobile. (153) 
 
But this invisibility and ubiquity doesn’t just refer to the cyborg’s materiality, but to its political 
significance. Cyborgs are not just about materiality, they are about something as intangible, 
intimate, and influential as “consciousness,” or are merely the simulation of consciousness, 
suggesting that someone or something is shaping this simulation. It is this consciousness that is 
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up for grabs so to speak. In perhaps one of the most useful clues for understanding her figure of 
the cyborg, Haraway tells us thay cyborgs are “floating signifiers,” that is signifiers, first 
theorized by Levi Strauss, that “mean different things to different people: they may stand for 
many or even any signifieds; they may mean whatever their interpreters want them to mean” 
(Chandler 74). The flexible, contradictory, and definitionally-resistant nature of the cyborg that 
Haraway both declares and performs in the piece, is also likely why, in part, that many have been 
able to take up her concept of the cyborg for diverse theoretical purposes.  
The conflicting aspects of the cyborg might also be usefully understood as a specific 
deployment of a strategy that Chela Sandoval calls “oppositional consciousness,” or the mental 
state in which an oppressed group resists their oppression. Haraway herself draws on this idea in 
the manifesto as a “hopeful model of political identity...born of the skills for reading webs of 
power by those refused stable membership in the social categories of race, sex, or class” (155). 
She writes: “Sandoval argues that 'women of colour' have a chance to build an effective unity 
that does not replicate the imperializing, totalizing revolutionary subjects of previous Marxisms 
and feminisms which had not faced the consequences of the disorderly polyphony emerging 
from decolonization” (156).  
With a better appreciation of this concept, one can see how “oppositional consciousness” 
heavily informs Haraway’s figure of the cyborg, sometimes even more so than the technological 
aspect of the original definition of the cyborg. The cyborg therefore does not refer primarily to 
technology, but to opposing Western modes of thought, identity, and affiliation, so as to 
reassemble new powerful political forms of resistance. We see this when she states, “The cyborg 
is a kind of disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self. This is the 
self feminists must code” (163). And also: “my cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, 
99
  
potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of 
needed political work.” Thus the cyborg signifies transgressed boundaries, whether technological 
or not.  
2.7. Conjuring a new critical political-economic techno-consciousness 
Haraway’s cyborg imagery works to help spark the process of breaking down assumed 
categories of understanding the world. We have seen this at play already in the examples recently 
considered. First and foremostly, she has adamantly contested the conceptual distinction between 
humans and machines, defamiliarizing for the reader both the apparently “natural” and the 
“technological.” In her myth, what has been known as natural and what has been known as 
technological are now both situated and constituted by a cyborg plane of existence. The 
supposed objectivity or neutrality of technology likewise melts away, as she insists on the social 
forces shaping technologies, and in turn, the ways these technologies enforce social 
relationships. She writes: 
 
Technologies and scientific discourses can be partially understood as formalizations, i.e., 
as frozen moments, of the fluid social interactions constituting them, but they should 
also be viewed as instruments for enforcing meanings. The boundary is permeable 
between tool and myth, instrument and concept, historical systems of social relations 
and historical anatomies of possible bodies, including objects of knowledge. Indeed, 
myth and tool mutually constitute each other. (164) 
 
This passage reflects views found in the “social construction of technology” theory within 
science and technology studies, which has its roots in 1970s work in the sociology of science. 
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Haraway’s incorporation of this view is another key distinction between her concept of the 
cyborg and the cyborg of Kline and Clynes. It enables her to attend to very different historical, 
political, and social aspects and aims of technology that are not considered in discourses that 
treat technology and technological progress as neutral and objective. For example, she draws our 
attention straight away to the fact that our technologies are often rooted in war: “The main 
trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and 
patriarchal capitalism, not to mention state socialism.” A description of her own perspective 
specifies this observation with a concrete example, as well as underscores the cyborg nature of 
individuals that are not “cyborgs” in the sense of Kline and Clynes: 
 
I am conscious of the odd perspective provided by my historical position - a PhD in 
biology for an Irish Catholic girl was made possible by Sputnik's impact on US national 
science-education policy. I have a body and mind as much constructed by the post-
Second World War arms race and cold war as by the women's movements. There are 
more grounds for hope in focusing on the contradictory effects of politics designed to 
produce loyal American technocrats, which also produced large numbers of dissidents, 
than in focusing on the present defeats. 
 
As this passage suggests, the impure origins of our social, intellectual, and technological tools 
need not, and in fact cannot, be grounds for their rejection, as there is no natural way of thinking 
and acting without them. She writes: “In short, the certainty of what counts as nature—a source 
of insight and promise of innocence—is undermined, probably fatally.” Notably, she accuses 
American radical feminists such as Susan Griffin, Audre Lorde, and Adrienne Rich of having 
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“profoundly affected our political imaginations - and perhaps restricted too much what we allow 
as a friendly body and political language. They insist on the organic, opposing it to the 
technological” (174). In opposition to their modes of thought, Haraway argues for a type of 
double perspective of the cyborg world that acknowledges its contradictory yet genuine 
oppressive and liberatory qualities: 
 
From one perspective, a cyborg world is about the final imposition of a grid of control on 
the planet, about the final abstraction embodied in a Star Wars apocalypse waged in the 
name of defence, about the final appropriation of women's bodies in a masculinist orgy of 
war (Sofia, 1984). From another perspective, a cyborg world might be about lived social 
and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and 
machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. The 
political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both 
dominations and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point. Single vision 
produces worse illusions than double vision or many-headed monsters.(154) 
 
This double perspective—which acknowledges both the “impure” origins and the necessity of 
cyborgs—is necessary for meaningful political action. In the manifesto, Haraway proposes two 
general forms of action, which are no more clear-cut than her figure of the cyborg. The first, as 
we’ve already established, is the creation of new social configurations built on political affinity 
rather than organic unity. Through choice, not through blood ties, she imagines “building a 
political form that actually manages to hold together witches, engineers, elders, perverts, 
Christians, mothers, and Leninists long enough to disarm the state” (155). The second form of 
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action she proposes is writing—though like the figure of the cyborg, writing is used figuratively 
as much as literally, signifying everything from the telling of stories and myths to etching code 
on a silicon chip: 
 
Cyborg writing is about the power to survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but 
on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world that marked them as other.  
 
The tools are often stories, retold stories, versions that reverse and displace the 
hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities. In retelling origin stories, cyborg authors 
subvert the central myths of origin of Western culture ….Feminist cyborg stories have 
the task of recoding communication and intelligence to subvert command and control. 
(175) 
 
The transformation of the cyborg world, therefore, relies not directly on the transformation of the 
technology, but on the transformation of the social order in which it is produced, and the stories 
and myths that we tell to help imagine the possibility of that transformation. She urges us to 
consider myth and social configurations as powerful liberatory tools.  
 
2.8. From ‘cyborg world’ to ‘cyborg oppression’: introducing a Freirian analysis of software 
Haraway’s cyborg myth is not simply about a world in which nature and machine have 
merged, but about a global struggle of domination in which technology is paradoxically a tool for 
both oppression and liberation. The myth is useful for overcoming dualistic thinking that posits 
digital technology as either good or bad, and and can encourage us to think about new 
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configurations of use that might enable genuine resistance in spite of the militaristic origins and 
continued oppressive tendencies of these technologies. And, as Chopra and Dexter underscore, 
the cyborg myth calls attention to the way that all of life and society is permeated by technology 
rather than simply its more technologically visible features. Questions concerning the politics of 
digital technology have powerful implications for the entire world. 
While the cyborg myth helps us consider the paradoxical way in which pervasive digital 
technologies are both liberatory and oppressive, it does not yet offer a clear analysis of the nature 
of that oppression, nor a particular method for overcoming it. To begin to make headway on 
these further tasks, I will now argue that Paulo Freire’s theories of oppression can usefully 
supplement Haraway’s cyborg myth by supplying a background theoretical framework for 
understanding and identifying oppression in general. Combining aspects from the frameworks of 
both thinkers, I will offer the concept of “cyborg oppression” as a way of identifying and 
analyzing oppressive features of the cyborg world. I will show how the concept of cyborg 
oppression offers an overarching category for organizing the diverse and wide-ranging critiques 
of digital technologies, as well as provides guidance on thinking through what it would mean to 
transform oppressive aspects of the cyborg world. Finally, because Freire’s concept is developed 
within the context of education, this will also allow me to begin to set the stage for the later 
application of the concept of cyborg oppression to the specific context of the university in Part II. 
2.8.1. Introducing Freire. Before delving into Freire’s concept of oppression, it’s first 
helpful to understand the context that motivated and informed his theories. Freire was a Brazilian 
educator and philosopher who wrote about education and social change from a theoretical 
background informed by Marxist thought and critical theory. He is best known for his 1968 work 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, which is based largely on his experiences in teaching the illiterate 
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poor in Brazil beginning in the 1940s, a practice that he would continue on an off-and-on basis 
through for nearly the rest of his life. Though the students discussed in this text seem to have 
little in common with the comparably richer, and better educated college students in the United 
States, many educators in the U.S.—especially writing instructors in higher education—found 
his critical methods relevant for assessing and transforming their own classrooms. Theoretical 
engagements with his methods pioneered by scholars such as Ira Shor, bell hooks, and Henry 
Giroux helped spark a critical pedagogy movement that is still actively developing today.  
As the title suggests, Pedagogy of the Oppressed is a book about the relationship between 
oppression and education. Its central argument is that educational processes are never neutral, 
but always work to reproduce an ideological view of the world. Education is oppressive when it 
is instrumentalized to preserve the status quo by suppressing critical consciousness in the 
students. Liberatory educational practices instead work to instill in students a mentality that 
enables them to critically understand and transform their world. While the text does pay attention 
to formal structures of education, it also points to the ways in which these formal structures are 
situated within a broader social context which also “educates” its members in diverse and subtle 
ways. It shows then how formal educational systems and dominant forms of culture act in 
tandem to repress the critical capabilities of the oppressed class.  
 
2.8.2. Oppression and liberation through understanding 
To do this, Freire offers a powerful concept of oppression that is flexible enough to apply 
across diverse institutional and social contexts. It is founded on his belief that human beings have 
a natural right, or an “ontological vocation” as he calls it, to develop their critical capacities to 
understand and transform the world (44-45). Oppression is the systematic suppression of this 
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natural right of people, a dehumanizing act which transforms subjects into objects so that they 
can be better manipulated and controlled. This oppression is carried out by a dominant class, 
whose power relies on the subservience of the oppressed and their inability to recognize 
oppression or imagine another possible state of affairs. Freire identifies a powerful mode of 
oppression within schools in what he calls the “banking model of education.” This form of 
education conceives of the student mind as an empty vessel to be filled with authoritative, expert 
forms of knowledge. It considers the process of education as one in which the student passively 
receives this knowledge without questioning its validity or relevance to her own life (72). 
Additionally, Freire sees this knowledge as alienating, as it is not made by and for the class to 
which it is being taught. Students are taught to be passive as “the scope of action allowed to the 
students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits” (72). They are kept 
from thinking that any other type of action might be possible or meaningful or valuable, as 
reality is presented as objective and changeless rather than as a social construction that they 
might be capable of collectively transforming. Thus, regardless of the content of knowledge 
being transmitted, the true “lesson” or “outcome” of the banking model is passivity and 
alienation. This passivity is useful for the dominant class, as the passive student becomes the 
passive member of society. Education is thus a core strategy for “precluding any presentation of 
the world as a problem and showing it rather as a fixed entity, as something given—something to 
which people, as mere spectators, must adapt” (139). Students are alienated from their very 
educational process as it is carried out to serve the interests of the dominating class rather than 
their own.  
In contrast, Freire argues that a genuine understanding of the world is interdependent 
with the ability and process of transforming it. Critical understanding is only possible in the 
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process of recognizing seemingly natural aspects of existence as social constructs and thus 
available for transformation. This process of identifying and naming a transformative goal, and 
working towards that transformation feeds back into one’s critical understanding by revealing its 
gaps and contradictions and stimulating further understanding. Critical understanding is thus the 
ongoing process of reflection stimulated by engaging with the world, which in turn must be 
refined and redirected as critical understanding develops. Denial of these two interrelated rights 
creates what Freire calls the “culture of silence” or the condition of a people who are unable to 
recognize, articulate, or communicate their oppressive state (Politics 72). His use of the word 
“silence” emphasizes that this oppressed culture is cultivated through the suppression of 
communicative tools, cultural practices, and mentalities that would enable and encourage them to 
conceptually grasp and then reflect upon their situation as a first step towards transforming it. 
 
2.9. Applying Freire’s concept of oppression to the Cyborg World: an initial sketch 
Readers may be initially skeptical as to how Freire’s concepts of oppression might relate 
to the cyborg world, especially when digital technologies have enabled practices of knowledge-
production that in many ways might be thought to oppose the banking model. As noted by 
scholars such as Yochai Benkler (2006) and Henry Jenkins (2009), accessible, networked digital 
technologies (such as Wikipedia) are allowing everyday, non-expert individuals to produce and 
share forms of valuable and influential knowledge based on their own experiences. Yet even if 
we acknowledge that these new modes of knowledge production represent an important step 
away from the banking model of education, it would be a mistake, to assume that rising 
prevalence of what are in some (important) respects ‘participatory’ forms of knowledge 
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production constitute political liberation from oppression in and of themselves. For even while 
these technologies have enabled more individuals to participate in producing certain public forms 
of knowledge, they still, in significant and interlocking ways, deny individuals the possibility of 
participating in understanding and transforming another equally important aspect of their 
world—namely, the technologies themselves. Whatever individuals learn and gain in process of 
networked information production and exchange, it must be said that the vast majority of users 
continue to learn to adopt a passive and alienated relationship towards the technical tools that 
structure and support it.  
It is this software pedagogy that constitutes passive users which therefore is most ripe for 
a Freirian analysis. This learned user passivity itself can be fruitfully understood as a key 
mechanism for maintaining what I call the “software status quo.” The software status quo refers 
to the organization of political and economic power in the cyborg world, and the configuration of 
technologies, mentalities, and social and cultural processes that work towards it reproduction. It 
is this software status quo which confers power to perform the activities to constitute the ‘global 
brain’ we analyzed in the previous chapter—and in particular enable corporations and 
governments to track and monetize user data to capitalist software companies, producing 
corporate intelligence that is alienated from the users who produced it.  
It is important that we not assume at the outset that the software status quo is constituted 
wholly by governments or wholly by the tech firms. As I will soon show, a wide variety of 
technical, cultural, and political strategies—including the more overtly ‘pedagogical’ strategies 
currently being adopted within higher education (compare Part II below)—are used to produce 
the passive user, or or the user who is not only unable to have a say in how digital technology 
mediates their everyday life, but is largely unaware of the degree and scope to which it does. 
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With Freire’s concept of oppression, we can see how this act not only economically benefits 
capitalist software companies, but also represents a direct act of oppression (enabled in part by 
political permissiveness) in that it denies users the ability to understand and transform these 
processes of the cyborg world. Users are treated as objects to be manipulated for the benefit of 
corporate (and potentially governmental) interest, rather than as subjects who have rights to 
direct the processes of their cyborg world according to their own needs and interests.  
 
2.10. Using Freire to dissolve the myth of software neutrality and objectivity in the cyborg world 
One key way in which the software status quo is established and maintained is through 
the dominant myth that computing technologies are objective and neutral, and thus could not 
possibly be improved upon by broader user understanding and transformation of their 
functionality—in short: there is no “other” way that digital technology might be. As I touched 
upon in the first chapter, Kevin Kelly, the co-founder of Wired Magazine, for example, exhibits 
this belief that certain technological outcomes are inevitable given that they are “natural” and 
rooted in the “ basic physics” (4) of technology. As Wendy Chun observes, the habits of viewing 
computing technologies as natural and neutral are deeply entrenched in our culture as well as in 
the development of legal policies pertaining to its development. For example, in the early days of 
computing it was difficult for engineers to obtain patents for software they developed, such as 
illustrated in the 1972 U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of a patent claim for an algorithm, which 
contains the striking claim that “mathematical innovations should be treated like scientific truths 
and laws of nature, and scientific truths and laws of nature are unpatentable subject matter” (4). 
Van Dijck has also called attention to the way in which “unbridled enthusiasm of many 
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researchers for datafication as a neutral paradigm, reflecting a belief in an objective quantified 
understanding of the social” (“Datafication” 206).  
If we follow Freire in understanding that what we learn to call ‘reality’ is a social 
construction that restricts our true understanding of reality itself, in service of the dominant class, 
we can begin to see how the cyborg world itself likewise is something we have learned to call a 
‘reality,’ but one that has constituted in a way that is neither neutral nor objective, and that its 
digital technologies and practices have been developed in the service of particular interests, 
namely those of capitalist digital technology companies. The apparent objectivity and neutrality 
of these technologies is partly an effect of their dominance in our everyday practices and 
technological imagination—a dominance effected not least through the impoverishment of our 
software education practices.  
To be sure, scholars have called attention to the social construction of technology long 
before the widespread diffusion of networked digital technologies. In 1984, Trevor J. Pinch and 
Wiebe E. Bijker published a highly influential paper that argued for the need of a social 
constructivist approach to technology, and combined theories from the sociology of science and 
technology studies to produce a theoretical method. Constructivist studies of technology that 
followed countered determinist and instrumentalist accounts of technology that claimed 
technological development proceeds along the lines of necessity and universality. As Andrew 
Feenberg helpfully spells out, this perspective asserts that:  
 
Technology is not “rational” in the old positivist sense of the term but socially relative; 
the outcome of technical choices is a world that supports the way of life of one or another 
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influential social group. On these terms the technocratic tendencies of modern societies 
could be interpreted as an effect of limiting the groups intervening in design to technical 
experts and the corporate and political elites they serve. (2005 51-52).  
 
A social constructivist approach to technology, such as offered here by Feenberg, helps connect 
Freire’s social views with contemporary critiques of technology that highlight ways 
contemporary technologies reflect certain interests or ideological perspectives. Charles Ess has 
called attention to the way that platforms impose the values and preferences of the designer onto 
the user (2009). Robert Bodle corroborates this view, pointing out that “the technological design 
of online spaces, tools, and operating systems constitutes a contested terrain where the 
imposition of designers' values and preferences are at odds with the values and preferences of the 
intended user base” (2010, 15, 154). More broadly, education writer Chuck A. Bowers (2014) 
has argued that digital technologies spread and reinforce a worldview that is overly-abstract and 
disconnected from the specificity of place and our relationship to the planet. In a slightly more 
optimistic view, Lawrence Lessig has argued that code itself is always an expression of human 
values, and thus needs to democratically directed for the public good rather than for corporate 
interest. “We can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to protect values that we believe are 
fundamental,” he writes. “Or we can build, or architect, or code cyberspace to allow those values 
to disappear. . . . Code is never found; it is only ever made, and only ever made by us” (2006, 
6).10  
                                                
10 To anticipate some of our discussion in Part II, complementary views have also been 
expressed in the field of computers and composition, which took note of the ways in which 
computers were changing the writing classroom throughout the 1980s. For example, composition 
scholar Carolyn Handa argued that word processing software influenced the writing process by 
imposing a masculine and individualist ideology about the nature of writing. In a chapter 
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What the invocation of Freire adds to this, first, is a specific focus on the context of the 
direct implementation of this oppression-relation in the context of ‘learning’ to become a user, 
and therefore a useful characterization of the critical problematic at issue as it is found concretely 
in our cyborg world of today. Secondly, as we will now see, the Freirian picture also functions as 
a useful model for understanding what is at stake already in the values that dictate the very 
design of the software itself, even at the level of code. 
The idea that the design of code itself can be used to subtly infuse a worldview into a 
user’s experience has an interesting parallel with an oppressive tactic that Freire calls 
“prescription,” where the oppressor prescribes their own values onto the oppressed. Freire writes, 
“Every prescription represents the imposition of one individual’s choice upon another, 
transforming consciousness of the person prescribed to into one that conforms with the 
prescriber’s consciousness. Thus the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, 
following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor” (29). In software whose underpinnings is 
‘closed’ to the user, in the sense of being unmodifiable, code enacts prescription by enabling and 
disabling different user behaviors that the developer believes are important and reflective of the 
goals of the software. Even when code is written to give choice in some aspects of the software, 
these choices are typically either limited to very specific parts of the software, or alternately, are 
designed using “choice architecture” that privileges one choice over the other. Arguing this 
point, Siva Vaidhyanathan writes, “the structure and order of the choices offered to us 
                                                                                                                                                       
appearing already in 1989, Handa urged the reader to remember that even though the user 
experience had ‘improved’ tremendously in the past several years, it should still be recognized as 
powerfully shapinged the writing process itself: ”Although the microcomputer programming 
today appears less obviously manipulative, we need to remember that we still use a program and 
respond to commands as they have been programmed. We work with a concept of writing 
procedures arising from the programmer’s view of the writing process and the way in which the 
particular programmer understands that we improve writing and gain knowledge” (175, italics 
original).  
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profoundly influence the decisions we make . . . If a system is designed to privilege a particular 
choice...people will tend to choose that option more than the alternatives, even though they have 
an entirely free choice” (88). Or in other words, “There is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ design” 
(88). As an example of the power of choice architecture, Vaidhyanathan points to the way 
Google’s default tracking settings greatly influence a majority of users’ setting choices. 
Prescribed values thus influence the functionality and use of software. However, if these 
values are ubiquitous across different types of software (such as concealed code), it can be 
difficult to recognize the degree to which human interest (rather than nature) shapes the design 
and use of software. This sense of naturalness of the software world as a whole, when combined 
with the impossibility of its modification, likely discourages the user from thinking how it might 
be different, how it is shaped to serve interests other than their own, and how it might be better 
fashioned serve their personal interests, needs, and values.  
In this sense, this prescriptive aspect of ‘closed’ software can be thought of as employing 
a banking model of pedagogy, in that it teaches users to accept its prescribed expression of 
digital technology and the ideology it represents as the natural and inevitable form of digital 
technology. This acceptance inhibits the user from asking questions, or thinking through how 
their own lived experience might also be a source of knowledge relevant to the development of 
software, and further reinforces the idea that code is only of interest and modifiable by technical 
experts. In this manner, technology continues to represent, and further inscribe, the worldview of 
the technocratic class and the dependence of the isolated, passive user. Like education then, 
software and its culture of use is never neutral, but always work to instill an ideology that serves 
a certain configuration of power.  
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2.11. Further oppression through the imbalance of knowledge and power via dataveillance 
The prescriptiveness of ‘closed’ software, however, is not the only way in which software 
can be seen to both oppress its users and also create a culture of oppression among them. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, the software underwriting many networked platforms and services is 
coded to subject users to intensive forms of dataveillance, where their online activity is tracked, 
analyzed, and traded as what John Cheney-Lippold described as a “new algorithmic identity.” 
Experiments with social media data point to the surprising range of highly-sophisticated insights 
and predictions that can be gleaned from even the most banal seeming data, such as 
demonstrated by a recent study published by researchers from Cambridge and Stanford 
Universities (Kosinski 2013). Private details not divulged by users on social media, such as their 
family background or lifestyle habits, could be predicted with great accuracy based on data 
gleaned from their social media activity. In an interview, the co-lead author of the study, Dr. 
Michal Kosinski, reported great surprise as how “our most intimate traits can be very easily 
predicted from our digital footprint” (Hutchinson), noting that everything from a user’s parents’ 
marital status to their drinking habits or political viewpoint could be predicted with a great 
degree of reliability based on their Facebook likes and connections.  
Kosinski’s study demonstrates the surprising types of insights that can be produced 
through the analysis of standard forms of data generated in everyday use of web platforms. A 
more recent study co-authored by Kosinski details the way psychologists are using the platform 
to make correlations between user behavior and psychological illnesses (Inkster 2016), which he 
hopes could one day help intervene in illnesses. Overall, Kosinski is optimistic about the the 
types of insight social media platforms can generate about users, but many others are find this 
sort of data gathering analysis worrisome. Privacy advocate Søren Louv-Jansen, for example, 
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created a tool that allows users to track their friend’s sleep habits through the Facebook 
messenger app as a means of raising awareness about what sort of insights seemingly impersonal 
data can generate. While these insights may not always be correct or seem remarkably important 
on their own, they suggest that the methods used to study and categorize users are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated, especially as the data profiles of users becomes increasingly 
comprehensive.  
At the same time, however, there is ample evidence that the insights generated by data 
analysis are inaccurate in important respects. The Stanford and Cambridge Universities study 
referenced above offers a free online tool for viewing predictive analytics based on one’s data 
collected from their personal social media profiles.11 The demo analyzes user likes and activity 
on Facebook to make guesses at different user characteristics such as gender, relationship status, 
interests, and so forth. When I tried using the tool, many of its guesses about my identity were 
wrong. For example, it incorrectly guessed my gender, based on the fact that I frequently post or 
engage with content that deals with technology.  
These inaccuracies may lead one to think that data tracking isn’t a serious concern given 
that one’s personal privacy does not seem immediately at risk in any sort of tangible way. 
However, as numerous scholars have argued, the issue with data tracking is not that an 
individual’s privacy may be violated, but that private data belonging to massive amounts of users 
can be instrumentalized for corporate or political purposes in exploitative ways. As Rita Raley 
writes, “The now orthodox market position is that the value of data does not depend on its 
connection to an actual person” (127-128). Cheney-Lippold also argues that these “new 
algorithmic identities” do not “not approach identity formation from an essentialist framework” 
                                                
11 I accessed the public demo at http://applymagicsauce.com.  
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(170) but rather as “ a statistically-related, largely market research-driven category” (170). They 
should be understood as part of the process of “soft biopower,” or the use of flexible, updatable 
“categories that on their own regulate and manage life” (175). Algorithmic identities are 
constantly updated based on user activity. For example, “the gender of the same user might 
change from male to female if enough user data, such as the addition of certain web sites that 
user visited, are presented to statistically identify that user with a different gender). (168) These 
identities are then used to structure user experience such as through targeted ads or modifications 
in the stream of presented content. Cheney-Lippold argues that this identity-formation-at-one-
step-removed constitutes an importantly distinct form of “control” that works at levels far past 
the purview of liberal individualism, situating subjects within networks of power that govern 
indirectly and without proximity” (176).  
The implication and scope of this control is still unclear—though the ongoing disclosure 
of the ever-more substantial role potentially played by Facebook manipulation and Facebook 
userdata analytics by Cambridge Analytica and others is as suggestive as it is alarming. As Bruce 
Schneier writes, “Increasingly, companies use their power to influence and manipulate their 
users. Websites that profit from advertising spend a lot of effort making sure you spend as much 
time on those sites as possible, optimizing their content for maximum addictiveness.” Already in 
2012, the infamous secret “Mood Manipulation Experiment” conducted by Facebook, where 
researchers found they could manipulate users’ apparent mood by saturating them with negative 
content, provides another example of how data can be used to powerfully and intimately 
manipulate users. Karen Yeung has argued that these techniques enable what she calls 
“hypernudging,” or the “nimble, unobtrusive and highly potent” way in which big data can be 
unethically used to influence a user’s behavior for commercial interest (122). Tarleton Gillespie 
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has observed that “Algorithms play an increasingly important role in selecting what information 
is considered most relevant to us, a crucial feature of our participation in public life. Search 
engines help us navigate massive databases of information, or the entire web” (2014). 
Increasingly significant results from these kinds of studies are what led journalists to begin 
investigate the role of “psychometric methods,” psychological profiling enabled through big data 
techniques, in the role of Brexit and the 2016 U.S. election. And as Kosinski speculates in the 
previously cited interview, these processes of collecting and analyzing data also have use for the 
creation of artificial intelligence, an increasingly important tool for digital products and services. 
2.12. The crucial role of ‘closed-source’ code in cyborg oppression 
Once we have recognized that digital technologies are not neutral, and likewise influence 
user activity, we are better equipped to understand why it is of critical importance for users to 
have the right to understand what is actually happening in and through their use, and also to be 
equipped with the capacity, if not to actually transform them, then at the very least to protect 
themselves against harm from their implementation. However, both of these rights are 
deliberately denied from users in the technical design of much of our everyday software. As cited 
earlier, Chopra and Dexter observe that most commercial software is technologically designed to 
prohibit users from modifying or even viewing source code, as a means of protecting the 
company’s “trade secrets” (xiv). This denial is part of the set of strategies deployed by software 
capitalists to “retain control of the means of production” and maximize their commercial 
advantage (18). Providing source code could potentially threaten the software capitalist’s ability 
to generate a profit from their product, given that the software could be freely copied, modified, 
and distributed across the web. Furthermore, it would threaten to undo the technical barriers to 
interoperability that proprietary software vendors establish to drive out competition. If the source 
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code were freely available (so it is argued), developers could potentially modify it to allow for 
greater interoperability between competing software products and foil this particular competitive 
strategy. Thus, software capitalists rely on the oppressive strategy of denying users the ability to 
understand and modify their code in order to protect the value of their product.  
In the cyborg world, where digital technologies play an important role in constructing 
reality, it is hard not to conclude that this severely limited, ‘closed’ strategy pertaining to code is 
equivalent to oppression itself. Chopra and Dexter agree, and go on to describe the effects of this 
oppression in terms of alienation. “The user of proprietary software is alienated from the 
product;” Chopra and Dexter write, “he [sic] is unable to perceive its product’s infrastructure or 
adapt it to meet his [sic] needs” (29). This alienation extends to any activity that implements 
closed software, such as cognition, creative expression, communication, even the act of 
governing itself. Noting the increasing trend of governments to automate and manage its 
processes through software, they write: “A system of e-government built on closed software is 
itself closed, one whose laws and policies are unknowable; by closing off participation, it denies 
the public nature of democracy” (167).  
This unavailability of source code has several oppressive implications. It prohibits 
individuals or user communities from critically scrutinizing the ways these technologies are 
mediating their activities and their cyborg world, such as through the dataveillance and 
hypernudging techniques previously outlined. It prohibits users from collecting their own data 
and applying their own analysis for their own purposes. It also prohibits communities from 
adapting technologies to better suit their individual needs and interests. One can also argue that 
the technical prohibition of user tinkering further reinforces a passive mentality in the user. The 
technical prohibition of understanding and modifying the code makes the software appear as 
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something objective and changeless by drawing user attention away from its “madeness.” There 
are parallels between this situation and Bruno Latour’s description of the “black box” of 
technology. The notion of a black box describes the fact that “when a machine runs efficiently, 
when a matter of fact is settled, one need to focus only on its inputs and outputs and not on its 
internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more 
opaque and obscure they become“ (Latour 304). The invisible influence of software, however, is 
not only “made invisible by its own success” but also by design when its code is deliberately 
concealed from the user.  
As Cheney-Lippold notes, “The individual user is incapable of really experiencing the 
effect that algorithms have in determining one’s life as algorithms rarely, if ever, speak to the 
individual” (176). He continues: 
 
The identifications that make us as subjects online are becoming more opaque and 
buried, away from our individual vantage points and removed from most forms of 
critical participation. They are increasingly finding mediation outside the realm of 
traditional political intervention and inside the black boxes of search engines and 
algorithmic inference systems (Becker and Stalder, 2009). (176) 
 
Cheney-Lippold is right in his assessment that the black boxed nature of algorithms is making it 
ever more difficult for individuals to understand and critically participate in the ways these 
algorithms mediate their lives. I will add that the ‘closed’ nature of much of the cyborg world 
makes it difficult if not almost impossible to assess whether tech companies and governments 
alike—really: any member of the current software status quo—are abiding by their own stated 
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legal limits. For example, in June 2016, rumors circulated that Facebook was “listening” to user 
conversations through the phone in order to gather information that would enhance its ability to 
place targeted ads. Facebook denied the accusation, but it is obvious that designing its phone app 
to start recording nearby sounds is certainly not beyond its technical capacity, nor is it without 
precedent in the company’s history. In 2014, the company released a feature which would allow 
Facebook to listen and record audio through the phone’s microphone. The feature was described 
as a means for Facebook to identify what the user was listening to or watching so that the 
platform could then suggest an automated reference to the media item in the user’s status update. 
In May of 2016, The Independent reported that “Facebook said that it does listen to audio and 
collect information from users – but that the two aren't combined, and that sounds heard around 
people aren't used to decide what appears in the app.” The Independent also reported: “Facebook 
says explicitly on its help pages that it doesn’t record conversations, but that it does use the audio 
to identify what is happening around the phone. The site promotes the feature as an easy way of 
identifying what you are listening to or watching, to make it easier and quicker to post about 
whatever’s going on” (Griffin 2016). Interestingly, however, as of January 2017, there is no 
mention on Facebook’s help page about its practices regarding audio recording. 
All of this, I hope, helps to bring home in a deeper way a lesson that I began to articulate 
in the first chapter. There I noted that while there is surely something right to Benkler’s claim 
that networked digital technologies were helping make culture more reflective and malleable, it 
is equally true that this reflection and malleability is reserved only for the explicit content 
produced and presented to the user by the software/platform. The algorithmic content powering 
the platform, by contrast, is not itself open for reflection, and there is almost zero malleability of 
the sourcecode itself. The software itself is thus profoundly untransparent and unmalleable by 
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networked users. The prohibition of understanding and modifying code also denies everyday 
users the right to reflect upon their personal and collective user data as a mode of better 
understanding their cyborg selves and cyborg world. It also denies them the opportunity to 
develop an appreciation, skill set, and purpose for big data literacy, which is instead being used 
to analyze and control them for alien purposes. These right are reserved for capitalist digital 
companies alone. As Lev Manovich points out, “only social media companies have access to 
really large social data, especially transactional data” (2012, 464, cited in Jin). Dal Yong Jin 
further points out that Google doesn’t allow users to analyze data, and strictly prohibits users 
from attempting to do so in its terms of service (163). “In the big data era,” he writes, “power 
belongs to platform developers and owners because they control information, in particular, in an 
economic sense, such as pricing and production. Therefore, those with access to data, expertise, 
and processing power are positioned to engage in increasingly powerful, sophisticated, and 
opaque forms of sorting”” As Jin rightly points out, these “opaque forms of sorting” create new 
and reinforce old social inequalities, echoing scholars such as Boyd and Crawford, who argue 
that “the current ecosystem around Big Data creates a new kind of digital divide: the Big Data 
rich and the Big Data poor.” These concerns help shine light on the political dangers of allowing 
companies to conceal their code from their users.  
 
2.13. Envisioning liberation from cyborg oppression: opening code 
The denial of user rights to study and modify code may seem trivial given that the 
average user does not possess the skill to participate in these activities on their own. In some 
respects, these denials may seem necessary and inevitable as it would be impossible, at least the 
way things stand, to build software whose source code is comprehensible and modifiable by the 
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general user. As Chopra and Dexter observe, advocates of proprietary software often argue that 
its rejection “will lead to the collapse of the industry” and that “by using free software we hurt 
the software industry and its consumers, who will be denied its benefits” (164). In this view, the 
quality and innovative potential of software will suffer if taken out of the hands of experts. 
However, this view fails to recognize that much more is at stake than the health of the software 
industry in the production of software and does not recognize that its own understanding of 
software experts is historically and socially conditioned. Though it is easy to assume that there 
will only be a small group of individuals with the talent and interest in developing software 
systems, many technologists and scholars have imagined or enacted forms of software 
production that enable broader forms of user participation in the production and ongoing 
development of software code. Theodor Nelson, for example, a pioneer of information 
technology who coined the term “hypertext,” argued in his 1974 Computer Lib manifesto that the 
gap between computer specialists and general users should be understood as a historical accident 
rather than a natural fact: 
 
Any nitwit can understand computers, and many do. Unfortunately, due to ridiculous 
historical circumstances, computers have been made a mystery to most of the world. And 
this situation does not seem to be improving. You hear more and more about computers, 
but to most people it’s just one big blur. The people who know about computers often 
seem unwilling to explain things or answer your questions. Stereotyped notions develop 
about computers operating in fixed ways—and so confusion increases. The chasm 
between laymen and computer people widens fast and dangerously. (Montfort 303) 
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Nelson’s argument shines line on the possibility that the divide between “laymen and computer 
people” may have less to do with individual’s natural skillset and more to do with the way 
cultural forces create this divide among individuals. Nelson argues that this divide might be 
narrowed by designing computer systems with users as well as with individuals with different 
professional perspectives, such as artists or educators. Technologist Alan Kay’s 1972 proposal 
for the Dynabook, a personal computer given to every student that they would program on their 
own, embodies a similar hope for democratizing computer literacy. The Free Software 
Foundation, since the 1980s, has likewise supported greater forms of user participation in 
software development in its advocacy for “software freedom,” which guarantees users the right 
to study, modify, and share software code (“What is Free Software”).12 Though software freedom 
doesn’t magically transform “laymen” into “computer people,” its commitment to keeping 
source code available to users at least provides a gateway for “laymen” to become “computer 
people.” It also allows user communities, made up of individuals with varying levels of computer 
skills, to collectively study and modify the code of software according to the community’s needs 
and interests. Many exciting and often voluntarily built free and open source software projects 
have been developed by free software communities such as the GNU/Linux operating system, 
the text editor Emacs, the anonymous browser Tor, and social networks such as GNU Social and 
Mastodon. Today, there are activist organizations that advocate for broader forms of user 
oversight on Internet platforms, such as The Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Internet 
Defense League, Fight for the Future, Platform Coop, and Unlike Us. 
These visions and practices embody more democratic forms of user participation in 
software development and help bring into question the seeming naturalness of the divide 
                                                
12 For an account of how free software differs ideologically from open source software, and common 
misperceptions regarding these differences, see Stallman 2003.  
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between laymen and computer people. They furthermore expose how closed source software 
reifies this divide and its assumed naturalness, given the way it prohibits user access to the very 
sources needed to develop computer literacy. If source code were freely available, users could 
join user communities aligned with specific needs and interests, where resources and expertise 
could be exchanged in a collective enterprise of understanding and modifying the source code of 
software. This is in fact the same exact manner in which software capitalists produce and study 
their own products—software is simply too complex an enterprise, requiring too many different 
types of skill sets, for any one single programmer to master. A software culture that encouraged 
user understanding and modification of source code could also arguably raise familiarity with 
basic software principles through exposure, and open up more channels for increasing one’s 
literacy. The possible development of such a software culture, however, relies on the free 
availability of source code. Though the availability of source code on its own does not guarantee 
computer literacy in general users or the cultivation of user development communities, it is an 
important if not necessary condition for the development of each. Denying users access to source 
code reinscribes the apparent naturalness and inevitability of the software status quo, given that 
there are fewer opportunities for users to develop skills and communities that would enable them 
to critically understand and shape their software.  
 
2.14. “Free as in beer”: The false generosity of ‘free’ software 
Another way that software capitalists maintain the software status quo is through 
cultivating dependence on capitalist software services among a large user population. They do 
this primarily by providing useful software services (such as email, online calendars, 
collaborative documents and social media) for ‘free’ that are difficult to quit once incorporated 
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into one’s information technology habits or even professionally difficult to avoid altogether. 
Google Search, Google Docs, Gmail, Facebook, Twitter, and so forth have developed large user 
bases in part by offering their services at no cost in the traditional sense of paying fees or 
subscriptions. As of 2016, for instance, Gmail had 1 billion monthly active users (Statista, 
“Active Gmail Users”). As of 2017, Facebook has 1.9 billion monthly active users (Statista, “US 
Facebook”). This freeness, however, should not be confused with the ‘freedoms’ that the Free 
Software Foundation articulates—namely, the freedom to comprehend source code and to 
manipulate/transform code for one’s own purposes. Free of cost (or “free as in beer,” as Richard 
Stallman, founder of the Free Software movement, describes it) and free as in freedom can be 
easily confused. Free of cost is sometimes promoted proudly as a promise on the part of the 
company; as Facebook states on its login page: “It’s free and always will be.” However, the “free 
of cost” status of nonfree software platforms and services, has arguably encouraged an uncritical 
embrace of their adoption in everyday life. As Jose van Dijck writes, “What is most striking 
about (social media or platform) sites like YouTube is their normalization into everyday life—
people's ubiquitous acceptance of connective media penetrating all aspects of sociality and 
creativity” (Culture 129). Van Dijck also points out that these software services are in fact not 
actually free: “Metadata and data have become a regular currency for citizens to pay for their 
communication services and security—a trade-off that has nestled into the comfort zone of most 
people” (“Datafication” 197).  
As there is no explicit civic obligation to use these software services, their use appears to 
be taken up as the free choice on the part of the user. This perspective, however, fails to 
recognize how the free availability of nonfree software is a tactical, aggressive business strategy 
that enables software to infiltrate a community and ideally crowd out other imaginative 
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possibilities. As many have observed, it is difficult to abstain from these digital services in 
everyday life. Bruce Schneier observes, “These are the tools of modern life. They're necessary to 
a career and a social life. Opting out just isn't a viable choice for most of us, most of the time; it 
violates what have become very real norms of contemporary life” (60-61). Obtaining a monopoly 
in software, then, in effect ‘forces’ everyone’s free choice. Finally, even if privacy settings grant 
users explicit ‘control’ over what they ‘share’ with these software companies, effectively 
adjusting these settings can be difficult. Van Dijck points to the growing literature on this 
phenomenon, writing: “Some have found the ability of users to resist platforms’ privacy policies 
and surveillance tactics to be quite limited; individuals are steered by platforms’ technologies 
and business models of single platforms while it is extremely hard to gain insight in the system’s 
interdependence and complexity (Draper 2012; Hartzog and Selinger 2013; Mager 2012)” 
(“Datafication” 206). 
The confusing nature of this free of cost software might be better understood by drawing 
on Freire’s notion of “false generosity,” a concept that describes how charity bestowed on the 
oppressed by the oppressor actually serves as an instrument of oppression. Freire himself 
critiques these acts of charity by oppressors, as it reinforces the servility and dependence of the 
recipient (rather than enabling them to become independent), and furthermore is rooted in an 
unjust order of the world (26). He writes:  
 
In order to have the continued opportunity to express their “generosity,” the oppressors 
must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the permanent fount of this 
“generosity,” which is nourished by death, despair, and poverty. That is why the 
dispensers of false generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its source.  
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True generosity consists precisely in fighting to destroy the causes which nourish false 
charity. False charity constrains the fearful and subdued, the “rejects of life,” to extend 
their trembling hands. True generosity lies in striving so that these hands—whether of 
individuals or entire peoples—need be extended less and less in supplication, so that 
more and more they become human hands which work and, working, transform the 
world. (44)  
 
In Freire’s view, oppressors are only able to be generous because their oppression has enabled 
them to monopolize resources. In some sense what they give to the oppressed could be conceived 
of as measured allowances of resources that have been unjustly denied from the oppressed. But 
as this theft is concealed, the act of false generosity heightens the sense of respect, dependence, 
and perhaps even loyalty and warm regard of the oppressed towards to oppressor, thus inhibiting 
recognition of their oppression. The oppressor is able to dole out their false generosity according 
to their own terms and at their own pace. False generosity thus has an immediate disciplinary 
power as the oppressed must accept the terms of the generosity and stay in good graces with the 
oppressed in order to ensure continued generosity. But the false generosity is never that which 
enables the oppressed to become self-sufficient, rather it increases their reliance on the oppressor 
for continued gestures of false generosity.  
In this way, Freire’s concept of false generosity is useful for understanding one of the key 
tactics of what media scholar Dal Yong Jin calls “platform imperialism,” or “the increasing role 
of U.S.-based platforms in capital accumulation and culture” in global Internet use (153), 
especially as manifested by Google and Facebook. Though freeness of capitalist digital tools is 
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not often directly articulated as “charity” or a “gift” to users, terms that Freire uses to describe 
false generosity, this freeness embodies a similar logic. The free availability of platform-based 
tools, and their frequent superior offerings to digital communication platforms offered by 
schools, businesses, and other organizations, has been an important strategy in cultivating a 
broad, loyal, and deeply-engaged user base, which in turn provides platform companies with 
valuable user data that enables them to sell targeted ads or create other products. Thus, freeness 
of these tools must be understood as a business strategy to capture and lock in as many users as 
possible as the companies rely on the extraction of their data to generate profit. As van Dijck 
writes, “Facebook users were gradually enticed to accept less privacy and more advertising in 
exchange for convenient and “free” networking services” (van Dijck, 2013a). The more users 
that these platforms are able to gain, the more they can capitalize on what is known as the 
“network effect,” or the fact that the value of a service grows as more people use it 
(Vaidhyanathan 19).  
This monopoly on networks makes it extremely difficult for community-driven 
expressions of technology to flourish, as evidenced by the variety of social networking platforms 
that have failed to become visible, if not viable, options. Many scholars and media commentators 
have called attention to Facebook’s near-monopoly on social media, which has defeated even 
Google’s efforts to establish a social media platform. Will Oremus, for instance, has written a 
brief summary of other attempted alternatives and the challenges they faced in developing a user 
base (2014). Other scholars have paid particular attention to challenges faced by non-commercial 
social media sites, such as Diaspora*, N-1, Occupii, Riseup, which offer alternatives to corporate 
social media platforms. Christian Fuchs and Marisol Sandoval define these non-commercial 
options as ones in which “activists produce, control, own and maintain them,” “are relatively 
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independent from state and corporate power,” “designed as platforms for the dissemination of 
critical information and for activist communication,” and enact a “convergence of users and 
producers.” However, in their study of social media use by Occupy activists, who largely share 
the values of these non-commercial platforms, they found that that these platforms were used 
much less than corporate social media because activists either didn’t know about them, or 
alternately, knew that they didn’t connect with large public audiences (Fuchs and Sandoval 172). 
Other scholars have noted that the free availability of these services may disincentivize 
public institutions to continue to provide them, even though the commercialization of these 
services represent ethical and civic compromises. For example, Vaidhyanathan raises the 
concern that Google Books might encourage libraries to "to remove physical books from their 
collection if they considered electronic access via Google to be sufficient” (164). As numerous 
university libraries continue to downsize or offshore their collections, Vaidyanathan's fears seem 
to have come true (Barclay 2015).  
The effects of this dominance are aggregative; the less users are exposed to other types of 
platforms that operate according to other logics, the less they are able to recognize the non-
neutrality of the platforms that they use. Additionally, the growing ubiquity and reliance on these 
tools for professional, educational, and communication needs for all spheres of activity, makes it 
increasingly difficult for individuals to abstain from using them even if they want to. And, as 
users become increasingly dependent on these platforms, they are arguably less able to freely 
reject them when the terms of use infringe more and more upon their rights.  
Thus, the freeness of these platforms should not be conceived of as a “gift” (to use 
Freire’s term), but as an economically-motivated tactic to capture users and cultivate a 
dependence on their platforms. Disguised as an innocent and freely-given resource, this gift is 
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designed to keep users from becoming more self-sufficient, critically aware, and self-directing in 
the networked information economy. The more that these companies can lock customers into 
their particular service, the more they can control those users and increase their dominance in the 
networked information economy. A lucid example of this can be seen in Facebook’s recent 
attempt to “gift” India with Internet connectivity completely controlled by Facebook as a means 
to meet achieve a 30% increase in Facebook users by 2020 (Bhatia). “Seeing first-hand how 
people here are using the internet was an incredible experience,” Zuckerberg wrote after visiting 
the country. “One day, if we can connect every village, we can transform many more lives and 
improve the world for all of us.” Though Zuckerberg didn’t directly describe the project as an act 
of “charity,” his description of it as a project intended to transform lives of Indians (leveraging 
the wealth and power of Facebook) amounts to the same thing. Charity in instances like these, 
however, isn’t only false because it is a business strategy, but because it is made possible by the 
unjust dominance of companies like Facebook, their ethically questionable data harvesting 
practices, and their algorithmic control of and influence over users. The gift of free connectivity 
given by digital companies is always only given on the companies’ own terms with connectivity 
itself mediated by their own interests. Thus, false charity enables platforms to rapidly and deeply 
embed themselves throughout a wide ranging population. While not all software companies 
subscribe to this “gift model,” it does accurately describe the business practices of the top three 
most frequented websites (Google, Youtube, and Facebook). Furthermore, the fact that 88% of 
all web platforms rely on targeted advertising as a primary means of generating revenue (Jin), 
suggests that the gift model is in fact the dominant business model sustaining the digital 
platforms that make up the networked information economy.  
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2.15. The further illusion of choice: the question of consent and ‘terms of service agreements’  
User agreements for software and digital platforms present another set of challenges to 
the general user’s ability to clearly understand the rights she surrenders to digital companies 
when using their products and the ways that her personal data might be used by those companies. 
Those user agreements are ostensibly intended to ensure a mutually-understood agreement 
between users and companies, in practice they are generally too long, complex, and tedious to be 
read by most users. As T. Franklin Waddell et al. point out, “most users do not read the EULA 
(End Users Licensing Agreement) carefully. The language and presentation of EULAs are often 
dull, dense and inaccessible” (2016 “Abstract”). Similarly, a report by The Growing Up Digital 
Taskforce found that 43% of Instagram users in Britain are between the ages of 8 and 11, and 
that almost 0% read the user agreement.  
When the TOSA is actually read in full, what emerges is that these user agreements are 
overwhelmingly economically-incentivized to protect the interests of the company over the 
interest of the users. A study of web 2.0 privacy statements by Zizi Papacharissi and Jan 
Fernback found that “privacy statements frequently do not guarantee the protection of personal 
information but rather serve as legal safeguards for the company by detailing how personal 
information collected will be used” (276). In particular, they found that: 
 
The MSN use of language articulates a concern for Microsoft's legal standing rather than 
for consumer protection. The Google privacy statement offers consumers little protection. 
The Kazaa statement is dismissive of consumer concerns, and the Real statement is a 
contradictory promotional apparatus. (722) 
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Papacharissi and Fernback correctly observe that privacy statements, often interpreted as 
documents outlining how a user’s privacy might be protected, are in fact written to legal protect 
companies’ infringement of user privacy. Similarly, Marisol Sandoval found in her study of web 
2.0 platforms that: 
 
The terms of use and privacy statements of commercial web 2.0 platforms allow the 
widespread use of user data in a way that supports the profit interests of platform owners. 
The business model of most commercial web 2.0 platforms is based on personalized 
advertising. Capital is accumulated by selling space for advertisements as well as by 
selling user data to third-party advertising companies. (Sandoval 2012, 166) 
 
Sandoval’s study thus extends Papacharissi and Fernback’s observation that privacy statements 
are often legal protections for the company by showing these legal protections directly reflect an 
industry-wide business model for web platforms.  
Equally problematic is that even if the user carries out the unwieldy task of carefully 
reading the entirety of a user agreement or privacy statement, company policies change 
frequently, often rendering the user agreement moot without notice. What Vaidhyanathan 
observes about Google is applicable to many if not most Internet companies:  
 
Google changes its policy often and without warning. So today’s policy—for all its 
strengths and weaknesses—might not be the policy tomorrow or next year. You might 
have engaged with Google and donated your data trail to under the provisions of an early 
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version of the policy, only to discover that Google changed the policy while you were not 
looking. (85) 
 
Though policies certainly need to evolve to reflect company changes, it seems that some 
companies make changes to strategically acculturate the user to more invasive privacy violations. 
As Eric Schmidt, Google’s CEO from 2001 to 2011 stated, “Google policy is to get right up to 
the creepy line and not cross it.” A recent example of approaching or crossing the ambiguous 
“creepy line,” occurred in June 2016 when Google deleted a clause in its privacy settings that 
prohibited the company from merging user data generated in various Google related accounts 
such as Gmail, search, and YouTube, thus allowing the company to generate richer profiles of 
users, and create targeted ads based on keywords found in users Gmail accounts (Solon 2016).  
Thus, through their length, complexity, and frequent changes, statements and agreements that are 
supposed to clearly inform users about the practices of a company in fact often do more to 
confuse users about these practices.   
 
2.16. The software status quo and the state: the rule of law and the security of its citizens 
Software companies have also given little reason for users to trust that they will abide by 
their own stated policies or even the law or that they will protect user data from being unethically 
used for commercial or political purpoes. In 2015, a report found that Facebook broke European 
Union law for tracking the online activity of any user, whether a member of Facebook or not, 
who had happened to visit a Facebook page (Gibbs 2015). Furthermore, the report found that 
Facebook illegally tracked Internet users who had explicitly requested to opt-out from tracking 
through the Digital Advertising Alliance in the US, Digital Advertising Alliance of Canada in 
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Canada or the European Digital Advertising Alliance in the EU which provide opt-out services. 
Other concerning crossings of the “creepy line” include Facebook’s recent release of a feature 
that allows advertisers to exclude users by race (Angwin and Paris 2016) or its recent interest in 
partnering with an insurance company to set prices based on user behavior data (Fuchs 2016). 
The precarious nature of policy in respect to one’s software and data has implications not 
only for day-to-day use, but for the long-term use of the data gathered by software companies. 
As van Dijck observes, use of these platforms presume “faith in high-tech companies’ and 
government agencies’ intention to protect user data from exploitation” as well as “trust in . . . the 
independence and integrity of institutions deploying these methods—whether corporate 
platforms, government agencies, or academic researchers” (van Dijck “Datafication” 204). This 
trust, however, is frequently violated by software and platform companies and often with little 
penalty to the companies themselves. Over the years, numerous instances have occurred that 
highlight the continuous risks of allowing corporate entities to determine the collection, 
protection, and use of user data, with consequences ranging from undesired exposure of personal 
activity to political persecution. For example, in 2007, without adequate warning or consent, 
Facebook launched an advertising feature called Beacon, that allowed vendors to publish 
information related to a user’s consumer behavior—such as their recent purchases—in their 
Facebook news feed. The outcry that followed led to a lawsuit, which Facebook settled for $9.5 
million (Kravets 2010). Nonetheless, the company was undeterred in its commitment to infringe 
upon user privacy to the point that in 2010 a global anti-Facebook movement developed in 
response (Robins 2010). 
The accumulation of user data also presents significant political and humanitarian 
concerns, especially in regard to activists who use software to communicate sensitive 
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information or critical opinions about the government of the countries in which they live. 
Rebecca MacKinnon’s Consent of the Networked details the way companies such as Facebook, 
Google, and Yahoo have repeatedly helped authoritarian regimes enact what she calls 
“networked authoritarianism,” that is the censoring, monitoring, and shaping of citizen’s private 
and public communications through networked technologies. These activities have not only 
enabled governments to influence public opinion and knowledge, but have also directly led to the 
imprisonment of activists who used these technologies to communicate sensitive information or 
opinions about their respective governments. Recent political events in the U.S. also show how 
quickly the stakes may seem to rise in trusting a company with one’s data. Shortly after the 2016 
U.S. election, activists began sounding warning bells about the potential governmental use of 
user data to support its unconstitutional agenda.The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a 
nonprofit organization dedicated to defending civil liberties in a digital world, released a full-
page ad in Wired Magazine in December 2016, shortly after the U.S. election. The ad called for 
tech platforms to delete user data on account of the fact that:  
 
Incoming President Donald Trump made campaign promises that, if carried out, threaten 
the free web and the rights of millions of people. He has praised attempts to undermine 
digital security, supported mass surveillance, and threatened net neutrality. He promised 
to identify and deport millions of your friends and neighbors, track people based on their 
religious beliefs, and suppress freedom of the press. (“It’s Time to Unite”).13  
 
                                                
13 EFF also has a Surveillance Self-Defense Guide (https://ssd.eff.org/en), and has been releasing annual 
“Who Has Your Back” reports on data practices of major tech companies, particularly as they pertain to 
government requests since 2011.  
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EFF’s advertisement echoed widespread concerns articulated by privacy activists, human rights 
campaigners, and former US security officials that current practices of data collection created a 
system, as one advocate observed, is “ripe for further abuse under an autocratic, power-obsessed 
president” (“Privacy Experts Fear”). Subsequent events continue to testify to the legitimacy of 
these concerns, such as reports that US Border Agents are checking people’s social media posts 
before allowing them in the country (Mortimer 2017). Education writer Audrey Watter raises 
other concerns about the stakes of student data collection practices under a Trump presidency 
(Watters 2016). Given the multiple incentives companies have to collect and share data, and the 
technical and political challenges to protecting it, there is little reason to trust that they will 
protect user data at all costs.  
 
2.17. The erosion of ‘commonwealth’ and governance by ‘the public’ 
The software status quo is also sustained by a broader ethos of what has come to be 
called ‘neoliberalism.” Neoliberalism has been used to describe a variety of evolving political 
and economic conditions in the past forty years, but I use it here to refer to what Damien Cahill 
and Martijn Konings define as “a shift a general shift from the social-democratic and progressive 
liberal era to policies and institutions that were concerned to promote market mechanisms and 
were more friendly to business and capital.” In the views of scholars such as Fred Turner and 
Siva Vaidhyanathan, neoliberalism, which views public and political oversight as ineffective 
mechanisms for solving real world problems, is one of the underlying philosophies driving the 
development of the software and computing industry. Vaidhyanathan identifies two core beliefs 
of neoliberalism as particularly influential to this industry’s growth: (1) “technofundamentalism, 
the optimistic belief in the power of technology to solve problems,” and (2) “market 
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fundamentalism, the notion that most problems are better (at least more efficiently) solved by the 
actions of private parties rather than by state oversight or investment” (40). In this view, there is 
little room for government regulation of the capitalist software industry. As one critical reader of 
Vaidhyanathan put it, technofundamentalism views markets as enacting the primary “learning 
and discovery processes” rather than a deliberating and governing people (Thierer 2011).  
According to Vaidhyanathan, this neoliberal approach has enabled what he calls “public 
failure,” or the failure of the state to “satisfy public needs and deliver services effectively” (41). 
Vaidhyanathan writes that this “failure occurs not necessarily because the state is the 
inappropriate agent to solve a particular problem . . . it may occur when the public sector has 
been intentionally dismantled, degraded, or underfunded, while expectations for its performance 
remain high” (41). Vaidhyanathan cites military operations, prisons, health care coverage, and 
schooling as examples of public failure in the United States. He argues that public failure has 
enabled private actors to “step into the void” and provide those services. While many may view 
this as a practical solution to supporting essential services, it ultimately allows the private sector 
to “(call) the shots and [apportions (or hoards)] resources” (40). In this scenario, the public is not 
only prevented from overseeing how these services are provided, they begin to lose (or 
alternately never develop) the sense that issues are up for public discussion.  
Public discussion is inhibited in a variety of interlocking ways, starting with the fact that 
there are few examples and opportunities that would train and incentivize a public to participate 
in overseeing software policy. Since software is viewed largely as business concern and 
technological issues are often viewed as best understood and managed by experts in those 
domains, there is little perceived need to involve non expert users in software policy, even if 
those users will be the ones most affected by this policy. Public oversight is also thwarted by the 
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fact that, as already noted, many of the means used to carry out software service are kept from 
public view as “trade secrets.”14 This is particularly manifest in the networked information 
economy in the fact that platforms are silently extracting enormous quantities of user data for 
unknown use, and additionally, also using secret algorithms to shape the experience of the user. 
While the complexity of algorithms in itself might not be comprehensible to a majority of 
individuals, the secrecy prevents the public from bringing its own experts to explain and 
deliberate upon the social effects of these algorithms.  
Technofundamentalism further reinforces the idea that the public need not be involved in 
rationally directing the development of the networked information economy, as technological 
progress is thought to work in concert with the market to neutrally advance social progress. In 
this view, democracy, and its attendant activities, is primarily viewed as a technological problem, 
or one that can be solved by expanding the capabilities and the reach of technology platforms. As 
media commentator Astra Taylor puts it, technofundamentalist discourse paints the state “as a 
problematic authority, while private enterprise is given a free pass; democracy, fuzzily defined, 
is attained through “sharing,” “collaboration,” “innovation,” and “disruption”” (9). There is very 
little attention, and at times even a headstrong refusal on the part of technocrats to acknowledge 
the social dimensions of problems related to politics, education, access, and so forth, that are in 
many ways immune, if not exasperated by market driven technological intervention. 
 
                                                
14 For example, in one broadly-circulated response to a request for user data, Facebook responded: 
“Section 4(12) of the Acts carves out an exception to subject access requests where the disclosures in 
response would adversely affect trade secrets or intellectual property. See Protalinski 2011.  
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2.18. The use-value of ‘Cyborg Oppression’  
The political, social, cultural, and technological issues surrounding our digital paradigm 
are highly complex. Comprehending and transforming these issues is further complicated by a 
lack of a conceptual framework that views them as interrelated parts that make up the whole of 
our digital paradigm, or is not “wholly adopted” from “Silicon Valley executives,” as Astra 
Taylor puts it. By combining the theoretical work of Haraway and Freire, the concept of “cyborg 
oppression” allows us to scrutinize all of these areas to see where and how they work in concert 
to deny users the ability to understand and transform their cyborg world. The concept also 
enables us to see that the steps for cyborg liberation entail actions that expand upon users’ ability 
to understand and transform their cyborg world in all of its varied domains.  
The figure of the cyborg will be foundational for Part II of this dissertation, “The cyborg 
university and its invisible discipline.” Discussions old and new pertaining to the use of digital 
technology within higher education and academics often treat it as something either external or 
separate to the institution. In contrast, I will argue that the university is better understood through 
Haraway’s defamiliarizing lens of the cyborg, or as an institution in which nearly all of its life 
processes are mediated by some form of digital technology. With this new appreciation of the 
ways in which digital technology already governs the processes of the university, I will follow 
Chopra and Dexter to argue that political freedom within the university will require the 
protection of political freedoms of the software it employs to carry out its activities. I will further 
argue, however, that as an educational institution, the university plays an important role in 
reproducing different attitudes, practices, and expectations regarding software in society at large. 
I will use the concept of cyborg oppression to examine how the implementation and use of 
software in different humanistic spaces in the past fifty years has either enabled or thwarted users 
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from understanding and transforming the software programs that they use. I will pay special 
attention to examples where social, technological, and pedagogical practices made promising 
advances in awakening participatory software consciousness in users. I will then point to ways 
the university might better cultivate these practices as a powerful partner in the struggle for 
cyborg liberation.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Cyborg University and Its Invisible Discipline 
 
 
We tend to forget much of the subject matter of the courses we have taken … but we do 
not easily forget the conventions that govern those courses and the values implicit in 
them. (63) 
—Kenneth Bruffee 
 
One of the things that built Apple II’s was schools buying Apple II. 
—Steve Jobs 
 
3.1. Flipping the narrative of technological innovation 
In 2010, Peter Thiel, one of Silicon Valley’s most successful entrepreneurs, announced 
the creation of a fellowship that would offer generous financial support to students who dropped 
out of college to pursue innovative projects. Today, the Thiel Fellowship website describes this 
activity as giving “$100,000 to young people who want to build new things instead of sitting in a 
classroom.”15 As representative of the beliefs of those developing and investing in the 
technologies that mediate so many of our professional, educational, and everyday 
communicative activities, it is worth considering this statement more closely. Of particular 
interest is the opposition described in this statement between “the young people who want to 
                                                
15 See http://thielfellowship.org/.  
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build new things” and those unlucky youths who are instead “sitting a classroom.” The former 
group, the website tells us, are interested in pursuing “ideas that matter,” doing “something 
new,” and charting “a unique course” whereas the latter are “pursuing mandatory tests,” learning 
what’s “been done before,” and presumably not interested in or capable of taking part in the 
activities that the exclusive Thiel Fellowship supports. 
To a certain extent, this lowly regard for classroom education is neither altogether 
unjustified nor even unique, or at least not for the forms of education that it mistakenly assumes 
are inherent to the classroom itself. Since the 1960s, educational critics such as June Jordan,16 
Paulo Freire, bell hooks, Ira Shor, and Cathy Davidson have been drawing attention to the ways 
that dominant educational practices stifle the intellectual freedom of students and diminish their 
ability to critically transform their realities (Gottesman 2016, Jordan 1988, Freire 1970, hooks 
2003, Shor 1989, Davidson 2017). Though the work of each of these critics focuses on varying 
student populations, institutional realities, and political concerns, they all share a conviction that 
pedagogy can and must be refashioned to empower all students to take a leadership role in their 
future rather than a select few. The Thiel Foundation, however, does not share this egalitarian 
ethic about how our technological future could and should be developed. In the view expressed 
on its website, we hear instead that only the exceptional youth—through a combination of 
individual ingenuity and a rare stroke of corporate favor—will be the ones to build the 
technological world to come while—we can only assume—the classroom and the general student 
passively receive it.  
Technology, we are often told, is made by passionate geniuses, hackers, and nerds 
(Rosenzweig 1998, Carlsson 2009, Isaacson 2014), those who drop of school because they are 
                                                
16 I am indebted to Danica Savonick and her presentation at the 2018 Modern Language Association 
Conference for drawing my attention to June Jordan’s critical pedagogy.  
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too smart, too visionary, and too impatient with institutions made for the ordinary individual 
(Wakabayashi 2015). Television shows like Mister Robot, Silicon Valley, and Halt and Catch 
Fire, books like The Innovators: How a Group of Hackers, Geniuses, and Geeks Created the 
Digital Revolution and When Wizards Stay Up Late, and biopics like Steve Jobs and Man in the 
Machine reinforce the idea (even in satire) that the direction of technological development is 
something only these exceptional, determined, and lucky few are qualified to decide. Certainly, 
technology needs its technologists, those with the talent, expertise, interest, and dedication to 
comprehending and solving practical problems related to its development. However, this genius 
narrative—one that the Thiel Foundation profoundly reinscribes—overlooks what I will argue is 
an equally important factor in the success of digital products, that is the role of the classroom in 
training a population to use and depend upon them.  
The use of digital technology within the university represents a largely overlooked form 
of education in and of itself—one I will describe shortly as the invisible discipline—in that it 
trains the academic community, particularly students, to adopt a set of technical skills, habits, 
cultural attitudes, assumptions, and consumer preferences and products that convert the academic 
body into a very particular type of technological consumer. By “overlooked,” I do not mean to 
say that educators are not thinking about the importance of technological training within higher 
education. Indeed, numerous academic and governmental organizations have called for more 
robust and critical forms of digital literacy, media literacy, and information literacy training as 
reflected in recent reports and statements by the National Council of Teachers of English (“21st 
Century Literacy” 2013), the Association of College & Research Libraries (“Intersections” 
2013), the World Economic Forum (“Future” 2016), the New Media Consortium (Alexander 
2017), and Project Information Literacy (Head 2013). Henry Jenkins, one representative of this 
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general trend in thought, argues that education needs to foster new media literacies given that 
“changes in the media environment are altering our understanding of literacy and requiring new 
habits of mind, new ways of processing culture and interacting with the world around us” (21). 
Given that these changes affect the way we work, socialize, find information, and learn, Jenkins 
argues that education needs to focus on “fostering what we call the new media literacies: a set of 
cultural competencies and social skills that young people need in the new media landscape” (4). 
As an example, he points to the New Media Consortium’s definition of new media literacy as 
“the set of abilities and skills where aural, visual, and digital literacy overlap.These include the 
ability to understand the power of images and sounds, to recognize and use that power, to 
manipulate and transform digital media, to distribute them pervasively, and to easily adapt them 
to new forms” (Jenkins 19).“ Like many advocates of these new literacies, Jenkins argues that 
fostering them in school will help prepare students to critically assess the ways commercial 
interests and other motives shape the media we consume and structure our perceptions of the 
world (16, 21). 
While I applaud the call for more robust and critical forms of digital literacy education as 
expressed by Jenkins and the organizations like the New Media Consortium, the emerging 
challenges of the cyborg world call for more robust forms of digital practice within and through 
the university. As I argued in my previous chapter using theoretical concepts taken from the 
work of Paulo Freire and Donna Haraway, our digital landscape has become increasingly 
oppressive in that general users are typically prohibited from collectively governing and 
modifying the software and information technologies that mediate their everyday lives. I called 
this oppression “cyborg oppression” given the way political rights are violated within and 
through digital mediation. Drawing from critical analyses of software and digital media 
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companies, I pointed to numerous social, legal, technical, and political factors that work both 
directly and incidentally to sustain cyborg oppression as well as inhibit general recognition of it. 
Given the numerous ways cyborg oppression enables capitalist digital media companies to 
manipulate user behavior (Vaidhyanathan 2012) and opinion (Gillespie 2014, Cheney-Lippold 
2011, Lessig 1999, Galloway 2006), exploit digital labor (Terranova 2000, Fuchs 2010, Ritzer 
2010, Scholz 2012), enact censorship (Damon 2018, Mackinnon 2012, Heins 2013), violate user 
privacy (Zuboff 2018, van Dijck 2014, Raley 2013), and override public decision making 
processes (Vaidhyanathan 2012), I argued that cyborg oppression and the cyborg status quo it 
represents must be resisted and overcome.  
What I aim to do in this chapter is expand the analyses offered in my last chapter to show 
how certain tendencies within institutionalized education, specifically the university, have also 
contributed to maintaining the cyborg status quo and some of its oppressive characteristics. As 
Chris Gilliard writes, many of the most pernicious practices of capitalist digital media—such as 
surveillance, information asymmetry, and digital redlining—are replicated in educational 
institutions “in the name of ‘efficiency,’ ‘engagement,’ or ‘improved outcomes.’ Gilliard argues 
that educators and students should not passively accept these pernicious practices and instead 
leverage the classroom to “make visible the effects of surveillance capitalism” and provide a 
unique site where students might “envision that something else is possible” (July 2017). To 
expand on Gilliard’s point, we need forms of digital literacy training that do more than prepare 
students to use emerging tools for professional activities, develop the next “disruptive” platform 
or app, or even critically assess the credibility of information generated in these environments. 
While these digital literacy skills are important, we also need to encourage students to question 
the normalization of surveillance capitalism in our technological landscape, in which information 
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technologies are often designed to “predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce 
revenue and market control” (Zuboff 75), and to prepare students with skills, experiences, and 
critical understanding that might enable them to explore and develop democratic alternatives. 
Instead, however, even the most critically-minded expressions of digital literacy often focus on 
“adapting” to emerging media forms as if they were a force developing outside of human control 
(Jenkins 19) rather than considering how university practice contributes to the cyborg status quo 
and how it might more effectively intervene. Ironically, as new media literacy becomes a greater 
focal point in the curriculum, the invisible discipline persists.   
I am certainly not the first to call attention to troubling technological trends in higher 
education; Safiya Noble (2018), Virginia Eubanks (2018), Zeynep Tufekci (2016), Danah Boyd 
(2104), Audrey Watters (2014), Jesse Stommel (2017), Henry Giroux (2004), and Chet Bowers 
(2005) are just some of the scholars doing excellent work in this area. My analysis however is 
meant to expand beyond the site of digital literacy initiatives and educational technology 
practices to examine more broadly the relationship between technological practice in the 
university as a whole and the politics of the broader cyborg world. Education, after all, is only 
one site of the university undergoing technological change. Since the turn of the 21st century, a 
wealth of new terms have emerged or taken on new life that describe the diverse ways research, 
teaching, or the university itself are adopting new technologies and technological practices. 
Some of these terms call overt attention to technology, such as “the digital humanities” (Gold 
2012), “digital scholarship” (Pearce 2012), “digital pedagogy” (Howell 2012), “digital learning ” 
(Warschauer 2007), “e-learning” (Rosenberg 2002), “mobile learning” (Laouris 2005), 
“escholarship” (Sweeney 2001), “digital rhetoric” (Zappen 2005), “the digital university” 
(Hazemi 2012), “the virtual university” (Robins 2002), “the networked university” (Agre 2000), 
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“networked participatory scholarship” (Veletsianos 2012), “Humanities 2.0” (Davidson 2008), 
and so forth. Other terms, while less explicit in their relation to technological practice, still 
describe academic practices that have come to depend equally on recent technological advances 
in the ability to cheaply and rapidly share or analyze information, such as “open access” (Suber 
2012), “data science” (Hey 2009), “participatory learning” (McLoughlin 2007), “scholarly 
communication” (Sompel 2004), or “the information-rich university” (Munck 2014).  
These terms and the discussions in which they are centered have been indispensable for 
thinking through the multiple ways digital technology is changing the academic experience 
across its many different dimensions. However, despite the valuable contributions of these 
discussions, we have yet to develop a sufficiently robust and visible discussion that directs our 
attention to the cyborg politics of this transformation, or who gets to make decisions about the 
design and use of these information technologies and what interests are served in those decisions. 
As Alan Liu observes about one of these discussions, “How the digital humanities advance, 
channel, or resist the great postindustrial, neoliberal, corporatist, and globalist flows of 
information-cum-capital, for instance, is a question rarely heard in the digital humanities 
associations, conferences, journals, and projects” (Gold 131 2012). In the same volume, 
Elizabeth Losh writes, “those interested in ‘hacking the academy,’ express too little interest in 
‘hacking the world,’ and experiments in open peer review and creative commons publishing in 
the academy are too often oriented around the self-interest of academics needing tenure rather 
than the shared interests of world citizens defending the dignity or survival of others” (Gold 
2012 176-177). Though the digital humanities has seen a lively uptake in the type of cultural 
criticism Liu and Losh calls for, these critically minded discussions still represent a drop in the 
ocean of scholarly and professional discussion regarding technological change in the university, 
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and have yet to have any substantial effect—at least as far as I’m aware—on political aspects of 
university technology practices at large. Discussions in professional academic spaces concerned 
with technological change instead tend to focus on practical application and future opportunities, 
technical, social, and other challenges to adopting new practices (Blin 2008), transformative and 
disruptive effects of technological change on academic practice (Hyman 2012, Katz 2010), and 
strategies that evaluate technological practice according to research and educational goals 
internal to the academic site in which they are used (Rose 2002, Tracy 2006, Hammarfelt 2014, 
Ball 2012). What is less common in such discussions is a problematization of the politics of 
digital technology at large and a consideration of the university’s role in these politics. In the 
next section, I will propose a cyborgian analysis of the university that reframes these discussions 
so that cyborg politics are at last the front and center of considerations university technological 
practice.  
3.2. Blending cyborg studies with critical pedagogy and critical universities studies 
A cyborgian take on critical pedagogy and critical university studies offers one promising 
way to begin connecting the use and implementation of information technologies within the 
university with broader technopolitical issues. In the same way that scholars of critical pedagogy 
have examined the university as a “device through which a corporate society reproduces its 
class-based order” (Shor 2), a cyborgian analysis of the university allow us to newly examine the 
complex and often non-intuitive ways in which the university reproduces the social order of the 
cyborg world. As I discussed in the last chapter, this social order bears scrutiny as it places the 
power to develop and direct digital technology within the hands of an elite corporate minority 
while denying this power from the everyday user with significant political consequence. 
Reconceptualizing the university as a “cyborg university,” we can momentarily set aside 
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conventional conceptions about the nature, purpose, and effects of the university and concentrate 
on its role in a broader technopolitical struggle. This framework allows us to ask, ‘what if the 
most important consequence of the university’s activities is not the actual content of knowledge 
being produced, taught, and learned, but the way it advances corporate technological power and 
intelligence by acculturating its student population to a certain status quo of technological 
exploitation and surveillance?” Certainly, the university and higher education contribute much 
value beyond the cynicism entertained by this rhetorical question, but the unchecked growth of 
cyborg oppression that I described in the last chapter demands that the technological 
infrastructure of research, publication, teaching and learning is scrutinized as seriously as its 
content. Provocative new framings are needed to reveal broader sites for intervention and to 
encourage cooperative action across areas internal and external to the university. As it stands, it 
is far too easy to brush off political issues related to digital technology as matters beyond the 
academy’s responsibility or ability to address.  
 
3.2.1. Critical Pedagogy 
Ideas borrowed from Freire’s critical pedagogy are especially useful for considering the 
academy’s relationship to the broader politics of software development and use . As I detailed in 
my last chapter, Freire argues that how we learn is often far more consequential than what we 
learn in that the conventions instrumentalized in the learning process shape our cognitive, social, 
and political habits (72). In particular, Freire outlines how pedagogical approaches that 
emphasize the transmission of “expert” or “authoritative” knowledge from the teacher to the 
“empty” student—a style he calls the “banking model”—are oppressive in that they inhibit the 
development of capacities in the student to critically understand and transform the world 
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according to their own needs, experiences, and interests. As expanded upon in work by Ira Shor, 
the banking model of education is carried out through a host of tools, practices, cultural 
conventions, popular beliefs, and organizational structures (1980). From the perspective of 
proponents of banking styles of education, these mechanisms appear as neutral means of 
transmitting knowledge as effectively and efficiently into the student population whether they 
pertain directly to the activities of teaching and learning, or to the broader institutional activities 
and conditions necessary for facilitating this teaching and learning. In their apparent neutrality, 
these mechanisms elude critical attention and can be conceived of as largely invisible.  
Though Freire’s ideas were developed in the context of teaching the illiterate poor in 
Brazil, a generation of scholars and educators in the U.S. found that the banking model was a 
useful metaphor for thinking through some of the issues of higher education in their own 
country. Scholarship from critical pedagogues such as Ira Shor (1980), Henry Giroux (1988), and 
bell hooks (1994) demonstrated how even the most trivial-seeming or incidental features of 
higher education—such as syllabi, textbooks, tests, seating arrangements, course content, 
academic culture, communication styles, institutional governance, the built environment, and so 
forth—all work in unique and even surprising ways to inhibit critical thought and participatory 
initiative in students. These scholars insisted on evaluating the mechanisms of education not 
simply according to how they performed in carrying out the university’s explicit goals of 
producing and transmitting knowledge, but rather how they functioned in the university’s 
broader but arguably more fundamental role of social reproduction.  
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3.2.2. Critical University Studies 
Of equal use to our analysis is critical university studies, a field which has emerged from 
scholarship over the past three decades related to “the corporatization of the university” and its 
attendant issues of deteriorating labor conditions, student debt, and other “ways in which current 
(university) practices serve power or wealth and contribute to injustice or inequality rather than 
social hope” (Williams 2012). While the field goes beyond the immediate concerns of the 
classroom, scholarship aligned with it often shares with critical pedagogy a commitment to 
“teaching the conflicts” (Graff 1993) or bringing students into the process of critically evaluating 
the issues at hand. As Jeffrey Williams writes in the first document to name the field, critical 
university studies “puts the issue in front of students for them to question, investigate, and judge” 
(2012). Sharing the same principles embodied in critical pedagogy, Williams asserts the 
importance of having students actively participating in shaping the future of higher education 
and its relationship to public life.   
Both critical pedagogy and critical university studies have been quick to recognize that 
digital technology, particularly within the context of teaching, is tightly entangled in many of the 
issues of interest to these fields. Christopher Newfield, for example, has called attention to the 
many ways digital technology trends have harmed teaching and learning practices. Citing studies 
that demonstrate poor learning outcomes of some forms for educational technology, he argues 
that many of these products and services are designed to capture the half trillion dollar 
educational technology market rather than serve established principles of teaching and learning. 
Despite their poor performance record, Newfield argues that they were attractive options to 
administrators who were looking for ways to help cut teaching costs and present their institution 
as adopting cutting-edge innovative teaching initiatives (2016). Similarly, in her book The War 
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on Learning: Gaining Ground in the Digital University, Elizabeth Losh provides an insightful 
critical analysis on the discourse, practice, and ideologies surrounding instructional technology 
initiatives, arguing for the need of new ethics and principles in directing these activities. Other 
important articulations along these lines include the academic journal Hybrid Pedagogy, which 
directly applies Freire’s concepts to analyzing digital teaching practices and Audrey Watters’ 
influential blog Hack Education, which covers educational technology from a critical standpoint, 
including questions of student surveillance. On the administrative front, Mike Reed and 
Rosemary Deem have written about how technologies of management and organization control 
developed within the private sector have been adopted by universities as part of their 
corporatization, affording what they call “manager academics,” or academics that manage other 
academic workers in addition to their research and teaching, new forms of power over the 
faculty, students, and staff that they manage (127).  
Each of these writers and publications have added to growing awareness of the political 
dimension of digital technology within the university. Many, too, such as those authors already 
mentioned, as well as the team behind the open source digital commons software Commons In A 
Box, have demonstrated alternative ways of engaging with digital technology that work against 
the neoliberal trends critiqued within the field of critical university studies. Altogether, these 
critiques and digital practices represent an important and influential intervention in neoliberal 
forms of digital technology within university practice. However, I’d like to suggest that the 
concept of cyborg oppression offers a useful framework for considering the broader relationship 
between higher education and the rise of digital technologies that are oppressive in the ways that 
they exploit, control, or surveil users whether within or outside of the university.  
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Cyborg oppression, as I argued in my last chapter, is the denial of individuals’ right to 
critically understand and transform their digitally-mediated world. In a digital landscape 
constituted predominantly by capitalist digital media, the denial of these rights is pervasive and 
thoroughly normalized. I further argued that many of the exploitative trends in capitalist digital 
media are enabled—if not altogether caused by—the denial of these rights. We should thus do 
more than attempt to respond to these issues on a case by case basis through regulation, policy 
changes, and boycotts, but also through a cultural shift in the way we make, govern, and 
implement digital technologies. A step towards cyborg liberation will require the development of 
educational, institutional, social, cultural, and technical processes that work towards enabling all 
individuals, regardless of technical skill, to have a democratic voice in the shaping of our digital 
world.  
If one accepts my argument that cyborg oppression is one of today’s legitimate and 
pressing problems, then it follows that critical universities studies and critical pedagogy should 
recognize the university’s obligation to prepare its students to critically assess and transform it. 
Both critical pedagogy and critical university studies are deeply rooted in the idea that the 
purpose of education is to equip rising generations with the knowledge, criticality, skills, and 
confidence necessary for addressing the pressing issues of the day. I am thus proposing an 
extension of the important analyses developed within the context of critical universities studies 
and critical pedagogy to develop a mode of analyzing university activity specifically in the 
context of how it resists or challenges cyborg oppression. This form of study will focus on what I 
call the “cyborg university” or the university as a technologically-mediated institution, which in 
turn, has an important relationship to the technopolitics of the broader cyborg world that I 
outlined in my previous chapter. That role may be as straightforward as the university’s 
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historical collaboration in the production of important forms of digital technology, such as the 
computer or the Internet, or its ongoing training of experts who supply the necessary technical 
labor in development carried out by private industry. But more importantly, the “cyborg 
university” helps focus our attention on the more subtle but equally powerful ways that the 
social, cultural, and economic conditions of the university contribute to the making of the cyborg 
world. In particular, I will argue that the ways the university purchases or otherwise adopts 
digital technology and normalizes a culture of technological use and expectation powerfully 
strengthens the monopoly of surveillance-driven corporate technology in students’ and 
researchers’ everyday use and in their technological imagination.  
The current culture of technological adoption and use of digital technology within the 
university has been largely shaped by commercial interests. Commercial digital technologies 
companies have long recognized the significant potential market that universities and institutions 
of higher education represent, particularly in regards to their student population. As Samir 
Chopra and Scott Dexter write, “in a foreshadowing of contemporary university-corporate 
relations, IBM offered its 650 systems to universities at massively discounted rates under the 
condition that they would offer computing courses. This strategy marked the beginning of direct 
corporate influence on the curricula of academic computing departments, one of the many not-
so-benign relationships between university and corporations that contributed to the 
industrialization of the sciences” (5). Commercial digital technologies companies were quick to 
recognize a market opportunity beyond computing departments. Apple, for example, pursued 
initiatives, partnerships, and political lobbying to bring its computers into every educational 
institution in the country and gain market share, of which the formation of the Apple Education 
Foundation in 1979 is one early example (Lundall 1981, Juneau 2013 21). In 1998, David Noble 
154
  
described these commercial activities as part of a transformation of education into a market 
brought on “by vendors of network hardware, software, and “content”—Apple, IBM, Bell, the 
cable companies, Microsoft, and the edutainment and publishing companies Disney, Simon and 
Schuster, Prentice–Hall, et al.” These companies, Noble observed, “view education as a market 
for their wares, a market estimated by the Lehman Brothers investment firm potentially to be 
worth several hundred billion dollars.” Noble points to one representative report of this trend that 
that states that, “Investment opportunity in the education industry has never been better,” 
indicating that education will be “the focus industry” for lucrative investment in the future, 
replacing the healthcare industry” (n.p.).  
Today, the importance of the educational market for digital technology companies 
remains strong as ever including for new companies such as Google and Amazon, and new 
products like e-textbooks, email services, cloud storage, and so forth. For example, CEO Tim 
Cook credits students for a 21% increase in Mac sales in 2014 (McCracken). In a 2007 article for 
Inside Higher Ed, Andy Guess observed that Microsoft and Google were providing free email 
services to universities in hopes that “they’ll have won users for life.” Jeff Keltner, Google's 
enterprise specialist for collaboration products, is quoted in the article as saying: “We think 
students are going to take these tools out to their personal lives, their professional lives.” In a 
similar vein, tech writer Brian Heater recently observed that the digital technology companies’ 
intense interest in education “isn’t entirely altruistic. Fostering an entire generation of first-time 
computer users with your software and device ecosystem could mean developing lifelong 
loyalties, which is precisely why all this knock-down, drag-out fight won’t be drawing to a close 
any time soon.” The public-private partnerships between schools and technology companies 
reflect a broader trend of commercial activities carried out in and through schools (such as direct 
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advertising, the provision of corporate-sponsored educational materials or teacher training, and 
market research) that generate cash, equipment, or other types of assistance to private companies 
as detailed in a 2000 United States General Accounting Office Report to Congressional 
Requesters (Shaul 2001). Prior to 1983, only 17% of elementary and secondary schools in the 
United States were reported to have partnerships with private companies. By 2000, however, 
there were more than several hundred thousand partnerships between schools and businesses, 
contributing an estimated $2.4 billion in aid to schools (Kowalski 2010).  
Public-private partnerships with information technology companies, however, are 
qualitatively different than other companies that have typically participated in these partnerships, 
such as those in the publishing or food and beverage industry. For one thing, as Juneau (2013) 
and Jaron Lanier (2010) note, information technologies are capable of “locking in” institutions 
(and the faculty and students they serve) into certain digital services and infrastructure given the 
complexity, inconvenience, and sometimes impossibility of transferring individual or 
institutional data and network relations from one digital service to another or changing an entire 
institution’s technological practice and habits. Additionally, what neither Guess nor Keltner 
mention in the Inside Higher Ed article is that information technology is now capable of 
generating valuable data for capitalist accumulation, meaning information technology companies 
have an additional incentive to partner with universities beyond direct sales, market research, or 
cultivating lifelong consumers. Robert Kaplan and David Norton call this the “transformational 
application” of information capital, or the way in which the technology infrastructure of a 
company can generate data that “change the prevailing business model of the enterprise (2015 
251). Advancements in machine learning, data science, and artificial intelligence have 
exponentially expanded the value of user data for companies that have the means to collect and 
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analyze it in mass (Chen 2012, Bose 2009, Svobla 2017, Kumar 2017). This user data, arguably 
collected without full consideration by the student (many studies have pointed to lack of user 
awareness of the full extent of data collection practices [Acquisti 2006, Tuunainen 2009, Strater 
2007, Debatin 2009, Joinson 2011]), is then held indefinitely by that company without the 
student’s knowledge or consent (given the incomprehensibility of user agreements I described in 
Chapter 2) about how the company will instrumentalize or sell that data in the future. This 
potentially leaves the student vulnerable to future discrimination as critics and scholars have 
raised concerns about the ways personal data is being used to make predictions about 
individuals’ professional, criminal, consumer, or other types of behavior (Sanders 2017, Fuchs 
“Facebook,” Boyd 2014, O’Neil 2016).  
In varying ways, each of these public-private partnerships between schools and 
technology companies embody some form of cyborg oppression. The surveillance and 
exploitation of student data is perhaps one of the more obvious examples. However, all of the 
technology companies mentioned thus far provide software and services using some degree of 
proprietary code that explicitly prohibits users from understanding the full extent of 
technological processes occurring through that software (such as user data collection) or 
modifying that software. Even if the denial of these rights seems harmless, they contribute to the 
acculturation of students and university workers to a passive mentality towards everyday 
software, reinforce the class division between technology users and technology makers makers, 
reify the understanding of software as a neutral utility that need not and cannot involve the 
general user’s participation in its design and governance, and inhibit the cultivation of skills and 
organization that would enable users to collectively understand and modify software according to 
their diverse needs and interests. Altogether, this culture of software use in the university 
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significantly contributes to training students to embrace a vision of software use and 
development that directly serves commercial interest.  
3.2.3. The Invisible discipline  
I call the university’s training of students’ technological imagination, behavior, and 
expectations the “invisible discipline.” By “discipline” I mean a branch of academic knowledge 
taught and studied at a university, such as “mathematics” or “English literature,” except that this 
discipline is taught and learned without explicit awareness by either the professor or the student. 
But by “discipline” I also mean the type of disciplinary power exercised by institutions of the 
state articulated by Foucault that produces “docile bodies” ready to be put to use by the political 
and economic needs of the age (135). In Foucault’s study, which centered on the Industrial Age, 
those needs revolved largely around creating malleable and obedient workers and soldiers for 
factory work and military participation. In our information age, however, we might think of 
docile bodies as serving the needs of digital technology companies by molding their behaviors, 
cognitive processes, and worldview in accord with the software systems they use to carry out 
their professional, personal, and/or academic communications.  
And finally, by “invisible discipline,” I also mean a mode of education very similar to the 
one Freire describes as the “banking mechanism.” Just as banking mechanisms work to produce 
passive subjects who are incapable of critically understanding or transforming the world beyond 
the classroom, the invisible discipline works to create passive users incapable of critically 
understanding or transforming the tools and technological processes of the cyborg world. 
Students are trained not only to become consumers of particular digital technology brands, but 
also to accept the dominant oppressive practices in which everyday software is developed, 
governed, and implemented as normal, natural, and inevitable.  
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As I will detail below, a major portion of decisions regarding the use, development, and 
governance of educational, administrative, and other information technologies within the 
university have been historically made without broad faculty and student participation. This is 
not to say that there has been zero participation on the part of students and faculty in these 
decisions. In a brief period during the 1970s, some instructors built their own educational 
software using user-friendly programming languages before the mass adoption proprietary 
software in the 1980s made such practices unfeasible (Juneau 21). Many universities have IT 
Governance Committees that involve student and faculty participation and reportedly are 
important parts of IT decision making processes (“2006 Educause Current IT Issues Survey”). 
However, other studies have revealed that many of these committees are still in early stages of 
development (Pirani). And needless to say, none of these examples represent an academic 
technology culture in which issues pertaining to the politics of enterprise level campus IT are 
widely known, discussed, and governed by all university members, rather than a small 
representative committee. For the most part, technology used in academic activities is something 
determined by technologists, administrators, and corporations, and rarely by the user.  
The fact that few academics participate in the development and governance of 
information technology in the university is not surprising given the sophisticated skill set 
required to implement, develop, and assess information technology as well as the general rift 
between academic culture and IT culture as described by Edward Ayers (2004). For many in the 
academic community, information technology may simply not be very noticeable given the 
tendency, as noted thinkers such as computer scientist Herbert Simon, philosophers Michael 
Polanyi and Martin Heidegger, and organization studies researcher John Seely Brown that “the 
most profound technologies are those that disappear” (Weiser 1991 94). And as reflected in the 
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argument of Nicholas Carr’s influential article “IT Doesn’t Matter,” there is a pervasive view 
that information technology is simply a neutral utility, which like building facilities or light, 
doesn’t require critical oversight by the community that uses it. But even if an academic 
community member did have concerns about information technology, the fast-paced, labor 
intensive culture of academic work (Berg 2016) would hardly allow them time to follow up on 
them in earnest. If every campus member had to take an active role in governing the technologies 
they used for research and teaching (which many faculty have reported as taking too much time 
just to use [Zellweger 2007, Begs 2000]), research and teaching activity might come to a 
standstill. In light of these cultural and practical aspects of the university and technological 
development, the invisible discipline, or the training of students to passively accept technology 
as given, may seem altogether natural and inevitable. How, for example, could a busy freshman 
with no technological background expect or even want to meaningfully participate in the 
development and governance of information technologies? To begin to answer that question, we 
will first have to show that invisible discipline is neither natural nor inevitable but has developed 
as a distinct mechanism of what I will describe more thoroughly below as the “cyborg 
university.”  
 
3.2.4. Cyborg University Studies 
Resistance to cyborg oppression in and through the university will require an 
understanding of technological practice that goes beyond scholarly discussion remarking on the 
transformative effects and opportunities of technological change within the university. What is 
needed is a reframing of these discussions so as to highlight historical, political, economic, 
cultural and practical factors that have contributed to the establishment and persistence of the 
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invisible discipline within the university. I am calling this approach “cyborg university studies” 
as Haraway’s figure of the cyborg foregrounds the social, historical, and political dimensions of 
technology in ways that encourage more expansive and critical thinking about the university’s 
engagement with digital technology. Unlike terms such as “digital,” “networked,” or “electronic” 
that have purely technical significance, Haraway’s figure of the cyborg immediately calls 
attention to the complex political contradictions of digital technology that make it impossible, as 
Cathy Davidson (2017) and Liz Losh have argued (2014) to simply refuse or embrace it in 
everyday life or university practice. On one hand, as I detailed in my last chapter, Haraway’s 
“Cyborg Manifesto” highlights the oppressive militaristic and patriarchal origins of digital 
technology (151) that might encourage individuals concerned with emancipatory politics (Alway 
1995) to reject digital technology outright. On the other hand, Haraway’s manifesto also reveals 
that such rejection is neither possible nor desirable given that human life is already thoroughly 
permeated by and dependent upon technology (more than most realize) and that such technology 
is nonetheless indispensable in the fight for emancipation despite the fact that it is “without 
innocence” (151). In these ways, Haraway’s cyborg helps us view technological practice within 
the university in new light even if the manifesto is now more than 30 years old.  
The “cyborg university” thus is a provocative term: it declares straightaway the 
university’s technological situatedness in a global struggle of domination in which technology is 
a tool for both oppression and liberation. It rejects any nostalgic notion that either the university 
or any of its techniques (whether digital or analogue) were ever innocent but also at once rejects 
the need for innocent origins in its quest for emancipation and survival. A cyborgian 
understanding of the university also allows us to see that the university as a whole has become 
technological rather than simply a discrete set of sites that are more explicitly so, such as the 
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digital humanities and educational technology. This is due to the fact that even the most banal 
activities of the university are have long been mediated by software in some way, such as the 
production of student writing and faculty research, the administration of payroll, enrollment, and 
grades, communications via email, and so forth. As Jerry Willis observed more than thirty years 
ago, “Today, there is a higher percentage of teachers who get a computer-generated payroll 
check than students who use the computer for learning” (7). The cyborgian understanding also 
helps foreground the fact that the American university’s current form was significantly shaped 
by the U.S. militarism and patriarchal capitalism of the 20th century, such as the growth made 
possible by funding from the National Defense Education Act signed into law in 1958 (Urban). 
Following Haraway’s understanding of the cyborg, a cyborgian view of the university calls for 
us to recognize the problematic roots and present conditions of its institutions and technologies, 
while recognizing them as nonetheless necessary tools and sites of intervention. It also 
problematizes simplistic forms of suspicion or rejection of all digital technology within the 
university that don’t account for the ways less visible forms of digital technology such as word 
processors, email, databases that have not only been long normalized within the university, but 
are essential even to forms of research and education that today seem to exist outside of 
technological mediation. It strives, as Roy Rosenzweig urges us (1998), to uncover more 
complex social and cultural understandings of the historical development of digital technology in 
and through the university, and enact, what Haraway calls a “feminist cyborg [story]” that has 
the task of “recoding communication and intelligence” of the history of digital technology “to 
subvert command and control” of corporate monopolies (175). 
The very first goal of cyborg university studies is to give a unifying name to this type of 
study in order to help elevate the visibility of the intersection of technopolitical issues and 
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university information technology to scholars, critics, activists, everyday users, and technologists 
across institutional, disciplinary, administrative, and professional lines and to group these 
intellectual and activities engagements in a common cause. Just as the university has represented 
a strategic site for digital companies to cultivate a passive consumer base, cyborg university 
studies can help develop novel collaborations and strategies for resisting cyborg oppression.  
In the next section I will attempt to begin tackling some of the challenges posed by 
cyborg university studies by offering a preliminary historical sketch of the many ways different 
ways the university has adopted and developed computing technology in the past fifty years. I 
will not focus, however, on sites more commonly associated with technological innovation—
such as computer science departments or the recent rise of informatics in the sciences. I will 
instead focus on university practices and time periods not typically not thought of as 
“technologically innovative” such as library networks in the 1960s and the adoption of word 
processing software in the 1980s. While even this considerably narrowed frame will still be 
woefully incomplete, my goal is to help intervene upon discussions of recent technological 
“disruption,” “innovation,” and “transformation” in the university to show that digital and 
computing technology has been transforming the university continuously for the entire second 
half of the 20th century. As far as I know, such a comprehensive sketch has not yet been offered 
before and I hope that it will help us better appreciate the longstanding cyborg nature of our 
university and academic consciousness.  
I also hope that it can clarify ongoing confusions between different types of digital 
practice often caused by an individual’s exposure to one of its particular forms, such as 
conflation of the digital humanities with text mining as seen in Timothy Brennan’s polemic “The 
Digital Humanities Bust” (2017), or how some faculty on my own campus at The University of 
163
  
California, San Diego have told me they thought digital pedagogy was synonymous with using 
learning management systems (a tool that is hotly contested by leading advocates and scholars of 
digital pedagogy (Davidson 2017, Stommel 2017, Watters 2014)) or neoliberal forms of online 
education rightly critiqued by Henry Giroux (2004), Christopher Newfield (2010) and David 
Noble (2009). These conflations are damaging as they deflect attention from the important ways 
that scholars and educators can resist cyborg oppression through intentional forms of digital 
academic practice and ways that they are unwittingly reinforcing it. A clear understanding of the 
diverse practical goals, institutional challenges, and ideological viewpoints that influence 
different sites of technological change can help us assess them for their political rather than 
technological character. Recovering these histories of technological change, engagement, and 
struggle within the university is important as it can help break down the way “digital” and other 
words that signal technological innovation often conceal not only very different practical ends, 
but diverse ideological and economic logics.  
This is not to say that the university might aspire to adopt neutral forms of digital 
technology. As Wendy Chun (2012) and Alexander Galloway (2006) have argued, digital 
technologies embody the ideology of their makers, echoing more general observations about 
technology at large made by science and technology scholars for the past three decades (Pinch 
1984, Feenberg 2005, Ess 2009, Bodle 2010). But the university community can, and should, 
develop guidelines for liberatory rather than oppressive digital tools and practices and insist that 
they be followed. In describing these sites of technological change I will show how each largely 
reified the invisible discipline while calling attention to important areas where it was in some 
sense resisted.  
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3.3. Cyborg university history 
How then might we retell the history of technological transformation in the university 
from a cyborgian point of view? The first thing to note is the complexity of our site of analysis, 
that is the university itself. While it can be tempting to talk of universities as a generic form of 
higher education, universities can differ dramatically from one another in terms of student 
demographic, financial resources, size, educational vision, disciplinary focus, and so forth. 
Universities are also only one type of institution in a broader landscape of higher education that 
also includes private liberal arts colleges, teaching intensive universities, community colleges, 
and for-profit universities. Thus, when analyzing universities and institutions of higher 
education, it is important to keep in mind that the character of each is informed by a particular 
set of historical circumstances, political ideologies, and educational objectives. Colleges 
established in the colonial period such as Harvard and Yale were designed to prepare the male 
children of the elite for positions as clergymen or public servants (Cohen 21). Land grant 
universities established in the mid to late 19th century through the passing of the Morrill Act 
focused on providing vocational training and liberal education as part of the social and economic 
development rural America (Davidson 2017, 25). In the mid 20th century, existing universities 
were significantly expanded and reorganized to make room for the massive increase in student 
enrollment stimulated by the GI Bill (Cohen 187). . Taken as whole, institutions of higher 
education today embody so many different marks of the long history of schooling that Kevin 
Robins and Frank Webster suggest using a “geological style of metaphor” to discuss their 
complex and conflicting qualities “in terms of the accumulation or accretion of new layers of 
complexity over what already exists from the past” (2002 6-7). Likewise, individual institutions 
themselves are often equally complex. As former Chancellor of Berkeley Clark Kerr observed in 
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1963, even an individual university might be better thought of as a “multiversity” at “war with 
itself” as it has “several competing visions of true purpose, each relating to a different layer of 
history, a different web of forces” (7). One should recognize universities not as unified 
institutions but as multiple departments, organizations, and professional units, and academic 
communities, each with its own set of objectives, interests, expertise, funding, challenges, and 
campus relationships. 
The diverse origins, historical influences, and other complex features of universities and 
their varied organizational structures and units are important to keep in mind in our study as they 
in turn influence the motives and resources of each institution’s approach towards adopting 
digital technology. They speak to the difficulty of offering a general analysis of the use and 
development of digital technology within higher education. Technological adoption within 
universities is far more often particular to specific areas of the university (such as libraries, 
information technology and educational technology units, media labs, individual researchers, 
faculty, and students, and administration) that adopt and develop different forms of digital 
technology for vastly different purposes with different resources and constraints at various levels 
of formality and institutional commitment. For example, an institutional subscription to external 
student plagiarism detection services such as TurnItIn has very different costs and represents 
very different approaches to education than an instructor’s use of freely available digital 
publishing tools for classroom assignments such as seen in the public multimodal digital book 
critiquing Uber produced by the students of English 602 taught by Lawrence Hanley at San 
Francisco State University in Fall 2016.17  
                                                
17 http://scalar.usc.edu/works/uber-and-transmission/index 
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Nonetheless, despite the complexity of the technological landscape in research and higher 
education, one can still grasp a coherent set of trends that constitute the basis for most 
technological engagement within institutions of higher education in the past fifty years. On one 
hand, we can understand these trends as related to the activities that technology supports, which I 
categorize loosely as teaching and learning, research, enterprise management, institutional 
communications, and publishing and scholarly dissemination. On the other hand, we can also 
identify trends related to the motives of adopting technology, which I categorize as reducing 
labor and other costs, generating innovative forms of knowledge production, democratizing 
education, generating revenue from research and teaching, and increasing efficiency and control 
of administrative activities. Various combinations of these trends may be found in any site of 
technological adoption within the university. Defining these different trends is an important first 
step in unpacking the many different processes, historical sites, economic pressures, social 
contexts, and ideologies at play in different technological applications that are sometimes lost in 
discussions of digital innovation in the university. It also helps us cut through the continuous 
false sense of being on the cusp or the early stages of a “technological revolution” within the 
university.  
Take for example, James Merisotis’ proclamation in a 2016 article for Educause that 
“While the modern technology revolution has reshaped nearly every sector of society, higher 
education has managed to retain its fundamental structure from centuries ago … That's all 
starting to change … (with) unleashing the power of technology to fundamentally reshape the 
higher education landscape.” The same sentiment is found in the founding editorial of 
Educational Technology & Society written in 1998 almost twenty years earlier: “In recent years 
we have witnessed the emergence of new, powerful and continuously improving communication 
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technologies, with the computer as its front end. The inter-activity and the inter-connectivity 
offered by these technologies promise to have an unprecedented impact on Education” (emphasis 
added). Forty years earlier in 1976, though not with the same amount of passion, the editors of 
Computers and Education wrote in their founding issue that such a journal was needed given that 
“Computers have entered nearly every aspect and every level of education today.” And finally, in 
1964, more than fifty years before Merisotis’ observation, a group of university deans and 
presidents founded the educational technology organization Educom in fervent belief “that 
digital computers offered an incredible opportunity for sharing among institutions of higher 
education” which the organization immediately proceeded to carry out through transformative 
research and infrastructure initiatives (Heterick 1998). One can find this vivid sense of imminent 
and unprecedented technological impact on education in the proclamations of educators, 
scholars, administrators, technologists, and businessmen across the decades. As Bill Ferster 
notes, recent excitement for new forms of online learning has made it "easy to forget that people 
have been looking how technology can facilitate teaching for a very long time" (ix). Just as 
Cathy Davidson observes that there is a widespread misperception that “higher education hasn't 
changed since Socrates Academy two thousand years ago" (4), discussions of technological 
change within the university often fail to fully appreciate the longer and nuanced history of its 
topic.  
To be fair, the persistent sense of imminent technological change and opportunity within 
the university is rooted in the very real and continuous development of services, initiatives, 
applications, technologies, resources, administrative interest, projects, communities, and so forth 
related to digital technology that do indeed offer new ways of carrying out the university’s 
activities. However, the excitement for novelty often overshadows the complicated, diverse, and 
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at times painful histories of technological transformation that the university has been undergoing 
since at least the 1960s. As we will see, projects are abandoned, mishandled, misunderstood, 
bankrupted, or never quite realized. And some, too, give digital technology as whole a bad name 
in serving processes of privatization, such as the enclosure of the knowledge commons for 
private interest described by Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess (2011) or the implementation of 
online education that was a center issue of a 55-day faculty strike at York University (Noble 
1998). There are few monuments to keep these histories in living awareness and distinguish the 
different purposes and ideologies they served. As Edward Ayers observes, “very real 
technological accomplishments have tended to become invisible (in the university) because they 
have been so successful” (50). To this observation we might add, that the history of 
technological change within the university, the good and bad, and the politics contained therein, 
has largely fallen away from sight.  
3.3.1. History of technological change within the university before the web 
Discussions of technological change in the university often treat digital technology as an 
external force to which the university and some of its more traditional disciplines must adjust. 
The continuous emergence of digital platforms and services that provide free tools for producing, 
distributing, and accessing information-based goods have led many commentators such as Anya 
Kamenetz (23), Kevin Carey (6), and Bill Gates (Raley “Digital Humanities” 31) to argue that 
the university will lose its leadership in higher education or even face extinction unless it adapts 
to these new digital practices. However, despite these depictions of the university as a latecomer 
to digital innovation, the university played a foundational role in the development of the very 
computing and networked technology that now appears as its threat. Though the U.S. military 
and private companies were critical partners along the way, the digital computer and its 
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networking technologies would be unthinkable without the mathematical knowledge developed 
within the university, the expertise of those who had received training within its auspices, and 
the research projects it facilitated (Ceruzzi 2012 , Abbate 2000). For example, in the 1930s, 
theorems put forth by mathematicians Alan Turing, Claude Shannon, Max Newman, all 
university-trained and employed researchers, laid the theoretical foundations for the development 
of the general purpose digital computer (Ceruzzi 25). Universities were also important sites for 
the physical development of computers, such as with the development of the world’s first 
automatic electronic digital computer at Iowa State College in 1942 (Ceruzzi 33), the first 
general purpose digital computer—the ENIAC—at the University of Pennsylvania in 1946 
(Ceruzzi 29), and the first stored program computer—the Small-Scale Experimental Machine—
at the University of Manchester 1948 (Ceruzzi 50). In 1962, Purdue University was the first of 
many institutions that would establish computer science departments and train the makers of the 
emerging digital world. During this same decade, universities would come to play an important 
role in the development of technologies that would lead to the Internet. In 1963, the Defense 
Department’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) began exploring ideas of developing 
a network that allowed the transmission of information between geographically distributed 
computer terminals (Ceruzzi 75-80). This technical goal was realized in 1969 in partnership with 
the University of California, Los Angeles and the Stanford Research Institute, and the project 
soon grew to include multiple universities (Abbate 56). Even key developments in digital 
computing that were not carried out within the context of universities, such as the invention of 
the World Wide Web by Tim Berners Lee in 1989 while at the European Organization for 
Nuclear Research (CERN) (Abbate 214), the development of the microprocessor by the 
companies Intel (Ceruzzi 92) and Texas Instruments (Ceruzzi 86-91) and the microcomputer’s 
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invention by the Japanese company Sord Computer Corporation in 1972 (“SMP80”), were 
nonetheless carried out by individuals whose expertise in domains critical to the development of 
computing—such as mathematics, physics, electrical engineering, and computer science—was 
developed within the context of higher education.  
 
3.3.1.1. Libraries 
Universities did not immediately imagine and apply new applications of these computational 
developments for its research, teaching, and administrative activities. Nor, however, did they 
entirely ignore them. As the information landscape broadened and became more complex, and 
the student population grew and diversified, many individuals from different areas within the 
university began considering how the computer might automate or support their labor. University 
libraries, for example, overwhelmed with an influx of research input due to the growth of Ph.D.s 
in the late nineteenth and early twenties centuries, were eager to explore emerging technologies 
to help automate circulation (Burns 2014 87). The librarian Ralph Halstead Parker introduced the 
first working example of library automation in a 1936 Library Journal article that details his use 
of a punched card-based library automation system, an early form of computing technology. 
Parker wrote in the article that he hoped the “eventual outcome of automation would be ‘a new 
day of no mistakes, no nervous strain, and much less manual labor for the library worker’” 
(Burns 89). He was, however, somewhat ahead of his time as it wouldn’t be until the 1960s that 
libraries began to seriously explore computers for their work, stimulated through events such as 
the American Libraries Association’s (ALA) exhibit on computers and libraries in the 1962 
Seattle World's Fair, the Clinic on Library Applications of Data Processing at the University of 
Illinois in Urbana in 1964 that was attended by representatives of over 50 libraries, and a public 
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discussion on library automation at the ALA’s 1965 Detroit conference that drew an 
unexpectedly large audience of several hundred librarians at short notice (Salmon 2006).  
During this early stage of library computing, interest remained focused on developing 
processes and protocols for automating laborious tasks related to circulation, serialization, and 
cataloguing. At the Detroit meeting, Salmon urged the ALA to take a leadership role on these 
issues, arguing that “much of the current activity in library automation ... was badly planned, 
imperfectly executed, and unnecessarily expensive, simply because there was very little 
opportunity for librarians to exchange information or learn from the experience of others” 
(Salmon 2006, n.p.). Salmon thus urged the ALA to form an organizational unit to help direct 
and cultivate these activities. His call resulted in the formation of the ALA Information Science 
and Automation Division (ISAD) in 1966—which Salmon would direct as president—and the 
launch of its organizational journal Journal of Library Automation (JOLA) in 1968.18 
Interestingly, library networks were also developed during this period as a means of saving on 
costs and labor. The Ohio College Library Center (OCLC) formed in 1967 to create a 
computerized network for libraries in Ohio, later dubbing itself the Online Computing Library 
Center when it opened up network membership to libraries outside of the state in 1977. OCLC 
developed the system for what would become WorldCat, the union catalog for 72,000 libraries in 
170 countries and territories that it maintains to this day. The establishment of these 
organizations and networks and the developments in library automation that they helped cultivate 
are perhaps one of the most overlooked ways computing dramatically transformed academic 
research (from humanities to the sciences) given the way it enabled university libraries to 
                                                
18Both organization and journal continue on today under new names. ISAD changed its name to Library 
and Information Technology Association (LITA) in 1977 to reflect its newly created responsibilities of 
overseeing audiovisual and educational technology, and subsequently changed the name of its journal to 
Information Technology and Libraries in 1988.  
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circulate the great volume of materials that they do today. Without detracting from these 
significant accomplishments, we should note that the computational infrastructure developed 
through these endeavors was not designed to allow for patrons to critically assess it or help shape 
it. Indeed, there was little reason to do so as the field of librarianship still largely considered its 
classification systems as neutral, objective, and universal (Samek 2004). In addition, as Salmon’s 
comments reveal, there were enough technical and organizational challenges to consider whether 
library automation was to be realized at all. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that these new 
computing infrastructures, which would make up part of the computational experience of the 
university, contributed to the normalization of digital environments that prohibited user 
participation. 
3.3.1.2. Education            
University faculty and administrators took special interest in the possibilities of the new 
computing technology for teaching right around the same time the field of library automation 
was forming in the 1960s. Bill Ferster credits the Programmed Logic for Automated Teaching 
(PLATO) system, launched in 1960 at the University of Illinois on the university’s mainframe 
computer ILLIAC 1, as the first successful use case of computer aided instruction (94). 
Educational technology, however, which can be traced as far back at the introduction of the 
hornbook (a device for teaching children the alphabet) in 1467, had been an actively developing 
industry in the early 20th century, replete with all sorts of mechanical devices used to deliver 
instruction with minimal assistance from a live instructor” (17). For example, in 1924, the 
psychologist Sidney Pressey introduced what he called the Automatic Teacher at the American 
Psychological Association meeting. The device was assembled from recycled typewriter parts 
and performed a form of “programmed instruction” designed according to behaviorist principles 
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of learning that emphasized self-pacing, personalization, and small chunking of the material to 
be learned. While Pressey’s teaching devices never reached widespread success (a deal with IBM 
fell through in 1956), PLATO did share some of these behaviorist features. However, whereas 
these former devices were designed according to psychological theories of learning, PLATO 
represented a “new philosophical approach” in that it was designed by engineers who saw the 
challenge of teaching in the reductionist matter as a “collection of smaller problems that in turn 
need to be solved” (95-6). It also “introduced a more interactive and conversational relationship 
between the ‘instructor’ and the student” (94). PLATO was also dramatically different in that it 
ran on general purpose computer, allowing PLATO to continue to grow and take on new 
functionalities as its developers were able. While never commercially successful, PLATO had a 
lively existence over the course of five decades, supporting thousands of graphics terminals 
around the world and running on nearly a dozen different networked mainframe computers. Not 
only was it a pioneer computer-aided instruction, it contributed to many innovations in 
computing in general, including online forums, touch screens, and plasma displays. Of particular 
interest is the development of the programming language TUTOR for PLATO by the zoology 
graduate student’s Paul Tenczar, which aimed to allow teachers without programming skills to 
develop lessons on the system (100). Unlike many implementations of computational technology 
in university settings, this initiative represents a rare concern for giving users, even those 
untrained in programming, increased autonomy in the use digital technology.  
User autonomy was emphasized in computer scientist Alan Kay’s idea of the Dynabook, 
a “personal computer for children of all ages” that he first dreamed up as a graduate student in 
1968. Kay was inspired by a range of new thinking about the evolving digital medium and its 
application for education, especially computer scientist Seymour Papert, who was adopting Jean 
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Piaget’s constructivist principles in his development of a programming language for children 
called LOGO. Instead of using computers to program instruction, Papert was interested in using 
computers to create “simplified environments he called microworlds, where instead of leading 
the student to the answer in small steps,” students would construct their own solutions in 
computer environments set up to explore a specific problem (105). Kay adopted this vision into 
an idea for the Dynabook, a personalized computers that students would program from the 
ground up, allowing them to “mold and channel its power to his [sic] own needs . . . a 
metamedium, whose content would be a wide range of already-existing and not yet-invented 
media” (Emerson 55). Dynabook, unfortunately, was never realized, but it nonetheless represents 
an exciting vision of academic technology where users directly participate in assessing and 
building their digital environment.  
 
3.3.1.3. Humanities Computing  
Compared to educational technology and library automation, humanities computing is a 
comparatively smaller site of technological transformation in the university and its practices 
were rarely visible beyond the field (Hockey). Nonetheless, the field of humanities computing is 
important as it represents a way computing technologies profoundly transformed the methods of 
a group of humanities scholars long before the emergence of the world wide web. Unlike the 
present day field of digital humanities, which consists of a wide range of digital practices 
including digital publishing, mapping, physical computing, and other experimental engagements 
at the cross sections of the humanities and computing, humanities computing was largely focused 
on using computational methods to analyze or manage text (Hockey). The Italian priest Roberto 
Busa is frequently credited as the first practitioner of humanities computing for the computerized 
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concordance of the works of Thomas Aquinas he began developing in 1949 in collaboration with 
IBM and would continue to oversee for the rest of his life (Jones 2013, Svensson 2010). Busa’s 
project, like many projects in the early days of humanities computing, originally relied heavily 
on using punch card systems, whose use was extraordinarily labor intensive and relied 
predominantly on the labor of female punch card operators (Terras and Nyhan 2016). Over the 
next decade and a half, enough scholars began participating in computational approaches to the 
humanities that the journal Computers and the Humanities was launched as a space to share 
information about existing projects and computing courses for the humanities. Not only does this 
issue demonstrate the existence of a burgeoning field, but it also acknowledges early skepticism 
towards their use of computers. “We recognize the strong fear often expressed that machinery 
will destroy the intangibles of humane scholarship—the intuitive, subtle responses of a trained 
mind,” its editors wrote in the first issue. “Distinguished voices have already warned that such a 
fascination with method may seduce us away from meaningful goals” (“Prospect”, 2). This issue 
highlights the fact that humanities computing was extremely labor and resource intensive in its 
expression of home that the journal will help “reduce the wasteful duplication of key-punching 
and programming that exists even in as small a field as computer research in the humanities” (1). 
On one hand, this aspect of the field made it difficult to grow beyond a group of dedicated 
specialists with extensive institutional support and collaborative teams. As Roseanne Potter 
observed in 1988, “Until everything has been encoded, or until encoding is a trivial part of the 
work, the everyday critic will probably not consider computer treatments of texts” (93). Today’s 
practitioners of computational text analysis are in agreement. As Matthew Jockers has observed, 
“Until recently, the amount of knowledge that might be gained from a computer-based analysis 
of a text was generally overwhelmed by the dizzying amount of work involved in preparing 
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(digitizing) and then processing that digital text” (4). On the other hand, the labor and resource 
intensive nature of humanities computing helped foster a collaborative ethic in the field leading 
to initiatives that aimed to share resources, protocols, and tools, such as the Text Encoding 
Initiative in 1986, the Oxford Concordance Program in 1982, and the Oxford Text Archive in 
1972 (Hockey). It also represented a field that was uniquely conscious and participatory in the 
information infrastructure that conditioned their work. Together, these characteristics of the field 
represent very exciting transgressions of the invisible discipline, yet were confined to the small 
group of its practitioners given the complexity of the work.  
 
3.3.1.4 Word processing  
Perhaps one of the most forgotten areas of technological transformation in academic 
practice is the mass adoption of word processing software by faculty, students, and 
administrators of all stripes during the 1980s.19 The few early explorations of word processing 
software for humanities research and teaching first used mainframe university computers, which 
typically required extensive training, institutional commitment, and grant support (Bean). In the 
decade following the 1976 debut of Electric Pencil, the first word processor for home computers, 
more than 400 word processing software packages were released by companies either to gain a 
part of the market share but these did not immediately lower the social and technical barriers for 
faculty and student exploration (Bergin 2006). During this period, computers were still largely 
construed as “number crunching machines” irrelevant to the work of the humanities student or 
                                                
19 Matthew Kirschenbaum’s Track Changes: A Literary History of Word Processing provides an important 
history of the adoption of word processing software by literary authors writing, for the most part, outside of 
the university. His work significantly contributes to our understanding of how one group of writers viewed 
the word processor and its effects on their practice. My short study here focuses on its adoption by 
academic rather than literary writers but borrows from Kirschenbaum’s general approach to studying this 
history.  
177
  
scholar. As one scholar reflected on her exposure to computers as a writing teacher in 1979, “I 
had never heard of using computers for writing, much less for teaching writing . . . It never 
occured to me that writing on a computer would become part of my teaching tool-kit” (Hawisher 
47). With only 8.2% of U.S. households owning a personal computer in 1984 (“U.S. 
Households), most academics would need access to campus computing resources to explore 
these emerging technologies. However, access to such resources was not always easy as many 
computer center directors believed that disciplines outside of computer science “had no business 
using computers...and writers should not clutter up the machines with their writing” (Hawisher 
49). As one early computer and compositionist reports of her experience in 1982, “I wasn’t 
allowed to use the computer lab— it was for computer faculty only. I had to explain to deans and 
vice presidents what in the world a writing teacher wanted to do with a computer terminal. When 
I explained that I should my writing students should have access, they knew I was a serious 
trouble maker!” (49).   
Getting access to personal computers with word processing software was only half the 
battle as the software was complicated to use and was “designed by people who did not think, 
talk, or write” like humanities scholars or teachers (105). As one frustrated user wrote: “Already 
I’m tired of being pushed around. The WordStar manual tells me I must poke my way through 
lists of coded commands. Last key I punched resulted in a chaos of words, lines zinging around; 
scared me crapless” (106). Those who persisted, however, were quickly converted. In a 1983 
article for The English Journal, English professor Charles Moran describes the word processing 
technology, which he discovered by tinkering with an Apple Computer he and his wife had 
purchased for his children, as a “blessing” given the flexibility, speed, and control it lent to the 
writing and editing process (114). Though it would be hard to study the way word processors 
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“sped up” academic writing given the highly variable nature of the work, studies of its 
introduction in other professional fields can help us appreciate the extent of support they gave. 
For example, a 1979 study of the use of word processing software in course houses found that it 
“increases secretarial productivity by 200 to 300 percent and decreases the number of typing 
hours by half” (Greenwood 2). The study also reported that the word processor enabled “a 52 
percent reduction in the time required by the court to prepare and issue per curiam opinions and a 
25 percent reduction in the time to prepare signed opinions” (2). But back in the university, there 
were also many faculty that were taking note of this exciting new writing technology. A 1985 
study of 60 faculty across 32 departments at a highly ranked private university in the U.S. found 
that faculty were “very positive about the microcomputer as a writing tool,” describing it as 
“more fun, more involving, and less frustrating than previous methods: in short, a tool that 
liberates expression" (Case 322). As one professor commented in the study, "I just know that it's 
a hell of a lot more satisfying than any other method” (321). Like Moran, many in the study also 
expressed small reservations about the potential ill social and intellectual effects of this powerful 
new tool, but none were concerned enough to change their practice. Though there are no studies 
of adoption of word processing among academics in general, research in the field of computer 
and composition on applications of word processing software for teaching writing pointed to 
their growing visibility and availability within higher education. Institutional studies also showed 
growing use, such as a 1989 report that found 69% of the faculty at The Ontario Institute for 
Studies in Education had adopted word processing software (Teles). Even if not all faculty 
jumped on the word processing bandwagon, by the end of the decade it changed scholarly 
production so much that the philosopher Michael Heim could proclaim: “The text processor is 
transforming the way philosophy, poetry, literature, social science, history, and the classics are 
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done as much as computerized calculation has transformed the physical sciences based on 
mathematics. The word processor is the calculator of the humanist” (1).  
In many respects, the adoption of word processing software in academic practice was not 
as momentous a change as the adoption of networked communication within academic practice. 
Nonetheless, a study of the perceptions of this change by faculty can help us better appreciate 
how massively this adoption changed the conditions, possibility, and practice of academic labor. 
It also contributes to our general study of the invisible discipline, given that in the many studies 
and commentary regarding word processing software for academic use, there is rarely discussion 
about how the software might be better designed to support the specific needs of academic 
writing or alternately address the concerns academics give about the software somehow sullying 
the intellectual process. There are two notable exceptions to this. The first pertains to a group of 
writing instructors and composition scholars who in fact were so passionate about studying and 
modifying software to better support writing that they founded the field of computers and 
composition in the early 1980s. This field, and the resistance to invisible discipline that it 
represents, will be the subject of my next chapter. The second exception I’ll mention fully here, 
as more clearly articulates the significance of writing technology that is shaped by the writers 
themselves. In 1984, Howard J. Strauss, a computing expert at Princeton, built a suite of software 
programs Structur for his colleague, the writer John McPhee. Structur was different than typical 
word processing software and text editors as it was designed to support McPhee’s unique writing 
process, which relied heavily on experimenting with the arrangement of chunks of text in 
different structures. Strauss thus wrote a program to "explode" McPhee’s individual notes into 
discrete files and another, "Alpha," to consolidate those notes back into a single file for McPhee 
to easily arrange as desired. McPhee wrote, “Howard, who died in 2005, was the polar opposite 
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of Bill Gates—in outlook as well as income. Howard thought the computer should be adapted to 
the individual and not the other way around. One size fits one. The programs he wrote for me 
were molded like clay to my requirements—an appealing approach to anything called an editor” 
(McPhee 2013). Structur is an exciting example of how even software as seemingly 
straightforward as word processing can be radically redesigned to support different cognitive and 
writing processes with potentially different outcomes. However, it is also testament to the fact 
that such participation is hardly ever expected or possible. McPhee’s access to customized 
software was based on his status as a distinguished writer and faculty member of one of a 
prestigious university as well as his privileged relationship to a generous and talented 
programmer who was committed to the marginal belief that technology should be adopted to the 
individual. McPhee was lucky in this respect, but few academic technology users have access to 
the social and technical capital necessary for customizing software according to their own 
cognitive needs and writing practices.  
3.3.2. History of technological change within the university after the web  
 
As Cathy Davidson writes, "a new world was born" on April 22, 1993 when the Mosaic 
1.0 web browser was made available to the public (2017 5). It was not by far, however, as some 
might think, the university’s first major encounter with networked technology for general 
communication purposes. In 1979, graduate students at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill and Duke University launched Usenet, a global networked discussion system that 
they once referred to as the “poor man’s ARPANET” as it was intended to give networked 
computing resources to those who didn’t have the political connections and $100,000 cash to 
join ARPANET (Leug 24). Usenet represents an interesting exception to the invisible discipline 
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in that it was originally developed by graduate students so that they could carry on 
communication with students at other institutions. Thus, in its early days, the users and 
developers of Usenet were the very same people. However, Usenet rapidly grew beyond this 
original vision connecting more than 1000 sites in the first five years of its existence and 
establishing what is often credited at the earliest Internet community (Leug 25). Other networks 
quickly followed on its heels, such as the establishment BITNET in 1981, a computer network 
that began between CUNY and Yale but at its height connected nearly 500 organizations and had 
over 3,000 nodes (Grier 40), and FIDONET in 1983, which had 16,000 bulletin boards by 1993 
(Hawisher 77).  Smaller discipline specific networked groups also emerged, such as PARTI, a 
national electronic discussion group for the field of computers and composition whose group 
peaked around 100 members between 1984 and 1987, and ANSAXNET, a listserv group started 
in 1986, that had 550 members as of 1992. And, as I’ll cover in my next chapter, dozens of 
composition instructors experimented with networked technology in the classroom beginning in 
the early 1980s. The university thus had been well acquainted with networked technologies for at 
least 13 years before the Mosaic 1.0 browser brought networked computing technologies to the 
masses.  
Nonetheless, the release of the Mosaic 1.0 browser had profound effects on university 
practices given that it changed the global information landscape in which university knowledge 
production and dissemination occurred. Before the release of the Mosaic web browser, access to 
networked communication systems was largely limited to members of universities, companies, 
and other organizations that had the resources and will to establish networks. And while the 
World Wide Web was publicly released in 1991, it hosted less than twenty websites in the first 
two years of its existence. After the release of the Mosaic 1.0 browser, more than 10,000 
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websites were created (Davidson 5). Though the digital divide was still very much in place, it 
had been narrowed in important ways. Anyone with a computer and modem connection could 
take part in this new virtual space, regardless of their professional or academic affiliations. The 
new virtual space was decidedly more public and more accessible leading diverse types of 
university-related organizations, institutions, and businesses to reimagine the ways they 
archived, circulated, managed, and disseminated knowledge.  
3.3.2.1 Libraries 
Libraries were well positioned for this transformation given that they had been exploring 
methods of digitizing collection materials for decades. These digitized materials were often 
meant to be accessed onsite or via university networks. However, once the web opened up 
Internet access to the broader public, these digitized collections had the opportunity to potentially 
reach anyone with a network connection. As Christine L. Borgman notes, “scholarly and 
professional interest in digital libraries (grew) rapidly throughout the 1990s,” (227) a decade in 
which early on the term “digital libraries” was introduced, though sometimes as a translation for 
practices that were much older (229). American Memory, for example, a digitization project 
launched at the Library of Congress in 1991, refocused its effort on digitization for web delivery 
after witnessing the acceleration of the World Wide Web in 1993. They launched their digital 
archive the following year, after raising $13 million in private donations. These efforts led to the 
establishment of the National Digital Library Program, which raised $60 million over the next 
six years (“Mission and History”).  
The National Digital Library Program was representative of an international trend in 
excitement for publicly-accessible, digitized collections. The decade saw numerous funding 
initiatives from the U.S., U.K., European Union and elsewhere fueling research and development 
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as well as the establishment of multiple conferences, listservs, and journals devoted to the topic 
(Borgman 227-8). In the U.S., digital libraries were designated a “national challenge application 
area” under the High Performance Computing and Communication Initiative, which was 
established in 1991 to promote U.S. leadership in computing, disseminate technologies that 
would serve the economy, national security, the environment, and education, and stimulate U.S. 
productivity and industrial competitiveness (“Evolving” 28). Within this social context, libraries 
began offering some of their materials online, such as seen with the Humanities Text Initiative 
established by the University of Michigan in 1994, or the Cuneiform Digital Library Initiative 
established by the University of California and the Max Planck Institute in 1998. New libraries 
and partnerships were also formed to take better advantage of emerging technologies, such as the 
Digital Library Federation (DLF) in 1995 as a partnership between twelve academic libraries, the 
New York Public Library, U.S. Library of Congress, U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration, and the Commission on Preservation and Access and the California Digital 
Library (CDL) established by the University of California in 1997 in collaboration with its ten 
campus libraries. During this time, librarians also produced theoretical work that helped 
distinguish libraries from the ever growing World Wide Web, and define the library’s role in the 
emerging information environment (Borgman 238).  
 
3.3.2.2. Scholarly communications 
Alongside the excitement for digitizing library collections lay new interest in the 
possibility of new technologies for scholarly communications in general. Though researchers had 
been advocating for the free dissemination of knowledge since the 1960s (“Timeline” Suber), 
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emerging technologies offered new opportunities to address the ever growing “crisis in scholarly 
publishing” that centered around issues related to the cost and accessibility of academic research 
(Davidson “Futures” 129). In 1998, multiple university and library entities, including the CDL, 
partnered in establishing the Public Knowledge Project (PKP), a nonprofit research initiative that 
sought to develop technological and social solutions to issues in scholarly communication. PKP 
went on to produce software in support of open access scholarship, such as Open Journal 
Systems (2001), which is currently used by more than 10,000 journals worldwide (“OJS Stats”), 
the Open Conference Systems, the PKP Open Archives Harvester (2004), and Open Monograph 
Press. In 2002, the Open Society Institute, a grantmaking agency founded by business magnate 
George Soros to advance “justice, education, public health, and independent media” (“Mission & 
Values”), released the Budapest Open Access Initiative, the first international statement to define 
and advocate for open access for all research and scholarship. That same year, the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) and HP Labs, a subunit of Hewlett Packard, partnered in the 
creation of DSpace, an open source software package that enables institutions to provide a space 
for researchers to archive their work, now in use by more than 1,700 academic institutions 
(“Dspace User Registry”). In 2003, Director of the Coalition for Networked Information (CNI) 
Clifford Lynch described these emerging digital archive spaces as “institutional repositories,” 
defining them as  
 
a set of services that a university offers to the members of its community for the 
management and dissemination of digital materials created by the institution and its 
community members. It is most essentially an organizational commitment to the 
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stewardship of these digital materials, including long-term preservation where 
appropriate, as well as organization and access or distribution. (Ina 7) 
 
These repositories became symbolically important within scholarly communication 
discourse as they represented institutional commitment to making research publicly available, 
even if published within a journal with prohibitive subscription fees.  
 
3.3.2.3.. Open education and education technology 
Concern for openness and free distribution of materials was also apparent in discussions 
and initiatives related to educational technology. The OpenCourseWare movement, which 
supports the free distribution of videos of university lectures through digital technologies, was 
first launched in 1999 at the University of Tübingen, and later popularized by MIT 
OpenCourseWare at MIT in 2002. In the same year, the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) coined the term “open educational resources” to refer to 
materials intended to be made freely-available within the public domain for educational purposes 
(“Forum on the Impact”).  
“Openness,” however, was not the only interest driving the use and development of 
educational technology during this period. A number of other technologically-related journals, 
nonprofits, and businesses with other concerns and interests developed during this same period, 
some that have become key players in today’s educational technology landscape. The nonprofit 
Educause, for example, was established in 1998 “to advance higher education through the 
intelligent use of information technology,” and sponsored research related to a broad variety of 
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educational technology issues, such as security, privacy, administrative record keeping, and the 
use of data generated by students. In the same year, the Journal of the International Forum of 
Educational Technology & Society launched with a founding editorial calling attention to the 
way the World Wide Web was opening up opportunities for educational technology to become 
more social, flexible, and modular.  
Learning management systems were also developed during this time. One early system, 
CourseInfo, was started by Daniel Cane, a Cornell undergraduate student after he began helping 
a faculty member put their course up online (Nagler). Demand for course websites was growing 
as more faculty wanted to take advantage of the communicative affordances of the web and as 
universities began mandating that some course were accessible online. Cane’s idea for 
CourseInfo was to enable faculty without website skills such as html to easily set up a course 
site. Noting the benefits of the software, he stated, “You can put your class online in less than 
half an hour. You just need to click and read.” A year later, CourseInfo would merge with IMS 
Global Learning Consortium to become Blackboard (Watters 2014), an educational technology 
that has become nearly ubiquitous and higher education (Ferster 129). Learning management 
systems have faced harsh criticism in the past few years given the way they are out of touch with 
the real processes and purposes of student learning and their incompatibility with other tools and 
practices of the web. As Audrey Watters writes about Blackboard, “It wasn’t about learning. It 
was about administration. Course enrollment. Scheduling. Grades.” Even Ferster, who asserts 
that learning management systems may “democratize” the web for instructors who have no 
website building skills, argues that most learning management systems:  
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adopt a militaristic command-and-control style of course management that is antithetical 
to the more constructivist approach popular among today’s instructors. While LMSs are 
theoretically neutral about pedagogy, in practice they tend to reinforce didactic, 
information-transmission pedagogical models. Their very design and implementation 
have a big influence on the nature of instruction, particularly with less-experienced 
instructors. (130).  
 
As Ferster indicates, learning management systems impose a very particular type of instruction 
within classrooms even though they are adopted as if they are neutral tools. They also represent 
one of the most significant examples of the invisible discipline as learning management systems 
do not give students or faculty any choice in developing or governing the tool. While 
Blackboard’s origin story might be conceived of as an example of active student participation in 
developing university infrastructure, the product itself was never intended to allow for general 
student or even faculty participation in its governance and design.  
3.3.3 History of technological change within the university after the development of “Web 2.0” 
As we can see, the growing popularity of the web inspired a number of new initiatives 
and new ideas pertaining to libraries, scholarly communication, and education in universities. 
However, it is worth noting that a majority of these initiatives relied on large-scale institutional 
efforts given that innovative uses of technology often required extensive technological resources 
and expertise. After the turn of the 21st century, the barriers to participating in emerging digital 
technologies would be significantly lowered once again in another historical shift for the world 
wide web. This time, however, the shift was not due to the release of a revolutionary set of 
technologies like the World Wide Web and its browsers, but rather to a shift in the dominant 
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approach to web businesses. Famously described as “Web 2.0” by Tim O’Reilly, this new web 
paradigm marked a new era where web businesses emphasized collaboration and interaction 
between users, content providers, and web companies, such as seen with user generated content 
or user code contributions. Between 1999 and 2005, a variety of freely available tools were 
released including the content management system Drupal in 2001 (“Our History”), the crowd-
sourced encyclopedia Wikipedia in 2001 (“Wikipedia”), blogging platforms like Wordpress in 
2003 (“History”) and Blogger in 1999 (“Blogger”), the virtual gaming platform Second Life in 
2003 (“About”), the social network Facebook in 2004 (Rothberg), the video sharing platform 
YouTube in 2005 (Fitzpatrick 2010), the micro-blogging site Twitter in 2006 (Carlson), and a 
suite of tools offered by Google, such as the collaborative writing platform Google Docs in 2004 
(Hamburger 2015), Google Books in 2004 (Love 2013), and Google Maps in 2005 (“Mapping 
Your Way”).  
These free availability and “user friendliness” of these tools enabled educators, scholars, 
and students to flexibly and independently experiment with them in their research, teaching, 
professional networking, and learning. Strikingly, these practices flourished without any initial 
institutional support perhaps partly due to the fact they had all the features of what the rural 
sociologist Everett Rogers found influenced adoption of innovation: they were easy to 
experiment with and incorporate into already-existing practices and yielded advantages that were 
easily observed by peers who might then experiment with the tools themselves (Ferster 168). We 
might also understand their growing popularity in academic contexts as part of what Steve Jones 
has called “eversion” or the growing effects of digital networked technologies in offline life that 
he credits as a driving force in the growth of the digital humanities in the first decade of the 21st 
century (2013 5). Regardless of why, many were so enthused by the way these practices 
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supported collaboration, interactivity, and public engagement in their various academic 
activities, that they became active advocates for their adoption in university practices, such as 
we’ll see below.  
3.3.3.1. Learning 2.0 
In their assessment of popular digital practices for formal education, Cathy Davidson and 
David Theo Goldberg observed, “Learning is happening online all the time” (3 emphasis mine). 
As if by magic, popular web technologies designed completely outside the context of education 
seemed to being doing a better job at creating exciting and generative learning environments than 
any instructional technology that had been specifically designed for that task. Davidson and 
Goldberg, observant of these trends, urged stakeholders of higher education to make use of this 
lesson:  
 
There have been rapid transformations in learning environments in the past two decades 
prompted by emergent digital technologies. Increasingly, these developments have 
prompted people to participate in media and the learning possibilities they entail, rather 
than simply consuming them. Feedback regarding their participation has become far more 
immediate. Learning tools and content can be shared nationally and internationally. 
Learning environments and techniques can be customized. There is almost instantaneous 
and easy access to vast amounts of new information. And new media such as massively 
mutliplayer online gaming environments and virtually enabled social networks pose new 
challenges to learning—new worlds require that we learn about them-but also new 
possibilities for learning media themselves. (86).  
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Davidson and Goldberg were excited about applying new popular web practices that emphasized 
participation and collaboration in educational activities. Many others shared their excitement, as 
is evident in Henry Jenkins’ book Confronting the challenges of participatory culture: Media 
education for the 21st century (2009), digital pedagogy projects like “Looking for Whitman: The 
Poetry of Place in the Life and Work of Walt Whitman” (Gold 2012), Howard Rheingold’s 
projects and talks, and numerous articles published in the Interactive Technology and Pedagogy 
Journal and the Hybrid Pedagogy Journal. Davidson and Goldberg also started an organization 
to help foster discussion and skill sharing around these practices. In 2002, they co-founded The 
Humanities, Arts, Science and Technology Alliance and Collaboratory (HASTAC), describing it 
as “an interdisciplinary community of humanists, artists, social scientists, scientists, and 
technologists that are changing the way we teach and learn.” HASTAC, which now has more 
than 15,000 members, has hosted and produced numerous conferences, blog posts, twitter chats, 
pedagogy guides, and other forms of exchange that have helped cultivate a movement in digital 
learning.  
Davidson and Goldberg, like many other advocates of these new digital learning 
practices, are careful to distinguish these popular digital tools from instruction technology, which 
they described instead as “a toolkit application that is predetermined and even institutionalized 
with little, if any, user discretion, choice, or leverage. It also tends to be top down, designer 
determined, administratively driven. In digital learning, outcomes are typically customizable by 
the participants” (5). These differences are not always immediately appreciated as it can be easy 
to assume that all new forms of technological practice in educational spaces are similar in nature. 
On this common confusion, Paul Fyfe observes, “Perhaps the most common shortcoming of 
digital pedagogy is how frequently it gets conceived in terms of instructional technology” 
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(2011). However, these practices could not be more different as they allows students and 
educators to creatively explore numerous different types of technology and customize their 
learning environments. These practices have enabled educators to appreciate first hand the 
difference that information infrastructure can have on our social and intellectual experiences. 
Altogether, they represent an enormous step forward in the development of an academic 
community that is more critically conscious and actively engaged in the information technologies 
that mediate their academic activities. Nonetheless, they should not be understood as a final 
victory against the invisible discipline. While these practices often offer more types of control 
and oversight over one’s information environment than learning management systems, many of 
the tools employed in fact deny user oversight in equally if not more pernicious, ways. As I will 
focus on in the next chapter, capitalist digital media tools that are used heavily in these 
practices—such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter—deny users rights to understand and control 
the processes mediating their information environment such as the collection of user data and the 
algorithmic control of how information is made visible. The widespread complacent use of these 
tools within digital learning practices reifies a general passivity towards digital technology in the 
academic community. As the invisible discipline is overturned, it reasserts itself in unfamiliar 
ways.  
 
3.3.3.2.Digital Humanities 
The turn of the 21st century is also critical for the formation of the digital humanities, a 
practice of research that had been emerging for decades but received a new name and broader 
forms of recognition and institutional support in the early 2000s. The term “digital humanities,” 
for example, became broadly recognizable in the years between 2001 and 2006, with early 
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discussions in 2001 regarding the title of what came to be published as Blackwell’s Companion 
to Digital Humanities in 2004, the formation of the Digital Humanities Summer Institute at the 
University of Victoria in 2001, the unification of two humanistic computing associations into the 
Alliance of Digital Humanities Organization in 2005, and the launch of the Digital Humanities 
Initiative by the National Endowment for the Humanities in 2006 (Kirschenbaum “What Is”). 
The diverse range of projects and research described in Blackwell’s Companion—such as 
computer-assisted textual analysis, the production and archival of different forms of digital texts 
and resources resources, digital libraries and databases, multimedia production, programs for 
generating creative texts, the aesthetics of interfaces, and so forth—would come to be 
representative of the field’s ongoing ambiguity and inclusivity. In an attempt to define this 
quickly growing field, Matthew K. Gold and Lauren Klein write “Along with the digital 
archives, quantitative analyses, and tool-building projects that once characterized the field, DH 
now encompasses a wide range of methods and practices: visualizations of large image sets, 3D 
modeling of historical artifacts, 'born digital' dissertations, hashtag activism and the analysis 
thereof, alternate reality games, mobile makerspaces, and more. In what has been called 'big tent' 
DH, it can at times be difficult to determine with any specificity what, precisely, digital 
humanities work entails” (2016).  
In some respects, the digital humanities represents one of the most promising resistances 
towards the invisible discipline. Though not all practitioners identify as technologists or makers, 
technological practice nonetheless remains a central aspect of the field. Many digital humanities 
events, such as workshops, week-long institutes, and courses, are geared specifically to teach 
new technical skills to individuals with little or technical background. Some scholars, such as 
Stephen Ramsay, have even argued that one must know how to code in order to be a digital 
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humanities scholar (2011). Coding, however, is only one of the many skills offered in DH 
training events. Other popular practices in the digital humanities include working with content 
management systems or software packages that require little-to-no coding skills for the 
production of projects revolving around other methods such as digital mapping, digital 
exhibitions, digital publishing, or text mining.  
Much of the time, these digital methods are used for the production of one-off scholarly 
research projects. However, as an academic field, the digital humanities is unique in that it also 
develops new tools to serve the needs of humanities research and publishing. In the last ten 
years, digital humanities practitioners have developed exciting new open source tools such as the 
digital exhibition software Omeka, the non-linear publishing platform Scalar, and the hybrid 
publishing platform Manifold. These tools embody an attention to the infrastructure and 
mechanics of knowledge production that have been practically inherent to the field and its 
precursor “humanities computing” given the way, as Matthew Kirschenbaum observes, 
“computing surfaces the barely subterranean machinery of scholarship” (2016). In a defense of 
DH against recent criticism, Brian Greenspan also points out the field’s preoccupation with 
computing and institutional structures: “Digital humanists tend as part of their scholarly practice 
to foreground self-reflexively the material underpinnings of scholarship that many conventional 
humanists take for granted. . . . If anything, DH is guilty of making all too visible the dirty gears 
that drive the scholarly machine, along with the mechanic’s maintenance bill” (2018). This mode 
of attention has enabled many digital humanities scholars to reveal cognitive cultural biases 
embedded in our technology. As Kathleen Fitzpatrick observes, “the networks of electronic 
communication carry embedded values within the codes that structure their operation, and many 
of the Internet’s codes, and thus its values, are substantively different from those within which 
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scholars—or at least those in the humanities—profess to operate. We must examine our values, 
and the ways that our new technologies may affect them, in order to make the most productive 
use of those new forms” (2011 53). Numerous DH research and projects embody this critical 
examination and “productive use” of new technological forms, such as Johanna Drucker and 
Patrick Svensson’s critique of the “middleware” of scholarly production (2016), Tara 
McPherson’s work on feminist coding and publishing platforms (2018), the Modern Language 
Association’s Humanities Commons for the open exchange of scholarly research, and the Global 
Outlook Digital Humanities “minimal computing” working group that advocates for more 
responsible digital practices.  
DH’s critical engagement with computational and institutional infrastructure continues to 
grow as evident by new events and publications devoted to the topic such as the session on 
Critical Infrastructure Studies at the Modern Language Association Conference in January 2018 
and the forthcoming third volume of Debates in Digital Humanities that will publish a range of 
chapters on infrastructure by scholars across the field. In many respects, this continued growth 
marks an exciting overturning of what I have called the invisible discipline as more scholars are 
actively engaged in critique the technological infrastructure of scholarly practice and remaking 
new forms that better align with their scholarly goals and values. However, as exciting as these 
accomplishments are, they should not be viewed as fully addressing the concerns I’ve outlined 
pertaining to the invisible discipline. For one thing, while these projects represent a more active 
engagement towards infrastructure for the field as a whole and for the individuals involved in the 
project, they are typically not designed to create technological infrastructure that gives all its 
users the opportunity to design and govern them. They are also typically focused on one type of 
digital method—such as digital publishing or text analysis—rather than considering the 
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importance of the broader technological infrastructure that mediates the university’s activities 
such as email, search engines, and enterprise resource management systems. These limitations 
are more representative of the challenges of creating digital scholarship projects rather than 
shortcomings of the projects themselves. Nonetheless, it is worth considering the productive 
possibilities of expanding the field’s critical gaze from the site of humanities knowledge 
production to the broader technological infrastructure of the cyborg university as a whole.  
 
3.3.4 Where is the cultural criticism of university technology?   
As we can see, a variety of professional and academic fields have contributed to the 
development and theorization of technology across multiple different sites of the university. The 
contributions made by these fields have been invaluable for grappling with the multiple 
opportunities and challenges of technological transformation in the university and creating 
professional space in which to critically evaluate university technology, share resources 
regarding its use and development, and form collaborative initiatives to better develop it. 
Without their efforts, computing technology in higher education would have looked vastly 
different in the past half-century. However, proportionately speaking, much of this professional 
discourse treats technological transformation as a politically neutral process without regard for 
the types of cultural criticism urged for by Alan Liu. Discussion thus is largely confined to 
examining institutional, practical, cognitive, and intellectual opportunities and challenges of 
technological innovation and determining the best methods for adoption and development rather 
than considering broader political questions about who designs, controls, and benefits from these 
forms of innovation. While there is indeed critical research and commentary on some of these 
aspects, especially coming from the digital humanities or educational technology discourse, this 
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discourse has still yet to play a leadership role in the way universities implement digital 
technology. This is not to discount the impact and value of the very exciting platforms and 
initiatives coming out of digital humanities and digital pedagogy—such as Domain of One’s 
Own, Commons In A Box, Omeka, the Humanities Commons, and Scalar—but rather to 
acknowledge that these projects have not achieved the same sort of widespread adoption, 
stability, and institutionalization as their proprietary analogues, such as the Blackboard learning 
management system and the scholarly hubs Academia.edu and ResearchGate. However vibrant 
critical discussions may be in any one of these fields, they should be recognized as still relatively 
marginal, especially among those who decide what types of technology the university will 
support.  
The broad acceptance of proprietary technology and its many exploitative tactics in the 
academy represents a dominant apolitical approach towards academic technology. A brief 
historical overview of the literature that has accompanied the development of technological 
adoption in various academic areas can help us understand how this apolitical approach came to 
be. Each of these areas of academic technology formed around the recognition that computing 
technology could open up radical new opportunities for their professional or academic 
endeavors, be it enabling library circulation across institutions or more effectively facilitating 
learning for students. Making good of these opportunities was not simply a matter of adding 
magic computing technology to their activities, but rather undergoing very complex and 
resource-intensive processes of developing computing technology to fit the specific needs of 
their field. Early literature emerged—often first as a single professional newsletter, journal, or 
listserv—to direct the technological imagination and cooperation of its particular field, study the 
effects of different technological applications, and teach and advise on technological matters.  
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For example, early discussions of technological transformation in the library were 
focused on practical opportunities and challenges rather than any political dimension of these 
transformations, and quite reasonably so. These discussions began with the publication of the 
Journal of Library Automation (JOLA) in 1968, whose articles discussed the cost and labor 
benefits of computer technology for library processes such as acquisitions, conversion, and 
cataloguing without any mention of the political significance of these adoptions—not even in 
terms of how such automation might feasibly enable libraries to make more knowledge available 
to its patrons. When JOLA changed its name to Information Technology and Libraries in 1988, it 
was only to broaden its focus to include new technological applications, transformations, and 
issues pertaining to intellectual property rights, shared library systems, interoperability, and 
integration of systems and standards for library activities such as archiving, cataloguing, and 
circulating collections rather than consider the social or political implications of these adoptions. 
Unsurprisingly, given the practical goals of librarianship, a great deal of this literature continues 
to be dedicated to providing information about emerging technical practices, such as Metadata 
for Digital Resources: Implementation, Systems Design and Interoperability (2014), Catalogue 
2.0: The Future of the Library Catalogue (2013), Digital Preservation for Libraries, Archives, 
and Museums (2017), and the book series put out by the Library and Information Technology 
Association and the Computers in Libraries Series. Even reflections on the history of 
technological transformation in the library do not consider political implications of this change, 
such as Development of Digital Libraries: An American Perspective (2001), the Educause article 
“From Automation to Transformation: Forty Years of Libraries and Information Technology in 
Higher Education” (2000), Digital Libraries: Principles and Practice in a Global Environment 
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(2005), Digital Libraries (2016), and the special report “Transforming Public Library 
Technology Infrastructure” by the ALA in 2011. 
This is not to say that library literature has been altogether silent on political issues 
regarding its technological transformation. Books such as Digital Library Use: Social Practice in 
Design and Evaluation (2003), Ethical Decision Making for Digital Libraries (2006), and 
Privatizing Libraries (2012) have called attention to social and ethical dimensions in the library. 
However, most of the literature that takes a critical approach to issues regarding technological 
change and the privatization of knowledge come from books that have strong ties to other 
disciplines, such as the volume Knowledge as a Commons edited by the political economist 
Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess, who has worked in numerous administrative and academic 
spaces, including libraries. Other books notable for critical perspectives on library technology are 
written from fields outside of library scholarship, such as The Library Beyond the Book by 
comparative literature scholar and director of metaLAB at Harvard Jeffrey Schnapp and 
associate director of metaLAB Matthew Battles and The Anarchist in the Library by media 
scholar Siva Vaidhyanathan.  
The lack of critical work related to technology in the library may be rooted in 
longstanding obstacles to critically-minded librarian scholarship in general. In her history 
Intellectual Freedom and Social Responsibility in American Librarianship, Toni Samek offers an 
assessment of this obstacle through the perspective of Sanford Berman, the “guru of alternative 
librarianship”: 
 
Sanford Berman once noted that although some of the ‘most committed and influential 
library-cats nationwide’ produced core alternative library literature, they were often 
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"heavily shit upon" by the establishment. He believed that alternative library publishers 
were targeted precisely because the literature they produced tightened connections 
between the alternative library movement and other movement groups and had the 
potential to make libraries "more like the social catalysts they should be—rather than the 
Establishment ass-lickers that most of them [were]’. (2000 135) 
 
The professional obstacles to cultivating critical librarianship practice noted here by Samek 
persist to this day. In 2007, Berman submitted a proposal recommending the new subject heading 
“Critical Librarianship” to the Cataloging Policy & Support Office of the Library of Congress, 
which has still not been accepted as of June 2017 (Garcia). In 2017 Library Juice Press published 
the first issue of the Journal of Critical Library and Information Studies (JCLIS), citing the lack 
of spaces for scholarship that critiqued the “discursive status quo.” In its founding editorial, the 
editors write, “As scholarship becomes increasingly commoditized, monetized, and 
‘productized,’ JCLIS was envisioned as both intervention and resistance to its commercialization 
and rarefication, as well as narrow definitions and conceptions of library and information studies 
that privilege or cast the field in the terms and methods of positivist or empiricist paradigms and 
dominant epistemological and ontological constructs, and the normative tendencies of the field to 
center such paradigms” (Lau et al). The launch of JCLIS is a promising step forward, but its 
editorial is also evidence of a pervasive lack of critical librarian scholarhsip. As Samek notes, 
while the “Internet has greatly enhanced relationship building, grassroots democratic organizing, 
and the development of “new citizenship groups” around the discourse and practice of 
progressive librarianship” (2004 2), there is still much work to be done in making librarianship a 
“more social, political, and humanistic profession” (15).  
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Similarly, the bulk of literature emerging from within the professional spheres of 
university information technology and educational technology tend to have a more practical 
interest in their topic, focusing on technical issues of incorporating and developing information 
technology for educational and administrative use, assessing its efficiency through empirical 
research, and discussing its significance for the relevance and survival of the university as the 
needs and practices of the knowledge workforce change. The history of Educause, one of today’s 
largest and most prolific non-profit associations dedicated to advancing higher education through 
the use of information technology, shines light on the field’s emphasis on practical issues rather 
than political issues.  
Educause formed in 1998 through the merger of two much older professional 
associations, Educom and Cause. Educom, also known as the Interuniversity Communications 
Council, Inc., was formed in 1964 with a five-year grant of $750,000 offered by W. K. Kellogg 
Foundation by a group of medical school deans and vice presidents from Duke, Harvard, SUNY, 
the Universities of California, Illinois, Michigan, Pittsburgh and Virginia, to steer the direction 
of technological change within the university (Heterick). Two years later it began publishing 
Educom Bulletin, one of the very first publications dedicated to educational technology. One of 
its co-founders, James Grier Miller, described the motives behind Educom in the October 1966 
issue of Science magazine:  
 
The dilemma of the information explosion affects all aspects of higher education, the 
primary function of which may be viewed as information processing broadly 
conceived—including the creation of new information (research), transmission of 
information (teaching), learning of information by students, and storage and retrieval of 
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information in libraries. Administration and management of universities also involve 
many sorts of information processing. (qtd in Heterick)  
 
As we can see from this quote, Educom was principally concerned with practical aspects of 
technological change. Its founders recognized that the “information explosion” offered new 
opportunities and challenges academic activities, which necessitated the thoughtful use and 
development of emerging information technologies. There is however little attention to the 
political dimension of this transformation. Instead, each of the core activities of the university—
research, teaching, learning, archiving, and administration—are described as forms of 
information processing, thus flattening these activities into a series of objective, abstract, and 
quantifiable steps that might easily be evaluated and assessed by administrative authorities. 
Educom thus would thus dedicate itself to evaluating these tools for “effectiveness” and “costs in 
human time and money,” while maintaining an emphasis on “human goals of educational 
institutions, rather than on gadgets” (qtd in Heterick). Its publication, therefore, would focus on 
addressing these practical concerns And indeed, over the next few decades, Educom made 
significant contributions to developing research and information technology for higher 
education, often with the support of major grants from corporations and foundations such as 
Exxon, IBM, the Lilly Foundation, and the Carnegie Foundation. Notably, Educom also served 
as founding partner of BITNET in 1981.  
Educom’s merger with Cause, an organization dedicated to administrative use of IT in 
higher education, in 1998 (“Cause History”) would only reinforce this practical focus. Cause 
itself emerged as a user group in 1962 as part of the the College and University Machine Records 
Conference that was first held in 1956 at Michigan State University for the purpose of 
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exchanging ideas related to data processing in higher education (Long 1982). This user group, 
comprised of 22 data processing directors from different colleges and universities, is credited as 
the first to develop computer information systems for administrative needs in higher education as 
“up to that point, ‘machine record’ equipment processed punched cards” (“Cause History”). Over 
the next several years, this user group grew into a formal organization with support from IBM 
and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, publishing its first newsletter Cause Information in 1972. 
Throughout its existence, Cause’s focus would remain strictly on the practical and institutional 
challenges and opportunities of implementing computing technologies for administrative needs.  
The apolitical and technically-focused character of Educom and Cause are representative 
of discussions around academic computing in the second half of the 20th century and strongly 
persists in professional discussions today, such as those facilitated through Educause’s 
conferences and publications. As I’ve noted earlier, there are importance exceptions to this trend, 
such as the field of computers and composition that I will discuss in the next chapter, and the 
recent uptick in opinion pieces on the politics of educational technology published by Educause 
after the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Gilliard 2017, Caulfied 2017, Stewart 2017, and Collier 
2017). Nonetheless, these important critical discussions have yet to influence the technological 
adoption and implementation at an institutional level. Anyone who has participated in a 
university IT meeting knows how difficult it is to translate these political concerns into 
meaningful institutional action. The complexity of the terrain in which IT decisions are made 
about resources, service providers, and customization makes it nearly impossible to leverage 
equal attention and responsiveness to political and abstract issues as are given to utilitarian and 
economic concerns. It is equally difficult, from my own perspective at least, to draw digital 
activists’ attention to higher education as a site in which hundreds of thousands of students might 
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be exposed to a more politically conscious form of digital technology. Nor does it seem practical 
if even possible to simply refuse to use oppressive digital technologies within their academic 
activities.  
However, as I hope to have demonstrated in this chapter, the university plays a critical 
role in the making of the cyborg world and not always in ways that digital activists or its own 
members seem to recognize. Through its passive acceptance of commercial digital technologies, 
it teaches the same oppressive idea held by the Thiel Foundation that only a few exceptionally 
gifted and lucky individuals should be able to determine the shape of that world. As Steve Jobs 
once said, “One of the things that built Apple II’s was schools buying Apple II.” It’s perhaps 
time that the university invest in the liberation of the cyborg world instead. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Writing in the age of alienated intelligence: 
The techno-rhetorical situation of the cyborg university  
 
 
4.1. University’s trash as Silicon Valley’s treasure 
It is an interesting time to be writing, especially within the university. Professors, brought 
to the brink of “hysteria” from grading poorly-wrought student papers (Thompson) post poetic 
odes (Mozer) and launch social media accounts bemoaning what they see as an intellectual 
tragedy of national proportion.20 Students, in cheerful agreement about the quality of their work, 
demonstrate mastery in digital communication through networked boastings, viral tutorials, 
crowd-sourced requests, and convivial complaints related to the practice of “bullshitting” the 
student paper.21 In the more serious though less viral venues of scholarly discourse, composition 
                                                
20 The Tumblr account Shit My Students Write posts short snippets of comically-bad student writing, 
which regularly receives thousands of “favorites.” Its tagline is: “Evidence of the true cost of educational 
funding cuts.” 
21In November 2016, a search for the word “bullshit” on a variety of social media platforms yielded an 
abundance of examples of students proudly declaring their engagement in this practice. On Twitter, for 
instance, students tweeted complaints such as “Writing a paper doesn't show anything but your ability to 
write bullshit for 7-10 pages” and “If there's one thing I'm best at it would be bullshitting a paper (thumbs 
up emoji).” The same sentiment was found in numerous corners of the web such as Vine, where search 
results for “bullshit” and “paper” turn up a wide array of looped, shaky video clips of students showing off 
the process of producing it. On YouTube, “bullshit” is taken up as topic of voluntary instruction by and for 
students in videos such as “How to BS an Essay” with 22,977 views and counting, presented next to a 
feed of related videos with titles like “How to Bullshit an Essay,” “How to Bullshit Your Way Through an 
Entire English Paper,” and “How to Bullshit Properly.” On Facebook, one student crowdsources his 
bullshit, inciting peer collaboration: “F***ck, can someone help me bullshit 2 more pages on to this 
research paper?” Friends cheerily cooperate with advice about changing font sizes, line spacing, and 
adding quotes. Memes, too, pay homage to the culture of student bullshit, such as one that displays 
“Bullshiticus, the god of students and general last minute fudgery” whose “powers of artificial energy and 
pretentious vocabulary can be invoked in case of the all nighter” and has received more than 500,000 
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scholars theorize the economic causes and political consequences of “student bullshit” (Perelman 
427), applaud it as a rightful act of resistance in alienating educational structures (Cruz), and 
defend its unexpected and positive learning outcomes (Smagorinsky; Eubanks). The 
phenomenon is, as one writing center director laments, “unfortunately, nothing new” (Griffin), 
recognized at least as early as 1963 in Harvard education professor William G. Perry’s 
condemnation of student “bulling,” a practice he defines as presenting “evidence of an 
understanding of form in the hope that the reader may be deceived into supposing a familiarity 
with content” (7). Ken Macrorie also noted the phenomenon more than forty years ago, 
describing it as “Engfish,” a “bloated, pretentious language (. . . found) in the students' themes, . . 
. . A feel-nothing, say-nothing language, dead like Latin, devoid of the rhythms of contemporary 
speech” (361). But despite this long and impassioned war against the practice, students continue 
to produce bull across the decades as if a defining feature of the genre.  
Though this theme may seem particular to the genre of student writing, there are 
interesting parallels in the world of academic publishing as well. Senior scholars decry the 
unhappy consequences of the “scribble, toil, and trouble” or “forced productivity” of the modern 
university (Savage) and the unread nature of scholarly publication (Bauerlein), while others 
express rightful frustration at the way the pressures and myths of academic advancement (in 
which written publication figures centrally) cause psychological, professional, and financial 
harm (Alvarez; Minichillo). These issues have become such salient features of academic life that 
its mental health crisis is now an object of serious study (Paine; Shaw and Ward; Flaherty). 
                                                                                                                                                       
views. The practice is so universally-acknowledged by the student web that the term is defined in Urban 
Dictionary, the popular crowd-sourced online dictionary founded by a college freshman in 1999, as “Stuff 
that is made up for the purpose of placating someone, or passing an exam, or getting elected to office. 
Most often false or ridiculous.” Both the first and second example of the term in a sentence emphasize its 
meaning in the context of a student assignment. Though these search results are admittedly unscientific 
and perhaps somewhat intrusive, I hope they at least demonstrate the phenomenon I describe is 
pervasive enough to urge us to seriously reconsider some of the assumptions guiding writing instruction 
in higher education today. 
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Maximillian Alvarez has gone as far as to call out common beliefs about academic writing as 
being instrumental to exploitative academic labor practices. In these cynical perspectives, we 
find a portrait of academic writing that in some respects appears as guilty as some of its more 
fraudulent students. It maintains, as the philosopher Henry Frankfurt defines bullshit, a “lack of 
connection to a concern with truth—(an) indifference to how things really are” (33-34).  
While these conditions suggest that few have sufficient incentive, let alone time, to 
consume the academic writing that is being produced, a surge of new companies arising in the 
past two decades have recognized an altogether different value in this material than the one 
aimed for by its producers—indeed, finding value to be capitalized even in the vast swaths of 
what is self-described as ‘bulling’ or worse. In the middle of a big data boom in which the 
potential value of student data alone has been estimated to be as much as $890 billion to $1.2 
trillion annually (Manyika 10), these various bodies of writing generated by university activity 
represent valuable datasets to be mined, analyzed, instrumentalized, and indefinitely archived. 
Elsevier, once a scholarly publisher, now describes itself as an “information and analytics” 
company, acquiring companies such as Bepress, Mendeley, and Plum Analytics to cash in on big 
data for product innovation (Reller) and accelerating research (Boersma). Turnitin, a plagiarism 
checker that holds the writing of 30 million students enrolled at more than 15,000 institutions 
worldwide, promises to ease the burden of grading papers while strip-mining and selling student 
work for profit, without—in an ironic twist—any rightful credit to its sources (Stommel; Jenson 
& Castell). Working under a related profit model, Google, too, has rapidly permeated 
educational institutions through its provision of free university email (Guess), Google classroom 
services (Singer), and the widespread use of Google docs and forms used informally for the 
production and review of grant applications, student assignments, article drafts, and other 
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academic activities (Kim). Data collecting practices in educational settings have become so 
ubiquitous, sophisticated, and potentially consequential that scholars and commenters have 
begun to ring the alarm bells. Estee Beck, Chris Gilliard, Audrey Watters, and Kate Goodman 
have critiqued forms of student surveillance carried out via digital platforms that violate student 
privacy and student consent. Their excellent scholarship and commentary raises questions about 
what is to be done. Are we simply in need of stricter policies regarding user data or is there a 
more productive way we might begin to understand the social and economic dynamic between 
universities, knowledge production, and digital media companies? What might the history of 
technological adoption within universities, particularly within the humanities and composition 
disciplines, have to add to our understanding of this dynamic? And finally, while Rita Raley has 
warned us that “the digital humanities should not, and cannot, bear the burden of transforming 
technocracy, the academic-corporate situation in which we are all mired” (2014), how might the 
expertise, experience, and collective will generated thus far by the field help support this line of 
inquiry?  
4.2. Alienated intelligence 
To address the previous questions, I’d like to begin by offering a concept. Intelligence 
produced by academics and students for corporate and/or state entities alien and unknown to the 
producers’ interests can be usefully understood as “alienated intelligence” in the Marxist sense 
that their intellectual labor is exploited for capitalist interest. Marx describes the process of 
alienation as one in which: 
 
The worker places his life in the object; but now it no longer belongs to him, but to the 
object [...] What the product of his labour is, he is not. Therefore, the greater this product, 
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the less is he himself. The externalisation of the worker in his product means not only 
that his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, 
independently of him and alien to him, and begins to confront him as an autonomous 
power; that the life which he has bestowed on the object confronts him as hostile and 
alien. (Quoted in Berardi 37-38).  
 
It may seem strange to apply a concept developed to describe the exploitation of 19th century 
factory workers to the intellectual labor of faculty and researchers and stranger still to apply it to 
the process of student learning, which is typically neither institutionalized as form of wage labor 
nor conceived of as an activity that might merit wages. Nonetheless, I think the concept of 
alienation is useful for pointing out a particular dynamic at play in digitally-mediated academic 
production processes regardless of whether the subject receives wages or pays tuition for 
participating in that activity. Just as the factory worker’s labor is alienated from them in order to 
feed capitalist accumulation (that “hostile and alien” object “external” to the worker), digitally-
mediated intellectual activity is also alienated from students and academics as it is transformed 
into what business theorists Robert Kaplan and David Norton call “information capital” (249) or 
data and metadata pertaining to user activity that is collected by corporate entities for the purpose 
of capital accumulation. As scholars such as Tiziana Terranova (2000), George Ritzer and 
Nathan Jurgenson (2010), Christian Fuchs (2010), and Trebor Scholz (2012) have argued, 
digitally-mediated activities carried out for personal interest rather than wages—such as 
community building or producing and sharing knowledge—can nonetheless be conceived of as 
labor given the way that capitalist digital companies exploit this activity for their own purposes. 
Though there are many ways that capitalist digital companies can and do go about this digital 
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exploitation, Jin Dal Yong has demonstrated that the extraction of information capital has 
become an especially dominant business model in the past ten years, an observation echoed by 
Shoshana Zuboff’s description of our age as one of “surveillance capitalism” (2018). As the 
value of personal data skyrockets (to the extent that it is commonly referred to as “the new oil” 
(Tarnoff)), capitalist digital media companies race to procure ever greater quantities and varieties 
of it through the provision of free services (such email, social media, collaborative tools, etc), the 
development of new services (such as personal assistants like Echo, Google Home, etc), and the 
capture of data related to existing industries and services (such as Amazon’s acquisition of 
Whole Foods, Elsevier’s acquisition of scholarly communication companies, and Google’s 
provision of university email (Tarnoff; Boersma)). These tools and services provide parent 
companies with data related to the explicit activities of the user (such as the content of their 
emails or purchases) as well as “secondary implicit disclosed information,” or metadata related 
to the behavior of the user (Duportail) that are used in the facilitation of targeted advertising, the 
generation of valuable consumer databases and profiles, and the continued development of 
company products.  
 
What I’d like to suggest here is that this form of data extraction by capitalist digital media 
companies can be usefully understood not just as alienation, but as alienated intelligence, given 
the way that it directly captures the intellectual labor of users to develop its own corporate 
intelligence for the accumulation of capital. I like this term because it helps unsettle our 
conception of the type of intelligence or knowledge that is produced through mass engagement 
with networked technology and also—as I will show later—helps us connect political issues 
related to digital technology with scholarly and educational writing practices. As is well known, 
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the intellectual capacities of the web—or the web’s ability to enable knowledge production and 
dissemination at unprecedented speeds and scales—has long been described as its chief promise. 
As networked digital technologies have increased in power, accessibility, and scope over the past 
two decades, scholars and commentators such as Kevin Kelly (1993), Pierre Levy (1999), 
Yochai Benkler (2005), and Francis Heylighen (2011) have praised them for the established and 
potential forms of collective, collaborative, democratic, personalized, and voluntary forms of 
intelligence they enable. Similarly inspired though more cautious in their approach, scholars and 
educators such as George Siemens (2005), Henry Jenkins (2009), Anya Kamenetz (2010), Cathy 
Davidson and David Theo Goldberg (2010) have remarked on the potential of web technology 
for the specific enterprise of student learning, or what we might call here for sake of comparison, 
the cultivation of student intelligence. I am in full agreement with these authors about the value 
and still unrealized potential of some of these forms of networked learning and networked 
knowledge production. However, the concept of alienated intelligence helps us recognize that 
many of popular capitalist digital media tools used to facilitate intellectual production 
simultaneously alienate the intelligence produced by the user for capitalist accumulation and 
arguably against the interest of the user. Yes, the web enables us to produce exciting forms of 
knowledge and knowledge making communities not possible before. But in that very activity, it 
also produces intelligence used in capital accumulation processes of capitalist digital media 
companies.  
The degree to which this form of alienation matters is an interesting question on political, 
intellectual, and educational fronts. Politically speaking, we should ask, what does it mean if our 
intellectual processes contribute to the power and wealth of companies that are continuously 
critiqued as posing significant threats to the advancement and preservation of democracy and 
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equality, such as articulated by Zuboff, Zeynep Tufekci (2017), Christian Fuchs (2013, 2018), 
and Safiya Noble (2018)? What might we say is the real outcome of academic intellectual 
production if it its chief contribution is complacently sustaining—and perhaps even reinforcing 
in its educational activities—the dominance of these alienating forces? More difficult but equally 
important, we might also consider if these alienating processes somehow affect the type of 
knowledge, knowledge communities, or educational processes produced through capitalist digital 
media. As Nicholas Carr, Betsy Sparrow, Sherry Turkle, and Curtis Bonk have pointed to the 
potential influence of digital technologies on cognitive and psychological processes, how might 
we think more carefully about the way their design and functionality shape intellectual 
production in academic settings? In short, what needs to be asked is whether the alienation of 
academic intelligence interferes, complicates, or expands our understanding of the goals, values, 
and processes of education and scholarly knowledge production. How might we begin to think 
productively about the relationship between intellectual practices and the capitalist processes that 
alienate the intelligence produced through them?  
4.3. Alienated intelligence as a techno rhetorical situation  
In what follows, I will argue that we can productively understand the implications of 
alienated intelligence on digitally-mediated intellectual practices, specifically the digitally 
mediated practice of writing, through a particular form of rhetorical analysis grounded on Lloyd 
Bitzer’s theories regarding “rhetorical situations.” I will focus this analysis on the specific 
intellectual activity of writing, not because writing is the only form of intellectual practice 
carried out via digital technologies, but because it nonetheless remains one of the most important 
mediums of education, knowledge production, and digitally-mediated communication and 
because the observations made about writing can apply to other communicative forms. Instead of 
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considering digitally-mediated intellectual practices as independent from and not affected by 
alienating processes, Bitzer’s concept of “rhetorical situation” enables us to consider these 
aspects as interdependent and evaluate them according to the range of effects that they bring 
about together.  
Bitzer defines rhetorical situations as a “context of persons, events, objects, relations, and 
an exigence which strongly invites utterance” (5). Obviously, the context in which digitally 
mediated writing occurs is dramatically different than oral or print communicative environments, 
as communication can reach much greater audiences (anyone with a networked connection in 
theory), circulate at different intensities and temporalities (such as by “going viral” or being 
discoverable through search engines), receive different forms of interaction (such as being 
favorited, shared, retweeted, forwarded, copied, remixed), and so forth. However, what I’d like 
to argue is that capitalist digital environments are notable not only for this set of distinctions 
from oral and print environments, but also because they represent two simultaneous but different 
rhetorical situations centered around the same communicative act. On one hand, digitally 
mediated writing can be seen to act much as it always has—as discourse whose interpretation 
and effects are tethered within the sphere of human dialogue and action—though now with 
greatly expanded opportunities afforded by networks and digital interactivity. On the other hand, 
however, digitally mediated writing also produces what I described earlier as information capital, 
or data and metadata pertaining to the text and its production (such as for example, the 
geographic coordinates of the author as the time of writing) that can be collected by corporate 
entities for the purpose of capital accumulation. In this sense, digitally mediated writing 
participates in what appears to be two different rhetorical situations that entail different 
audiences, interpretive frameworks, and effects. Its production is instrumentalized for attending 
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to two different exigences—the exigence determined by the writer (whether it’s to persuade, 
inform, provoke, or otherwise) and the exigence of capitalist accumulation determined by the 
capitalist digital media company. The simultaneous appearance of these two different rhetorical 
situations surrounding the same communicative act can be understood as a new “techno-
rhetorical” situation, as writing, on account of its information capital, has acquired a profound 
and complicated new dimension.  
What is notable about the rhetorical situation centered on the information capital of 
writing is that the writer is likely not conscious, or at least need not be conscious, of her 
participation in it and, additionally, is likely illiterate in the computational methods that 
“interpret” her writing for capitalist accumulation. The information capital of a piece of written 
discourse is, after all, largely invisible to the everyday communicator; its interpretation and 
instrumentalization requires the computational resources, economic drive, data science 
techniques, and access to other information capital that make up the perspective of capitalist 
digital media companies. But even a general awareness of information capital may not strike the 
general communicator as significant to their own concrete acts of producing and exchanging 
writing in digital environments. From their perspective, the instrumentalization of the 
information capital of their discourse comes after the act of its production and thus does not 
seem to have any direct influence on its production. For example, it may appear to the writer that 
how they write an email, social media post, or collaborative document is unaffected by the 
information capital extraction processes that occur after they’ve written the content. At first 
glance, this assumption would seem to make sense, given that it would be difficult to explain 
how a process that happens after writing would somehow affect the creation of the writing that 
writing itself. This assumption, however, passes too quickly over the fact that the the availability, 
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design, and functionality of these various writing environments are largely shaped by companies’ 
incentive to extract information capital, which in turn, as argued by Johanna Drucker (2011) and 
Drucker and Patrik Svensson (2016), influence intellectual activity that occurs within and 
through these writing environments. Though it would be impossible to generalize the many 
different types of influence occurring through differing digital environments and tools, many of 
them are designed to stimulate and capture the mass production of information capital given its 
value in today’s data-driven economy (Srnicek; Van Dijck; Dal Yong). As Bruce Schneier 
observes, “Increasingly, companies use their power to influence and manipulate their users. 
Websites that profit from advertising spend a lot of effort making sure you spend as much time 
on those sites as possible, optimizing their content for maximum addictiveness,” (58). Google, 
for example, combines user data generated through is various products (such Gmail, Google 
Docs, search, and Youtube) to generate rich user profiles that improve targeted advertising 
(Solon 2016). The increasing popularity of using Google Docs to facilitate collaborative writing 
in classrooms (as evident in an abundance of scholarly literature such as Zhou et al. 2012, 
Suwantarathip 2014, Kessler et al. 2014, Calvo et al. 2011) , must be understood to be at least in 
part as enabled and shaped by the logic of surveillance capitalism. Without the economic 
incentive of information capital, the availability, quality, functionality, and convenience of these 
writing environments would be drastically different. How writing platforms and systems might 
look different in varying economic conditions and how those differences might influence the 
actual processes and products of writing is an important question and one that I hope to address 
in the future. Here, however, I simply want to focus on the fact that digitally mediated writing—
as one of the core communicative mediums of our global information environments—contributes 
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directly to the intelligence, wealth, and consequential dominance of capitalist digital media 
companies.  
Viewing information capital as part of a rhetorical situation may strike some readers as 
incorrect. The very idea of information capital, after all, is currently quite foreign to many 
common notions about discourse. What is more, its production, interpretation, and effects all 
seem to happen without need of the writer or recipient’s awareness or understanding and requires 
machine agents for interpretation and instrumentalization. Given its current standing outside of 
the radar of our writing consciousness, thus, one might argue that information capital is beyond 
the scope of rhetorical study, that it is simply an event occurring simultaneously with discourse 
though not a part of the rhetorical nature of discourse itself. However, a consideration of Bitzer’s 
notion of of “exigence” can help us appreciate the way that information capital might be 
fruitfully understood as a core part of a more multi-dimensional rhetorical situation. For Bitzer, 
exigence is “an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to 
be done, a thing which is other than it should be.” It is distinct however from general 
imperfections such as “death” or “winter” in that it can be “positively improved” through 
discourse (6). What is notable about the techno-rhetorical situation is that it has two different 
lines of exigences—one set from the traditional rhetor, and another from the corporate entity 
providing the digital space in which she transmits discourse. Regardless of the particular 
exigence of the rhetor, the exigence of the corporate entity is to stimulate the rhetor’s discourse 
for the purpose of extracting data. Though this exigence is not resolved through an interpretation 
of the discourse as intended by the rhetor, it does require the rhetor’s discourse, as well as its 
own form of interpretation. A techno-rhetorical analysis thus directs us to consider the effects of 
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discourse in both registers and consider the relationship, if any, between these different 
exigences and their potential conflict. 
4.4 The university as a techno-rhetorical situation 
The problem of alienated intelligence is significant for considering all instances of all 
digitally mediated writing, but it poses particular concerns for the consideration of the university 
and its contribution to digital politics at large. The processes at play that work to alienate the 
intelligence produced by the academic community has implications for multiple aspects of the 
university’s goals, activities, and effects. On a purely practical level, the harvesting of data 
generated by diverse forms of academic communicative activity represents a direct economic 
way that the university contributes to the capital and continued dominance of exploitative digital 
technology companies. But on a pedagogical and philosophical level, the techno-rhetorical 
situation raises urgent questions about how members of the university should teach and practice 
academic writing given these alienating processes. Though there are many forms of data 
generated and harvested via the university, writing merits special attention given that it is a core 
medium of knowledge production and transmission and a skill set central to the objective of 
education. How then should our concept of written knowledge production with the university be 
expanded to account for the ways professional scholarship simultaneously generates alienated 
intelligence that is potentially at cross purposes with its producers? And how should our concepts 
of literacy and the ability to write persuasively likewise be expanded to guide the teaching of 
writing and its use as a medium given this alienation? 
Two sets of critical discussions regarding academic technological practice are relevant to 
these questions: those pertaining to the open access movement in scholarly communications, 
which has worked to detach university research from capitalist extraction through the 
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development of open access repositories, university policies, and community practices (such as 
forwarded by Peter Suber (2012), Kathleen Fitzpatrick (2011), and Gary Hall (2015), and the 
those that critically discuss the digital infrastructure of student learning, with a particular focus 
on the forms of student surveillance happening therein, such as critiqued by Estee Beck et al. 
(2018), Chris Gilliard (2017), and Audrey Watters (2016). Conversations and initiatives in both 
of these areas have done much to generate awareness and action, but there is still much work to 
be done given the continued dominance of the practices they critique. On one hand, the open 
access movement has discovered that changing the culture of scholarly communications is far 
more difficult than establishing complex and expensive open access institutional repositories and 
policies that would enable the free dissemination of knowledge.22 On the other hand, despite 
ongoing criticism of exploitative technologies used to carry out student writing and learning, 
these technologies continue to be institutionally mandated or practically enforced for want of 
alternatives. The difficulty in addressing both sets of issues is exasperated by the fact that from 
the academic’s perspective—whether student, professor, or scholar—the intellectual activity 
supported by these alienating systems and infrastructure seems left relatively undisturbed by 
alienation, thus inhibiting sufficient motivation for resisting it. But by expanding our general 
concept of academic writing to attend to the complexities of the techno-rhetorical situation and 
its alienating tendencies, we might then show how these issues are in fact centrally relevant to 
the processes of teaching and producing academic writing and thus deserving of more response 
at institutional and individual levels. By this light, we might also recognize that both sets of 
                                                
22 “Three years after the California system’s Academic Senate approved a bold plan to make faculty 
research freely available, only 25 percent of professors are putting their papers in a state-created 
repository. Other universities have experienced similar faculty inertia and have sought to counter it by 
reaching out to professors in person. But such solutions are more of a challenge for a large, financially 
strapped system like California’s.” (Baskin https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-U-of-California-
s/237044) 
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issues are symptomatic of the same broader system of alienation in which corporate technologies 
are always bent on extracting maximum amounts of data for corpoate interest.  
Of course, it is impossible to speak of a general concept of academic writing; its 
processes, purpose, and attendant skills change not only from student writing to scholarly 
writing, but, as David Russell points out, according to discipline and rhetorical setting. However, 
we can begin to enhance our understanding of the culture of academic writing at large through a 
study of the way student writing has been taught over the course of the past century. There are 
several reasons for doing this. First, the practice of teaching student writing is accompanied by 
an extensive body of scholarly literature that stands as perhaps the richest and most extensive set 
of theoretical and historical perspectives of the use of writing within the university. (There is 
comparably much less research on the practice of professional scholarly writing.) While writing 
instruction is informed by goals, values, and processes distinct from scholarly research, it 
nonetheless often reflects broader views and practices regarding academic writing as a whole, 
not least of all because every professional scholar likely received academic writing instruction as 
a student. Second, as an activity in which the university is already charged to direct, student 
writing represents a site of academic practice that may be more open to the creative 
implementation of new rhetorical theories and modes of writing practice that might not be as 
easily explored in professional scholarship. Pedagogies developed to critically respond to 
alienated intelligence could potentially help train a generation of future scholars to sensitively 
attend to its issues, while also modeling ways that today’s scholars might begin to attend to them 
in their professional engagements in knowledge production.   
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4.4.1 A brief survey of writing and rhetoric in 20th century education  
Hundreds if not thousands of different writing pedagogies have been theorized and taught 
at universities and liberal arts colleges from the late 19th century to the late 20th, but, as James 
Berlin has suggested, they can be usefully categorized according to three different trends. Berlin 
describes these distinct pedagogical trends as “rhetorics” and distinguishes them not according to 
the formal features of the writing they aim to produce, but according to their underlying 
epistemologies or assumptions about the “very nature of the known, the knower, and the 
discourse community involved in considering the known” (Reality 3). These epistemologies 
break down into three categories: the objective, the subjective, and transactional, whose 
adoptions, Berlin argues, are informed by institutional, cultural, economic, and political 
circumstances, and in turn, influence everything from the processes designed to carry out 
instruction to—as I will show—the way writing instructors began to experiment with computers 
in their classrooms beginning in the late 1970s. After presenting these categories, I will 
demonstrate how they can be useful for analyzing the rhetorical situation of more contemporary 
digital environments.  
4.4.2 Objective theories of rhetoric 
Objective rhetorics assume truth exists in material reality and that therefore the goal of writing is 
to capture and convey that truth as effectively and efficiently as possible through specific forms 
of language, which is viewed as ideally a neutral medium (Berlin Reality 3). Among historians of 
composition, the most infamous and entrenched objective rhetoric is known as the “current 
traditional rhetoric,” which is organized around teaching students standardized forms of 
grammar, style, and structure in writing, rather that other possible ‘non-traditional’ academic 
writing styles and modes such as creative expression or peer dialogue (Berlin 31); there was also 
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little attention to the way language might also work towards changing social realities (Berlin 
“Current Traditional”). Development of the current traditional rhetoric was informed by the 
common sense (along with ‘positivist’) philosophy that posited reality as a rational entity readily 
understood by the mind. In this view, language at its best would hope to transcribe material facts 
from the mind of the speaker to another as clearly and efficiently as possible. The current 
traditional rhetoric was institutionalized in 19th century rhetoric textbooks and quickly became 
one of the most dominant modes of teaching writing, given the ease in which its methods could 
be standardized and distributed and its provision of a ready logic for institutions to evaluate and 
sort its potential or current students.  
4.4.3 Subjective Theories of Rhetoric 
In contrast to objective rhetorics, subjective rhetorics locate truth within “a realm that is 
accessible only through the individual’s internal apprehension, apart from the empirically 
verifiable sensory world” (Berlin Reality 11). Subjective theories are strongly tied to 
philosophical idealism, such as manifest in Descartes’ and Kant’s privileging of mental activity 
itself as of supreme and indubitable value, as well as to 19th century romanticism and the 
championing of genius. These theories often go hand in hand with aristocratic notions of culture 
that posit that only a privileged few whose subjectivities are capable of, and indeed worthy of, 
intellectual and creative production. At the beginning of the 20th century, subjective rhetorics 
were most strongly associated with elite, liberal-arts focused institutions such as Yale and 
Princeton that found general writing instruction beneath their educational aims. These schools 
instead cultivated a “belletristic approach” in which writing-intensive literature courses provided 
aesthetic and ethical experiences to encourage self-cultivation, self-refinement, and self-
realization in the student (35). The intended result, as Berlin writes, “would be a kind of 
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aristocrat who demonstrated his education through living a certain kind of life”, including in his 
form of writing and speaking, rather than a citizen whose developed communicative skills would 
serve them in a career (39).  
Throughout the course of the century, however, political and educational movements 
would develop subjective rhetorics that looked quite different than these early more explicitly 
aristocratic versions, though they maintained the central idea that truth is an entity located within 
the individual. In the 1920s and 30s, for example, the post war progressive education movement 
popularized theories of learning that held that every individual possessed unique creative 
potentialities that could be further developed in the proper environment for the benefit of all of 
society (74). In the writing classroom, instructors democratized the formerly elitist subjective 
rhetoric into what Berlin calls “expressionist rhetoric,” by encouraging personal and poetic 
expression in students, and emphasizing originality and identity-formation through writing, 
rather than the dogmatic formalism of the current traditional rhetoric (78). As momentous as this 
shift was in the nation’s educational and cultural history, it was only the beginning of what 
became known as the “process movement,” whose methods and assumptions would become 
internalized by a majority of writing instructors in what was described as a “Kuhnian paradigm 
shift” of the field (Faigley 527). As these subjective theories continued to emphasize the 
importance of individual truth, they developed increasingly complex theories and procedures 
regarding the means of accessing that truth. Many of these methods included downgrading the 
role of authority in both the status of the teacher and in the formality of some writing 
assignments as a means to provide an environment in which students would be able to more 
readily access and express internal truth. Creative writing, in opposition to analytic writing, was 
increasingly praised by composition scholars as means for students to discover their internal 
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imaginative, empathetic, and intuitive powers, while processes such as free writing and 
journaling became popularized as part of capturing “one’s unique personal response to 
experience” (Berlin 1987, 152). Radical compositionists during the 60s and 70s developed 
composing processes that involved activities completely off the page, such as the argument that 
composition classrooms should become a “happening,” where the instructor exchanged their 
authoritative role for a performative role in which they “shock” students into awareness (150-
51). On the other end of the spectrum of subjective theories about writing, researchers influenced 
by cognitive research developed scientific theories of mental processes involved in the act of 
writing.  
4.4.4 Transactional theories and the social epistemic 
In contrast to subjective and objective theories, both of which view truth as an already-
existing entity (whether outer or inner) to be found and transcribed by the individual writer, 
transactional theories instead view truth as something produced through the interaction of 
speaker and audience within a rhetorical situation (15). In this view, knowledge is seen as a 
linguistically-conditioned, mutable social reality that emerges through communicative acts, 
rather than existing prior or separate to it (166). Though interest in this type of socially-minded 
rhetoric appeared as early as the late 19th century, it underwent a renaissance in the years 
between 1960 and 1975 in which literary theorist Kenneth Burke articulated his influential 
notion of language as a material force in history (Burke 1966) and compositionists theorized the 
relationship between rhetoric, cooperation, and democratic participation (Berlin Reality 169-
171). The 1970 English publication of the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire’s treatise on critical 
pedagogy also influenced compositionists and other educators to consider the production of 
knowledge as a social enterprise and its implications for writing instruction. In the decades that 
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followed, scholars such as Ira Shor, bell hooks, Peter McLaren, and Henry Giroux implemented 
Freire’s pedagogical theories to think about how the classroom and student writing practices 
could be used to either suppress or stimulate students’ critical participation in analyzing and 
transforming social realities.  
Of these many transactional rhetorics, Berlin describes those that put the question of 
ideology at the center of its theoretical practice as “social epistemic” rhetorics. These rhetorics 
are not simply interested in the social production of knowledge but in the dialectical relationship 
between the social production of knowledge and ideology (“Ideology” 478). For Berlin, 
knowledge is never objective but always a product of a social reality, which in turn contributes to 
the making of that social reality. This dimension can be more fully recognized by asking 
questions about the social, political, and economic effects of knowledge production, such as who 
benefits and gains power from knowledge, how is knowledge and its benefits distributed through 
society, and how those distributions influence social relations and social conflict (“Ideology” 
489). The chief aim of the social epistemic in the writing-intensive classroom is “the liberated 
consciousness of students” (492) rather than the ability to write correctly or expressively. 
Though peer dialogue is a key instrument of this rhetoric, its value is viewed as ultimately fully 
dependent on the degree to which it works towards social liberation.23 
While finding increasing traction among theorists and critics, genuine social epistemic 
rhetorics could not find the same institutional stability among larger-scale writing instruction 
programs as did the earlier objective and subjective rhetorics. In part this is no doubt due to the 
institution’s commitment to objective modes of evaluation manifest in testing and grading; it is 
                                                
23 Thus, writing pedagogies that adopt dialogical methods for enhancing the development of a student’s individual 
abilities as an end in itself (such as seen in the pedagogies of Kenneth Bruffee and Peter Elbow), should still be 
understood as informed by subjective rhetorics given their lack of attention to the ways their processes of producing 
and exchanging knowledge contribute to social reality (“Ideology” 486-7). 
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also neglected in part due to the field of composition’s continuing interest in subjective 
expressivist and process-based rhetorics (Siegler; Berlin “Ideology” 487), and the comparative 
success in formalizing and standardizing subjective and objective forms of pedagogy as well 
(Berlin “Ideology” 492).  
4.5 The arrival of computers in writing instruction 
Berlin’s taxonomies and the institutional histories they embody are useful for 
understanding the different ways compositionists and writing instructors came to engage with 
computing technology: many, if not all, of these endeavors can be considered as strongly 
influenced by one of Berlin’s three rhetorics. More specifically, the history of these engagements 
is useful to this study, as it helps articulate the different types of assumptions about writing 
processes, purposes, and possibilities that also underlie the development of different digital 
writing programs and environments, which in turn influence the techno-rhetorical situation they 
facilitate. A brief survey of major trends in this history will enable us to later on detect rhetorical 
theories underlying our own digital writing environments.  
Before the advent of the personal computer in 1975, few composition instructors had 
access to the extensive resources and expertise necessary to develop computer programs for 
teaching and writing, and thus these types of engagement relied on large scale institutional 
support and were largely informed by administrative interest in using computers to automate 
certain aspects of teaching and evaluating student writing, which were served very well by 
objective epistemologies. Engagements during this time consisted largely of drill and practice 
programs that taught grammar and spelling rules based on B.F. Skinner’s learning model 
outlined in his 1964 article “Why We Need Teaching Machines” (Wresch 5) or research into 
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automated grading, such as Project Essay Grade, an initiative supported by the College Entrance 
Examination Board from 1966 to 1968. 
Participation in these types of endeavors significantly broadened in the 1980s as access to 
personal computers and university mainframes expanded, lowering the barriers for writing 
instructors to experiment with the computer in their classroom from their own theoretical 
perspectives and according to their own pedagogical interests. Described as the “ Copernican 
turn” by practitioners in the field, this time period was marked by a sea change in viewing the 
computer as a “number crunching machine” irrelevant to writers to a writing instrument 
(Hawisher 46). At first, these engagements consisted largely of the development or use of 
objectively-styled, grammar checking programs, such as the style checker program HOMER at 
UCLA (1981) and the COMP-LAB Writing Module at York College (1981), which consisted of 
computer-aided grammar exercises (Wresch 95). On their own, these tools embodied the current 
traditional rhetoric’s emphasis on correct grammar, but they were often implemented as tools for 
carrying out revision or reflection in process-oriented writing pedagogies. A number of writing 
instruction technologies were also developed to more directly serve popular process-based 
writing strategies, such as Topoi, which implemented prewriting functionalities informed by 
Aristotle’s theories of invention (Wresch 16) and Writer’s Aid and Author’s Helper 
(WANDAH), whose process-oriented functionalities (freewriting, nutshelling, planning, 
invisible writing, commenting, and revising) drew from Linda Hayes and John Flowers’ research 
in the the cognitive processes of composition (Wresch 156). 
In the first few years of the 1980s, much of the development and implementation of 
software programs for writing instruction was geared toward supporting these process-based 
pedagogies, often implementing grammar or rule-training modules consistent with the concerns 
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of current traditional rhetoric. However, as compositionists and writing instructors were 
increasingly exposed to emerging ‘computer mediated communication’ (CMC) in their everyday 
academic work in the early 1980s—such as email, bulletin boards, computer conferencing, office 
automation, shared databases, list servs, and document management tools—they began to 
consider the implications of networked communication with socially-grounded theories of 
knowledge and rhetoric that had emerged in the past two decades. Cross-institutional, academic 
electronic bulletin board systems such as Bitnet (established 1981), Fidonet (established 1983), 
and finally their own field specific bulletin board system PARTI (1984) were particularly 
important as they enabled compositionists to experience firsthand the transformative possibilities 
of networked writing communities. Compositionists praised these networks for the ways they 
boosted morale, fostered strong intellectual and social relationships, enabled the exchange of 
valuable criticism, and allowed for flexible, asynchronous, and voluntary participation (Hawisher 
78). As more compositionists came to participate in these networks, the field underwent its 
“second Copernican turn” where the computer was now recognized not only as a writing 
instrument but as “as a means of connecting to a virtual space in which we might participate with 
others in the construction of knowledge” (Hawisher 135).  
This second Copernican turn influenced some compositionists to develop what might be 
called the ‘first-wave’ of digital pedagogies centered around networked writing practices often 
informed by collaborative, student-centered, audience driven and critical pedagogies that were 
developed prior to or outside the context of the computer-oriented composition classroom. One 
of the earliest engagements in this area was SEEN, a computer program developed in 1980 that 
included a program where students would read one another’s written assignments and post 
feedback (Wresch 47). Breadnet, an electronic conference system developed in 1984, enabled 
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students and teachers across the United States to communicate with another and is still active 
today (Hawisher 138). Also in 1984, Trent Batson implemented a local area network in the 
Gallaudet English department for the purpose of peer dialogue, establishing a modestly-adopted 
method of practice known as Electronic Networks For Interaction (ENFI). Those who engaged in 
these types of pedagogies seemed genuinely transformed by the experience and praised CMC as 
a way to “explode traditional classroom boundaries and constraints” (Hawisher 192). Many 
spoke in glowing terms about how CMC enabled them to develop more enjoyable, informal 
bonds with students (Wresch 58), connect students with students in other countries with different 
cultural perspectives (Haley-James; Susser), provide students with genuine and responsive 
readers (Schwartz), train students in practices of being a global and connected citizen (Hawisher 
242), and create more engaging, student-centered, democratic space for learning (208). These 
instructors also frequently reported that students improved on standardized tests after 
participating in a CMC writing course (Hawisher 102) and that students did not typically use the 
opportunity to plagiarize other students’ writing but instead began citing them as secondary 
literature sources (Wresch 58).  
By the 1990s, advocates of CMC writing pedagogies were more cognizant of the ways 
social issues, hierarchies, and biases often persisted in CMC environments. However, even those 
who conducted research in these areas remained committed to CMC, while at the same time 
developing more politically-charged CMC pedagogies that invoked critical and collaborative 
pedagogies developed prior or outside of the computers and composition community. For 
example, one can hear the echo of Shor, Elbow, and Bruffee in ENFI-founder Trent Batson’s 
declaration that CMC “blurs social distinctions in the class, making the teacher less the center of 
most ideas and energy. Instead of staying above the fray as a disinterested expert, the teacher 
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joins the class as a fellow writer” (Hawisher 150). Batson, too, like many others, began to 
translate the implications of the CMC classroom to thinking about the hierarchical and 
constrained practices of the academy as a whole, writing that CMC helped instructors raise 
questions “about the academy and its ways of thinking and speaking and writing” and alternate 
ways of “imagining and valuing student writing that [makes] a difference when students [write]” 
(Hawisher 245). Likewise, Gail Cooper and Cynthia Selfe praised the “revolutionary potential” 
of CMC in that it enabled “non-traditional forums” that gave students the opportunity to 
reexamine the authoritarian values of the classroom, to resist their socialization into a narrowly 
conceived form of academic discourse, to learn from the clash of discourses, to learn through 
engaging in discourse” (867).  
None of these faculty driven writing technologies exist today, but CMC approaches to 
writing-intensive courses underwent explosive growth in the first decade of the 21st century, 
often described as “digital pedagogy,” “digital learning,” “networked participatory scholarship,” 
or “connectivism.” Many of these engagements, however, did not grow out of the field of 
computers and composition, but instead came about in diverse pockets of academia as educators 
began to flexibly and individually experiment with new freely-available, broadly-accessible 
networked digital tools. Other adoptions of digital technology within the classroom drew from 
emerging networked practices within the digital humanities (Hirsch; Brier). Just like their 
predecessors, these educators discovered that networked forms of writing helped support and 
stimulate collaborative, student-centered forms of learning that were often more pleasurable for 
both the students and the educators (Davidson; Savonick & Tagliaferri; Jenkins). However, these 
practices became exponentially more influential than they had been in the 80s and 90s, perhaps 
because they mirrored networked practices now common in the everyday extra-curricular life of 
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students and that they no longer relied on slow-moving forms of academic-institutional support. 
These practices were also able to support more fully public forms of learning and research 
(rather than just networked) given the increased number of digital venues that allowed for 
broader types of public participation such as Wikipedia, Twitter, and public-facing websites 
easily facilitated through blogging platforms and services. In response, many educators and 
advocates have developed pedagogies that enable students to contribute to public knowledge or 
open educational resources (such as Wikipedia or open access textbooks) as a form of open 
education (Konieczny; Wiley; Hendricks; Mays).  
Over the course of the first decade and a half, organizations and journals were established 
to help cultivate and critically guide these practices, such as the Humanities, Arts, Science and 
Technology Alliance and Collaboratory (2002), the Journal of Online Learning and Teaching 
(2005), the Journal of Interactive Technology and Pedagogy (2012), and Hybrid Pedagogy 
(2011). The success of these endeavors is not surprising given that collaborative approaches to 
the writing intensive course have been endorsed by writing instructors for at least fifty years as a 
successful method for improving student writing, with or without computers. In many ways, their 
success speaks to the way the rhetorical situation of student writing significantly influences 
student engagement and the quality and content of student writing. Writing technologies that 
resist this trend, and instead continue to mirror the private processes of writing and evaluation 
that dominated writing instruction practices in the U.S. throughout the earlier 20th century, are 
likely to continue to produce Macrorie’s “say-nothing language” due to the fact they create 
rhetorical situations in which there is no genuine audience to say anything to and no genuine 
exigence to provoke its utterance. Conversely, writing technologies and pedagogies that situate 
student writing within rhetorical situations with genuine co-discussants have emerged as one of 
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the most significant strategies for countering student cynicism towards writing-intensive 
educational activities. In these endeavors, learning is often not simply a private good that 
abstractly contributes to the student’s personal grade, skillset, and potential professional success, 
but one that works immediately toward the production of peer dialogue, collaborative relations 
with fellow students, and potentially public goods. The digital exchanges posted by students 
regarding their disgust for the term paper assignment and their fraudulent modes of producing it 
(as described in Footnote 2) is yet another lucid example of how student writing is significantly 
influenced by its rhetorical situation. In their statements, we see how the very same authors of 
“bull” in their ‘official’ capacity as students writing, are in fact capable of lively, purposeful, and 
rhetorically-aware digital writing for their peers on social media. They suggest that the product 
of student writing is not simply a reflection of the students themselves but also of the 
opportunities provided in the rhetorical situation in which the writing is produced.  
4.6 The social epistemic in the age of alienated intelligence 
The growth of CMC in writing-intensive courses has significantly expanded the range of 
rhetorical opportunities in which student writing can occur, enabling exciting new forms of 
publicly useful or collaborative student writing that should encourage us to continue cultivating 
these practices. However, regardless of the promising horizons of these emerging digital 
practices for student writing, many of them rely on capitalist digital technologies that exploit 
user data as information capital as part of a process I’ve called “alienated intelligence.” 
However, given the unfamiliar, difficult, and largely impalpable nature of these alienating 
processes, it has been all too easy to disregard them as insignificant to the aims of the writing-
intensive course. None of the major schools of rhetoric that I’ve covered here have prepared 
practitioners to investigate the effects of writing processes that transcend the sphere of 
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immediate human understanding. Objective- and subjective-minded rhetorics would likely see 
these alienating processes as irrelevant to teaching writing given that each strive to teach a skill 
they consider independent of social reality. Neither of these schools of thought then offer an 
inherent incentive or framework for investigating the peculiar new ‘behind-the-scenes’ dynamics 
of digitally-mediated discourse. Even general transactional theories, which emphasize the 
production of truth through dialogue (something CMC is well-equipped to facilitate), do not on 
their own offer a theoretical basis for critically investigating the social and political realities of 
the mechanisms that allow for it.  
Only the social epistemic, which evaluates knowledge production according to its 
contribution to social and political realities rather than merely correct, expressive, or useful 
forms of writing, would seem to have a theoretical perspective fit for comprehending and 
critiquing the implications of alienating processes on our techno-rhetorical situation. The social 
epistemic, as we recall, is a particular type of transactional rhetoric that emphasizes the liberation 
of student consciousness as its chief aim. Of all the types of computer-oriented pedagogies 
covered above, CMC appear the most conducive to supporting or stimulating social epistemic 
views and practices of student writing given its support for student-centered dialogue, an 
important component of social epistemic pedagogy. As we saw in the comments from Trent 
Batson, Gail Cooper, and Cynthia Selfe, CMC practices also open up radical new perspectives 
for analyzing the social dimension of student writing and knowledge production within the 
university as one is able to explore new purposes, audiences, and other contextual features for it. 
At the same time, however, the social epistemic should not be conceived of as a pedagogical 
approach that merely privileges the facilitation of student dialogue. Instead, the social epistemic 
analyzes rhetorical activities from the standpoint of their contribution to social and political 
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realities rather than simply an evaluation of the knowledge they produce. A social epistemic 
analysis of digital writing technologies would thus look not only at the way they support forms 
of student dialogue (which is an important part of liberatory practice), but would also consider 
the alienation processes of these technologies as equally important given the way they reinforce 
certain oppressive social realities.  
A consideration of the techno-rhetorical situation of student writing at scale can help 
draw out its two competing exigences—the exigence of student learning and the exigence of 
information capital—and have informed debate as to which we want to privilege and at what 
cost. An evaluation of the ways the exigence of information capital potentially interferes with the 
exigence of student learning will require a re-evaluation of the purpose and needs of education in 
an age in which information technologies have been thought to lend themselves powerfully to 
both liberatory and oppressive practices that shape intellectual and political realities. I hope 
however that I have provided evidence to show that student learning and capital accumulation 
via student data are sufficiently at odds with one another in ways that call for intervention. How 
to intervene, and to what purpose, however is a complex question. It is striking, indeed, that 
some of the most progressive-minded writing-intensive pedagogies currently in development rely 
on tools that have been documented to be organized around the principle of information 
capital—in fact, nearly all technologies used in student writing and submitting processes are 
affected in one way or another by this dynamic. A complete rejection of these technologies, 
while likely impossible in the short-term, would most likely have the immediate effect of 
prematurely stunting some of the most exciting and important work in collaborative and 
progressive pedagogy. It would also deny students the experience of learning digital skills and 
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using digital resources that do indeed have great professional and intellectual value, even if they 
also contain alienating features.  
While I believe that a social epistemic pedagogy in the age of alienated intelligence does 
necessitate a reclamation of information technologies used to facilitate learning (as part of a 
broader reclamation of technologies used to carry out scholarly knowledge production and 
dissemination), there is much work to be done before such a reclamation is possible. What is 
needed first is the development of theories for the classroom and for broader settings of 
academic knowledge production that can help bring awareness to the alienating processes of 
information capital and help us better understand the effects of those processes. These theoretical 
engagements would be well complemented by participation in academic initiatives that share this 
spirit of reclaiming control of academic information technologies and data such as the Modern 
Language Association Humanities Commons, ScholarlyHub, and Commons In A Box. In 
tandem, these activities can help cultivate the techno-rhetorical consciousness of students (and 
ourselves) to more sensitively understand the way information capital organizes the rhetorical 
situations that shape knowledge production, public discourse, the circulation of news, informal 
communication, and even the possibilities of student writing. In this pursuit, we should consider 
what new techno-rhetorical situations we would design to make writing and its information 
capital work simultaneously towards liberation rather than alienation. Though this approach may 
strike many as too utopian in aim given technical and economic realities, any engagement with 
knowledge production and transmission that does not put these issues at the fore misreads the 
exigence at stake.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Dialogic Machines 
Reprogramming the Invisible Discipline 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, I made a series of arguments connecting university practices to 
the politics of the broader cyborg world. First, I argued that the politics of this cyborg world are 
oppressive given that for a variety of social, technical, and economic reasons the everyday 
technical user is prohibited from having a critical understanding and choice in the direction of 
their cyborg world. Second, I redescribed the university as a “cyborg university” to call attention 
to unacknowledged features of its productive role in reproducing the cyborg world and named 
this overlooked process the “invisible discipline.” Third, I argued that the invisible discipline 
inherent in academic practice has contributed to the broader academic community’s inability to 
sufficiently recognize the ways alienating processes of information capital are at cross purposes 
with with academic and educational values thus inhibiting a comprehensive rejection of the tools, 
publishers, and companies that enable them. These arguments culminated in a call for holistically 
assessing forms of technologically-mediated alienation happening across the board in academic 
practices (from scholarly communications to student assignments) as critically relevant to the 
intellectual (rather than merely technical) processes of the university. I suggested that a 
reconceptualization of academic writing that attended to these issues might provide a fruitful 
way for communicating their importance and urgency to the broader academic community.  
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But with this newfound awareness, what sort of meaningful action might be taken so that 
the invisible discipline, made visible, might be redirected in ways to work towards cyborg 
liberation within and through the cyborg university? In this chapter I will argue that the 
incorporation of participatory design practices into educational and scholarly communication 
technologies represents an important counter model of technological practice and suggest that 
Paulo Freire’s concept of “dialogue” can help steer them towards critically engaging and 
transforming the cyborg university. I will introduce and develop the notion of “dialogic 
machines” or communicative acts made of code, speech, or some combination thereof as a tool 
for “reprogramming the invisible discipline” or allowing more users to understand and develop 
the software of the cyborg university. Where large scale, well-funded, socially supported 
dialogic machines are not possible (as is usually the case), dialogic machines may simply be 
individual, modest efforts to help bring that possibility into being.  
I will then suggest that this dialogic approach to information communication technologies 
used in educational settings have rich potential for fostering critical technological consciousness 
in the general student body that will better equip them to democratically participate in the 
pressing technopolitical issues of our time. I will further argue that this approach is highly-
relevant to undergraduate and graduate writing intensive courses as it offers opportunities for 
students to study and modify how software subtly influence their intellectual and writing 
activities. I will draw on examples of participatory technological practices to outline a way they 
might be applied dialogically within educational settings and point to Social Paper, a project that 
explores these ideas in practice.  
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5.2. Educational technology and critical technological consciousness 
As I detailed in chapter 3, instructors, programmers, and entrepreneurs have creatively 
explored applications of software and computing technology for teaching and learning since the 
launch of the PLATO computer-aided instruction system at the University of Illinois in 1960 
(Dear 2017) . These applications of software and computing can be categorized as typically 
supporting one or more of the following educational processes: (i) the management and 
administration of student learning (Ferster 2014), (ii) the delivery of learning content such as 
used in distance education (Ferster 2014), (iii) the facilitation of networked peer collaboration 
and knowledge production (Davidson & Goldberg 2010), (iv) the facilitation of personalized 
learning and assessment (Ferster 2014), and (v) the incentivization of learning such as through 
gamification, “edutainment,” and other reward systems (Ferster 2014).  
While each of these areas has seen different periods of growth and types of application 
over the course of the past fifty years, technical and cultural developments in the past decade 
have been especially conducive for fostering innovation, experimentation, and adoption related 
to the use of software for educational purposes. In the public sphere, broadened access to the 
Internet has enabled educational technology companies and organizations such as Coursera and 
the Khan Academy to easily provide educational resources to the general public at a scale 
previously unimagined and often for free. Within institutions of higher education, educators 
throughout humanities disciplines have embraced freely available “Web 2.0” technologies, such 
as Google Docs, Twitter, Wikipedia, and WordPress to facilitate collaborative or public-facing 
pedagogies in their classrooms (Davidson & Goldberg 2010) while more recently Github, 
Jupyter Notebooks, and other digital platforms and practices have shown exciting promise in 
teaching individual and collaborative programming skills (Smith 2016; Zagalsky 2015). Across 
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disciplines, educational institutions have begun to explore the uses of augmented and virtual 
reality for delivering more interactive and engaging forms of content delivery (Sinclair 2016) 
while developments in artificial intelligence technologies have led many to speculate about their 
transformative potential for personalized learning and assessment (King 2017).  
Taken together, these different initiatives in educational technology speak to exciting new 
possibilities for facilitating learning within, across, and beyond institutions of higher education. 
However, few, if any, of these initiatives are geared specifically towards teaching a participatory 
relationship towards software within the general student population. Unless the software 
application is designed specifically to support the teaching of programming skills—such as the 
freely available web platform Code Academy or the programming lessons available through 
Khan Academy or Coursera—educational software applications rarely teach lessons relevant to 
understanding the code of the application itself. Even these software designed to teach 
programming, however, rarely allows students the ability to view and modify the software of the 
application itself. As I argued in chapter 3, this prohibition constitutes an “invisible discipline,” 
that in effect trains the technological consciousness of students, or how students imagine and 
expect digital technology to mediate their intellectual and communicative activities. Currently, 
the broad denial of the right to study and modify the code and functionality of software in 
university settings inadvertently train students to passively accept the denial of these rights in our 
broader cyborg world as natural, neutral, and inevitable. While software has this pedagogical 
effect whether used within an educational setting or elsewhere, universities and institutions of 
higher education have the special opportunity to provide students with critical skills and 
perspectives regarding software that are often not easily obtained in the usage of popular, freely 
available digital platforms, tools, and services. By supporting social and technical practices that 
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would enable students to experimentally modify their tools, universities might begin to teach 
students how software actively shapes or reinforces certain beliefs, processes, and outcomes of 
the communicative activity at hand.  
As I outlined in chapter 2, the general inability for users to study or modify the source 
code is not unique to software in educational settings but rather emblematic of a broader 
software culture in which the most prominent and ubiquitous digital tools and platforms are not 
designed to enable or encourage user oversight and participation. While user participation may 
seem to offer no real value to software maintenance or development and require skills and 
interest beyond the typical user, a variety of issues point to the political and social harms caused 
by software that are developed without user oversight and participation. For example, the 
circulation of misinformation such as exemplified by the fake news scandal of the 2016 U.S. 
election (Shane 2017) and the radicalization of terrorists and mass shooters (Morlin 2017), the 
racial, economic, and social biases of search engines (Noble 2018; Goldman 2005; Diaz 2008), 
and the vulnerability and economic exploitation of user data facilitated by many digital 
platforms, tools, and services (van Dijck 2014; Cheney-Lippold 2011) are evidence that the 
design of digital capitalist platforms, tools, and services is often at odds with the interests with 
the public good. Though many of these capitalist tools present themselves as neutral and 
objective,24 they are in fact designed according to the worldview and capitalist interests of their 
developers, which privilege and incentivize certain types of information flow over others (Zuboff 
2015).  
In this sense, digital tools and the software that constitutes them are ideological. This 
ideology influences the type of knowledge that is produced and transmitted through the tools, 
                                                
24 For example, Google has long described its activities as positivistic (Hillis 2013). Similarly, Facebook 
has attempted to portray its role as neutral in the Fake News Scandal of the 2016 U.S. Election (Madrigal 
2017) .  
239
  
which in turn, affect social and political realities. This is not to say that software might in some 
way be transformed to remove its ideological features. In the same way that Paulo Freire asserts 
education is never neutral (Freire 1970), ideology is always an inherent and inevitable feature of 
software and the digital tools it creates. What may vary from one software system to another, 
however, is the type of ideology it embodies. Ideology is a set of beliefs and assumptions about 
what exists, what is good, and what is possible (Berlin 1988). We can therefore understand 
ideology in software as embodying the developers’ set of beliefs and assumptions about what 
exists, what is good, and what is possible with regard to software and the activities they are 
designed to carry out. For example, Google’s search engine is designed from the ideological 
perspective that tracking users is a good while DuckDuckGo’s search engine is designed from 
the ideological perspective that user privacy is a good (Preibusch 2015). Rather than attempt to 
remove ideology from software, which is impossible, we should consider making their ideologies 
more apparent and critique them from the view that software must not be at odds with 
democratic principles. 
Many have called for increased public oversight of digital platforms and tools through 
government regulation (Vaidhyanathan 2012; MacKinnon 2012; Tufekci 2017). While new legal 
policies are likely a necessary component of ensuring the democratic health of our digital future, 
I’d like to argue that cultivating critical technological consciousness in the general user 
population is equally important. Critical technological consciousness in the general user 
population is not only necessary for creating the mass demand that digital platforms and tools 
strive to uphold democratic principles but also for creating a body politic capable of recognizing 
the often overlooked ways software can alternately impinge or advance democratic freedoms and 
steering them accordingly. Given the universality and urgency of political issues related to digital 
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tools and platforms, we should recognize the cultivation of critical technological consciousness 
as a core responsibility of educational practices today.  
While there are already numerous efforts within higher education to teach critical 
information literacy skills that are often related to these issues, I’d like to suggest here that 
critical technological consciousness relies in part on experience that grants users diverse 
ideological perspectives on the production and use of software. In particular, a dialogic approach 
to software in educational settings would provide a unique and promising experiential learning 
opportunity for students to explore first hand the unexpected ways in which software mediates 
power, knowledge production, and communication, as well as the complex social, technical, and 
economic factors at play in this mediation. This dialogic approach would draw heavily from 
participatory design values and practices, but would be focused in its goal of working towards 
cyborg liberation. Before describing this dialogic approach more concretely and the way it builds 
upon participatory design, I will first provide a brief overview of participatory design approaches 
to digital technology.  
5.3. Participatory design approaches to software 
5.3.1. Outside of the classroom  
Most users have little expectation or ability of understanding or modifying the source 
code of software that mediate their everyday communicative activities such as email, social 
media, Internet searching, or text editing. While this lack of critical user participation in software 
oversight and production may appear as natural, inevitable, and relatively inconsequential, it is in 
fact a socially-constructed phenomenon, normalized and reinforced through corporate technical 
policies, cultural myths regarding programming, and the use of technology in educational 
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settings. There are, however, a number of software cultures, projects, and visions that point to the 
possibility of giving the everyday user greater agency in shaping the technical functionality and 
policy of their software. Though many of them are not self-described as such, they can be 
usefully understood as committed to the values of “participatory design,” a design practice in 
which users play a critical role in design by working closely with designers or by taking on roles 
related to the design process itself (Simonsen 2012).  
There are a number of real and aspirational projects that illustrate the unique affordances 
of participatory design approaches to software. The Free Software community, for example, has 
championed a form of software development in line with the values of participatory design since 
the early 1980s. As individuals came to realize the technical and social drawbacks of using 
proprietary forms of computing technology that denied users the ability to study and modify 
source code, they established a counter model of software production that preserves those rights 
for all users in perpetuity (Kelty 2008). Though Free Software often relies on voluntary and 
lateral forms of production that run counter to software production models found in proprietary 
business settings, they have produced a wide range of surprisingly sophisticated tools such as the 
GNU operating system, the extensible text editor Emacs, the MySQL relational database, and the 
Apache web server.  
Others have experimented with participatory design approaches to computing technology 
and software for varying purposes. In the 1970s, union clubs in Scandinavia explored 
participatory approaches to designing computer systems and information technologies in the 
spirit of enabling workers to shape the means of production (Simonsen 2012). In 1972, Alan Kay 
created a proposal for Dynabook, a personal computer inspired by developmental psychology 
that would enable children users to construct its software programs according to their educational 
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interests and needs (Kay 1972). More recently, the Platform Cooperative movement has argued 
for forms of user-owned digital platforms as Twitter or Uber—that allow user communities to 
democratically oversee the design and governance of the tool rather than corporate entities 
(Scholz 2016).  
5.3.2. Political value of participatory design in the classroom 
In varying ways, projects coming out of the Free Software and participatory design 
movements point to way users and user communities might have greater agency and control over 
their digital tools (and the software that constitutes them). They also suggest how participatory 
development models of software production could make important political, economic, social, 
and educational differences. At the same time, however, these projects also point to the 
challenges of implementing participatory design practices in software. Free Software’s own 
advocates, for example, have acknowledged that its software tools can be inflexible, unreliable, 
and inconvenient (Hill n.d.). It should also be noted that participation in Free Software 
development is still limited to the very narrow class of users who have access to sufficient 
resources and expertise. In an article on sexism in the Free software community, Joseph Reagle, 
observes “Despite the values of freedom and openness, the free culture movement’s gender 
balance is as skewed (or more so) as that of the computing culture from which it arose” (n.p.). 
Other visions—such as the DynaBook or a user-owned Twitter—have thus far remained 
unrealized given the economic and social complexities of establishing user-managed or user-
owned digital tools and platforms. Nonetheless, these examples gesture towards models of 
software design that are radically more inclusive of user participation than standard proprietary 
options.  
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Experimenting with these type of approaches towards software in the classroom could 
help grant students a new political perspective about software in general. First, students would 
learn that software need not always be controlled by corporate entities outside of the classroom 
and experience first hand the pros and cons of community-driven software. Second, students 
would have the opportunity, if adequately supported by the course and/or institution, to 
experiment with greater forms of creative and critical control over software not typically 
available in everyday settings. And third, participatory design approaches to software have the 
potential to provide students with the data they typically produce and surrender to digital media 
companies when using proprietary software. 
It is worth briefly expanding on this last point. Companies typically downplay the 
collection and use of user information capital and many have argued that users are typically 
unaware of the extent and effects of this collection (Acquisti 2006; Van Dijck 2014; Cheney-
Lippold 2011; Pangrazio 2017). It is also often extremely difficult to obtain personal data 
collected by companies and many are surprised when they learn of the extent of data collected 
and the types of insights that can be generated from this (Hutchinson 2015; Duportail 2017). 
While the collection and exploitation of user data is politically concerning in and of itself, lack of 
access to personal data makes it difficult for individuals to understand the sensitivity of this data 
or to explore firsthand its potential value for personal use. Gregory Donovan (2013) and Luci 
Pangrazio (2017) have shown that exposing adolescent users to the collection and use practices 
of their personal data by corporate entities increases their critical regard of digital tools and 
platforms and may even influence a more cautious approach to these digital tools. Using 
software that gave students participatory access to their data would allow them not only to 
understand the extent of data collected by these tools but could also give them access to it to 
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explore for their own interests. Students could use this data study patterns in their own 
intellectual and communicative activities for personal growth and social analysis and as well as 
critically investigate the limits of these data representations.  
 
5.3.3. Intellectual value of participatory design in writing intensive classroom 
Participatory design has rich intellectual potential for writing practices and technologies 
used within educational settings. To understand this potential it is first important to recognize 
that the processes and products of writing are influenced by the technological, social, and 
cognitive systems used to support the activity. Given the way these support systems fade away 
from awareness, it can be easy to conceive of writing as an objective activity in which writing 
tools or processes have little influence on the transcription of the writer’s thoughts into written 
words. However—many individuals invested in writing activities for various purposes, such as 
authors, composition instructors, literary scholars, and academic researchers—have found that 
technological, organizational, and social processes do have significant effects on the type of 
writing produced and the rhetorical consciousness that guides writing’s production. In regard to 
cognitive processes, Johanna Drucker and Patrik Svensson argue that everyday technologies and 
conventions of scholarly production “imprint their format features on our thinking and 
predispose us to organize our thoughts and arguments in conformance with their structuring 
principles—often from the very beginning of a project’s conception” (2016). Similarly, David 
M. Berry and Jan Rybicki use what they call “medium theory” to investigate the relationships 
between a literary work’s medium and its epistemological assumptions, practices, and stylistics 
(2012). Berry and Rybicki cite Nietzsche as an early observer of these subtle relationships in his 
famous quip that “our writing tools are also working on our thoughts” (qtd. in Kittler 1999) and 
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point to scholarship demonstrating stylistic changes in literary works caused by technological 
changes in the writing processes.  
Some writers, aware of the relationships between technical and organizational processes 
and written products, have actively worked to design tools to support specific writing goals. The 
essayist John McPhee, for example, co-designed the writing software “Structur” with a 
university programmer to support his complex process of drafting (McPhee 2013). Similarly, the 
novelist Keith Blount designed the writing software Scrivener, which supports complex drafting 
and outline processes, and is now a popular tool among academic and creative writers. The 
writer and programmer James Somers reverse engineered Google Docs to allow him to more 
fully visualize his writing process (2014). There are also compelling examples of participatory 
approaches to writing systems long before the computer’s arrival. In the 19th century, essayist 
Ralph Waldo Emerson designed an extensive system for organizing his drafts and research notes 
over the course of more than fifty years that allowed him to efficiently recycle and renew 
intellectual work and creatively explore associative links across his notes and writing 
(Rosenwald 1988).  
Other writers have focused on hacking the social processes involved in the production of 
a written text. In roughly the first decade of the 21st century, a number of free or cheap digital 
tools and services emerged that enabled writers and readers to easily exchange writing and 
feedback. During this period, scholars such as Noah Wardrip Fruin (2008), Cathy Davidson and 
David Theo Goldberg (2010), and Kathleen Fitzpatrick (2012) experimented with these tools to 
post drafts of their academic texts for networked public and peer review. These scholars cite the 
importance of design of the digital tools in making networked review feasible for their particular 
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type of writing. For example, they praise the WordPress plugin CommentPress for the ways it is 
designed to allow review on long form academic manuscripts.  
As I outlined in chapter 4, composition instructors have also long been interested in the 
ways cognitive and social processes can positively affect writing products. The “process theory 
of composition,” a subfield of composition studies, has produced an abundance of research 
related to the ways cognitive activities such as brainstorming, outlining, drafting, style checking, 
revising, and reflecting affect the final written product. Other compositionists have paid attention 
to the effects of implementing social activities in writing processes, such as peer dialogue and 
peer feedback, workshopping, public engagement, and service learning, where student writing 
aims to produce a public resource or help steer social change (Elbow 1998; Adler-Kassner 1997; 
Faigley 1986; Shor 1980). Though these different approaches to writing instruction often 
overlap, process-oriented approaches emphasize process techniques as a means of creating more 
capable and reflective student writers, while social approaches often emphasize the importance 
of collective knowledge making and citizen participation.  
Both approaches have their roots in the late 1960s and influenced the way software was 
used and developed in the writing classroom beginning in the early 1980s. Noticing that standard 
word processing software was designed to serve office management needs, some compositionists 
developed writing software packages that supported prewriting, invention, and revision process-
oriented activities such as as WANDAH, Homer, and the Writers’ Aide Helper (Wresch 1984). 
Other compositionists, inspired by their exposure to newly emerging academic online bulletin 
systems, explored the use of computer networks for socially-engaged, collaborative forms of 
writing instruction such as SEEN in 1980, ENFI network engagements in the 80s and early 90s, 
and Breadnet, a network that still persists today. These educators often spoke in glowing terms 
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about the way networked writing spaces positively transformed the quality of student writing and 
their interest in producing it (Wresch 1984). However, these software projects faced multiple 
sustainability issues, and for the most part were unable to find the same degree of stability, 
support, and uptake as commercial forms of writing and educational technology, such as seen 
with Microsoft Word, Google Docs, and the Blackboard learning management system. 
 
5.3.4. Informal participatory design approaches to software for academic writing today 
Though compositionist-directed software development projects were not sustained, the 
explosion of diverse and often freely-available writing, reading, and research applications, 
services, and other tools have lowered the barriers for many writers and researchers—including 
writing instructors—to experiment with a rich range of tools that support different stages of the 
writing and research process. Like the early engagements of the field of computers and 
composition, these experimental practices can be broadly categorized as either supporting the 
individual cognitive and organizational processes of research and writing, or alternately, 
supporting activities like peer review, publication, and dialogue that facilitate social forms of 
knowledge production. In the first case, tools and functionalities such as note taking, draft 
organization, text editing, versioning, annotation, style checking, citation management, mind 
mapping, time keeping, focus, and inspiration, are adopted as part of academic workflow. In the 
second case, writers and educators explore digital networking and publishing tools such as blogs, 
social media, wikis, version control repositories, collaborative writing tools, and social research 
platforms to explore social forms of knowledge production in academic research and higher 
education. There are numerous academic blog posts, library guides, tutorials, and tech reviews 
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evaluating their use for academic writing and research or describing experimental academic 
workflows based on a systematic use of several tools.25  
Taken together, these various experiments suggest that writing processes and 
technologies can have diverse types of influence on final written products. Increasingly 
intelligent style checkers can help writers produce more polished prose and internalize style 
guidelines while networking tools provides writers with real audiences whose presence helps 
stimulate more authentic—and often more correct—written communication. While few of the 
examples given here represent cases where the writer directly participated in the design of the 
writing tool, the diversity of accessible writing-support tools have enabled many to take a more 
participatory approach to the design of their academic workflow. Commentary on these 
processes suggests that experimentation with different tools helps writers achieve a greater 
awareness of the subtle relationships between writing tools, written products and practices and 
assumptions related to knowledge production more broadly. For example, Davidson and Gold 
observed that using CommentPress to solicit public feedback on the drafts of The Future of 
Thinking changed the way they conceptualized authorship, authority, and publishing (2010, 7-8). 
In a column for The Chronicle of Higher Education, Ryan Cordell detailed the numerous ways 
that the software package Scrivener “changed the the way I think through, organize, and perform 
my professional writing” (2010). Critical participation in shaping the technical aspects of our 
writing practices however is still largely limited to choosing different tools rather than designing 
or modifying the tools themselves.  The exceptional cases of John McPhee, Keith Blount, and 
James Somers point to the fact that only a very few individuals have skills and resources 
                                                
25For example, see Eduardo Marisca’s in-depth blog post on using tools such as Zotero, Github, and 
Latex to write his dissertation thesis (Marisca 2014).  
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necessary for making those sorts of interventions. Nonetheless, their projects point to the 
intellectual value of enabling these interventions.  
5.4. Dialogic consciousness and dialogic machines 
  As exciting as participatory design approaches to university software may be, they do not 
on their own promise to work against forms of cyborg oppression carried out by the university. 
As Theodore Roszak reminds us, participatory practices can be instrumentalized for any purpose, 
even those as atrocious as the administration of concentration camps (206). I’d like to thus offer 
a specific approach to participatory design whose chief aim is liberating the university from 
oppressive forms of software. My approach draws from Paulo Freire’s theorization of the role of 
dialogue in the struggle for liberation.  
For Freire, dialogue is an activity foundational to freedom in that it represents a human 
being’s active striving towards becoming a self-directed subject rather than a passive object. It 
consists of a dialectical and unending process of action and reflection as it conceives of humans 
and the reality they make as in the “process of becoming” rather than static and fixed (65). He 
writes, “To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn 
reappears to the namers as a problem that requires of them a new naming” (69).  
This process of naming, as part of the activity of reflection, plays an important role in 
making aspects of the world available for transformation. Freire writes: 
 
That which had existed objectively but had not been perceived in its deeper implications 
(if indeed it was perceived at all) begins to “stand out,” assuming the character of a 
problem and therefore of challenge. Thus, men and women begin to single out elements 
that are typically invisible in their “background awareness” and to reflect upon them. 
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These elements are now objects of their consideration, and, as such, objects for their 
action and cognition. (64) 
 
This cognitive activity of increasingly recognizing aspects of given reality as social constructs 
capable of transformation is part of what Freire calls “problem posing education” in which 
“people develop their power to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and 
in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality 
in process, in transformation” (64). The full expression of this process is social in that it works 
towards further perceiving the social constructedness of reality and in turn recognizes that 
transformation itself must also be a social construction requiring cooperative forms of action 
rather than merely individual. However, this social process must remain dialogical in that all 
participants are actively engaging in the collective naming and transformation of the world rather 
than merely receiving objective truths—even if “liberatory” in content—that would only further 
reinforce a dependent and passive mentality. This means that every human being must have the 
opportunity to participate in dialogue from their authentic perspective representative of their 
experiences and build their perspective through continued experience and dialogue with others.  
Freire’s notion of dialogue is useful for considering approaches towards cyborg liberation 
within and through the cyborg university. I mean this somewhat differently than the way that 
scholars and critics such as Sean Michael Morris and Jesse Stommel (2014) have rightly 
championed certain digital pedagogy techniques as powerful methods for facilitating Freire’s 
dialogue within the classroom. I applaud their use of certain types of software for fostering 
student dialogue around course content, but here I want to focus instead on the possibility of 
establishing a dialogic approach to software itself.That is to say, how can we as an academic 
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community strive to critically understand how technological, social, cultural, institutional, and 
rhetorical practices come together to either facilitate or resist cyborg oppression and transform 
them accordingly? We might then ask how the invisible discipline I sketched out in chapter 3 
subtly works to reinforce certain individualizing and alienating processes in academic activity 
(such as homework assignments or professional scholarship carried out through certain 
platforms) and consider practical steps towards creating more cooperative, liberatory techno-
rhetorical practices within the cyborg university.  
This dialogic approach, however, is not a simple two-step process of first theoretically 
identifying cyborg oppression and then practically resisting or overcoming it. The concept of 
cyborg oppression is abstract and it is up to academic communities to determine where and how 
in their own specific academic and institutional sites it matters and can be meaningfully 
transformed. This process thus requires critical interdisciplinary study, discussion between 
diverse institutional and professional perspectives, and experimentation and negotiation in a 
complex institutional terrain. Large scale technical and institutional transformation is rarely a 
possibility; in this case, a dialogic process requires that participants explore intellectual or 
practical actions that will help them better understand and raise awareness of the significance of 
these issues and thus prepare the way for their transformation.  
I offer here the concept of “dialogic machines” as a way to describe any concrete act that 
helps facilitate this dialogic process. My concept is based on Bill Ferster’s “teaching machine,” 
which he defines as:  
 
a way to deliver instruction by using technology that marries content and pedagogy into a 
self-directed experience for a learner and which relies on minimal assistance from a live 
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instructor. The notion of what is a machine needs to be taken more broadly so it can 
include less mechanical devices such as programmed instructional textbooks but not 
other, equally valuable but less content-driven, innovations such as graphing calculators. 
In this definition, a book can be teaching machine but not a blackboard and not even the 
new electronic smart boards, in spite of their highly sophisticated electronics and obvious 
usefulness in whole-class instruction. (17) 
 
Ferster developed the concept of the “teaching machine” to help readers categorize a very 
particular type of technology that is broader than the computer but does not simply refer to any 
type of technology used in the classroom as it must contain instructional content. Similarly, my 
concept of dialogic machines is used to describe a type of dialogical engagement with software 
that extends beyond the direct use or creation of software. I define a dialogical machine as a 
communicative acts made of code, speech, or some combination that works to critically and 
collectively understand or transform the software of the cyborg university. They are thus tools 
for reprogramming the cyborg university and its invisible discipline. Dialogic machines may 
investigate and address any aspect of the cyborg university—such as its social and technical 
practices, institutional structures and divisions, labor practices, histories, corporate contracts, and 
student and professional evaluation processes, that intersect with the university’s use, 
development and adoption of software. They may also be carried out in any institutional setting, 
such as a homework assignment, a scholarly paper, a course syllabus, a campus initiative, 
software development, terms of agreement, a community of practice, a grant funded project, a 
conversation, and so forth. They might also consist of the social development of what 
Christopher Kelty calls “recursive publics,” by which he means publics that are “vitally 
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concerned with the material and practical maintenance and modification of the technical, legal, 
practical, and conceptual means of its own existence as a public.” These publics could help 
oversee the governance and development of software in the university, or simply work to bring 
more public and academic attention to the politics therewithin. No particular set of expertise or 
institutional power is required to create a dialogic machine—they can be constructed out of the 
resources, skills, and institutional and social connections that are within reach. Nor do they need 
to be grand. A small-scale personal experiment can be a dialogic machine, as can a project 
intended only to inspire the creation of others.  
5.5. A case study of dialogical approaches to software in educational settings 
To help illustrate what I mean by a dialogical approach to software in the cyborg 
university, I’d like to share a personal experience and subsequent project that highlights its 
potential value along with some of its challenges. The first part of this anecdote involves my 
exposure to a type of academic technology that opened my eyes to the way academic technology 
always embodies and reinforces certain ideological views on the purpose and processes of the 
academic activity it supports. In 2012, as a doctoral student in English at The CUNY Graduate 
Center, I was introduced to The CUNY Academic Commons (CAC), a social network for my 
institution powered by open source software. CAC was established to foster collaboration and 
digital engagement in our academic community by providing readymade resources for building 
customizable websites and discussion groups and networking with other community members.  
These tools thus helped transform solitary and private research and learning activities into 
public-facing, collaborative, and community-building activities. CAC thus stood in distinct 
contrast to standard learning management systems that are designed to support the authoritative 
management and evaluation of students on an individual basis and thus have less features for 
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non-hierarchical collaboration, individual expression, and public communication. It is used to 
support a diverse range of academic needs and activities such as courses, professional websites, 
research group communications, and so forth. In addition, the developers behind CAC saw the 
value of providing a loosely centralized hub for digital activity so that campus members might 
more easily easily discover the network activity of their peers or showcase their own activities to 
the community (Gold & Otte 2011). Today CAC has almost 2,076 public blogs (there are more 
that are private), 945 groups, and 11,333 members, speaking to its ongoing value to The CUNY 
community.  
CAC notably influenced the way some academic activities were carried out at our 
institution in that it stimulated more forms of online and offline collaboration and public 
engagement in our academic community. A 2011 case study found that CAC “increased 
awareness of member projects and research interests; built a greater sense of community between 
discrete campuses; promoted an open culture of sharing; and encouraged collaborative ventures 
across the system” (Gold & Otte 2011). My personal experiences likewise reflected the benefits 
of CAC for academic work: my educational activities became increasingly collaborative and 
publicly engaged as a result. However, I also came to appreciate a less explicit but equally 
significant value of CAC that was based on its status as community-driven tool rather than 
simply on its functionality. Unlike the proprietary tools we used for educational activities, such 
as Blackboard, Google, and Microsoft Word, CAC was powered by open-source software and 
developed and maintained in-house by members of our academic community. Though CAC was 
not geared towards incorporating participation in its design by all of its users, it represented a 
profound step towards participatory design for academic technology given that it was directed 
and developed by academics at The CUNY Graduate Center. And given the open source nature 
255
  
of its code, CAC remained open, in theory at least, to further modification by the user 
community.   
As my research in digital rhetoric and composition sharpened my understanding of the 
relationship between social and cognitive processes and the written products the produce, I 
became interested in thinking about how digital tools in general and CAC in particular could be 
designed to support collaborative environments for research and learning even more. In 
particular, I wanted to see if tools and networks could be developed to cultivate student publics 
that spanned across disciplines, institutions, and academic terms in ways that would provide a 
more meaningful audience for student writing. Had I not been exposed to a form of community-
driven software, I am not sure I would have had the motivation or sensibility to pursue these 
ideas in earnest. However, exposure to community-driven software within an educational setting 
encouraged me to try to participate more fully in its development, even though I was not yet 
aware of participatory design practices at that time.  
In a final paper entitled “Death of the Term Paper” for the course Interactive Technology 
and Pedagogy, I outlined ideas for new tools and practices that would help transform the 
normally private practice of student writing into a more collaborative, meaningful, and 
(hopefully) pleasurable activity. Though CAC and many other tools and services offered the 
ability for students to make their work technically public, the lack of visible, cohesive student 
publics centered around student writing indicated that tools and social practices could be better 
designed to cultivate this form of engagement. Platforms like Facebook and Twitter demonstrate 
that public circulation of content depends not only on being technically available on the web, but 
also on its incorporation into networked spaces where it might be easily discovered, shared, and 
interacted with. Compared to offline academic practices, CAC did this very well as it allowed 
256
  
course members to share their writing with one another on class blogs and highlighted member 
activity through activity feeds and notifications.  
However, there were a number of particularities about CAC and about the form and 
conventional practices of student writing that prevented the development of a robust practice of 
networked student writing. Digital tools for collaboration often didn’t account for the 
sensitivities and particularities of student research and writing. The form of the term paper, for 
example, with its format and file specificity, seemed particularly resistant to “socializing” among 
one’s peers for feedback. Given that a majority of instructors require assignments in document 
files with specific formatting requirements, it seemed unlikely that student writing would be 
socialized if the network didn’t easily integrate these type files. There was also no easy way for 
individuals to “network” their papers or discover the papers of their peers or flexibly set different 
permissions and privacy settings for each paper.  
5.5.1. Social Paper 
These thoughts led Urban Education graduate student Jennifer Stoops and I to develop an 
idea for an addition to CAC that would allow students to easily network their papers and 
feedback across courses, disciplines, terms, and even institutions as a means for creating a more 
collaborative, discoverable, and public-facing student public. With a budget of roughly $60,000 
provided by a 2014 National Endowment for the Humanities Digital Start Up Grant and a CUNY 
Advancement Grant, we worked with the CAC development team to create a beta version of a 
tool we called Social Paper. We initially imagined a socialized writing space that had full word 
processing functionality and robust commenting and networking features, though we knew we 
would have to scale down our vision considerably given our budget and available resources. 
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As a whole, the project was both exciting and educational. We faced a number of 
interesting technical and financial challenges from the beginning. For example, we desired a rich 
text editor that would allow for formats standard to student papers and granular commenting but 
there were not many sophisticated open source software options that had these functionalities 
that would integrate easily into CAC. As Google Docs offered many of these features, we 
considered building a plugin that would link Google Docs to CAC. However, we ultimately 
decided to use open source tools given that proprietary tools can be be discontinued or changed 
by the parent company at any point in the future (as had happened to the digital humanities 
project HyperCities that relied on Google Maps). However, open source technology proved to be 
an imperfect route, too, given that one of the software packages we incorporated was being 
abandoned by its maintainer. Negotiating these complex technical and social decisions helped us 
appreciate the complexity of factors that need to be addressed in software development.  
In the end, given our limited resources, we were only able to achieve a small portion of 
the original design for Social Paper and were unable to implement features such as document 
integration and flexible formatting that might make the tool more convenient and attractive to 
use for academic writing. Currently it hosts 128 public papers but has not yet achieved in earnest 
its ambitious vision of transforming student writing practices. Nonetheless, Social Paper 
embodies a novel and promising approach to the use and development of software in academic 
settings that with further institutional, financial, and social support could have the potential to 
flourish into a new paradigm for academic software production.  
Though I did not learn of participatory design practices until after development on Social 
Paper began, it embodied another step forward for participatory design approaches to software in 
the cyborg university as it provided the students involved—Jennifer Stoops, the Digital Fellows, 
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and myself—an opportunity to develop the technology that hosted some of our academic 
activities. This process was deeply educational as we learned through experience the complicated 
technical, social, and economic issues at play in software development, especially for 
educational and institutional purposes. Negotiating these issues had intellectual value for my 
personal research, as it led to a dissertation that explores the historical, cultural, and institutional 
forces that shape today’s educational and academic technology practices. In trying to describe 
how these forces are largely invisible in our everyday academic practice, I theorized the concept 
of the invisible discipline and investigated both its political and intellectual effects. During this 
process of research and software development, it seemed increasingly important that the entire 
academic community should have opportunities to better understand the ways software subtly 
mediates our academic activity and to participate in the shaping of that mediation. Because these 
practices were no longer simply a type of participatory design but rather worked to address 
issues of cyborg oppression, I call them dialogic machines. 
5.6. Conclusion 
My experience with Social Paper and the research it inspired left me a series of strong 
impressions about the value of participatory design approaches to technology used in educational 
settings. First, I am convinced of the intellectual and political value of providing the general 
student population with the opportunity to govern and modify the software they use for 
intellectual production. By providing students with the perspective and control over software 
normally only afforded by corporate or administrative entities, students have the opportunity to 
study more directly the way software mediate their intellectual activities and communities and 
explore how technical modifications might help support personal and collective intellectual goals 
and values. For example, access to data produced and transmitted through software would enable 
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students to use text analysis techniques from the digital humanities to study patterns in their 
individual and collective intellectual activities for the purpose of understanding the social 
dynamics of knowledge production and transmission. It would allow them to gain basic 
familiarity with some of the algorithmic techniques that have increasing power in everyday life. 
And it would also provide students with the opportunity to experiment with how different 
aesthetic and algorithmic design features might better support individual cognitive activities 
related to writing process or productive intellectual exchange among students. These 
opportunities would not only have rich potential for the use and development of educational 
technology itself, but would also help students consider the way digital technology mediates the 
production and transmission of knowledge and power in everyday life. By sharing my 
experiences and research regarding the intersection of participatory design, software, academic 
writing, and cyborg politics I am hopeful that more educators, students, and administrators will 
be encouraged to explore dialogic approaches to the technologies of the cyborg university.  
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AFTERWORD 
 
#SocialDiss: Transforming the Dissertation into Networked Knowledge Production 
 
A description of the dissertation’s digital process 
 
 
6.1 The hidden lesson of the word processor 
In some respects, most dissertations have been digital since at the least 1990s, as 
digitally-supported word processing software became all but ubiquitous in the the production of 
academic writing. However, despite its digital structure, word processing software is rarely, if 
ever, considered a tool whose use in knowledge production constitutes what we call digital 
scholarship today. When we use the word “digital” in discussions pertaining to scholarly 
production, what we often mean is not simply the use of digital technology in and of itself, but its 
use for the incorporation of something different into the research process or product than 
typically found in the home discipline of the researcher. Text mining, network analysis, digital 
exhibitions, the incorporation of digital multimedia, crowdsourcing, and digital mapping are 
often referred to as “digital” methods when used within humanities research. Word processing 
software, however, which is no less “digital” than any of these methods, has been so thoroughly 
embraced by the humanities that it simply does not count as “digital” in the same sense.  
The exclusion of word processing software from the category of the digital is that it 
speaks to a normalization of word processing software along with a number of assumptions it 
embodies about the process and possibilities of academic writing. Today, standard word 
processing features—such as a window for producing and manipulating text, the options of 
saving and editing files, and functionalities related to formatting and spell check—all seem like 
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relatively neutral means for facilitating a straightforward process of transmitting words from the 
mind of the writer to a tangible medium for the purpose of public consumption. As a whole, the 
design and underlying logic of word processing software is so naturalized that it can be hard to 
imagine how a different design or logic might make a meaningful difference in knowledge 
production. But in fact, word processing software—along with its adoption by academics—was 
anything but neutral and in fact significantly helped shape the culture knowledge production 
within the university. It also—though I don’t have room to detail here—shaped the politics of 
software production in the university. When I decided to write a dissertation on this topic, 
Software of the Oppressed: Reprogramming the Invisible Discipline, I decided not only to make 
this argument through scholarly writing, but also through demonstrating the non-neutrality of 
writing technologies in my drafting process.    
Though it may be hard to fully appreciate today, the computer was not always considered 
a tool that might be productively used for writing. Word processing software was first 
conceptualized and developed in the 1960s as a text-focused analogue to “data processing” 
applications that had been developed for office automation since the 1950s (Haigh). These 
applications, however, were developed for expensive office computing systems and were largely 
out of reach for personal or experimental use. It wouldn’t be until the mid 1970s, after the arrival 
of the personal computer, that word processing software was released for the personal computer 
that was gradually becoming more accessible to individual consumers. The first instance of it, 
however, almost occurred by accident. In 1975, Michael Shrayer released Extended Software 
Package 1 (ESP1), a program designed to assist with writing, editing and debugging programs 
for the Sol computer. ESP1, however, needed extensive documentation and so Shrayer spent a 
year developing a program specifically designed for text production to help automate some of 
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this labor. The program, which he called Electric Pencil, gained immediate popularity after its 
release in 1976, kicking off what would soon be a thriving word processing software industry.   
Administrative and business entities were quick to recognize the use of word processing 
software, with studies in the late 1970s showing that word processors could speed up secretarial 
productivity by 200 to 300 percent (Greenwood 2). Academics, however, did not rush all at once 
to incorporate this new technology into their writing practices. Word processing software was 
notoriously difficult to use in the late 1970s and early 1980s and few academics had access to 
computing labs or to a personal computer where they might encounter it (Hawisher). As one 
academic relates, university computing resources were seen as too precious to be wasted on the 
mere production of text (Hawisher). Over the course of the next decade, however, academics, 
would ultimately embrace word processing software, noting the flexibility, speed, and control it 
lent to the writing and editing process, features that were also highly favored by literary authors 
as noted in Matthew Kirschenbaum’s insightful study Track Changes: A Literary History of 
Word Processing. Though there is no overarching study of the adoption of word processing 
software in academia, one can still piece together a general picture of their reception through 
small scale studies and individual commentaries made throughout this decade. In 1983, for 
example, English professor Charles Moran deemed the technology a “blessing” after discovering 
it on the Apple computer he had purchased with his wife for their children (114) and asserted 
that, despite some problems, it would soon become the norm at colleges and universities (115). 
Two years later, a study of 60 faculty across 32 departments at a highly ranked private university 
in the U.S. found that faculty were “very positive about the microcomputer as a writing tool,” 
describing it as “more fun, more involving, and less frustrating than previous methods: in short, a 
tool that liberates expression" (Case 322). Though one can find in these commentaries small 
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reservations about potential unwanted social and intellectual effects of this powerful new tool, 
most of the academics interviewed in the study seemed in accord with Moran’s opinion that “the 
gains outweigh the losses” (114). By 1987, the philosopher Michael Heim declared the tool’s 
victory in the humanities. “The text processor,” he wrote “is transforming the way philosophy, 
poetry, literature, social science, history, and the classics are done as much as computerized 
calculation has transformed the physical sciences based on mathematics. The word processor is 
the calculator of the humanist” (1).  
It was perhaps short sighted, however, to compare word processors, which help facilitate 
the subjective and messy process of communication, with machines developed to automate the 
application of the universal laws of mathematics. As the design and functionality of word 
processing software became standardized in the 1980s, the field of Computers and Composition 
emerged in pursuit of exploring the computer’s diverse possibilities for composition research and 
instruction. In the first decade of this field’s existence, they created and implemented computing 
technologies for writing instruction that dramatically transcended the status quo of word 
processing, including networked writing environments and Aristotelian-inspired programs that 
provided conversational assistance during the drafting process. The diversity of software 
programs produced during these years and the difference it made upon the writing process of 
both students and composition scholars taught the field firsthand that there was no such thing as 
a natural word processor. As Carolyn Handa observed in 1990, “We work with a concept of 
writing procedures arising from the programmer’s view of the writing process and the way in 
which the programmer understands that we improve writing and gain knowledge” (175). Turning 
to MacWrite, a popular word processing program at the time, Handa argued that the program’s 
design emphasized writing as a solitary practice given that it provides sophisticated options for 
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solitary forms of editing (such as cutting, pasting, and copying text) but not options for 
consulting with other writers. She lamented that without a strong antithetical pedagogy to this 
view, both students and instructors would be ill equipped to see how the program shaped their 
writing practice and their understanding of writing more broadly.  
 
2. Tools for a student public  
And so, I, too, was blind to the invisible lessons of the word processor for most of my 
education. When I arrived at graduate school, I took it for granted—as I believe many academics 
still do—that writing software was more or less a neutral utility for facilitating the transfer of 
thoughts from the dark mind of the writer to the bright light of the public page. That does not 
mean that I was perfectly pleased with whatever writing software I happened to be using or could 
not imagine a number of improvements. I accepted writing software for what it was along with 
the belief that—like most forms of digital technology I encountered—was something made by 
technologists somewhere far away without any possibility of receiving or caring about my input. 
I did not imagine that the tool might have played an influential role in the development of my 
conception of what it meant to write, think, or produce knowledge. Nor did I imagine that there 
could be an entirely different form of software production in which the user community 
(including those who were not technically skilled) might play a role in designing that software. 
Even if I was told that in fact there were examples and advocates of community made software 
(such as seen in the free software communities), I am not sure I would have been able to imagine 
what sort of meaningful difference academic participation in software design might make. I was 
largely blind to how—as Johanna Drucker and Patrik Svensson observe—popular technologies 
used in scholarly production “imprint their format features on our thinking and predispose us to 
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organize our thoughts and arguments in conformance with their structuring principles—often 
from the very beginning of a project’s conception.”  
 
I may have very well continued ignoring the way word processing software influenced 
my scholarly practice. Academic writing is hard enough without critically unpacking the tools 
one uses in the process. However, an unexpected collision between my research interests and 
experiences pushed me to begin thinking about the complex forms of influence wielded by our 
writing tools. In my pursuit of looking for diverse critical perspectives on technology within 20th 
century literature, I came across the poet Imamu Amiri Baraka’s critique of what was at the time 
the current dominant form of writing technology:     
 
A typewriter?–why shd it only make use of the tips of the fingers as contact points of 
flowing multi directional creativity. If I invented a word placing machine, an 
“expression-scriber,” if you will, then I would have a kind of instrument into which I 
could step & sit or sprawl or hang & use not only my fingers to make words express 
feelings but elbows, feet, head, behind, and all the sounds I wanted, screams, grunts, taps, 
itches . . . (156 italics his).  
 
I found Baraka’s words both preposterous and brilliant. A writing machine in which one would 
need to “sprawl” and “hang” in order to write seemed ridiculous in comparison to the practical 
typewriter, but then again, only because I had absorbed what writing machines like the 
typewriter and computer taught: that writing was strictly mental and solemn process. Ironically, 
however, Baraka’s vision for a writing process that involves the movement of the whole body in 
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some ways seemed more practical than today’s computers given the way computers often cause 
painful and debilitating back, wrist, and neck issues.  Baraka’s ability to creatively imagine 
another possibility for such an ordinary-seeming tool helped me understand that every single 
aspect of writing technology represented a human decision rather than any sort of natural essence 
of the writing process.  
During this same early period of my graduate education, several courses I attended 
required students to post reflections on a course blog or learning management platform as a 
means of extending our classroom discussion in a virtual space. Some courses even went as far 
as encouraging us to share our final papers with other students for peer feedback. I would later 
come to learn that educators have been experimenting with forms of virtual and analogue student 
collaboration since at least the early 1980s, such as detailed and advocated for by Kenneth 
Bruffee (1984), William Wresch (1984), and Lester Faigley (1992) and championed yet again in 
the first decade of the 21st century by scholars such as by George Siemens (2005), Henry 
Jenkins (2009), and Cathy Davidson and David Theo Goldberg (2010). However, despite this 
strong and enduring endorsement, it was the first time I had been asked to engage in forms of 
virtual collaboration in my postsecondary education and I found the experience disorienting 
given the simultaneous hopes and anxieties it triggered. I was excited about the prospect of 
transforming the solitary activity of writing assignments for courses into an opportunity to 
exchange ideas with peers and potentially develop an intellectual community. And though wary 
of social media, it was enticing to consider how the experience and reach of academic activity 
might change if cultivated in a similar networked environment. Could such an environment, I 
wondered, give student writing more dignity and more purpose?  
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However, the lived experience of writing on these platforms fell somewhat far from these 
hopes. If writing for a single professor caused anxiety, writing for a class full of strangers could 
cause one to want to quit graduate education altogether. Part of the problem may have lay in the 
fact that I felt suddenly rushed into a new rhetorical situation in which I felt pressure not only to 
perform “learning” through my writing but to do so with all the likeability, expertise, personality, 
and confidence that seems necessary today for speaking publicly on a social media platform. 
Though the task of to extending classroom discussion in a virtual space may have seemed 
relatively straightforward, it in fact felt remarkably unclear exactly what one should say in such a 
space and how one should say it. There was no student public one could quietly observe in order 
to develop a sense of how to participate in a public student forum as student virtual spaces were 
popped up and then whisked away with the start and close of every term. The design and 
functionality of the virtual spaces themselves seemed in conflict with the real needs, practices, 
and sensitivities of student writing, adding further roadblocks to genuine and continuous 
engagement with others. And for numerous technical, institutional, and social reasons, none of 
the writing we posted really had the opportunity to develop a real community of readers in the 
same way that a tweet, Facebook post, or even Google Doc does.     
Nonetheless, despite the imperfection of these experiences, there were still moments in 
which the value of networked environments for student writing shone through. Reading the 
writing of other students gave me a glimpse of their intellectual interests that was not as visible 
in classroom discussion. Their writing provided the groundwork for connecting with them in real 
life while also enriched my sense of audience — or who I was writing for and why it might 
matter to individuals beyond myself. Baraka’s words echoed in my mind. why shd student 
writing depend on technologies that inhibit the cultivation and sustainability of student publics? 
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why shd cat memes and food pictures have digital infrastructure designed to enable their 
extravagant circulation, but the words that students spend thousands of dollars and hundreds of 
hours learning to produce remain largely unseen? What sort of writing tool might in fact allow a 
student public to flourish and how might such a public change the way students thought about 
the purpose and possibility of their writing? 
These questions might have withered on the vine but I was taking a course that required a 
proposal for a digital project and so I had the opportunity to develop the ideas in earnest. One 
thing led to another and I was soon writing a grant proposal with Urban Education graduate 
student Jennifer Stoops, English Professor Matthew K. Gold, and The CUNY Academic 
Commons development team for a National Endowment for the Humanities Digital Start-Up 
Grant. We were incredibly fortunate to receive the grant and spent two years developing Social 
Paper, a platform intended to provide a centralized space for students to network writing and 
feedback across terms, courses, and disciplines with granular privacy settings for every 
individual paper.  
While developing this tool, I became increasingly concerned about the rise of what 
Shoshana Zuboff calls “surveillance capitalism,” a form of capital accumulation where personal 
data is collected to “predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and 
market control” (Zuboff 2015 75). Though I found that many academics shared concern about 
the growing power of surveillance capitalism, we seemed helpless to reject its tools in our own 
knowledge making and communication practices. I became ever more curious about the 
depoliticization of writing technologies within the university and how they had come to be 
treated as neutral utilities. But why shd we blindly accept the writing technologies that we have 
been handed, I wondered, especially in an institution whose goal is to cultivate a critical 
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understanding of the world, including the technology that enables us to produce and share that 
understanding? I wrote a dissertation on university technology, education, and oppression, 
planning all along, of course, to publish the drafts on the tool whose development had sparked 
the dissertation’s genesis.  
2. In search with imperfect tools and imperfect words   
It turns out, however, that thirty thousand dollars, the generous amount we received from 
our grant, does not go far in terms of software development. While I’m proud of the tool we 
created and its step towards student-driven software, it became clear that it would not be able to 
compete with writing environments created by major digital companies and the frictionless user 
experience they offered. By the time I had my dissertation drafts ready, I was concerned that my 
plan to post them exclusively to Social Paper might sabotage my attempt to generate actual 
engagement with them. On one hand, I wanted to enact an example of what student writing on a 
student driven platform might look like, but on other hand, I also wanted to explore the 
possibility of creating community around one’s drafting process. Unfortunately, the two desires 
no longer seemed compatible. I revised my original plan and decided I would post drafts of 
dissertation and reflections on the process across a variety of platforms (including Social Paper) 
in an open, ongoing experiment. What types of engagement—if any—would I receive on 
different platforms? How would it affect my scholarship and academic experience? And would I 
regret being so open with the process? I wasn’t sure what to expect.  
In late February 2017, I posted a draft of the dissertation’s introduction to a public 
Google Doc and to the Social Paper platform and announced its presence on Twitter, Facebook, 
and in a few emails to friends and colleagues over the next few weeks. On the HASTAC blog, an 
open network that encourages academics to share their ideas, I wrote a short post announcing the 
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project as a “search of an evermore cooperative, influential, and self-directed student public.” 
Calling the experiment #SocialDiss, I asked: 
 
To what extent can the general public participate in and benefit from the production of a 
dissertation? How might the private and anxiety-ridden processes of education be 
transformed into a public good and social joy? Are the imperfect artifacts of learning to 
be hidden and disposed of as shameful waste, or might they provide fertile soil for the 
cultivation of a global learning community? Could the form of the dissertation itself 
blossom into something more vibrant and responsive to today’s world in the process? 
The draft of the introduction I posted was far from perfect, perhaps even cringe-worthy at times. 
But that was the point. I wanted to push against the crippling fear of being judged for imperfect 
writing and imperfect thoughts. Why should only perfect writers have publishing communities, 
especially when such perfection demands quantities of free time that are often unavailable to 
working Ph.D. students and candidates such as myself? What if we evaluated knowledge 
production not only by its content, but by the communities and social practices we built in the 
process? After writing much of the dissertation three thousand miles away from the academic 
community I developed in graduate school while working a full time job, it had come to feel like 
a barrier between myself and the living. Letting it see the light of day was a relief.   
Of course, given the scarcity of free time in academic life, I didn’t expect that anyone 
would donate their own small scraps of it to engage with my developing piece. To my surprise, 
however, many did. In the weeks that followed I received 125 comments on the draft 
introduction from eleven different individuals ranging from close colleagues and academic 
friends to individuals I had only briefly connected with over Twitter at prior conferences. In 
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addition, the project spawned multiple backchannel connections and encounters where folks 
opted to give me feedback over coffee or email or connected me with other scholars who kindly 
shared their perspective on my research area. Hundreds more clicked on links related to the 
project and even friends and family members outside of academia (with whom I rarely discussed 
my research) began to ask me about some of the topics I wrote about. The professional 
generosity I encountered during these weeks was humbling and kept my spirits afloat when other 
challenges made the dissertation journey feel almost impossible. And, for this first time in my 
graduate education, it felt like the hours of labor I privately spent doing research were at last a 
visible part of my identity.   
The engagement I received, however, was not only encouraging, but also intellectually 
invaluable. Altogether, the comments I received represented one of the most wide-ranging and 
in-depth conversations I’ve ever had about my dissertation topic and were loaded with 
information and perspective that simply could not be found in research alone. It was impossible, 
in fact, to digest the rich set of criticism, related anecdotes, conceptual suggestions, and text 
recommendations I received even in the first few weeks of #SocialDiss. Commenters offered 
everything from tips on my choice of language, personal experiences with computers and Usenet 
in higher education in the early 1980s, their reading notes posted on Github on the 
transformation of science as a pastime to a profession in the 19th and 20th century, the potential 
relevance of Derrida’s notion of “pro-gram,” and even jokes! One of the authors that I engaged 
with in the introduction urged me to think more carefully about my use of the cyborg concept 
while sharing criticisms of his own prior use of the term. There is even a two-part, nearly 1,000-
word comment thread debating the difference between “programming” and “scripting,” with a 
passionate discussion of the rather obscure Emacs text editor between folks that didn’t know 
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each other. Reading these comments was exhilarating—it was as if I discovered a secret volume 
of unknown texts on my dissertation subject.  
My commenters also gently pointed out grammatical errors, logical oversights, and 
places where the clarity of my writing could be improved. And while only a few years ago such 
exposure would have horrified me, I now found it relieving to see that such imperfections 
wouldn’t cause my community to discount or ignore my work. While their feedback did 
contribute to the unwanted realization that I needed to rewrite the introduction entirely, it also 
provided me with the sense of a real conversation that made this rewriting feel more purposeful. 
I rewrote many parts of the dissertation in more confidence and ease with their voices now 
ringing in my head.  
Over the next few months, I continued with the #SocialDiss experiment, posting drafts 
and links on Google Docs, Twitter, Facebook, Hypothes.is, Medium, the HASTAC website, the 
Modern Language Association’s Humanities Commons, CommentPress, Academia.edu, and my 
personal website. I often posted a draft in one place, wrote a short post about the draft (including 
a link to it) on another site (such as HASTAC), and then linked to the post on Facebook and 
Twitter with short introductions to the draft. Writing blog posts on websites invested in 
cultivating their community (such as HASTAC and the MLA Commons) drew considerable 
engagement as these organizations would promote my posts on their homepage and social media 
accounts. It also helped me practice describing my research in a variety of contexts while 
continuously asking myself why my research might matter to broader publics.   
As I suspected, I found that platforms, their functionalities, and their communities made a 
big difference on the tone, type, and amount of engagement my drafts and posts received. Drafts 
posted on Google Docs, for example, were far more likely to receive comments than any other 
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place I posted, and when I gave readers a choice between Google Docs and some other platform, 
a majority would choose the former. I continued to receive interesting surprises in Google Docs 
comments, such as uncannily useful feedback from as scholar I was previously unaware of 
(leading to my discovery of her very useful research) as well as occasional formatting or spacing 
corrections from unknown individuals, a friendly sign of their passing through. On Facebook, 
friends left deeply personal comments about forms of depression and isolation that accompanied 
their dissertation writing. A short Twitter essay that summarized a chapter and tagged scholars I 
cite in the chapter resulted in generative conversations with two of those scholars. The various 
results of different forms of engagement are too lengthy to fully describe here, but they have 
provided a very rich set of examples to draw on for making decisions about ongoing digital 
projects and making the case for community driven software in academia to various 
stakeholders.  
As an experiment, #SocialDiss was an attempt to see whether it was possible to generate 
community around student writing processes that have traditionally been private and at times 
even isolating. What I hoped to show is that networked forms of sharing writing and feedback 
can generate invaluable intellectual and social experiences when given the right opportunities, 
technologies, and communities of practice. While I think the project has successfully 
demonstrated this in many ways, my aim is not to suggest that all students should consider 
carrying out similar networked writing projects using the broad range of tools and practices that I 
employed. Rather, I want to use this experiment to point to what I think student writing could be 
if we developed tools, practices, and a culture of sharing that enabled students to share academic 
writing and feedback as easily as they share other types of content on social media. This is not to 
say that all student writing should be public—many parts of thinking and learning demand 
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privacy and sheltered spaces. Nor is it to say that we should naively embrace the logic of social 
media into our academic practices, such as seen with for profit academic platforms such 
Academia.edu and ResearchGate. During my search for an “evermore cooperative student 
public,” there were times I felt I was teetering all too close to what Gary Hall calls the 
“uberfication of the university,” a dystopian future where academics have to perform sociality 
with colleagues and others on social media to maintain a good reputation score. These concerns, 
however, shouldn’t cause us to disregard the valuable potential of networks for student writing. 
Nor should they convince us that the conventional word processor, a tool developed for office 
automation, is a more natural and neutral choice. It remains to be seen then what tools and what 
words might help us bring about a genuine student public. I hope that Social Paper and 
#SocialDiss can help contribute to our collective imagining of its possibility.  
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Appendix 1 
Description of Appendix Materials 
If not impossible, it would take an undue amount of time to neatly and accurately 
catalogue every aspect of #SocialDiss, a project in which I posted drafts and reflections 
related to my dissertation, chatted with colleagues and strangers alike about my 
dissertation’s topics, made new professional connections, and received an overwhelming 
amount of feedback using platforms and websites like Google Docs, Comment Press, 
Hypothesis, the Humanities Commons, Medium, the HASTAC website, Academia.edu, 
Twitter, Facebook, and Social Paper. However, given the importance of #SocialDiss to 
both the ideas and the formation of the dissertation, I think it is important to provide 
some record of its process even if incomplete and somewhat messy. The following 
documents represent a sample of some of the “posts” I created for #SocialDiss, which 
I’ve archived here by turning them into PDFs. While these PDFs often distort the visual 
and interactive features of the original posts, I hope they still help illustrate some of the 
key aspects of the process as well as demonstrate that there are still many exciting 
possibilities for open scholarship that have yet to be explored. 
Appendix 2 is a record of my first post on the HASTAC website announcing the 
#SocialDiss project. Appendix 3 is a record of the first draft I circulated publicly, the now 
discarded draft of the dissertation’s introduction, which I posted on Google Docs. 
Appendix 4 is a post on Medium that recounts my experience of sharing this draft. 
Appendix 5 is a post announcing the draft of what is now my first chapter. Appendix 6 is 
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a screen shot of a tweet related to a #SocialDiss post on Academia.edu. Though much is 
missing from this record, most conspicuously absent are the rich and highly personal 
interactions I had on Facebook as part of #SocialDiss, which I leave out here out of 
respect for participants’ privacy.   
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Software of the Oppressed: Reprogramming the Invisible Discipline 
An introduction to a dissertation in the English Department at The CUNY Graduate Center1
Erin Rose Glass, UC San Diego 
Feb 22, 2017 
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 “writer’s blur,” november 2016 
mechanical pencil, backside of previous draft, 
instagram filter x-pro ii, and iphone 5 
1I dedicate this draft to the networks that made it possible: the San Diego Digital Humanities network, especially Paul 
Evans, Maura Giles-Watson, Katherine Hijar, Pamella Lach, Jessica Pressman, and Stefan Tanaka, whose 
intellectual warmth provided the soil that enabled the ideas to grow; the NYCDH network, which got me started in the 
first place, especially Matthew K. Gold, who introduced me to the power of open source technology in higher 
education and gave me the opportunity to dig in; and the HASTAC network, which anticipated many of the ideas 
outlined here, especially Cathy Davidson, a visionary leader who ceaselessly models the ways in which academic 
activity can work to transform the world. I’d also like to thank Clinton Tolley for his extensive comments and 
conversations regarding this draft, and Amy Cimini, whose light gave me the courage to write it.  
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Introduction to the Dissertation:  
The Cyborg University as Reproductive Organ of the Cyborg World 
In December of 2015, I was part of a team at The CUNY Graduate Center that launched a 
beta version of Social Paper, a student-directed tool for networking writing. While the tool is 
not perfect, it is intended to mark a step forward for a student reclamation of the tools of 
knowledge production, in line with some of the values of the Free Software Foundation, 
Platform Cooperativism, Unlike Us, and scholarly networks such as the MLA Commons, 
Force 11, and HASTAC.   
The process of developing this tool spurred a dissertation on the historical development of the 
university’s reproductive role of our everyday software environment, as seen from the unlikely 
site of the humanities. The glitchiness of both text and tool are proudly demonstrated here as 
a political act whose joy will be further described below.  
Readers are free to read and comment where they like: here on Google Docs, on Social 
Paper (instructions), or through the Hypothes.is annotation overlay (thanks to Jared McCoy). 
1. The Perils of Seamless Integration
Software is in a state of crisis, which is to say, so is our freedom. A growing number of 
advocates, scholars, and commentators2 have pointed to the numerous and complicated ways 
that the so-called web of liberation has in fact been forged into what one of its most famous 
critics has deemed an “architecture of oppression.”3 Scholarly discussions centered on these 
issues, often emerging from fields such as new media studies, Internet studies, communication, 
political theory or legal studies, have made important contributions towards advancing our 
understanding of the multiple political, cultural, psychological, and social stakes of this rapidly 
2 Here or in subsequent sections of the dissertation I will draw from the critical work of media scholars, 
advocates, and commentators such as Yochai Benkler, Samir Chopra, Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, Scott 
Dexter, José van Dijck, Christian Fuchs, Alexander Galloway, Tarleton Gillespie, David Golumbia, Lilly 
Irani, Ganaele Langlois, Lawrence Lessig, Geert Lovink, Evgeny Morozov, Trebor Schulz, Richard 
Stallman, Astra Taylor, Siva Vaidhyanathan, and Audrey Watters. 
3 In an interview with Glenn Greenwald for the the Guardian, Edward Snowden referred to the 
infrastructure that enabled top secret data surveillance practices by the U.S. government as “architecture 
of oppression.” While the concept of software oppression I will develop in this analysis will expand beyond 
surveillance activities, Snowden’s revelation of its surveillance practices highlights one of its most salient 
and disturbing features. 
281
2 
Software freedom or convenience? Disciples of the former, please visit this text’s 
instance on Social Paper, see http://tiny.cc/SocialPaper. 
emerging and all-subsuming environment. Yet among this rich array of critical discussions there 
exists a startling blind spot. That is, there is simply very little attention to the way that the 
institution that supports these conversations—that is, the university4—has been a key 
contributor to the situation at hand from the very beginning. For if there is any single lesson that 
the university has universally and effectively instilled for nearly the past fifty years, across its 
disciplines and to nearly all of its faculty and students, it is the practical belief that software is a 
neutral utility, or a mere labor-saving device for the transmission and production of knowledge, 
and that in turn, the everyday user need not and cannot have an understanding and a say in the 
ways in which it mediates their individual and collective lives. In one sense, the lack of critical 
attention to this dynamic is testament to its utter and comprehensive success. If politics and 
economics have provided the motivating forces behind this architecture of oppression, it is the 
university that trained and still trains hundreds of thousands of members of the general public to 
passively accept it as an inevitable and inscrutable given. 
This training I call the invisible discipline, or rather the largely impalpable shaping of the user’s 
expectations, imagination, and behavior in regard to their engagement with software in their 
broad ongoing use of it, especially (in the case of our study) within an educational or scholarly 
context. My concept of the invisible discipline draws strongly from the Brazilian educator Paulo 
Freire’s 1968 text Pedagogy of the Oppressed, which famously argues that how we learn is 
often far more consequential than what we learn in that the conventions instrumentalized and 
adopted for carrying out the learning process shape our cognitive, social, and political habits 
going forward.5 In particular, Freire outlines how pedagogical approaches that emphasize the 
transmission of “expert” or “authoritative” knowledge from the teacher to the “empty” student, a 
style he calls the “banking model,” are oppressive in that they inhibit the development of 
capacities in the student to critically understand and transform their world according to their own 
needs, experiences, and interests. This banking model of education is carried out through a 
host of tools, practices, cultural conventions, popular beliefs, and organizational structures, 
which I will describe as the mechanisms of the banking model. From the perspective of 
proponents of this model of education, these mechanisms appear as neutral means of 
4 I use “university” to refer to the broad social phenomenon of institutions of higher learning dedicated to 
education and scholarship, which while certainly not monolithic, will be treated here as exhibiting certain 
common trends. 
5 As the composition scholar Kenneth Bruffee observes, “we tend to forget much of the subject matter of 
the courses we have taken … but we do not easily forget the conventions that govern those courses and 
the values implicit in them” (63). 
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transmitting knowledge as effectively and efficiently into the student population given the 
available resources, whether they pertain directly to the activities of teaching and learning, or to 
the broader institutional activities necessary for facilitating this teaching and learning. In their 
apparent neutrality, these mechanisms can be said to be largely invisible, in that they elude 
critical attention and transformation.  
Following Freire’s work, however, a generation of scholars and educators called attention to the 
dominance of the banking model within the U.S. system of higher education, and showed how 
even in its most trivial-seeming or incidental features—such as syllabi, textbooks, tests, seating 
arrangements, course content, academic culture, communication styles, institutional 
governance, the built environment, and so forth—all work in unique and sometimes surprising 
ways to inhibit critical thought and participatory initiative in students (Shor 1980, Giroux 1988, 
hooks 1994). These scholars insisted on evaluating the mechanisms of education not simply 
according to how they performed in carrying out the university’s internal goals of producing and 
transmitting knowledge, but rather how they functioned in the university’s broader but arguably 
more fundamental role of social reproduction. From the view of critical pedagogy, education 
should produce a liberated people capable of making their own knowledge, rather than an 
oppressed people, filled with authoritative knowledge but incapable of making their own.  
In what follows, I will argue that this critical mode of investigating the university’s social effects 
has become ever more pressing as the mechanisms of the banking model of education have 
reached a new level of complexity, durability, control, influence, and invisibility as part of the 
long, ongoing computational transformation of the university.  This critical mode of investigation 
however applies not only to the ways in which computation is implemented within teaching and 
learning (as is the focus in critical pedagogy), but also within the university’s broader activities of 
knowledge production and transmission such as pertaining to research, writing, publication, 
archiving, and communications, as well as teaching and learning.  
1.1 From the Cyborg World to the Cyborg University 
The computational transformation of the university might be best understood within the 
framework of the “cyborg world,” a term which Samir Chopra and Scott Dexter offer to describe 
the present existential situation “in which computer technology infiltrates all interactions with the 
physical world” (149). Submerged in this cyborg world, and, as I will demonstrate through the 
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course of this analysis, complicatedly involved in its production on multiple fronts, today’s 
university might just as well be called a “cyborg university,” as nearly all of its activities, such as 
managing courses, degree programs, students, employees, library collections, research data, 
and so forth, are mediated to some degree, if not thoroughly, by computer technology. We might 
then also call attention to its cyborg students, cyborg faculty, cyborg research, and cyborg 
homework, not to cast these elements in the dramatic light of science fiction, but to consider 
them as subjects and objects produced and mediated by the university’s cyborg structure. This 
transformation did not happen all at once, nor can it be said to be unified in vision, aims, 
techniques, or ever complete. Instead, this transformation has been occurring in piecemeal 
fashion, as external and internal pressures and opportunities incite different domains of the 
university to adopt new technologies, such as, for example, the library’s adoption and 
development of computer applications in the 1960s to deal with the new demands of the rapidly 
expanding university (Rayward 11), or the adoption and normalization of word processing 
software in the 1980s (Hawisher et al). These developments may be the result of formal 
institutional initiatives, such as in the former case, or influenced through the consumer behavior 
of its faculty and students, such as in the latter.  While it is common that a period of institutional 
and cultural irritation accompanies each site-specific cyborg transfusion, they can be judged 
successful to the degree that they fade back seamlessly and invisibly into the everyday and 
normal body of the university, though to be sure they leave scars and waste6 in their wake. 
From the perspective of critical pedagogy, we can make several interesting observations about 
the character and consequences of the university’s cyborg transformation. First, we can say that 
computation has in effect added an extra layer of invisibility to the already-largely invisible 
banking mechanisms of the university, given that computational technology in and of itself has 
long been perceived as neutral and natural (Chun).7 Thus, much like the mechanisms of Bruno 
Latour’s “black box,” computation merged invisibly with the already-existent and invisible 
banking mechanisms of the university, obscured from consciousness to the degree that they 
6 For example, Clifford Lynch observes that moving from one computational circulatory systems to 
another could be quite painful for libraries “as some libraries discovered that there was no way to get 
information out of the old system and into the new one and often had to run the two systems in parallel for 
a year or more” (62).  
7 As Wendy Chun has persuasively argued, computing technology has a long history of being viewed as 
neutral and natural which initially made it difficult for engineers to obtain patents for software they 
developed. In 1972, for example, the U.S. supreme court rejected a claim to patent an algorithm as 
“mathematical innovations should be treated like scientific truths and laws of nature, and scientific truths 
and laws of nature are unpatentable subject matter” (4). 
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efficiently enabled the university’s activities (304). In the university, software and the culture of 
software use, —for all activities pertaining to humanistic research, teaching, learning, and 
administrating (and often beyond the humanities as well, though the humanities will be the focus 
of this dissertation)—has become just this sort of invisible convention, internalized and 
normalized as one uses software primarily as a labor saving device for complex communicative 
activities that pertain not only to academics —such as the ability to rapidly access, manipulate, 
archive, and transmit texts, but also to sustaining the complex social organizations of a degree-
granting institution through email, websites, management systems, and so forth.   
Second, we can say that computation has added an extra layer of hierarchical control to the 
banking mechanisms of education, in that—as David Golumbia has persuasively 
demonstrated—the very communicability of computational technology is carried out through 
mechanisms of control. Computation in the cyborg university is predominantly (and durably, as I 
will explain later) organized around the institutional ability to manipulate both members (faculty, 
students, and staff) and information (books, data, publications, homework, test scores) as 
objects in carrying out its internal aims, rather than, as a means for carrying out social change 
through its intellectual activities, or, as in Seymour Papert’s vision, tools available for student 
modification and understanding. Third, just as mechanisms of education embody an ideological 
viewpoint about what is good, possible, and true, computational technology is also always 
designed according to some ideological viewpoint, wittingly or no. Fourth, in terms of social 
reproduction, just as banking mechanisms work to produce the passive subject who is incapable 
of critically understanding or transforming the world beyond the classroom, the computational 
banking mechanisms work to create the passive user incapable of critically understanding or 
transforming the cyborg world.  In effect, the banking model ideology and the computational 
ideology blend seamlessly to produce the passive user class necessary for enabling and 
supporting the dominant class of the cyborg world.  
2. Rethinking the Teaching of Writing, Its Technology, Its Practice
As I will later describe in more depth, the oppression of the passive user class represents a 
global political crisis of such gravity that an examination of the university is of value purely for its 
contribution to this crisis.  However, I have not introduced the university in this analysis simply 
Mark Marino  3/13/2017 1:39 PM
Comment [24]: Premature thought here: 
but did the roll book/grade ledger or 
campus mail previously serve such a role? 
Scott Dexter  3/13/2017 9:12 PM
Comment [25]: You might want also 
emphasize (as you do later) that while the 
"uncritical user" may have labor-saving in 
mind, there are plenty of managerial 
imperatives that are more nuanced than 
simple efficiency. 
Evan Misshula  3/6/2017 2:10 PM
Comment [26]: I would add hr websites 
which reinforce (manager/worker 
relationships). 
Evan Misshula  3/6/2017 2:12 PM
Comment [27]: The other product of 
universities is research...There is a whole 
infrastructure on that side...IRB and grant 
management 
Mark Marino  3/13/2017 1:40 PM
Comment [28]: and this will include 
library access to articles and books, rt? 
Patrick Smyth  3/8/2017 3:31 PM
Deleted: to
Scott Dexter  3/13/2017 9:19 PM
Comment [29]: is there a more 
optimistic word? incapable sorta makes it 
seem like this generation is lost. maybe it 
is? Is /ability/ more plastic than /capacity/? ... [7]
Mark Marino  3/13/2017 1:41 PM
Comment [30]: I have suspicions when I 
don't see the seams... 
Scott Dexter  3/13/2017 9:17 PM
Comment [31]: it would be good to have 
an understanding, at this point in the text, ... [8]
Garrison LeMasters  3/7/2017 7:01 AM
Comment [32]: Anyway, sorry to go:  
I've enjoyed this chance to look in on this ... [9]
Patrick Smyth  3/8/2017 3:33 PM
Comment [33]: In technical circles these 
passive users are known (sometimes ... [10]
Patrick Smyth  3/8/2017 4:03 PM
Comment [34]: You'll enjoy this (on the 
subject of end users): ... [11]
Mark Marino  3/13/2017 6:15 PM
Comment [35]: With possibility of other 
types right? 
Patrick Smyth  3/13/2017 6:35 PM
Comment [36]: In that ontology, it's 
really a dichotomy between "technical" and ... [12]
Mark Marino  3/13/2017 6:15 PM
Comment [37]: to addressing it, right?
285
 
6 
 
Software freedom or convenience? Disciples of the former, please visit this text’s 
instance on Social Paper, see http://tiny.cc/SocialPaper. 
              
due to its role in the crisis of the cyborg world, but rather on account of a crisis regarding its own 
internal aims and interests of institutionalizing and protecting society’s activities pertaining to 
knowledge production and transmission. I will argue that the crisis of the cyborg world is in fact 
deeply related to the university’s own internal crisis in the humanities that has been brought 
about by an academic ideology that stretches at least as far back as the late 19th century. This 
academic ideology subscribes to what I call the revelatory ideal, which views the use of writing 
to reveal truth as the chief good of academic activity whether as a student or a professional 
scholar.8  Under the revelatory ideal, writing is evaluated on account of the truth that it reveals 
rather than the effects it has in the world, both at an individual and collective level, and without 
adequate attention to its marginalized realities, which I will describe in more depth in Chapter 1. 
The revelatory ideal sustains a tradition of producing ideal texts (at both a scholarly and student 
level), or rather texts whose abstract perfection substitutes for their lack of genuine audience 
and genuine purpose. As a result of this blind spot, the content of humanistic academic 
production, whose producers are either too self-assured of its value or too caught up in jumping 
the hoops of academic advancement to attend to the labor of its reception, has either lost or 
failed to gain adequate esteem, attention, engagement, and support from both internal and 
external publics.9  In turn, this focus on the objects of academic production has led to a lack of 
critical attention to the ways adopted digital tools mediate academic activity and have broader 
social effects.  
 
In using these tools to carry out the narrow goals of textual production and transmission, the 
cyborg university widely propagates a passive regard for digital technology across its students, 
and unwittingly plays a key role in enabling the oppression of the cyborg world. However, this 
passive mentality can be resisted and overturned by reclaiming critical control of the 
technologies used to carry out scholarly production. One important example of this can be seen 
in Alex Gil’s advocacy for “minimal computing” in scholarly production as a means to replace 
proprietary digital technologies in scholarly production that pose a variety of problems to goals 
                                                
8 This curious combination of instrumentalization and idealization of academic writing has arguably 
enabled a self-defeating complacency with its impact and effects in the world. 
9 Consider studies that assert the fact the most scholarship goes unread or uncited (Meho, Bauerlein), 
and the prevalent discourses pertaining to the crisis in scholarly communications or the the death of the 
humanities.  
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of preservation and transmission.10  In later chapters we will look at still other models for 
resistance. 
2.1 The Middleware Mediating the University’s Intellectual Activity and Effects 
The computational layer of the cyborg university might be aptly thought of as middleware, a 
concept that Johanna Drucker and Patrik Svensson wonderfully introduce in their recent critical 
analysis of digital tools used for research, publication, and presentation within the digital 
humanities, but also often more broadly across fields and disciplines.11 They argue that 
scholars, often relying on types of middleware for “their ease or familiarity,” do not pay enough 
critical attention to the way that they also “imprint their format features on our thinking and 
predispose us to organize our thoughts and arguments in conformance with their structuring 
principles—often from the very beginning of a project’s conception.”  As a corrective, Drucker 
and Svensson argue that middleware needs to be critically examined for how it works in 
“structuring what can and cannot be expressed, presented, or argued in the enunciative 
system...of our projects.”  At stake in this engagement is whether it will be the scholar or the 
middleware that “thinks” and “argues,” and delivers its experience on the audience.  
Drucker and Svensson’s analysis lucidly articulates one of the most elusive features of our 
software experience, that is, that it does indeed have great influence on our subjective 
processes of thinking and communicating, but that once we’ve adopted a software convention it 
can be incredibly difficult to detect its influence and to imagine it another way.  They show how 
an individual scholar’s choices of tools, whether provided freely online (e.g. WordPress), paid 
for as part of a software package (e.g.Powerpoint), or provided by a university, either internally 
(e.g. the visualization screens at the HUMlab at Umeå University) or externally, as a public 
resource (e.g. Scalar, Omeka), all enforce a certain logic on the scholar’s argument and the 
experience of that argument which in itself deserves critical analysis.  While it can be difficult to 
fully appreciate the ways in which writing and publishing technologies mediate the possibility of 
the production and reception of thought, there are a number of scholarly discussions that have 
helped shed further light on this phenomenon. For example, in his delightful recovery of the 
history of word processing in literary production, Matthew Kirschenbaum points to plenty of 
10 See http://go-dh.github.io/mincomp/thoughts/2015/05/21/user-vs-learner. 
11 [REF] 
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examples of how writing tools can be shaped according to different styles of thinking, and 
likewise, as Nietzsche also famously noted a long time ago, have their own effect on the 
process and products of thought. Take for example the group of writing programs used by 
essayist and journalist John McPhee, which were customized by his friend Howard J. Strauss to 
"emulate the structures of [McPhee's] thought". Observing McPhee's drafting style, Strauss 
wrote the program Structur to "explode" individual notes into discrete files, and another, "Alpha," 
to consolidate those notes back into a single file for McPhee to easily arrange as desired. 
Kirschenbaum notes that McPhee's attention to the structure of his thinking parallels his interest 
in the interrelationships between built infrastructure and the natural world. He writes that the 
tools are "writing instruments created in a single author's image: to know the software is to know 
something of the mind of the writer, however obliquely” ("Forward"). 
 
I’d like to build on Drucker and Svensson’s analysis to think about the middleware of the cyborg 
university itself, or the very diverse range of computational tools that mediate the cyborg 
university’s activities both internally and externally.  Following their astute observation that 
middleware influences the subjective experience of producing or receiving intellectual 
arguments, I’d like to argue that it also significantly mediates the social life of the intellectual 
argument, or the ways in which it can be distributed across, instrumentalized by, and preserved 
for diverse publics within and beyond the university. Furthermore, I’d like to call attention to the 
fact that the dominance of certain forms of middleware in scholarly production is not merely due 
to a lack of criticality on the part of scholars who use them, but rooted in the social reality that 
there are very few resources, social and institutional mechanisms, and cultural incentives for 
long-term academic involvement in the very complex and resource intensive process of building 
the software of middleware. As evidenced by Kirschenbaum’s example of custom-designed 
software, only a very few individuals have access to the social and technical capital necessary 
for creating middleware that departs from mainstream norms.  
 
Thus, to follow Drucker and Svensson’s critical imperative to develop “better tools for sketching, 
thinking and composing for the humanities,” we will require not only increased critical attention, 
but a reconfiguration of the social organization of the resources and incentives that drive the 
production and dominance of middleware. To their assertion that the middleware of the 
scholar’s argument has a certain logic that structures what can and cannot be said, I will add 
that the middleware of the cyborg university structures its speech as a whole, both internally and 
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externally, ranging from scholarly communication within a discipline, to 
administrative/bureaucratic internal memoranda, to the ways that its diverse assortment of 
intellectual activity is spoken out into the world. I will also further argue that the logic of the 
cyborg university—from word processors to learning management systems—is predominantly 
shaped for individual and hierarchical evaluation of faculty and student progress, rather than the 
participatory production of knowledge for the public in the service of progressive goals for 
bringing about social justice. 
To be sure, the middleware of the university is not homogenous, as I already alluded, it is a 
Frankensteinian patchwork of computational tools, interfaces, and databases, each put in place 
to serve some particular institutional need with conflicting, overlapping, competing, and 
complementing qualities in respect to other computational tools making up this ecology. The 
middleware of the university of course extends well beyond tools that pertain directly to the 
speech of scholars, educators, and students, as it consists also of ways of managing the 
institution’s diverse operations, ranging from the management of library collections to the payroll 
of its employees. Nonetheless, the entirety of this middleware must be considered in any 
evaluation or intervention upon the middleware of academic speech, not only in that by 
sustaining the institution, it provides the conditions for that academic speech, but also in that it 
reflects the overarching logic that has produced the middleware specific to academic speech, 
such as described by Drucker and Svensson’s analysis. And part of that logic, as I keep 
repeating, is that users, in our case, students and faculty, need not participate in developing or 
governing these tools, which in turn, means that not only is our middleware largely immune to 
our modification, but that we lack the social structures, the resources, and the cultural mindset 
that would make this sort of transformative engagement with middleware part of academic 
practice.    
2.2 The new value dimension of reading and writing 
The university is already a prominent figure in most histories of computation, yet it typically 
appears in these histories only in respect to its contributions via computer science or 
engineering departments, whose faculty and, importantly, students played key roles in its 
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development.12  My analysis will attempt to provide a necessary complement to this important 
though more familiar part of the history, of computational development, by recovering mostly 
neglected parts of this history from the vantage of the humanities.   The humanities has more 
commonly been seen as, or perhaps more often implicitly assumed to be, primarily a beneficiary 
of digital technology rather than as a creative, contributing force to its development.  While there 
is much truth in the assumption that humanistic activity within higher education has not directly 
participated in technological development of large scale significance, one cannot discount the 
fact that its ongoing incorporation and implementation of technologies has in effect helped 
condition the consumer group that made its development possible. More specifically, I will 
argue, first, that the passive adoption of labor-saving computational tools for reading and writing 
within the humanistic sphere helped establish (or at the very least failed to intervene upon) the 
oppression of the cyborg world.  Secondly, I will argue that the more recent arrival of ubiquitous 
data surveillance and the platformization of the web, two topics I will describe in further depth 
below, has further complicated the situation in that practices of reading and writing not only 
invisibly discipline the user behavior to passively accept the technological given, but also 
directly profit and gain intelligence from the reading and writing of users, and so further 
disadvantage the user both economically and politically. Through these practices reading and 
writing can be said to have acquired a new value dimension, one that is alienated from the 
reader or writer herself, and further contributes to the wealth and power of the cyborg 
oppressors.  
 
Thus, the dominant form of middleware not only constrains the possible public diffusion of 
university's intellectual activity, but also helps sustain the oppression of the cyborg world, by 
reproducing broadly among students, and thus the public at large, a passive and dominated 
mentality towards computational tools, as well as generating value for the cyborg oppressors 
through the use of their tools.  Whereas the history of the university’s contributions to the 
                                                
12 For example, see Paul Ceruzzi’s History of Modern Computing, which details not only direct university 
contributions (such as the development of the ENIAC, which “inaugurated the era of digital computing in 
the United States” at University of Pennsylvania(15)) but also the ongoing influence of computer science 
researchers and students on subsequent developments in computing, such as in improving software 
languages (104), or (students) writing programs for the purpose of teaching programming that would have 
further significance (203-204). In many respects, students and researchers had a much more 
“participatory role” in their use of software, but this openness in certain respects was also increasingly 
constrained by the privatization of software, as detailed by Richard Stallman, as well Chopra and Dexter 
(see below).   
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development of computing technology is well acknowledged, there is virtually no discussion 
about its contribution to the culture of use surrounding that technology, even though it is 
arguably just as significant.13 For one, higher education represents significant consumer and 
business markets that contribute to the immediate wealth and flourishing of technology 
companies. For another, higher education also represents a site to train tomorrow’s consumer 
market, in that students will potentially develop consumer tastes they will carry with them as 
they enter the workforce, and potentially sites of professional influence where their consumer 
tastes may help expand the consumer market.14 It is also important to note that they represent 
coherent, organizable, social bodies, that at the right moment, can provide the necessary seed 
community to grow a broader digital network, such as exhibited with Usenet and Facebook, as I 
will show shortly. What happens in the university, therefore, anticipates the broader culture of 
software use, arguably not only in the U.S. but in some respects globally, given the fact that 
U.S. digital companies dominate the global market in a phenomenon that media scholar Dal 
Yong Jin refers to as “platform imperialism.”  My own focus, however, will be almost exclusively 
on conditions in the States itself.  A significant and untold part of the tale in our own country is 
one of how the university directly contributed to shaping a U.S. public that came to passively 
adopt digital technologies within their everyday lives and why we continue to complacently 
surrender our freedom and privacy in exchange for its use.  
 
3 Participatory Oppression: The Political Stakes of the Cyborg World  
I have talked a great deal about the university’s corroborating and -- given its language of 
empowerment and advancement, strikingly self-defeating -- role in making possible the current 
state of oppression present in the cyborg world, but I have not yet described the specific political 
stakes of that oppression. For some, my emphasis on oppression might come as a surprise, 
                                                
13 I am still looking for histories related to the marketing and sales of computing technology to higher 
education, rather than literature pertaining to their “transformative” effect. It seems one could be cobbled 
together from the brief asides in this latter literature, that task will have to wait for now.  
14 I speculate this is one of the reasons that digital technology companies have long been eager to 
capture educational markets, often in acts of gifting or philanthropy (a tactic I will explore in Chapter 5), 
ranging from hardware to cloud services. For example, Apple’s Education website currently leads with the 
text: “Apple has joined President Obama’s ConnectED initiative and pledged $100 million of teaching and 
learning solutions to 114 underserved schools across the country. We’re donating an iPad to every 
student, a Mac and iPad to every teacher, and an Apple TV to every classroom. And we’re implementing 
a process that provides planning, professional learning, and ongoing guidance so every school can 
experience the transformational power of technology” (“Education”).  
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since many of the salient issues currently discussed in the critical scholarly literature pertaining 
to the web and digital technologies largely point in the direction of seeing these new 
technologies as providing more and more liberatory and democratic affordances. As is well 
known, waves of technological innovation that have enhanced the connectivity of the cyborg 
world (in both reach and responsivity) have been championed by scholars and advocates as 
democratizing in that they enable more individuals than ever before to create, share, and 
discover information and cultural goods with a global public.15 Through its complex emerging 
modes of networking users and organizing labor, the cyborg world has leveraged individual 
interest, expression, and intellectual activity for the production of political movements,16 vibrant 
interest groups,17 highly-complex technical projects,18 public knowledge resources, as well 
created new cultural forms and practices such as exemplified by blogs, social media platforms, 
wikis, memes, and so forth.19 In contrast to cultures arising out of industrial conditions in which 
only an elite few have access to the means of producing and transmitting knowledge and 
cultural goods, scholars have described the networked cyborg culture as participatory in that all 
members of society, in principle, have the chance to participate in the production of culture.  
What I want to begin to explore now is the extent to which this optimism is misplaced. 
3.1 Critical Perspectives on Participation in the Cyborg World 
While there is much to be excited about regarding the expanding participatory modalities of the 
cyborg world, their present configuration also presents significant concerns. As an increasing 
number of critics have recognized and sought to bring to the attention of the wider public, the 
capabilities of the emerging software to all but silently track, predict, and influence political, 
social, and consumer behavior—while at the same time putting up almost insurmountable 
roadblocks to the ‘telecommunication’ of this ‘information’ back to the very users that are 
producing it—points up the sharp limits to the sort of participatory culture.  What is more, the 
                                                
15 For example, Yochai Benkler, Howard Rheingold, Henry Jenkins.  
16 Such as Black Lives Matter, Occupy, the Egyptian Revolution of 2011,Obama’s campaign, the 
Women’s March, also Vanessa’s piece.  
17 For example, see Hellekson (2006) on online fan fiction and fan communities, Johnson 2010 or 
Boellstorff (2015) on the online gaming community Second Life, and Song (2009) for a case study of 30 
online communities.  
18 "Examples of FLOSS [Free/Libre and Open Source] development projects are found in the social 
worlds that surround computer game development; X-ray astronomy and deep space imaging; academic 
software design research; business software development; and Internet/Web infrastructure” (Elliot and 
Scacchi).  
19 For example, Varis et al draw attention to development of memes, virality, and new social structures 
made possible through social media (2015).  
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cloistered existence and private-corporate possession of such information itself represents a 
threat to a democratic society of unprecedented significance and have already enabled deeply 
disconcerting practices on the part of both corporations and governments. In particular, scholars 
and advocates have drawn attention to the ways they enable corporate and state actors to 
surveil users (Mackinnon 2012, van Dijck 2014, 2013, Lyon 2014, Cohen 2016), enact 
censorship (Fuchs and Sandoval), exploit the labor of digital workers (Scholz 2016, Irani 2010, 
2015, Fuchs 2014), manipulate or control user behavior (Cheney-Lippold 2011, Lessig 2006, 
Galloway 2006), infringe upon software freedom (Stallman), algorithmically control circulation of 
information (Gillespie 2014) shutdown services to control political unrest (MacKinnon 2012), 
inadequately suppress abusive activity (Burges et al 2015), and so forth. Many of these issues 
are not a reflection of the essential character of participatory culture or networked technology in 
and of itself, but are in fact are rooted in the capitalistic nature of the platforms used to carry 
them out, and their complex alliances or relationships with government entities (van Dijck 2014). 
What may appear as the progressive drive to better connect and rationalize all spheres of 
human activity is in fact economically driven by corporate interest in colonizing and extracting 
value from ever deeper frontiers of everyday life (Fuchs 2013, 2015).  
 
The general, almost ‘common’ sense that these networked technologies have profoundly 
contributed to the increasing democratization of information and communication channels in so 
many spheres of life—such as politics, education, and cultural production—has made it 
supremely difficult to simultaneously take seriously their oppressive characteristics. However, 
even when these characteristics are recognized, there is little that users can do to directly 
change these features of the networked technologies, given that many dominant forms of 
software are what free software advocate Richard Stallman calls “nonfree,”  in that it is 
specifically designed to prohibit users from viewing or modifying the code, which, among 
numerous effects, inhibits the development of social structures that would allow for collaborative 
modification. In the attempt to protect and promote its interests, software companies implement 
this prohibitive design feature in their software, which then insulates the code, and thus also the 
company’s aims and mechanisms, from public understanding, political debate, and direct 
intervention. This fact reveals a critical limitation in what has otherwise been seen thus far to 
contribute to a more participatory culture -- that is, whatever new participation computing 
technology has enabled, it must be understood as essentially a participation largely 
Scott Dexter  3/13/2017 9:34 PM
Comment [66]: I've lost the antecedent. 
Scott Dexter  3/13/2017 9:35 PM
Comment [67]: users' 
293
 
14 
 
Software freedom or convenience? Disciples of the former, please visit this text’s 
instance on Social Paper, see http://tiny.cc/SocialPaper. 
              
circumscribed to the realm of the joint production of communicative objects rather than joint 
construction and governance of communicative systems themselves. 
 
I will argue that this restriction or prohibition has not only enabled the political issues described 
above to continue to advance unchecked, but has also continually worked to reinforce the 
invisible discipline I referred to in my prior section in the production of the passive user, who is 
unable to both critically understand and transform the oppressive conditions of the cyborg world. 
The invisible discipline is thus oppressive in that it teaches the user a slavish dependency 
towards software and its makers. The fact that a majority of dominant forms of software are 
specifically designed to inhibit the ability of a  user or a user community to study or modify the 
code, has arguably contributed to the suppression of broad computational literacy in the public. 
Public acquiescence to this denial has doubtlessly been supported by the widespread 
misunderstanding that coding is the privileged occupation of geniuses, hackers, and geeks, and 
is thus far beyond the capabilities of the everyday user. This is not to say that everyone might 
be an expert programmer or individually understand and modify the software programs they 
use, but rather that the extreme dichotomy between coder and non coder has been socially and 
technically reinforced. That is, the helplessness of the everyday user, and the great gulf 
between themselves and the makers of their software, reinforces a passive relationship towards 
software in that they don’t actively imagine the possibility of participating in its development to 
better suit their needs and values.  
 
The invisible discipline however is also oppressive in the way that it divorces in users’ 
understanding the ways in which their everyday communicative activity supports and enables 
the ‘architecture of oppression,’ which in turn shapes their everyday communication and 
communities. So long as our attention remains fixed on the superficial “freedom” to produce  
‘explicit’ objects of communication and intellectual activity that are conveyed through such 
software (e.g. tweets, emails, posts, ‘open-access’ articles and books, etc), we remain 
incognizant or only dimly concerned about the manifold ways in which our use of software 
shapes not just these communicated contents themselves (via, e.g., the functionality written into 
the ‘closed-access’ code of content management systems themselves), our interactions with the 
powers responsible for constructing, administering, and monitoring the uses of these programs, 
and more generally, our communities, communication, behavior, and thought, and, finally, in 
fact, continues to contribute to the dominance of nonfree software at a global scale.  
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Regrettably, however, when these aspects of software are acknowledged, they are often viewed 
as unfortunate but comparatively trivial costs of a more connected and convenient world—or at 
least we can assume as much by the lack of a popular rejection of nonfree software. Yet as 
software continues to collect and influence ever more granular aspects of the behavior of the 
global population, its political stakes rise to unspeakable heights.  
 
4 The Stubborn Blindspot of the Cyborg Scholar 
4.1 The Logic of Naturalization of the Cyborg University’s Prosthetics  
Given the rapid growth and diversification of critical scholarship devoted to exploring the web 
and networked technologies, along with the ever rising pleas ushered forth by advocates of 
software freedom and digital activism at large,20 it is somewhat startling to see the lack of 
serious attention to the sizeable and influential role the university in particular plays in this 
reproductive cycle, not least  with respect to the humanities, and other non-computational fields 
that contribute significantly to the culture of software use.21  And yet, for a variety of reasons that 
I will describe here, it is also completely logical. For one, in terms of scholarship, the invisible 
discipline is not really just something out there for objective critical analysis, but rather is the 
very mode in which the university and humanities have lived and moved and had their very 
being: the production and transmission of learning, scholarship, and other academic-critical 
analyses has been plunged into this emerging technological ecosystem since at least the 1980s 
with the arrival of word processing, though arguably longer given the adoption of computer 
technology by university libraries in the 1960s and 70s.  What is more,as I will argue at length 
later in this dissertation (and more directly introduce in a moment), this specific form of discipline 
via technology itself marks a continuation of a more deeply rooted academic ideology that 
existed long before the arrival of computing technologies -- namely, an ideology which sees 
                                                
20 Related advocacy groups and informal initiatives include the Free Software Foundation, Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, the Cooperative Platform movement, the Library Freedom Project, and the Unlike Us 
network.  
21 Chopra and Dexter given an invaluable critical analysis of how the field of computer science contributes 
to an oppressive software world. As already discussed, my analysis is concerned with the culture of 
computer use in academic fields that use computers primarily as a utility for teaching and scholarship, 
rather than as a tool to which they contribute. 
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pedagogy, writing, and research as subservient most directly to what I will call the ‘revelatory 
ideal’.  
 
The invisible discipline therefore is thoroughly infused within our processes and imagination of 
all aspects of scholarly activity, and there are a variety of formidable cultural and technical 
barriers that make recognizing (and especially transforming) its ubiquitous presence almost 
impossible. For example, as Drucker and Svensson’s concept of “middleware” tries to repair, it 
is hard for many of us to imagine how not only the influence, but the content of scholarly 
discourse itself, might look radically different if generated through a different software 
environment and culture.22  
 
This is not to say however that the cyborg transfusions and transplants of the university entered 
invisibly or without politics or irritation. One of the aims of this dissertation is to begin to 
historically articulate the different waves of computation inflecting the university’s humanistic 
activities pertaining to research, teaching, and learning—that is, instructional technology, 
computers and composition, digital humanities/humanities computing, and digital learning—and 
to describe their different ideological, economic, and organizational structures, which I will 
argue, have not been adequately considered as a whole. As I will show, each of the waves I 
describe involved an enormous amount of energy, resources, and professional passion, and 
each came with its own set of internal and external controversies and challenges. For example, 
in the late 1970s and through the decade of the 1980s, early practitioners in the little known field 
of computers and composition took enormous pains in gaining access, resources, and validation 
for computer-engaged work during a period when computers were rarely available outside 
computer science and engineering departments and even activities such as word processing 
required significant technical skill. What is more, as their efforts became more complicatedly 
entangled or confused with corporate educational software initiatives, scholars concerned with 
preserving the tradition or dignity of humanistic education launched fierce critiques on the 
                                                
22 Of course, some pioneering scholars and organizations are exploring new possibilities for scholarship 
and teaching by adopting and advocating for practices manifest on social media platforms, online forums, 
and Wikipedia. For example, the Modern Language Association (specifically its MLA Commons initiative), 
HASTAC (Humanities, Arts, Science and Technology Alliance and Collaboratory), Mozilla Science, 
Force 11, and a variety of open access initiatives, have been thinking through and creating new 
infrastructure and cultural practices for scholarly communication. Arguably, however, we still have yet to 
see or even imagine the full potential of these initiatives.   
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appearance of technology in the classroom, foreshadowing today’s current debates by more 
than three decades.  
 
In an ironic twist, the lack of sufficient support for these critical and creative investigations of 
computational technology in humanistic spaces enabled its ready absorption into the banal, 
non-participatory, and seemingly neutral infrastructure of the university. Today’s ubiquity of the 
computer and nonfree software in humanistic education and scholarly research attests to the 
fact that its victory in these spaces has been thorough and complete. As Edward Ayers, then a 
dean and history professor at the University of Virginia, observed in 2004, “Very real 
technological accomplishments have tended to become invisible because they have been so 
successful” (50).  Even today’s harshest critics of digital technology in humanistic education rely 
on a multitude of software systems (such as word processing, online communication, database 
research, and so forth) in order to produce and circulate their critiques. 
 
What is interesting about this situation is that over time certain aspects of computing technology 
become so naturalized, and so invisibly absorbed into our everyday technological engagement, 
that the idea of exploiting computers in higher education and scholarship continues to sound 
novel. This dynamic has led to the curious situation where the use of words like “computing,” 
“digital,” and “networks” in regards to humanistic research and education rhetorically work to 
signify something radically innovative and sometimes vaguely threatening even though all three 
of these things have had a significant presence in humanistic spaces since the 1980s, or in 
some cases, long before.  
 
More importantly, however, as I have just anticipated a moment ago, I will argue that this 
seamless passage into invisibility of computers is itself rooted in a deeper convention of 
academic culture that is prior to digital technology. That is, software became invisible in 
humanistic spaces where it successfully merged with an academic ideology that posited 
individual evaluation of the student as the chief aim of education, and the authoritative 
revelation of individually-produced truth (regardless of its audience or impact) as the chief aim of 
scholarship.  This deeper convention that directly contributes to the success of the integration of 
computing practices into the humanities is what I call the commitment to the ‘revelatory ideal’ 
concerning academic writing, research, and communication. 
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In themselves, this sort of academic ideal may seem altogether reasonable, but, as I will show 
below, once they are absolutized, they also present profound limits on conceiving of and 
directing the ways in which academic activity both directly and indirectly shapes the world. For 
our story, embrace of this academic ideology led to the widespread humanistic adoption of 
computing technology as a labor saving device for the traditional academic practices of 
individually producing, circulating, evaluating, and researching texts. However much this 
technology opened up possibility for academic practices, it also dramatically reinscribed an 
idealistic individualistic understanding of the production of knowledge in the academy as 
primarily a matter of revealing and archiving facts.  
 
Today, these reinscribing digital processes of humanistic activity are so normalized that it is 
enormously difficult to imagine them any other way. Their entrenchment is due to the 
interrelated facts that the software used to carry out these practices did not enable user 
modification, lacked technical and social arrangements to allow for community oversight and 
modification, and that such sort of an engagement was seen beyond the interest and capability 
of those using the computer for humanistic purposes—in short, that the academy (especially the 
humanities) did not relate to the production and development of software as itself a ‘higher’ form 
of knowledge-production (often likening it to the use of other utilities, to keeping the lights on, so 
real research can go forward).23 In this perfect marriage between an academic ideology and 
software use, an invisible discipline was forged within educational practices themselves.  
 
The seamless pairing obscured from view the complex ways even the most banal seeming 
software mediates and influences individual and collective intellectual and communicative 
activities. Internally speaking, we might say this invisible discipline simply helped preserve 
higher education’s traditional assumptions and practices about knowledge production.  More 
broadly speaking, however, this integration of digital and software discipline into educational 
practice provided the mass training grounds for the acculturation of the passive software user.  
While certainly not all software users have received college education—especially today given 
the increased availability of computers—it is apparent that the computer industry has long 
                                                
23 There is a general economic view that the invisibility of Information Technology marks its maturity in 
that, like with other general mature forms of communication and transportation infrastructure, it has 
become so cheap, standardized, and commonplace, that it no longer makes sense for companies to 
direct their own IT. See Nicholas Carr’s widely-cited 2003 article “IT Doesn’t Matter.”  
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recognized students, in both secondary and higher education, as critical consumer groups in the 
computer market. 
4.2 Student Writing, or the Waste Product of the Labor of Learning 
One especially striking manifestation of the university’s reproductive role in cyborg oppression 
can be found in the teaching and instrumentalization of student writing, a site that, perhaps even 
more so than software studies itself, has long been beneath the interest of “serious” scholars 
and the technical elite alike. In fact, as I will show in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, there is an 
especially vocal and longstanding disdain or lack of respect for student writing, as well as a 
stigmatization of the field that specifically teaches it, which have emerged in part from the field’s 
perennial and pernicious labor issues.24  For the past century, composition instruction has often 
relied on the labor of those whom have been repeatedly described as the ”hapless bottom 
feeders” of the university, caught in the contradictory web of teaching writing in the hope of 
obtaining the more respected, and better compensated, though extraordinarily rare research 
position that will in fact only be gained through publication that their teaching commitments 
makes extremely difficult to achieve (Connors Writing 172).25 What is more, as is also well noted 
by scholars in the field, the labor of writing instruction is largely feminized,26  and is perceived as 
of interest only to its service workers, rather than to serious scholars.  Additionally, as 
addressed and beautifully reframed by Elizabeth Losh’s War on Learning, even the 
conversations which do occur within institutions pertaining to student use of technology are 
often focused on the threatening appearance of new forms of digital technology, rather than the 
                                                
24 In contrast to the normalized view that the “amatuer” writing of students lacks value, consider the 
significance Ira Shor grants the student “voice” as an instrument able to resist mass culture (Critical 108) 
as well as design liberating alternatives to their oppressive environment (179). Throughout Shor’s work is 
the underlying sense that student’s voice is not only capable, but in fact a necessary component, of broad 
social change towards justice. The concepts of critical pedagogy conveyed in his work and the work of 
Paolo Freire, provide the underlying motivation of this dissertation.  
25 Composition historian Connors describes that the rhetoric instructor of 1900 was much like the one 
today: "Instead of being an esteemed intellectual figure in community and campus, the rhetoric teacher of 
1900 is increasingly marginalized, overworked, and ill-paid. Instead of being a senior professor, he, or 
she, is an instructor or graduate student. Instead of being sought by students, rhetoric courses are 
despised and sneered at, and their teachers have fallen from the empyrean of named chairs to the status 
of permanent underclass "composition teachers": oppressed, badly paid, ill-used, and secretly despised” 
(“Overwork/Underpay” 108).  
26 There is rich body of scholarship regarding the”feminization” of writing instruction, comparing it at times 
to “prostitution” or “housework” (Holbrook 2009, Laeur 1995, Schell 1992).  
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politics of the ways in which student activity has long been immersed and mediated by in digital 
practices.  
Ironically, however, while being continuously disregarded by cyborg scholars, there are many 
signs that student writing, as part of a broader ecology of “student data,” is becoming 
recognized as significant asset by digital technology companies and economists, with one report 
arguing that it could generate between $900 billion and $1.2 trillion dollars year (Manyika et al). 
Though there are still technical and legal barriers towards creating this economic possibility, 
educational companies such as the plagiarism detection company Turnitin and learning 
management systems like Blackboard use student data to generate insights about student 
behavior, further develop new and existing products, and increase their intellectual capital. 
Additionally, the student use of platforms that rely on user data for their main source of revenue, 
such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter, are also arguably illustrations of ways that student 
writing is being increasingly recognized as having raw value, though in a way that is alien to the 
students’ interest. 
4.3 Aversive Cultures: Science and the Humanities, IT and Academics, Geeks and 
Technophobes 
A number of cultural faultlines within the cyborg university also have worked systematically to 
inhibit critical reflection on the reproductive role of the cyborg university’s technological 
practices. These fault lines might all be seen as stemming from the broader “two culture” 
problem described by C.P. Snow in 1959, which refers to the mutual lack of understanding and 
interest between the sciences and the humanities that is arguably as relevant and institutionally 
reinforced today as it was when Snow first observed it. I won’t speculate here on the origins of 
this divide, but it is worth noting the various ways the adversity between these two cultures have 
been described, both within academics and in popular culture. Historians of the field 
composition, for example, describe how compositionists encountered hostile resistance when 
they tried to use university computing equipment in the 1980s by those who thought writing was 
too insignificant an activity to waste precious computing time on.27  Laurel A. Sutton has also 
drawn attention to the ways in which online communities during the same time period exhibited 
hostile communicative practices meant to silence differing perspectives, often along gender 
lines. Today, in popular computing communities, we might find similar types of exclusionary or 
27 Hawisher et al, p. 108. 
Paul Evans  3/1/2017 9:39 PM
Comment [86]: Again, I don't claim my 
experience was typical, but I had a full 
professor (Stan Chodorow, now emeritus) 
who was intensely concerned with my 
writing, and who made sure I had access 
to the right computer resources, 
supervising my undergrad senior thesis in 
1982-83. It's a very powerful combination if 
you have the opportunity. 
Paul Evans  3/1/2017 9:47 PM
Comment [87]: Re: writing instruction as 
feminine, I'd point out that at least in 
Silicon Valley, IT itself came to be 
gendered in some ways as feminine -- 
there were more women in IT than in 
Engineering (although by no means a 
majority), it was viewed by Engineering as 
a service function, and it eventually 
acquired an affective labor dimension. 
Scott Dexter  3/13/2017 9:39 PM
Comment [88]: this sounds like 
something that should be defined. 
Evan Misshula  3/6/2017 2:44 PM
Comment [89]: and downright 
antithetical to their interests 
Patrick Smyth  3/8/2017 4:40 PM
Comment [90]: There's some good 
literature on this if you want to dig in a bit, 
perhaps in another chapter. This was a 
transformation that took place between the 
late 19th and early 20th century with the 
movement of science from a gentlemanly 
pastime to a profession. Here's my notes 
on three books that cover this pretty well: 
https://github.com/smythp/orals/blob/mast
er/notes/victorian.org#relationship-
between-literature-and-science 
Alex Gil  4/11/2017 1:37 AM
Comment [91]: For this historical bit, if 
you will do it, I also highly recommend the 
work of Chad Wellmon on the German 
university model 
300
 
21 
 
Software freedom or convenience? Disciples of the former, please visit this text’s 
instance on Social Paper, see http://tiny.cc/SocialPaper. 
              
elitist characteristics, such as manifest in bullying and sexual harassment,28 gender and racial 
bias,29 and general hostility,30 which needless to say doesn’t do anything to welcome social or 
pragmatic interactions with less-technically skilled communities, such as those that constitute 
the humanities. One might even detect the faintest whiff of hubris in discourses pertaining to 
one of computation’s more recent darlings—big data science—as if the ability to visualize 
massive data sets equips its practitioners with an intellectual omnipotence that transcends 
entirely the perceived primitivity of humanistic consideration. 
 
On the other hand, another scholar of composition studies, Michael Knievel, has drawn attention 
to the long tradition of distaste for science and technology on the part of humanists, and the fact 
that the humanities often defines itself as a “counter-movement to the rise of science and 
technology,” especially as a means of professional self preservation (94) -- perhaps hoping to 
find funding life-rafts by making their work more legible to science award granting institutions, in 
the face of worries about increasing scarcity of resources allotted to more ‘traditional’ 
humanities research. Without pointing fingers at who or what is to blame for this divide, we 
might safely say that at the very least the disinterest is mutual, and additionally, extends beyond 
simply the formal disciplines themselves, but into broader cultural affiliations, such as between 
academics, and campus organizational units that deal with information technology.  As Ayers 
notes, there are “deeply entrenched habits of thoughts and behavior” that work to keep these 
cultures distant: 
 
The problem is that the academic culture and the IT culture simply do not mix together 
well. [...]On the other hand, as someone who has served on IT committees dominated by 
IT staff, I know how IT people speak about academics. I’ve seen the eyerolling and 
heard the chuckling at some of the more clueless of my academic colleagues who can’t 
figure out how to empty the trashbin on their desktop computer. Still, my friends in 
                                                
28 Gamergate is a famous example. See Massanari 2015.  
29 A fascinating study shows that women’s software contributions are generally accepted more than 
men’s, but only when they are not identified as women (Terrell 2016). For racial bias in technoculture, see 
Massanari 2015.  
30Joseph Reagle for example argues “(a) some geek identities can be narrow and unappealing; (b) open 
communities are especially susceptible to difficult people; and, (c) the ideas of freedom and openness 
can be used to dismiss concerns and rationalize the gender gap as a matter of preference and choice” 
(“Free”). For one example of this, we can turn to a blog post that details the hostility on one programming 
forum, Stack Exchange, which not only points out numerous examples, but received more than 60 
comments from sympathetic readers who relate many of their own negative experiences (Schreiber).  
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information technology have their own struggles. You know the stereotypes. You’ve 
heard the whispers: “geek.” As for me, I represent the worst of all worlds: I’m both a 
lifelong academic and a longtime IT geek. But perhaps this does give me the credentials 
to delve into the nomenclature of both the academic culture and the IT culture. (51-52) 
 
Ayers’ argues that academic and IT culture have “so much to offer each other,” if they would 
only “look past the tweed and elbow patches on the one hand and the pocket protectors on the 
other” (52). Arguably, however, two cultures problem isn’t simply bound up in cultural preference 
that needs to be socially overcome but is in fact entangled in various issues regarding the 
economic and political conditions of the emergence and preservation of each professional class. 
For example, resistance to IT on the part of academics can be bound up with the economic and 
institutional threats that technology often represents,31 and I would imagine, alternately, 
resistance to academics on the part of IT could be in part due to the seemingly “free” life of the 
academic who often does not have to spend 9 to 5 in an office, does not report directly to a 
manager, travels widely, and is promoted on the basis of producing “critical” and “independent” 
work rather than serving others.  
 
Regardless of the underlying reason, and even considering important advances made within the 
fields of digital humanities and digital learning, collaboration between these adverse cultures is 
still relatively rare. Thus, given the already-marginalized status of student writing within the 
humanities, collaboration across these cultures for the purpose of student writing in particular is 
nearly non-existent. The few collaborations established between computer science labs and 
departments and arts and humanities departments have been predominantly related to the work 
of academic research (largely in service of text mining and analysis, data visualization, etc), 
rather than the intangible labor of teaching writing.  The technology and digital activities relevant 
to writing instruction are seen as more appropriately in the purview of  the domestic duty of IT, 
educational technology, or other campus service entities. As a result, technological innovation in 
the field of writing instruction often relies wholly on commercial tools designed outside the 
university altogether, tools which are at base for economic rather than educational interests.  
What is more, whether access to these services is ultimately provided by the university (such as 
learning management systems), or available ‘freely’ online (such as Google, Twitter or Genius), 
                                                
31 For example, in 1997, full-time faculty of York University carried out a two-month strike in response to 
“administrative initiatives in the implementation of instructional technology” (Noble).  
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most of these commercial tools subject the student to predatory dataveillance practices, and 
even more importantly, prohibit student participation in the development and governance of the 
tools. Thus, Ira Shor’s observation that “schooling is a device through which a corporate society 
reproduces its class-based order” (2) can be extended to the ways that schooling also 
reproduces those who design our software worlds, and those who have been conditioned to 
obey it.   
4.4 Missed Opportunities 
Though any genuinely alternative type of user participation in the development and governance 
of the university’s cyborg middleware may seem like an unrealistic aspiration, given the current 
realities of software development, I’d like to point out here that there do indeed currently exist 
successful alternative models of software development that actively involve users in their 
production. However, these communities have historically been constituted mainly by those with 
technical expertise and already situated within computer science or programming communities, 
thus limiting the reach of these communities to one side of fault lines I described earlier.  During 
the eighties, at the same time that technology and publishing companies were establishing 
contracts with universities for the use or development of nonfree software, programmer and 
activist Richard Stallman was leading a free software movement that demanded that software 
offer its users four freedoms consisting of the “freedom to run a program for any purpose, 
freedom to study the mechanics of the program and modify it, freedom to redistribute copies, 
and freedom to improve and change modified versions for public use.” These freedoms applied 
not only to user applications, but the operating system used to run those applications, thus 
requiring a massive, decade-long cooperative and voluntary effort on the part of programmers in 
building a operating system from scratch—all practices which contrast in significant ways both 
to the production and development of software within proprietary contexts but also, and perhaps 
more importantly, to the passive relation to software by traditional consumers of such products  
 
As important as these efforts were however, educated awareness of them -- let alone 
participation in and appreciation of them and their possibilities -- seemed mostly limited to the 
techie community.  From what I can tell, there was (and unfortunately continues to be) very little 
understanding on the part of humanistic computers advocates of what the free software 
movement might contribute to their own progressive agenda.  To be fair, there was (and 
continues to be) likewise, relatively little attention in the writings of Stallman and others in the 
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free software community to the increasingly influential use of computers and closed proprietary 
software in humanistic spheres, and its effects on large scale popular practice. To highlight one 
particularly striking example of these ships passing in the night: while the import of a free 
operating system might have been understandably lost on writing instructors who were already 
fighting the uphill battle of just gaining access to computers, it notable that one of Stallman’s 
other well-known contributions to free software was a writing program, the GNU Emacs, which 
allows users to modify the tool according to their needs and has an active community of users 
and developers to this day. Despite the fact that Emacs was already then available as an 
existing tool that would have technically allowed for the continuation of experimental word 
processing design that faded away once proprietary word processors thoroughly colonized the 
humanistic space, Emacs has up until today remained largely the tool of the technically 
literate.There are of course many good (or at least understandable) reasons for this lack of 
mutual awareness and interest, but nonetheless, it importantly demonstrates that history could 
have been otherwise. Had the humanistic sphere been introduced to and adopted Emacs, 
rather than Microsoft Word for example, and trained its diverse student body not only use it to 
write, but also to contribute to its technical development, we would likely not have only made 
Emacs a more universally-accessible, popularly-used, and pluralistically-developed writing tool, 
but would have arguably marked our user consciousness in such a way that would make us 
more receptive to, even expectant of, the virtues of the production and consumption of free 
software more generally.  
 
Thus, there are a variety of significant cultural and institutional reasons as to why the 
university’s role in the reproduction of passive users has been barely addressed.32 Nonetheless, 
these are barriers that must be overcome if we are serious, in either our critiques or our 
interventions, in the emancipation of the current status quo of the cyborg world. Though the 
challenges that they present are complicated and daunting, they also mark a site of great 
opportunity. Just as technology companies have now long recognized students as critical to 
their corporate growth, we, like Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, and bell hooks , and other advocates of 
                                                
32 Audrey Watters is a remarkable exception in that she has been forcefully and tirelessly calling attention 
to the many political and pedagogical issues that plague the current state of educational technology. My 
study does not treat educational technology in nearly the same degree of breadth and sensitivity as 
Watters has achieved in her online column “Hack Education,” but instead focuses on the broader, related 
topic of the relationship between the culture of software use and academic ideology.  
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critical pedagogy, must grow to more fully recognize students as the necessary source of a 
cyborg liberation. 
5. Freeing Users, Freeing Minds: Reimagining Software, Education, and their 
Integration 
5.1 Metaparticipation as an Alternative Participatory Model 
I have now briefly introduced the interrelated crisis of the cyborg world and the cyborg 
university, which this dissertation will seek to describe in further detail. However, the intention of 
this dissertation is not merely to critique the situation at hand, but to suggest productive ways 
forward. Rather than arguing for a rejection of the cyborg university for a mythical pre-
computational “goddess” university,33 I will argue that the cyborg university itself -- precisely 
because it is a vital reproductive organ of the cyborg world -- must strive to stimulate a critical 
cyborg consciousness in its students, faculty, and all other campus employees and members, 
as a first step both to resisting cyborg oppression within the university, and cultivating the 
mentality, community, resources, and coordination necessary for resisting and transforming the 
oppression of the cyborg world beyond the university. This resistance and transformation, 
however, need not only be done for the abstract purpose of the liberation beyond its walls, but 
rather as a means of transforming technology to more sensitively and productively attend to its 
internal goals.Though there are potentially many ways the cyborg university might set about this 
task, I will suggest that it cultivate a culture of what I call metaparticipation, or a participation that 
consists of users not only participating in the production of knowledge and information goods, 
but also involved in some way in the production and modification of the technical, 
organizational, cultural, and political, structures that enable that participation. 
 
My concept of metaparticipation draws strongly from Christopher Kelty’s concept of “recursive 
publics,” which he describes as publics that are “vitally concerned with the material and practical 
maintenance and modification of the technical, legal, practical, and conceptual means of its own 
existence as a public.” Kelty likewise points to the Free Software Movement as an example of a 
recursive public in that it not only works  cooperatively to produce software, but also 
cooperatively develops the conditions of that cooperation, such as the technical means to 
                                                
33 I am borrowing Haraway's contrast to the cyborg.  
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enable that co-production, the social protocols for interacting as a group, and the licensing 
frameworks to ensure that their goods remained in the public domain for continuous recursive 
availability. However, I use the concept metaparticipation to describe any sort of step towards 
participation in the conditions of participation, whether in full-fledged, collective form as 
demonstrated by Kelty’s recursive public, or in more modest manifestations where even a single 
user attempts to participate, in whatever way to whatever degree, in the shaping of the legal, 
technical, and social structures that shape their participation. Whereas Kelty’s concept of 
recursive publics represents perhaps ideal forms of metaparticipation in that they consist of 
cooperative, complexly coordinated, sustained, and culturally validated forms of 
metaparticipation, the concept of metaparticipation allows us to describe efforts made outside of 
recursive publics in institutional spaces that don’t anticipate metaparticipation (or even 
participation in some cases) from its members. I will argue that one of the most important ways 
we can intervene in the oppression of the cyborg world is to facilitate a metaparticipatory space 
at the site of writing (especially that of students’), the reproductive heart of the cyborg university. 
However, the strength of metaparticipation will rely on its ability to create networks across 
disciplines, domains, and institutional boundaries of the cyborg university, as well as across and 
with different publics.  
5.2 The Cyborg University as Invisible Network Mother  
Just as the university prior to the cyborg world gave rise to an abundance of social, 
professional, and academic networks of both formal and informal varieties, the cyborg university 
continues to produce, sustain, and/or contribute to cross-institutional, multidisciplinary, and 
public-intersecting networks such as exhibited by professional academic organizations,   
partnerships with the private sector or cultural organizations, and the informal social networks 
generated by its students, staff, and faculty’s social activity. However, unlike the networks of old, 
today’s university networks are able to capitalize on network technology to expand the reach of 
their networks, as well as the complexity, responsivity, and speed of their communication and 
collaboration. In this sense, the cyborg university is often seen as a beneficiary of networked 
technology and the popular network cultures enabled by them (though sometimes a reluctant 
one), a communities whose members must be schooled by academic pioneers (early adopters), 
workshops, and white papers about the benefits of new modes and cultures of networked 
communication spontaneously generated out in the wild world web.    
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As I argue below, this perception is deeply misleading: the networks of the cyborg world are not 
simply the offspring of drop out genius hackers,34 renegade free thinking entrepreneurs,35 and 
other extra-university denizens, but were in fact to a large degree engendered by the cyborg 
university itself, and specifically mothered by it.  By this I mean that, the labor of the university in 
relation to software, networks, platforms, etc provides the underlying support system for their 
development, even if in ways that are largely invisible, unacknowledged, and readily dismissed, 
and consists not in the explicit goals of education, but in the care and socialization of students 
that makes that explicit goal possible and of use. I say this for a number of reasons. First, there 
is the most obvious fact that the architects of prominent network companies and importantly 
their laborers, received training, resources, and professional contacts that all surely contributed 
to their ability to develop the cyborg world’s networks along technical and economic lines. 
Second, the university has been a major contributor and key site not only to the development of 
computing, but also to the development of networked infrastructure such as manifest not only in 
the establishment of ARPANET, one of the earliest forerunners of the Internet, but also in 
important new applications of networked technologies, such as the development of shared 
library cataloguing pioneered in the 60s and 70s, and the digitization of the Interlibrary Loan 
system, which should be recognized not only as tremendous advances for library science, but in 
the cultural development of networked coordination and cooperation pertaining to the 
transmission and production of information.  
 
The final point I’d like to make about the cyborg university mothering networks, however, trumps 
both of these former points as I think it has gone largely unrecognized, that is the consistent role 
of students in particular in both the development of these networks, and even more importantly, 
in populating them. To consider the role of students in developing networks, we might first turn 
to ARPANET. While ARPANET was a highly-complex collaboration between the U.S. 
Department of Defense, private enterprise, and university organizations, it is worth noting that it 
was a student programmer, Charley Kline, who happened to send the very first message on 
                                                
34 The roster of tech superstar dropouts includes Bill Gates and Paul Allen (Microsoft co-founders), 
Michael Dell (Dell Computer), Mark Zuckerberg (Facebook), Steve Jobs (Apple), Jack Dorsey and Evan 
Williams (Twitter co-founders), Larry Ellison (Oracle), Sean Parker (Napster (never went to college)), and 
Jack Koum (Whats App). The launch of the “Thiel Initiative” by Paypal co-founder and billionaire Peter 
Thiel, which pays students $100,000 to drop out of school and pursue a business venture, is another 
testament to the tech industry’s suspicion of higher education (Griswold).  
35 The libertarian ethos of Silicon Valley is persuasively demonstrated in Fred Turner’s From 
Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, and the Rise of Digital 
Utopianism. 
Jessica Pressman  3/14/2017 3:38 PM
Comment [102]: This gendered 
language needs some clarification beyond 
"support" 
Jessica Pressman  3/14/2017 3:39 PM
Comment [103]: esp since you are 
using a term "cyborg" made famous by 
Haraway's feminist manifesto 
Jessica Pressman  3/14/2017 3:37 PM
Comment [104]: role of this metaphor? 
Connection to feminist theorists of the 
early web, e.g. Sadie Plant? 
307
 
28 
 
Software freedom or convenience? Disciples of the former, please visit this text’s 
instance on Social Paper, see http://tiny.cc/SocialPaper. 
              
ARPANET, (“Lo,” as the system crashed right as he typed the third letter of “Login”), at 10:30 
pm on October 29th, 1969 when he was 21 years old. Ten years later, it would be students who 
first conceived of Usenet, the “poor man’s ARPANET,” which is often credited as the earliest 
Internet community, and in which many of the web’s cultural features were first established, for 
better and for worse. It also served as the public forum in which many important software 
projects and developments were announced, such as the launch  of the World Wide Web by 
Tim Berners-Lee, the Linux project by Linus Torvalds, and the Mosaic browser by Marc 
Andreessen.  And it would be a student again, the sophomore Mark Zuckerberg that launched 
what would become the number one social networking site in the world with 1.86 billion monthly 
active users (as of December 2016)36 from his Harvard dormitory in 2004.  
 
But what I’m most interested in drawing our attention to is not the role of the individual students 
in the development of these networks, but the role of students in seeding the population of the 
networks, and even more specifically, the fact that the relationship between this population of 
users and the much smaller populations of developers was a relationship within the student 
body. I think it is important to note that Usenet was developed by students who wanted a way to 
communicate with other students at distant universities, thinking that ten to twelve people at 
most would use their system, and likely people that they knew. These developers viewed 
themselves as the primary users, and thus developed a system in which the interest of the 
developer and the user were one and the same.  To be sure, by the first year, 50 Usenet sites 
had sprung up not just across college campuses but also at Bell Labs sites, a number expanded 
to 500 by 1983, and nearly doubled again a year later. Still, compared to commercial networks 
that developed later on, we might say this growth developed largely along the lines of social 
desire and mutual consent, rather than through strategic techniques to capture and sustain user 
activity, and had strong affiliations with university student culture. While Usenet hosts quickly 
expanded beyond the boundaries of colleges and universities, students remained an important 
part of Usenet’s growth and a highly-visible part of its character, with a new cohort causing 
chaos every September as they were introduced to Usenet for the the first time and engaged 
with its forums without having yet learned the proper “netiquette.” This time period of student 
disruption was so well known by the Usenet community, that when American Online granted its 
users access to Usenet in 1993, thus ushering in a continuous influx of new users and social 
                                                
36 See “Our Mission” at https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/. 
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chaos, the Usenet community proclaimed it had entered into the age of the “Eternal 
September.”  
 
More recently, the cyborg university’s students played an equally important role in populating 
the network of Facebook -- though the origin story here is arguably not about mutual desire and 
consent between developer and user, but rather one of force carried out by code for the 
developer’s own interest. Before Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg designed Facemash, which 
illegally scraped names and photos of students off Harvard databases without their permission 
to create a site where users could collaboratively rank the sexual attractiveness of the students. 
Facemash was quickly shut down by the university, but provided the blueprint for many of 
Facebook’s features, and its extreme popularity encouraged Zuckerberg to immediately get to 
work. What’s important to note is that Zuckerberg imagined Facebook’s users as a way of 
connecting college students, first at Harvard, the oldest institution of higher learning in the 
United States and arguably the most elite, and then its expansion first to other Ivy League 
schools, then Boston area schools, and finally, in 2006, to anyone over the age of 13 with a 
“valid email address.”  
 
While both Usenet and Facebook quickly came to serve populations beyond the university, it is 
worth noting that both originated in students’ visions of using network technologies to connect 
students, and that students arguably played an important role in the growth of both networks 
even after they were opened up to the broader community.37 However, while narratives of 
networked technologies often dismiss the role of the university in their creation and criticize it for 
its incompetence,38 it is worth noting that these prodigal networks have in fact returned back to 
partner with the learning institutions they so hastily dismissed through the establishment of 
university partnerships and educational institutions,39 or products and services (such as Google 
classroom, and the free roll out of Gmail for many universities).  In other words, as they have 
                                                
37 As further evidence of the strong presence of students in the web’s development, it’s worth noting that 
one of the victims of what is called the “first rape in cyberspace” was a doctoral candidate at the 
University of Washington, while the perpetrator, presumably a student as well, logged in from New York 
University (Dibbell). 
38In describing why he launched Facebook without university oversight, Zuckerberg (quite 
understandably) expressed impatience with the rate of university change: “ I think it’s kind of silly that it 
would take the University a couple of years to get around to it as I can do it better than they can, and I 
can do it in a week” (Tabak).  
39 See for example Vindu Goel et al “Facebook takes a step into education software.”  
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come to recognize the university as sites of intellectual and social capital readily organized for 
networked use.  
5.3 Cyborg Alienation 
Thus, we can say, that in a variety of important and distinct ways, the university has played a 
critical role in engendering these two historically important networks of the cyborg world, and 
continues to represent an important partner (or prey) in the growth of networked technologies.  
However, what should be clear by now about these two networks is that they represent different 
degrees of shared interest between developers and users, those interests being much more 
unified in the origins of Usenet compared to the origins and practices of Facebook. While I do 
not want to idealize Usenet, which had its own set of social issues especially pertaining to 
gender,40 I am comparing it with Facebook to draw attention to the latter’s much higher degree 
of what I call cyborg alienation, or the separation between the interests of software developers 
and software users. While the complete elimination of cyborg alienation is theoretically 
impossible, especially as defining “interest” is always debatable along political, economic, and 
psychological lines, I hope the concept of cyrborg alienation will allows us to analyze networks 
and software not just according to their technical features and political effects, but to the ways in 
which users are invited or forbidden from participating in and reflecting upon their development.  
 
Cyborg alienation is not simply produced through technology but is rather a reinscription and 
amplification of social divisions and hierarchical structures existing prior within the cyborg 
university, such as through the social divisions I’ve already referred to occurring along 
disciplinary and professional lines, but also along race, gender, and class lines as well. That is 
not to say that technology does not also enhance whatever alienation already exists for the 
participants in the cyborg university, by further manipulating user behavior and perception, 
infringing upon user privacy, or denying users the ability to understand and transform software; 
the important point is that this further alienation  is still nonetheless rooted in the pre-existing 
social dimensions.  In light of this, I will suggest in what follows that one of the most important 
ways in which cyborg alienation can be addressed is not through further tool building or 
innovative tool use (though it will certainly involve that), but through the creation of new social 
organizations and social actions that will work to create new alliances and shared goals, new 
                                                
40 See for example Laurel A. Sutton’s “Using USENET: Gender, Power, and Silence in Electronic 
Discourse.”  
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forms of mutual understanding and respect, and new types of dialogue across these sharply 
fractured arenas of the university.  
 
The sort of labor required to create and foster such social organizations and actions, however, 
cuts precisely against the grain of the imperative guiding much of the cyborg world and cyborg 
university’s proudest and most instrumental forms of innovation -- at least as viewed from the 
point of view of capitalism and the administrated society: these are the tools and ideas that meet 
the general imperative to expertly and deftly automate, analyze, manipulate, and control 
information and populations.  The work needed for more social-communal formation and 
maintenance of public spheres of creative individuals, by contrast, will  fall back into a form of 
feminized labor that is comparatively unvalued both culturally and professionally.41 And yet, it 
will be precisely this non-automatable labor of building dialogue, shared understanding, and 
mutual goals, across the sharply divided cultures of the cyborg world—through humility, 
experimentation, and a near inhuman persistence, in spaces where social, professional, and 
practical gratification is not guaranteed—on which the reprogramming of the cyborg world 
depends.  Or at least I will argue below. 
5.4 The Right to Cyborg Reflection 
As a means to break down cyborg alienation, students must have a right to acquire the capacity 
for cyborg reflection -- that is, the ability to reflect for themselves on the ways in which software 
mediates all aspects of their individual and collective lives, whether pertaining directly to their 
university activities—such as research, writing, learning, being evaluated and managed, and so 
forth—or to their external social, domestic, political, and economic activities. Part of the 
development of this capacity for cyborg reflection will require becoming aware of emerging 
historical, sociological, and philosophical research on the general emergence and effects of 
different technological aspects of the cyborg world; equally important, however, will be the ability 
for reflection on the opaque mechanisms underlying the tools as well as reflection through the 
tools themselves.  
 
Currently, these last two modes of reflection are largely prohibited in the student and general 
user population, and enjoyed as the sole right of the digital companies who track user activity 
                                                
41 The situation parallels that which is well documented in the field of writing instruction. See for example 
Eileen Schell’s “The feminization of composition: Questioning the metaphors that bind women teachers.”  
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and information flow for the purpose of expanding their intellectual capital. Turnitin, for example, 
a company that provides plagiarism detection services for 15,000 institutions worldwide, 
currently holds 30 million student papers in its database, which it uses to further develop its 
current services (such as automated feedback), and one can imagine given the tech industry, 
could be easily “pivoted” as a raw asset for an entirely different product, service, or market.42  
 
While many might not see the value of the data of 30 million student papers, especially given 
the low esteem held for student writing, I will argue that they represent an enormous asset for 
generating insights about the student population that students, not companies, should be in 
charge of. As I will describe in more depth in Chapter 5, today’s data analysis techniques are 
capable of generating surprisingly sophisticated and personal insights that may seem vastly 
unrelated to the original data, especially when one considers the rich array of metadata (such as 
timestamps and geographic location) that accompany that data.  At the same time, however, 
these insights are not objective, even though they are largely presented as such, as they are 
always generated by an entity with a certain ideological perspective and a certain interest at 
stake. For example, in the case of Turnitin, student data is always captured, analyzed, and 
instrumentalized according to the company’s ideological understanding of the purpose, aims, 
and methods of learning to write, as well as their business interest in further cultivating 
institutional dependence on their services.  
 
While it may not be immediately clear how this ideological positioning bears any relation to the 
sorts of insight capable of being generated by this data, I will argue here that this sort of 
privatization of data reflection represents one of the most cynical and self-defeating approaches 
to education today, and also systematically suppresses one of the most important new forms of 
literacy in the general population. That is, I’d like to argue that granting student access to 
analyzing and instrumentalizing the multitude of data generated by their cyborg activity, we 
would see data interrogated and instrumentalized in very different ways than it is by private 
companies, as students would use it to investigate themselves and their broader student and 
public communities as thinkers, citizens, and community members, rather than as consumers 
and manipulable users. At one and the same time, this sort of accessibility of data reflection 
would help stimulate in students, and hopefully in turn the broader public, a greater appreciation 
                                                
42 See company description at http://turnitin.com. 
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for the ways in which their data is currently being instrumentalized (often invisibly) by digital 
companies.  
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While I cannot predict how students might use this data if given the resources, support, and 
incentive for analyzing it, I’d like to point here to a few examples and ideas that I hope will stir 
our imagination about the value and possibility of its use. First, I’d like to simply turn to the 
possibility of cyborg reflection on the act of an individual piece of student writing -- taking the 
present essay as a case study. To the left is a placed an image of a visualization of this 
document that was generated through Voyant, a free, browser based text visualization tool, 
which shows how the top five words of the document (excluding stopwords) fluctuate in 
frequency across the course of the text.43 On their own, these words (“cyborg,” “software,” 
“university,” “social,” “writing,” in order of most frequent to least ) perhaps don’t tell us very much 
new that we wouldn’t have already discerned from reading the text itself, and, what’s more, as 
Drucker and Svensson might point out, the visualization itself is only one possible way of 
visualizing the text, and occludes as much as it might reveal. However, what this image doesn’t 
show, is that this visualization significantly differs from the past draft, whose most frequent 
words were instead “software,” writing,” “digital,” “education,” and “social,” indicating that my 
new focus on “cyborg,” was somehow also associated with a reordering of the importance of 
“writing,” which is now less frequent than “social,” and a new most-frequent word, “university.” 
While this particular visualization set is of somewhat limited interest in and of itself, I hope it at 
least provides concrete material for imagining more interesting analytical projects, and so 
suggests that being able to visualize our intellectual production, not only across drafts, but 
across the eras and domains of our intellectual development, might offer some interesting 
modes of self-reflection, and also perhaps allow us to build more cohesively on our intellectual 
production in the past that is often lost in the great shuffle of the cyborg world. That’s not to say, 
of course, that these visualizations offer us anything like purely objective insights on our activity, 
                                                
43 To use Voyant to visualize this introduction, see its instance here: http://tiny.cc/cyborgIntro 
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but that they are nevertheless a potential tool for what Stéfan Sinclair and Geoffrey Rockwell, 
the developers of Voyant, call the agile interpretive cycle, where the investigator switches 
between different technical and intellectual modes of reflection in a dialectical process (278). 
This same sort of cyborg reflection, however, can be applied not just to the finished products of 
one’s work, but to the process itself as a way of thinking through our habits of research, writing, 
and thinking. Back in December of 2015, I wanted a way to examine my process of writing a 
long-overdue term paper, and turned to Mozilla’s publicly-available instance of Etherpad, a 
collaborative writing platform that allows users to “play back” the full process of the text’s 
creation. In my experience, Etherpad is mainly used as a quick and dirty digital notepad for 
collaboratively taking notes or sharing resources during professional meetings, and is not so 
much intended for creating 
polished, highly-formatted 
documents expected in 
academia. However, it also 
allows users to assign 
different highlighting colors to 
different users, so as to easily 
attribute authorship to 
different parts of the text. I 
used this feature to assign 
every different period of 
writing a different color, so 
that by the end of the 
production of the text, I could 
also easily visualize what portions of the text were written during which period. Again, what I 
found in my one case was not earth shattering; there were both large sections that consisted of 
a single color indicating I had composed it from start to finish in a single sitting with very little 
revision afterwards, and other sections that contained multiple colors, revealing that I had 
revised a paragraph or sentence in multiple different settings. Nonetheless, this visualization 
brought to the foreground the very complicated temporality of the text’s production which is 
completely invisible in a text’s final form.  I gained a better appreciation for how the final paper, 
was in essence a stitching and weaving together of text to make its narration and logical 
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argument appear to unfold linearly, when in fact the chronological production of the text had to 
be radically rearranged to effect this appearance (see image above).44 I became very curious 
about visualizing the temporalities of production of the work of my colleagues, and thinking more 
about how different temporal processes, conscious or not, have relationship to other features in 
final product.   
This experience led me to want to carry out the production of this dissertation with a writing tool 
that might allow me to analyze and visualize the data and metadata of the process from start to 
finish. Given that I had never written a dissertation before, I expected it to be a process full of 
mistakes, learning —and 
hopefully growth!—as an 
academic writer. Though I 
didn’t know exactly how I 
would reflect on this data later 
on—especially as I was 
overwhelmed enough with the 
task of producing the 
dissertation—I thought it 
would be interesting to explore 
the data and metadata as a 
means of reflecting on different aspects of the process after the dissertation’s completion. For 
example, I was curious to see whether and how my style might change throughout the course of 
the project, depending on variables such as how far along in the project I was, the time of day, 
my geographical locations, or the topic on which I was writing. I was also curious to know if 
there was a way of analyzing the writing that I ultimately discarded, or revised significantly, in 
terms of their topics, style, and conditions of production. My analytic imagination was obviously 
influenced by the blend of tools and functionalities I’ve been exposed to (such as Voyant and 
Etherpad), but there of course was no readily available tool to support this sort of process. My 
colleague and friend Evan Misshula very generously spent several weekend Skype meetings 
44 Though it appears that the length of my document overwhelmed the timeslider functionality, one can 
see this project at https://public.etherpad-mozilla.org/p/incomplete_draft/timeslider#33175. While at the 
time of this writing the document has not yet been vandalized, it is publicly modifiable text. One can see 
the final version here:  https://commons.gc.cuny.edu/papers/a-savings-bank-for-process-the-application-
of-emersons-literary-system-for-student-writing/. 
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helping me set up an Etherpad instance of my own, but it proved too complicated and not 
accommodating enough for the process of academic writing. I also tried Github, but it did not 
seem to track revisions in a manner that was fine-grained enough for my purposes, and by this 
point, it seemed clear that I needed to focus on the writing itself, rather than fiddling with my 
tools. For the sake of convenience, I chose Google Docs.  
 
These minor experiments, however, limited as they were by time, interest, and resources, are 
just two possible ways one might enact cyborg reflection on student activity. I am confident that 
students, especially those whose identities are not well represented in the tech industry, would 
find much more interesting and critical ways of interrogating their data, both as a means of self 
reflection, as well as a way of coming to critically understand and reflect on the techniques of 
data analysis themselves. Before moving on, I’d like to briefly point to a few other examples that 
involve critical approaches to data collection that I think also might help point to further 
possibilities. Gregory Donovan’s wonderful project “My Digital Footprint” gave students 
administrative perspective and control (so to speak) of the platform they were using to conduct 
their communication. Students were not only able to see how much personal data is regularly 
and easily collected during their digital activities, but were also invited to make ethical decisions 
as a group about the tool’s mechanisms that would typically be left to administrators.45 This 
practice of enabling students to participate in the governance of a tool is directly the opposite 
from the standard use of learning management systems that deny students of an understanding 
of the full range of data collected on them, and the ability to modify these practices. We might 
see another example in the work of Gabi Schaffzin, a graduate student in the Visual Arts 
department at UC San Diego, who reclaims the proprietary data generated by a Fitbit to show 
the ideological limits of its ability to express a subject’s state of health, while also looking to new 
possibilities of using data to expresse marginalized health states.46 We might also look to the 
Domain of One’s Own initiative at the University of Mary Washington that offers all campus 
members websites to host the entirety of their intellectual production (such as term papers, 
writing assignments, syllabus, and so forth)  as a means to unify their intellectual activity across 
courses and terms, which they can also easily export once they leave the university.  
 
                                                
45 See http://mydigitalfootprint.org/. 
46 See http://utopia-dystopia.com/#/ar-qs/. 
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Finally, I’d like to note that whereas my experiments represent a form of cyborg self-reflection, it 
is likely that much more interesting reflection would come about through cyborg social-reflection, 
where one could analyze their personal data in the context of a broader population, such as that 
of the class, department, or institution that they’re in, or alternately, simply analyze the activity of 
these broader populations without immediate concern for their individual practice. Social 
reflection, however, not only entails developing a social perspective on the topics one is 
analyzing, but would also in fact require forms of social collaboration among individuals with 
diverse skillsets and backgrounds. Not only do I think this might help students develop a 
broader “class consciousness” so to speak about the interests, struggles, and activities of their 
fellow students, but it would also immediately require students to begin considering the ethical, 
social, and technical issues involved in that sort of analysis.  
 
What I wish to draw attention to here is the fact that this sort of data analysis on students is 
already happening, but without any kind of involvement from students in terms of oversight, 
governance, or even in terms of being able to benefit from the types of data generated. To be 
sure, making cyborg social reflection available to students on their own terms and for their own 
purposes would involve multiple challenges, but it is precisely this sort of engagement that is 
necessary for stimulating a critical and participatory cyborg consciousness in students. Through 
university support, students would have to create governance for determining how students 
might decide to volunteer their data and metadata (and the extent of that data) and technical 
capabilities for doing so. Not only might students use this data to better understand and connect 
with its community on an intellectual basis, but they might also be able to investigate and 
address social issues as they appear in a university setting, as well as better understand the 
ideological limits of data science as suggested in Gabi Schaffzin’s work. They might also 
reflecton the diverse social and historical conditions that led to university resources being 
deployed to pay for Turnitin’s plagiarism detection service, which reinforces competition, rather 
than a digital student commons, which might enable students to cultivate cooperation. 
 
6 Brief Overview of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will thus be an exploration of the origins, persistence, and stakes of the 
invisible discipline within the cyborg university as a means to both understand and transform it  I 
will begin by tracing this invisible discipline to a longstanding academic ideology in the practice 
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of teaching and instrumentalizing academic writing in the course of the 20th century, which I will 
then argue considerably shapes and limits the four waves of technological innovation and 
adoption within the humanistic sphere over the past fifty years. I will then tie the practices of 
technological use within the cyborg university to the broader political issues of the cyborg world, 
and show how Freire’s practice of dialogue, offers a promising way towards a cyborg liberation 
through the gradual process of bringing the social, technical, political, and cultural problems of 
the cyborg world to consciousness through the naming of them.   
 
For students and citizens of the cyborg world, I have conceptualized this Freirian renaming as 
reprogramming, though I don’t simply mean it in its computational sense. Instead, I mean it is a 
way of transforming the cyborg world, piece by piece, through activities that involve or influence 
the technical, social, cultural, and political codes of the cyborg world, whether implemented 
through code, speech, social practice, or some combination thereof. While some may find my 
use of a computational term to describe a social intervention guilty of the technological 
solutionism that this dissertation opposes,47 I in fact am reclaiming the sense of “programming” 
prior to its first application to computing in 1945. The first sense that I have in mind is 
programming as “a plan or scheme of any intended proceedings” (OED), which calls attention to 
the fact that speech acts in the cyborg world have both linguistic and computational significance 
and effects. The second older sense of programming is “to write in public” (OED), which I refer 
to so as to call attention to the importance of writing itself in public, to the public, as a form of 
contributing to the programming or shaping of that public. I will conclude with my concept of a 
dialogical machine as a speech act that attends to both its linguistic and computational 
significance in the naming and transformation of the cyborg world. Here, I will turn to Cathy 
Davidson and David Theo Goldberg’s concept of “learning institutions as mobilizing networks,” 
exhibited by the vibrant and influential cross-institutional network HASTAC (Humanities, Arts, 
Science and Technology Alliance and Collaboratory) they co-founded, as providing the 
foundational values, principles, and social organization from which dialogical machines can 
most effectively launch, and which dialogical machines can help further cultivate.   
 
* * * 
 
                                                
47For example, see David Golumbia’s astute critique of “computationalism” in The Cultural Logic of 
Computation.  
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In essence, this dissertation is my own attempt at a dialogical machine, however clunky it may 
be. Regardless of the way the reader comes to these words, it should be noted that they bear a 
very special relationship towards writing and publishing software. That is, this scholarly project 
was in fact born from a software project that aimed to create a tool for the building of a non-
proprietary, metaparticipatory digital commons for student writing. In a certain sense, it attempts 
to answer Drucker and Svensson's call for the active participation in the middleware that 
structures one’s argument, though not in the aesthetic experience of the writing, but in the 
broader labor of working towards a social reorganization in both the way that writing tools are 
made and for whom and what academic writing is instrumentalized. 
 
The idea for this tool first occurred to me in the Fall of 2012 while taking a course called 
Interactive Technology and Pedagogy with Urban Education professor Steve Brier. Not only did 
the course include readings on topics pertaining to scholarly communication, digital pedagogy, 
and the politics of software, but it also required students to share their reading reflections on a 
course blog hosted on The CUNY Academic Commons, a digital commons for The CUNY 
Graduate Center powered by free software and developed “in house” so to speak by a team led 
by English professor Matthew K.Gold. My complex reaction to this requirement led me to think 
seriously about the many psychological, social, and political issues at play in the production and 
instrumentalization of student writing, and how they are further complicated when that activity 
enters the digital realm. While I was deeply excited by the potential of these public and 
collaborative forms of learning in theory, I found that the actual experience of their use 
disregarded many of the complex sensitivities at play in one’s intellectual process and online 
identity, and arguably, though for many good reasons, did not take full advantage of the 
possibility of software for these forms. For example, why wasn’t networking, discovering, setting 
permissions, and commenting upon student writing as easy as parallel activities on social media 
platforms?48 And in turn, why couldn’t we experiment with these mechanisms to think through, 
as Drucker and Svensson urge us to, the ways they structure our intellectual activity? 
 
                                                
48 In particular, I was struck how a friend of mine, Tom LaGatta, then a postdoc in mathematics at the 
Courant Institute, was able to cultivate lively, ongoing, interdisciplinary conversation on Facebook, a 
phenomenon that seemed to me less common at the time. While thinking about the use of social media 
for academics, I was able to gather some thoughts from his network by posting to his Facebook wall. See: 
https://deathofthetermpaper.commons.gc.cuny.edu/iii-on-scholarly-forms/ 
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These observations might have remained vague discontents, but as I gained an appreciation for 
the fact that the software that hosted our writing, The CUNY Academic Commons, was 
developed and maintained not in far-off buildings or hidden entities of campus that I would never 
come across, but by academics who shared my interests in humanities research, I realized that 
there was a possibility—at least in principle—to create or modify software to meet some of 
these concerns. During the course, I was also introduced to Kathleen Fitzpatrick’s wonderful 
monograph Planned Obsolescence, a critical analysis of scholarly publishing whose drafts she 
posted for public review by using CommentPress, a WordPress theme designed for peer review 
of long-form scholarly texts. I was particularly struck how this technological engagement was in 
some respects a critical response to the conditions of academic labor and publishing, which in 
turn, stimulated a more critical and sensitive attunement to the historical origins of academic 
ideals we now take for granted, and their deep relationship with modes of knowledge production 
and transmission. It led me to think about how the “term paper,” something I needed to produce 
for the end of that course, might bear some relation to issues Fitzpatrick discussed in her book.  
 
This reflection led to the conception of a global metaparticipatory commons for student writing 
that would speak to the everyday needs and sensitivities of student writing as well as work 
towards drawing out its imaginative potentialities. I began to wonder how a commons might be 
designed to further support vibrant and innovative forms of collaboration as well as private 
intellectual processes. For example, how might a commons account for the different degrees of 
publicity and privacy needed at different levels in one’s intellectual process; how might it allow 
one to share, discover and comment upon writing across disciplinary and institutional 
boundaries; and how might it broaden the audience and import of student writing at large?  In 
terms of analytics, how might a commons allow for students to think critically about the data 
generated in their intellectual and communicative practices and encourage them to collectively 
determine new methods and ethical governance for studying and instrumentalizing that data? In 
terms of software functionality, how might this commons encourage students to critically 
interrogate the way even the most banal aspects of software mediate intellectual and social 
processes (from the activity feed to the spell checker) and also enable them to imaginatively 
recreate these features as a means of bringing about a more critical, creative, and cooperative 
student public? How might we create new types of automation and break down other 
conventional forms of automation to work against pernicious social issues within the cyborg 
university?  In terms of usability, how could the text editor, commenting features, and notification 
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system better suit the needs of scholarly writing?  And in terms of intellectual activity and 
archiving, was there any possibility that software tools and practices could be designed to 
enhance the fragile space of thinking rather than further fragment its processes and products 
across media and time? Most importantly of all, how might this commons be set up to 
encourage an ever greater diversity of users, whatever their skillset, to participate in the ongoing 
development and governance of this commons?  
 
These sorts of questions might not have found fertile soil had I not happened to be at The 
CUNY Graduate Center right at the time when the longstanding efforts on the part of multiple 
faculty and staff were beginning to coalesce into a vibrant digital humanities community, which 
in many respects, emphasized the importance of student leadership in charting its course and 
setting its values. To be sure, the digital humanities, as it manifested there and as an 
overarching field of academic practice, neither solves nor provides refuge from the “increasingly 
monstrous institutional terrain”49 of higher education and academics, nor can it be said to 
represent a unified body of methodological and ideological approaches that might simply on 
their own lead to meaningful transformative work. What it has the potential to do, and what I 
believe it helped do for me, is to provide an environment that can help stimulate a dialogical 
approach to understanding the ways tools, infrastructure, social practices, resources, labor, and 
ideologies are all complicatedly intertwined in the production of academic activity in ways that 
concretely shape its broader social effects and social possibility, for better and for worse. 
Working to identify the imprint of one of these aspects in the features of another, enables us to 
defamiliarize our assumed understanding of that thing, and evaluate it for its real, not ideal, 
effects in the world. As one observer put it: “Digital humanists tend as part of their scholarly 
practice to foreground self-reflexively the material underpinnings of scholarship that many 
conventional humanists take for granted. . . . If anything, DH is guilty of making all too visible the 
dirty gears that drive the scholarly machine, along with the mechanic’s maintenance bill.”50   
 
Though a critical transformation of the cyborg university must examine and transform more than 
just tools, digital technology is critical component of this process as it codifies, normalizes, 
conceals, and controls so many aspects of our thinking and communicating, and how those 
processes create communities of inclusion and exclusion, within and across institutional and 
                                                
49 See Kirschenbaum “What Is.” 
50 Quoted from Kirschenbaum “Am I.”  
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public boundaries, To my mind, this engagement with tools therefore need not necessarily be 
technocratic thinking, but in fact can represent one of the most robust responses and 
resistances possible to the colonizing technocratic forces that have all but thoroughly infused 
our everyday lives, both within and well beyond the academy. However, even when there is in 
interest in this sort of engagement, it is still extraordinarily difficult to marshall resources, 
expertise, incentive, time, and engagement from the variety of institutional and extra-institutional 
partners necessary for cultivating a shared language, consciousness, and set of goals, across 
these diverse partners necessary for enacting transformation. At every turn there are significant 
cultural, institutional, and economic barriers obstructing this sort of critical coming together. The 
digital humanities does not remove these barriers, but it does provide perhaps a more legible 
excuse for confronting them if one is up for the monstrous struggle.  
 
It was in this spirit that I began conversations around the themes of the scholarly machine of 
student writing with Jennifer Stoops, a graduate student in Urban Education, which culminated 
in a decision to pursue the idea of tinkering with that machine in whatever way we could as our 
final required project for the ITP program. It was there that the idea for Social Paper was born.51 
Neither of us were even remotely equipped to begin building something like it ourselves, so we 
began brainstorming a variety of possible approaches and reaching out to potential allies. I 
brought the idea up to Matthew Gold, who directed the Digital Fellows program I was a part of, 
but also whose teaching and institutional initiatives had long been invested in cultivating 
collaborative student writing environments, such as in his directing role for The CUNY Academic 
Commons, its free and open source software surrogate Commons in a Box, as well as in an 
earlier, multi-institutional student writing project called “Looking for Whitman.”52 Matt, while 
perhaps reserved about the technical feasibility of our original plans, was immensely supportive 
of the general idea and helped us to think through the many technical, institutional, and social 
complexities that such a project would entail. Jennifer and I were incredibly excited about the 
potential of the project, and jumped at the chance to apply for a National Endowment for the 
Humanities Digital Start Up Grant, which gave us the opportunity to work closely with Boone 
Gorges, the lead developer of The CUNY Academic Commons, on further refining a realistic 
prototype. Though we knew our chances were incredibly slim, the conversations and 
collaborative thinking that resulted from just the creation of the proposal was worth it alone. We 
                                                
51 See https://github.com/cuny-academic-commons/social-paper 
52 See Gold “Looking.”  
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were thrilled and deeply humbled, however, when we received news that the NEH would 
generously help us make Social Paper a reality. With Matt, Boone, the rest of the enormously 
talented Commons team, and the support of too many individuals at the Graduate Center to 
name here,53 we set out on the year-and-a-half-long endeavor of building Social Paper, 
launching its beta version in December 2015.54  
 
The process of developing Social Paper further honed my critical understanding of the many 
challenges and opportunities surrounding software’s broader significance for both the internal 
activities of education and scholarship, as well as their broader social contributions. For one, I 
became increasingly critical of the general passive attitude towards digital technologies 
throughout all areas of the university, and the ways in which this attitude was reinforced by 
pretty much every single form of digital technology, whether overtly academic or not, entering 
the humanistic sphere. On the other hand, however, I came to appreciate how dominant 
business models of software production make it exceedingly difficult to develop competitive 
metaparticipatory, non-commercial alternatives for scholars and students, given that there are 
very few resources and social structures organized for that purpose, and not nearly enough 
exemplary models of multi-institutional software collaborations that specifically engage 
humanistic research that might actually enable such a possibility.55  For example, the funds we 
had for Social Paper significantly constrained our ability to carry out its original vision of being 
not only a publishing platform, but a writing environment as well, complete with the all-but 
obligatory mechanisms for scholarly production such as file export capabilities and footnotes, 
and numerous other subtle, but crucial features. While I very much appreciate Free Software 
advocate Richard Stallman’s insistence on valuing software justice over software convenience, I 
think it is worth noting that a lack of suitable options for a diversity of users perhaps remains one 
of the biggest barriers to the mass adoption of free software today. Thus, as I am as eager to 
                                                
53 In addition to Steve Brier, Matt Gold, and Boone Gorges, there are numerous others I should thank for 
their significant support of Social Paper, including the Digital Fellows, particularly, Laura Kane, Jojo 
Karlin, Micki Kaufman, Mary Catherine Kinniburgh, Jeremy March, Andrew McKinney, Alice Lynn 
McMichael, Michelle McSweeney, Evan Misshula, and Patrick Smyth, as well as others at the Graduate 
Center and CUNY, such as Jeff Allred, Eileen Clancy, Cathy Davidson, Scott Dexter, Amanda Licastro, 
Michael Mandiberg, Katina Rogers, Danica Savonick, Maura Small, Chris Stein, Lisa Tagliaferri, Christian 
Wach, Luke Waltzer, and Kalle Westerling. 
54 For a short talk introducing Social Paper given around the time of launch, see “Why We Need Social 
Paper” at https://commons.gc.cuny.edu/papers/45249/. 
55 Hydra, an open source software project for Library archives, offers one promising exception, though it 
most likely well beyond the awareness or interest of the average humanities scholar.  
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share some of my ideas about free software’s importance for students as I am to enact its 
possibility, I have decided it is best to publish this draft not only on Social Paper, but on Google 
Docs as well, where the footnotes might be visible and some users might be more likely to 
interact with it, even though this may fragment any potential reader discussion across two sites, 
as well as represent a betrayal of Free Software’s ethics to some.  
 
All in all, this dissertation is an attempt to respond the social, historical, and technical questions 
that arose while thinking through the potential significance of student-developed writing tools. In 
essence, I have attempted to begin to name some of the important and unconscious ways 
software mediates our individual and collective forms of knowledge production, and why our 
practices of software use within higher education have broad political significance. Making the 
process of this naming visible, however, by posting the dissertation—in all of its messiness, and 
with all of its oversights, errors, and shortfallings—to Social Paper is also an important part of 
this project, even if it is the one I feel least comfortable about. Uncertainty has marked my 
engagement with academic writing from the very beginning, and thus revealing these drafts—
rush-written in the spare scraps of time in the first year of a complicated full-time job, (a 
condition that seems to be somewhat familiar in the field of DH, if not academics at large) —is 
for me, a genuine act of professional and social vulnerability. However, in the course of reading 
through the history of academic writing in the 20th century, I have come to recognize this 
anxiety as not merely representative of my personal capabilities and quirks, but part of a much 
broader social phenomenon. That is, for at least the past century and a half, writing has been 
used to judge the character, intelligence, and class of the writer for the purpose of gatekeeping 
higher education and protecting social hierarchies within academics and beyond.56 In turn, I 
have come to suspect that this broadly diffused anxiety,57 manifest most in those whose 
                                                
56 For example, Pierre Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power suggests some of the reasons 
underlying the psychological pressures to write “well,” and also why there is a tendency to hide the 
struggle which one undertakes to effect that performance. He argues that the “linguistic habitus,” as a set 
of “dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak in particular contexts (the family, the peer 
group, the school, etc.)” (17) reveals one’s status, and thus grants and denies access to certain social 
groups. In the introduction, the editor describes how “the hyper-correction of petit-bourgeois speech is the 
sign of a class divided against itself, whose members are seeking, at the cost of constant anxiety, to 
produce linguistic expressions which bear the mark of a habitus other than their own” (21). It would seem 
then that the private anxiety of writing is connected to a broader set of social issues.  
57Anxiety and depression caused by writing requirements is a well known phenomenon in graduate 
school. While certainly there are a broad range of factors contributing to this phenomenon, vulnerability of 
exposure (and potential judgment) figures high. For example, in Women Writing the Academy, a book 
that explores the experiences of women within graduate school and the scholarly profession, one 
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background or life experiences make them feel alien to the academy, effectively silences voices 
that are most urgently needed in its internal and public discourses.  
 
Thus, posting my imperfection in public is offered as a small protest against the many 
psychological, social, and technical barriers that inhibit the creation and cultivation of 
cooperative and caring student publics.58 It is representative of the thought that has been 
possible in the particular configuration of time, resources, mentorship, and tools, not all of which 
are in abundant supply. If it receives comments, I hope then too that it will make visible the 
importance of community for writing, though it is likely they will only represent a microscopic 
portion of the many people who have already lent their energies and expertise to the production 
of these drafts and their ideas. I fully anticipate, too, that any public attention received, whether 
kindly intentioned or otherwise, may come with unexpected challenges, exposures, or 
unpleasantries. From the still-sheltered perspective in which I write, I hope it is not too 
shortsighted to say that I will consider these potential discomforts as a valuable part of better 
understanding the ways in which our writing practices are socially and psychologically charged, 
and how these aspects must be better accounted for as we design the possible. I should also 
note that I make this dissertation public not as an assertion that all writing should be public or 
that privacy and intimacy aren’t the cherished rights of thought. Nor do I mean to suggest that 
the hard labor of making a text act precisely as one wants, often through the skilled and 
progressive use of conventions, is not a fundamental value of democratic, intellectual, and 
creative discourse. Nonetheless, it has seemed to me that our notions of writing, and the 
anxieties and ideals that they entail, have blinded us from the surprising range of their 
oppressive effects, as well as stifled the full possibility of public and academic speech. While 
any sort of comment gifted by the collegial reader here will be most humbly and gratefully 
                                                                                                                                                       
graduate student, Ms. Dannon, explains, “writing is exposure. It’s like being naked and you can’t fake it 
with a lot of things. When you write it down, you’re pretty naked and you’re alone. There’s no one else 
there, and it’s just you, raw meat.” Elsewhere she writes, “At the end, the finished project just kills me. I 
mean, I’m almost physically ill when I complete it” (Kirsch 45). For other literature on the anxiety of writing 
in graduate education see Bloom 1981, Onwuegbuzie 1998, Jiao 1998, Aronson and Swanson 1991.  
58 The rare personal disclosures of this anxiety from professional academics begins to suggest the 
tremendous stakes involved in maintaining a confident, effortless writerly identity. As Ms. Dannon also 
notes: “The other thing I didn’t realize is how much you rewrite. I really thought things came out that way, 
that people are brilliant. Then I talked to one of my best professors, who said he is criticized. One person 
trashes [his writing] and the other person thinks it’s great. He told me how many times he’s rewritten it. I 
had no idea; maybe other people ought to share more of that” (Kirsch 46).  Indeed, the secrecy and 
shame which blanket the individual’s writing process is the very mechanism for its social reproduction. 
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47 
Software freedom or convenience? Disciples of the former, please visit this text’s 
instance on Social Paper, see http://tiny.cc/SocialPaper. 
received, the perfection for which this dissertation strives is not in the text itself, but in the world 
we’re making together.  
Alex Gil  4/11/2017 1:49 AM
Comment [116]: So looking forward to 
seeing this develop! 
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Page 2: [1] Comment [10] Garrison LeMasters 3/7/17 5:48 AM 
This setup is compelling, certainly, but its zeal may be hard to answer for later.  So much 
of the language in this sentence (which, again, I admire for its passion) seems contrary 
to the realities scholars work to tease out:  e.g., distrust "single truths" in favor of multiple 
ones; "universal" truths are seldom, well, "universal". 
Further, I'd ask about "the university" here.  As before, there are many institutions that 
instruct (explicitly; tacitly) their members in the use of computation.  But more to the 
point here, is "university" the best candidate?  In effect, I'd be dubious towards the 
proposition that "the university encouraged professor LeMasters' students better to 
understand software by breaking it as often as possible."  Indeed, my university would 
be just as dubious, if not moreso.  Plus, "university" includes a wealth of irrelevant 
infrastructure (sports programs; capital campaigns; food storage facilities).  All of which 
suggests to me that you'd be well-served by something more granular than "university." 
[I see footnote 4, which is likely getting at the same thing.  But even once you've begun 
cutting away at the monolith, "university" seems to me to be overlarge by orders of 
magnitude.] 
Page 4: [2] Comment [18] Garrison LeMasters 3/7/17 6:29 AM 
Again, you've done admirable work here as you leverage these powerful images in the 
service of your argument.  I wonder though, how accurate is this characterization?  Who 
is judging the success or failure of this transition?  And who decided that success means 
"fading from view"?  How many faculty would report that their experience with campus IT 
has been "seamless"?  What's more, I worry that "the everyday and normal body of the 
university" points to our moment as a rarefied moment of change and revolution:  But 
consider the prominence of English over Latin or French in scholarship; the presence of 
women on campus; the class changes wrought by the GI Bill; the advent of Origin of the 
Species.  Or, more media-specific:  The automobile-friendly campus; TVs in the dorms; 
the advent of lucrative ESPN contracts, as pursued by Big 10 schools. 
Which brings me to the "scars and waste" line.  Evocative?  Yep.  But why scars?  Why 
waste?  Perhaps you'll explain further below... The university certainly doesn't want 
those beautiful new computers to disappear from sight -- you'll be looking at those in 
every prospective student guide and all across the school's website.  The school 
bookstore would love to sell you a new laptop as soon as you've moved in (here's a 
brochure, and they're on display in the student union).  Finally:  Microsoft is the company 
that underwrites so much computation in academe -- and if you've ever been to the site 
they use to distribute institutionally-purchased software to students, you'd know that it 
was *anything* but seamless; between my Windows 10 updates, my Office 365 updates, 
my New Google Docs alerts, and my Adobe Suite update warnings, I barely have time to 
get any work done. 
Page 4: [3] Comment [20] Scott Dexter 3/13/17 9:46 PM 
well, those notes apparently resided in one of the more windswept alleys of my brain. I 
think the gist was: maybe this is the paragraph where you state several claims about the 
cyborg university (which you promise to support in the sequel) and explain their 
significance. which is to say, make an argument rather than just saying interesting 
things. 
Page 4: [4] Comment [21] Scott Dexter 3/13/17 9:07 PM 
OK, so this is perhaps overly literal-minded, but adding a "layer of invisibility" sounds like 
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it wouldn't change anything. more like a layer of de-visibility. or obscurity? but then  
that's not your metaphor.... 
 
Page 4: [5] Comment [22] Garrison LeMasters 3/7/17 7:00 AM 
This was the reason I initially wanted to comment on your (really very good) work here, 
but now its late, and I need to sleep.  Here is an abbreviated version of my comment, 
then:   
 
1. I would dispute that computational technology "in and of itself" (?) was ever perceived 
as neutral.  Almost no one ever sees technological innovation as an intrinsic Good, but 
few see it as Neutral, either.  Instead, it is at least a problem, or (more likely) a blight. 
(see, e.g., Thamus and Thoth; Timothy McVeigh; Hugo's Frollo, who cries out "This will 
kill that!").  Tropes of paranoia and alienation that followed WW2 were rapidly replaced 
by tropes of dehumanization and fears of "unnatural" homogenization (a la the CCCP) 
via computation.  See most pop SF films from Forbin Project to Wargames to AI, etc.) 
 
2.  Even so:  Maybe you cover this later, but the history of computation within the 
university is always worthy of careful attention.  The software crisis (so-called; a disputed 
term) ca. 1968 saw NATO, the US Military, top technical universities and the largest 
corporations meet in (Iceland?  Norway?) to discuss the disastrous way that Maths 
departments had been handling software development (which is to say:  Not at all).  In 
effect, industry had beautiful new computers (very expensive capital) that were useless 
without (1) error-free software and (2) documentation for that software.  Typically, they 
had neither.  Universities turned to programs in Engineering, in part because they 
already had an "applied" methodology that could emphasize reliability, customer-
satisfaction, and (most of all) efficiency in a way that theoretical mathematicians and 
their starry-eyed students never could.  So we invented "software engineering," with the 
aid of NATO, Naval Logistics, and lots of industry. 
 
My history is sloppy and top-of-the-head here, but I want to weigh in as in favor of 
computation as a set of material artifacts imagined, created, distributed, and used in 
historically-particular fashion. 
 
Page 4: [6] Comment [23] Scott Dexter 3/13/17 9:09 PM 
I'd add that "long been" is maybe less precise than you (ERG) need to be. Have you 
read Frabetti's Software Theory? She spends a lot of time talking about NATO and 
software engineering in ways that might be helpful. 
 
Page 5: [7] Comment [29] Scott Dexter 3/13/17 9:19 PM 
is there a more optimistic word? incapable sorta makes it seem like this generation is 
lost. maybe it is? Is /ability/ more plastic than /capacity/? That is, would "unable" allow 
more potential for user autonomy? 
 
Page 5: [8] Comment [31] Scott Dexter 3/13/17 9:17 PM 
it would be good to have an understanding, at this point in the text, of who/what this is, 
or who the 'oppressors of the cyborg world' are. 
 
Page 5: [9] Comment [32] Garrison LeMasters 3/7/17 7:01 AM 
Anyway, sorry to go:  I've enjoyed this chance to look in on this work in progress.  Very 
exciting to see this coming out of an English dept. 
 
Page 5: [10] Comment [33] Patrick Smyth 3/8/17 3:33 PM 
In technical circles these passive users are known (sometimes disparagingly) as "end 
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users." 
 
Page 5: [11] Comment [34] Patrick Smyth 3/8/17 4:03 PM 
You'll enjoy this (on the subject of end users): http://catb.org/esr/writings/unix-koans/end-
user.html 
 
Page 5: [12] Comment [36] Patrick Smyth 3/13/17 6:35 PM 
In that ontology, it's really a dichotomy between "technical" and "end user." It's an elitist 
attitude. of course, end user isn't always used disparagingly, it can just innoculously refer 
to the person you're making the software for. 
 
Page 14: [13] Comment [73] Garrison LeMasters 3/7/17 7:15 AM 
Hi:  If I can just chime in on this point for a moment, this "not everyone can program but 
most people can script" stuff belongs in the 20th Century.  It is part of the essentialist 
vocabulary that has allowed Computer Science to convince so many that learning to 
code is beyond them; it is one of the myriad effluvia that make communities like Stack 
Exchange toxic.  Its well nigh time to be done with "some people think they can program, 
but they can't:  They're merely scripting."   
 
Indeed, it may well be that this essentialism is why we're looking at a deficit of tens of 
thousands of programmers in the US in the coming decade. 
 
Page 14: [14] Comment [74] Paul Evans 3/7/17 6:31 PM 
Hi Garrison, these marginal comments don't leave a lot of room for nuance. I'd refine it 
this way. We're talking about students, staff, and faculty in higher ed, so pretty much 
everyone is capable of learning to program. But it's an skill with a learning curve, and is 
best acquired in the context of some task you need/want to perform. Not everyone has 
the time and institutional support needed to acquire the skill. 
 
Page 14: [15] Comment [75] Patrick Smyth 3/8/17 4:24 PM 
Agree with this reformulation, and also would get my hackles up a bit at the 
scripting/programming dichotomy, which I think is a distinction without a difference. 
 
I will say that it's not just end users not being able to program that is at issue, but the 
types of programs that people use. Older software tended to be more configurable and 
hackable, though often less easy to use initially. Many early GUI (or semi-GUI) 
applications, such as HyperCard and early AppleScript, let end users access the power 
of fully customizing software in a way that was cognitively accessible (or at least more 
accessible). Even platforms such as MySpace that are laughed at now encouraged 
users to customize their sites with real HTML and CSS, and many front end developers 
(especially women) got into the business by coding their MySpace site. This is what is 
lacking from modern software, which nudges the user toward desirable data and 
infrastructure-building activities while providing interfaces that are oppressive in their 
"minimalism" that provides only the most obvious and mainstream affordances. 
 
Page 14: [16] Comment [76] Patrick Smyth 3/8/17 4:25 PM 
Reading Writing Interfaces has a lot of good things to say on this 
 
Page 14: [17] Comment [77] Alex Gil 4/11/17 1:33 AM 
May I reframe away this thread from programming/scripting to highlight the role of 
"fundamentals"? The latter may be our way out, and it goes beyond coding to an 
understanding of UNIX, basic networks, data structures, etc. 
 
Page 14: [18] Comment [78] Patrick Smyth 4/11/17 3:27 PM 
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I agree with this, but some fundamentals can also pose an access problem. Sockets are 
fundamental, but I wouldn't necessarily start off there if I were designing a tool that 
encouraged technical participation. You're right though that comprehensibility is key--if 
you have too much abstraction between you and what the thing is doing, it becomes 
hard to learn and hard to get involved technically. So having the guts of a system 
exposed to some extent encourages tinkering. 
Page 24: [19] Comment [100] Paul Evans 3/6/17 9:29 PM 
Hi Evan, your experience with EMACS is quite a bit more recent than mine, so I'll defer 
to you on that point. (I tried to teach myself EMACS several times between 1984 and 
1994, with only limited success. To get the religious preferences on the table, I've been a 
daily vi user since 1982.) My comment really had to do with the moment around 1985 
when long-forgotten VARs like Interleaf successfully sold WYSIWYG to the academic, 
commercial, and publishing worlds as superior to document processing systems like 
nroff/troff. Packages like Org mode (2003) and Pandoc (2006) didn't exist back then, and 
so weren't part of that conversation. Your point about EMACS not being widely used 
outside of MIT is well-taken, and I think has some bearing on Erin's larger project. MIT 
students, staff, and faculty form a community that has been able to create and evolve a 
distinctive computing culture over many decades (with EMACS and Scheme at the 
center), and not just knuckle under to every tool, product, or fad coming out of industry. 
But it takes an enormous concentration of resources and privilege to pull that off. 
Page 24: [20] Comment [101] Patrick Smyth 3/8/17 4:56 PM 
I will just add that more than 90% of Emacs is written in Emacs Lisp, so when you write 
Lisp to customize Emacs there isn't much of a distinction between the customization you 
create and core Emacs code. Last summer I made a screen reader for Emacs that 
works by overriding core Emacs functions while it's activated. 
https://github.com/smythp/eloud  
There is a long tradition of using recursion in the Lisp community. Most Lisps are 
actually defined in terms of themselves (i.e., most implementations of Scheme are 
written in Scheme, with perhaps 6 functions written in a lower level language). This is in 
contrast with Python, which is mostly implemented in C. 
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